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Judge Richard Goldstone 
Judge Richard Goldstone is a man who 
could hardly be accused of shirking a 
challenge. Appointed to head a 
Commission of Inquiry into the 
behaviour of the security forces in his 
native South Africa, during the run up 
to the first democratic elections, he 
gained International prominence with 
a hard-hitting report which revealed 
widespread abuses. Now a judge In 
the South African Supreme Court, he Is 
currently on secondment having taken 
on the job of United Nations 
Prosecutor for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda. His task is to bring to 
justice the perpetrators of genocide in 
these two countries. In an exclusive 
Interview with The Courier during a 
recent visit to Brussels, he explained 
how he was going about this. From a 
legal standpoint. Judge Goldstone Is 
operating in almost virgin territory and 
in this wide-ranging interview, he tells 
us more about the principles which 
underpin his work and about some of 
the practical hurdles which he faces. 
pages 2 to 5 
COUNTRY REPORTS 
DJIBOUTI 
After three years of civil war, peace 
has finally returned to Djibouti. This 
country, in more than one sense, is 
one of the hot spots of the planet : a 
lunar 'cauldron' of uncommon beauty, 
where ethnic checks and balances are 
of prime Importance. Today It is 
having to pay the price of peace. Its 
service economy Is In dire straits and 
urgently in need of radical reform. 
Formally a democracy — although the 
opposition is not represented In 
parliament — Djibouti recently saw 
the leaders of the former FRU D rebel 
movement joining the government 
and, In the process, putting the seal on 
the pacification process. In order to 
examine how to restore financial 
equilibrium and reduce state control of 
the economy, a Round Table with the 
principal donors Is foreseen for this 
autumn. President Hassan Gouled 
Aptidon, who has held office since 
independence in 1977, comments on 
his country's recent political and 
economic evolution. 
Pages 14 to 31 
NAMIBIA 
Five years ago Namibia gained Its 
Independence after a long and bitter 
struggle against the apartheid regime 
In South Africa. The mood at the time 
was characterised by a remarkable 
spirit of reconciliation but few 
underestimated the challenges that lay 
ahead. In economic terms, Namibia 
was effectively two separate countries 
with great extremes of poverty and 
wealth. Among the majority black 
population, there were high 
expectations that the government 
they had elected would deliver 
Improved living standards and a more 
secure future. The Courier recently 
visited Namibia to 'take the 
temperature' and assess how far the 
country has progressed In Its efforts to 
meet these expectations. 
Pages 32 to 46 
DOSSIER 
meeting point 
Southern Africa 
Southern Africa will have to grapple 
with many challenges over the coming 
years, but at least hope seems finally 
to have been restored after decades of 
division, civil war and racial strife. 
Although the ending of apartheid and 
the flowering of democracy may only 
be the first steps on the road to 
renewal, the region appears better 
equipped than ever before to face the 
uncertainties of the new millenium. 
We examine some of the key political, 
economic and social issues facing 
Southern Africa at the end of a 
turbulent 20th century. 
Pages 47 to 78 
Issue 151 Front Cover 
On the front cover of issue 151 of The Courier, we published a photograph featuring a 
man holding an infant child to illustrate our Dossier on Social Development. The caption 
on the inside referred to 'the battle against poverty, unemployment and social 
disintegration' as key objectives for the Copenhagen Summit. We should like to make 
clear that there was no Intention of suggesting that those featured in the photograph 
were victims of 'poverty, unemployment and social disintegration.' Indeed, the choice of 
picture was determined by a desire to portray the subject in a positive manner. The 
Courier regrets any offence which may have been caused. 
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Published In English and French. Writers of signed artides bear sole responsibility for their 
contents. Reproduction authorised, subject to Indication of origin. Judge Richard Goldstone 
UN Prosecutor for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
'Exposing the truth' 
It Is not often that members of the judiciary are to be found in the international 
limelight. As a general rule. Judges — even those responsible for 'landmark' 
decisions — rarely become household names outside their own countries. Those 
who choose an interna tional legal career may gain a global repu ta tion, but because 
they operate in an area that seldom attracts the attention of the wider public, this 
is likely to be restricted to specialists in the field. 
Judge Richard Goldstone has, perhaps involuntarily, succeeded in breaking both 
of the above 'rules' during his distinguished career. Working in the 'domestic' 
setting of his native South Africa, he hit the global headlines with a hard-hitting 
official report which revealed illegal and unauthorised activities by sections of the apartheid 
regime's security forces. In so doing, he helped to neutralise one of more serious threats to 
the process of democratic transition in that country. Today, he holds the high profile position 
of United Nations Prosecutor, charged with bringing to justice the perpetrators of genocide 
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Traditionally, criminal jurisdiction has been a matter 
of domestic rather than international law and although there is the precedent of the 
Nuremburg hearings fifty years ago, the UN Security Council's decisions establishing 
international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda effectively break new ground. 
When Judge Goldstone visited Brussels in June, we had an opportunity to find out more 
from him about how the tribunals operate and his role as Prosecutor. We began, however, 
by asking him about his work heading the Commission of Inquiry in South Africa during the 
transitional period, and about the difficulties he had faced. 
— Leading up to the elections, ment for the mass action. This had become 
there was a tremendous fear that violence very much a feature of South African 
would derail the whole process. The 
Commission I headed had a three-year 
term of office and the interesting aspect 
was that we had our own investigation 
units — police officers working for us. In 
terms of the legislation under which we 
operated, I was given unlimited powers of 
search and seizure. This enabled us to send 
in our own investigators to raid military 
intelligence and other site offices — which 
was quite dramatic at the time. This led to 
the uncovering of illegal activity, carried 
out without the consent of the govern-
ment, by right wing factions within the 
security forces. 
In my view, however, the single 
most important achievement of the Com-
mission was our investigation into be-
haviour at mass demonstrations and rallies. 
I set up an international team of experts, 
sitting with South African experts, to try 
and find a politically acceptable arrange-
politics and it had tremendous potential 
for death and injury. For political reasons, 
the liberation organisations refused to give 
notice under South African legislation of 
marches and mass meetings involving tens 
of thousands of people. The police, on the 
other hand, didn't know where people 
would be marching, how many would be 
involved, what route they would take or 
when it would happen. The marchers 
didn't know whether they would be 
stopped physically by the police or allowed 
to march. So there was this tremendous 
uncertainty which was extremely danger-
ous. Indeed, it resulted in some very 
unfortunate clashes in 1990 leading to 
death and injury. One of results of the 
investigation was that the liberation 
organisations — particularly the ANC — 
and the South African police, sat down 
with us and listened to the expert opinions. 
At the end of it, there was an agreement 
brokered where the liberation organis-
ations agreed to give notice — not in terms 
of the legislation but under the new 
agreement. In turn, the police acknowled-
ged that they had a duty not just to 
facilitate demonstrations but also to pro-
tect demonstrators and not stop them. 
Under that agreement, thousands of 
marches and mass meetings were held 
without incident. It was in that context 
that the EU, UN and Commonwealth 
monitors came to South Africa and played 
a very major role in ensuring that the peace 
was kept at such events. That was ob-
viously of vital importance in the run-up to 
the first democratic election. People were 
able to exercise their rig ht of assembly, in a 
fairly peaceful atmosphere. 
■ Given that your report focused directly 
on misbehaviour in the security forces, did 
you come under any pressure, or were you 
able to operate freely ? 
— Well I certainly had no 
pressure from the political leadership. 
President De Klerk's government obviously 
didn't like the truth but it encouraged me 
nonetheless and gave me the resources 
and facilities to continue the investigation. 
I couldn't have done it but for that. In the 
area of witness protection alone, millions 
of rands were spent on getting witnesses 
out of the country. That couldn't have 
been done without additional resources 
being obtained from the government. 
There was no question of any pressure to 
Ίί 
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desist. And obviously, Mr Mandela was 
more than delighted that the investigation 
was taking place so there was no political 
pressure there. There was certainly 
pressure from the right wing who, ob-
viously, for political reasons, hated the fact 
that this was being done. 
■ Do you think that what you did in 
South Africa could provide a model for 
countries that are seeking to establish the 
rule of law. 
— Well, it is really a question of 
exposing the truth. It was for that reason 
that I was and still am a supporter of the 
Truth Commission which is now, happily, 
going forward in South Africa. If the truth 
hadn't emerged as a result of the Com-
mission's investigation, the election may 
well have been made impossible because 
the people causing the violence would 
have been able to continue acting unlaw-
fully without detection. The fact that their 
activities came to light put them on the 
defensive and made it difficult, if not 
impossible for those activities to continue. 
■ Can we turn to your role as prosecutor 
in two very different situations — al-
though they have certain common fea-
tures — Ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The 
idea that there can be international control 
of criminal behaviour within a country is 
something which is very new, Nuremburg 
notwithstanding. Do you see this as a sign 
for the future development of inter-
national criminal norms ? 
— Well I have no doubt that it is 
the way international humanitarian law 
should go. It is not the best solution to 
have ad hoc tribunals appointed by the 
Security Council. It is a great deal better 
than nothing, of course, but it is dis-
criminatory in the sense that it only applies 
to some countries and not to others. To 
have a really fair and just system of 
enforcement, one would want a per-
manent court which would have jurisdic-
tion over all countries. That can't be done 
via this route. It is generally accepted that 
there would need to be a treaty and 
countries would have to agree or be 
persuaded to join in. This is really the 
difficulty. In order to create such a court, 
nations would have to give up their 
sovereignty to the extent that they would 
allow an international court to have 
jurisdiction over their citizens. 
■ So you would not see the new tribunals 
as, an embryonic international humani-
tarian court ? 
— I see it more as an experiment 
which, if it succeeds, will provide very 
important arguments to support the 
permanent court about which I was 
talking. To the extent that it is deemed to 
fail, it will be an argument against such a 
court. 
I
'To have a really 
fair and just 
system of 
enforcement, 
one would want a 
permanent 
court which would 
have jurisdiction over 
all countries' 
■ What sort of resources have you got at 
your disposal for carrying out your task ? 
— For the tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, we put in a budget for 1995 to 
the United Nations of just over $28 million. 
From every practical point of view, that has 
been accepted. I say practical because the 
technical position is that there is still a 
dispute in the General Assembly as to 
whether the money should come from the 
regular UN budget or the peacekeeping 
one. Until that has been settled, the 
budget cannot formally be approved. This 
is not having a practical significance 
because, while they are arguing, every 
three months they are giving us a quarter 
of what we have requested. Added to that 
is our authority to enter into 12-month 
contracts. That is the same position we 
would be in if the budget had been 
approved in the first place. 
■ And how does that translate into 
personnel ? 
— We have now in my office — 
that is, the office of the Prosecutor for the 
former Yugoslavia — about 125 people, of 
whom about 50 are investigators. The 
others are legal people, administrators, 
analysts, interpreters and so on. 
■ And what is the situation with regard 
to Rwanda ? 
— Rwanda is still very much in 
the start-up phase. There has been a 
tremendous shortage of funds because of 
the UN's financial situation but, for-
tunately, a number of interested countries 
have come forward. They are organising 
contributions of investigators and other 
staff, as well as money for the trust fund 
which was created by the Secretary Gen-
eral.
 
1 At the moment, we have nine 
people in the office of the Prosecutor in 
Kigali and five who are working jointly on 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda at my office in The 
Hague. But the number in Kigali will at 
least double over the next few weeks. We 
are also going to have extra staff in The 
Hague because a lot of the investigations 
need to be done in Europe. We will be 
setting up the actual court in Arusha, 
Tanzania, but a lot of building needs to be 
done before that is up and running. 
■ Can I ask about the legal basis for your 
actions. I understand your authority stems 
from UN Security Council resolutions ? 
— Yes, under Chapter 7 of the 
UN Charter, which is binding on all member 
states. 
■ What legal system are you applying for 
the actual prosecutions ? 
—What has happened is that we 
have six trial judges for each tribunal and a 
further five appeal judges who are 
common to both. That makes 17 judges in 
all. The Yugoslavia tribunal was set up first 
and the 11 judges involved in that for-
mulated the rules of procedure and evi-
dence. It is more or less what one would 
understand by a trial in the common law 
countries. They agreed on an adversarial 
system. The rules of evidence, however, 
were purposefully, and in my view, sen-
sibly, left very vague. Within my office and 
among the judges there is a common 
feeling that what we are doing is creating 
a new international jurisprudence and 
procedure. We feel very free to look at civil 
' Judge Goldstone's visit to Brussels included a 
meeting with Commissioner Pinheiro who indicated 
that the Commission was willing to provide funding 
to support the tribunal. 
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law, common law and other systems to 
decide what aspects, procedures and rules 
of evidence are the fairest. 
■ If and when somebody is found guilty, 
what sanctions can you impose ? 
— The maximum penalty is life 
imprisonment. It can obviously be shorter 
than that. There can also be monetary fines 
and, in appropriate circumstances, confis-
cation orders applying to property or 
funds. 
■ Looking at the actual work of the 
investigators, how easy have these people 
found it to gather the evidence for the 
cases ? 
— In the former Yugoslavia, the 
major difficulty is the mass of information 
and evidence that there is to sort through. 
There are huge numbers of potential 
witnesses - hundreds of thousands of 
refugees in various European countries and 
each one a potential witness. There are 
over 300 000 in Germany alone. We have 
documents coming in by the thousand 
every week. Most are in Serbo-Croat and 
have to be translated. The bulk of the 
witnesses need to be interviewed through 
interpreters. Taken together that amounts 
to a huge mass of work. The problems is 
obviously exacerbated by the fact that a 
lot of investigations need to be carried out 
in the former Yugoslavia — particularly in 
Bosnia. With a war going on that is difficult 
and often hazardous. In October last year, 
we had to pull out two teams because it 
was too dangerous and in any event, 
because of the hostilities, it was physically 
impossible for them to do the work. We 
look at Nuremburg with a certain amount 
of envy. The prosecutors were appointed 
by nations that had complete control over 
the relevant territory and they had a very 
efficient paper trail which made life a lot 
easier. We don't have that luxury. 
I
'In Rwanda, 
the former leaders 
made no secret 
about what they were 
doing — so one 
can go, as it were, 
f or the jugular' 
■ In view of what you have just said and 
given the resources that you have, isn't 
there a danger that you will end up by just 
scratching the surface ? 
— We decided at the outset that 
we could only really target the main 
offenders who are the leaders. These are 
the people responsible for implementing 
the policy which led to such terrible 
atrocities. Our limiting factor is that we 
only have two trial chambers, so we can 
put on very few trials. 
A ruined village in the former 
Yugoslavia 
Carrying out investigations while a war 
is going on is 'difficult and hazardous' 
■ So the idea is to make an example of 
those who were in charge ? 
— That is really the point. We 
can't waste a scarce resource on people 
who didn't play a major role. In fact, it is 
easier in Rwanda to investigate and 
implement this policy because the leaders 
of the former government that was in 
power when the genocide was committed 
in April and May 1994 made no secret 
about what they were doing. They used 
the radio and other forms of propaganda 
and really did it quite openly. Even since 
fleeing Rwanda to the camps where they 
are now, there are some who have made 
no secret of what went on. So one can go, 
as it were, for the jugular and investigate 
the leaders. 
■ In practice, how can you apprehend the 
people in the camps ? 
— That's a matter for the future 
and obviously there may be some dif-
ficulty. In terms of the statute, however, it 
will be the obligation of the state where 
those people are to execute arrest warr-
ants if indictments are issued. If any 
country doesn't comply, it will be reported 
to the Security Council. I hope that it would 
take appropriate action against any 
member state flouting one of its resol-
utions. 
■ Surely there is a practical difficulty in 
the case of Rwanda, given that a lot of the 
suspects are apparently in Zaire. Even if the 
'spirit' of the authorities is willing, the 
'flesh ' may be weak in that they simply are 
not capable of complying ? 
—That may well be the case, but 
I think we are going to have to cross that 
bridge when we come to it. There are 
many scenarios that one could think of. If 
we don't get the people, and this is 
obviously happening in the case of a few 
people we have already indicted in areas 
controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, then we 
have no option but to follow what we call 
the Rule 61 procedure. This involves 
presenting the evidence on which the 
indictment is based to a trial chamber of 
three judges. Witnesses can be led so that 
the historical record begins to be created, 
an international warrant of arrest is issued 
and the information is made public. It is not 
a trial in absentia — there is no question of 
issuing a verdict against the accused. But 
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that person, in effect, becomes an inter-
national fugitive, which is not a very 
pleasant situation to be in. 
■ Do you think there is any practical hope 
of establishing the rule of law in some-
where like Rwanda at the moment ? 
— Yes I do. I have visited Rwanda 
twice, meeting with the authorities on 
both occasions and having detailed discus-
sion with the leaders. What impresses me is 
the importance that they attach to justice 
in the process of reconciliation. I have been 
left in no doubt that it is their first priority. 
It is the reason, after all, that Rwanda 
that those suspected of having been 
responsible for the misery should be 
brought to court in Rwanda itself. We have 
no jurisdiction over that — nor should we 
have. It is really the coming together of 
national and international justice that we 
are aiming for: on the one hand, the 
restoration of effective local justice and on 
the other, an international tribunal to try 
the relevant people in leadership positions 
who are not within the jurisdiction of the 
Rwandan courts. The latter is something 
the Rwandan government cannot do and 
no other state is likely to attempt even if 
their local rules on jurisdiction allow it.. 
requested the establishment of the inter-
national tribunal. I don't think there is any 
doubt that without such a request, it 
wouldn't have happened. 
I should add that on its own, the 
international tribunal cannot succeed in re-
establishing the rule of law. A vital element 
is for Rwanda to be assisted in restoring its 
own criminal justice system. Obviously, it 
will be highly significant if we succeed in 
trying leaders who, according to the 
evidence we collect, were guilty of organis-
ing the genocide. That will clearly have an 
important healing effect. But at the local 
level, there are many people currently in 
Rwandan prisons who should either be 
tried or released. From the point of view of 
people in local areas, it is very important 
A problem in apprehending suspects 
Many of those who organised the 
genocide in Rwanda are living in 
refugee camps such as this one in Zaire 
■ How were the judges who sit on the 
two tribunals chosen ? 
—All the judges were chosen in a 
joint exercise involving the Security Council 
and the General Assembly. In the case of 
the 11 for Yugoslavia, 22 names were put 
forward by the Security Council and the 
General Assembly chose 11 of these. In the 
case of Rwanda, the six trial judges were 
chosen by the General Assembly from 12 
Security Council nominees. The judges 
come from 17 different countries covering 
all the continents. 
■ Are there any arrangements envisaged 
for the defence of the accused ? 
— Absolutely. There is a tremen-
dous concern, both within the Prosecutor's 
office and among Tribunal members, to 
ensure that the system is as fair as any 
system can be to the accused. We are 
acutely conscious of the fact that this is 
international justice and that what we do 
must be exemplary. No doubt for that 
reason, the Security Council decided that 
defence counsel should be provided, at the 
UN's expense, for impecunious defendants. 
The only trial pending at the moment, 
which relates to events in the former 
Yugoslavia, is that against Mr Tadic who 
was arrested in Germany. His lead counsel 
is a Dutch lawyer who is being paid for by 
the tribunal. He is assisted by three other 
lawyers who have been provided by the 
Serbian government. 
There is also a victim protection 
unit which is gearing up now to deal with 
witnesses whom, we anticipate, will need 
protection as well as medical and psycholo-
gical assistance. So we are going out of our 
way to ensure that the system is beyond 
reproach. ■■ Interview by Simon Horner 
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Agreement clinched at eleventh hour 
by Debra Percival* 
It took the Summit meeting of EU 
heads of government in Cannes, 
France on June 26-27 for agreement 
finally to be reached on funding for 
the Lomé IV second financial proto-
col covering the next five years. A 
wrangle over the level of funding, 
traditionally pooled from the poc-
kets of the EU Member States, had 
held up talks on other improve-
ments to the Convention such as 
access to the EU market for ACP farm 
produce. Under pressure from the French 
Presidency, Member States finally agreed on 
the sum of ECU 13.307 billion for the next 
five years. This includes a 1.28% share for 
the 20 Overseas Countries and Territories 
(OCTs). 
After a round of late-night bar-
gaining among Member States — and 
agreement by the European Commission 
to scrape the bottom of its own 'barrel' 
with ECU 292 million of 'unallocated Lomé 
resources' - the leaders of the European 
Union succeeded in reaching the French 
Presidency's 'bare minimum' of ECU 
13.3bn. This takes account of inflation 
within the Union over the past five years 
(21.5%), but means no 'real' increase for 
the 70 ACP countries this time round, 
despite the accession of Austria, Finland 
and Sweden to the EU since Lomé IV came 
into operation. 
The final deal was reached after 
the French agreed to increase their 
national contribution by another ECU 100 
million with Germany finally consenting to 
give more than last time despite originally 
seeking a nominal decrease. Britain, which 
said it wanted to shift more of its overseas 
development contributions to its bilateral 
budget, also put more into the 'kitty' than 
* Journalist specialising in issues of EU develop-
ment policy. The full text of the revised Lomé 
Convention will be reprinted in a forthcoming issue 
of The Courier. 
it had originally envisaged. One result is 
that France now replaces Germany as the 
number one contributor to the EDF. All 
other EU states except Britain are provid-
ing more, in nominal terms, this time round 
(see Table 1). 
The deal was done in part thanks 
to decisions on EU development assistance 
packages for other 'developing' regions — 
six Eastern and Central European nations in 
line for EU membership and 12 Mediter-
ranean nations with whom the EU has 
ambitions of creating a giant Euro-Medit-
erranean free trade zone. In a typical piece 
of EU bartering, the German government 
agreed to put a little more into the Lomé 
pool following agreement on an ECU 6.7bn 
package for Central and Eastern Europe 
over the period 1995-2000. Meanwhile, 
some of the EU's Mediterranean nations 
(notably Spain and Italy) — content with 
an ECU 4.7bn aid deal covering the same 
period for their Mediterranean basin 
neighbours — were able to agree to the 
ACP figure with some last-minute adjust-
ments. 
ACP nations, who had sought a 
package of ECU 15.8 bn, notably to 
improve processing, marketing, transform-
ation and distribution of produce to hold 
their own in an ever more competitive EU 
market, expressed initial disappointment. 
'This is natural when one receives less than 
one requested,' Papua New Guinea's 
information minister, John Moms, told 
journalists. 
But the financial deal swiftly led 
to a special one-day meeting of EU and 
ACP ministers on June 30 to tackle the 
outstanding matters in the mid-term 
review: more open access to the EU 
market, tariff concessions, a declaration on 
the protection of tropical forests, another 
on the alleviation of ACP debt, a comprom-
ise on methods of allocating development 
funds and finally, a breakdown of the 
financial package for the next five years 
among the different instruments of the 
Convention (see Table 2). 
Some trade concessions 
Under the new arrangements, 
there will be better access to the EU market 
for ACP farm products although it is less 
than the ACP group had hoped for. For 
numerous products which currently do not 
qualify for any preference, customs duties 
and levies are reduced by 16% across the 
board. Excluded from this are highly 
sensitive items such as olives, olive pro-
ducts, wine and lemons. The ACPs origin-
ally sought 36% tariff cuts. 
A 50% reduction of the current 
levy on 15 000 tonnes of cereals and 500 
tonnes of pork meat has been agreed. 
Better access for ACP farm products 
but less than the ACPs had hoped for 
This is Ghanaian cocoa being loaded for 
shipment to Europe 
^ 
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There are also numerous concessions for 
products currently subject to quotas and 
reference quantities. The tariff quotas on 
fresh figs, sorghum and millet are trans-
formed into less restrictive 'ceilings', tariff 
quotas on sheep meat, poultry meat, milk 
products, pears and meat preparations are 
doubled and the quota for strawberries 
rises from 1500 to 1600 tonnes. 
Import duties on rice are reduced 
by 15% within existing quotas and 're-
ference quantities' are abolished for all 
products except oranges and mandarins. 
There is also some liberalisation in respect 
of a number of items that can only be 
exported to the EU at certain times of the 
year. Finally, the export quotas for canned 
tuna and tuna loins are increased to 4000 
and 500 tonnes respectively. 
More cumulation for 
regional growth 
One innovation over the next 
five years is to allow other developing 
countries to benefit from Lome's 'cumu-
lation clauses'. Thus, in the interests of 
Table 1 : Where the money comes from (in ECU millions) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
Unutilised previous EDF funds 
Extra humanitarian aid for 
ACPs from EC budget 
Transformation of special 
loans into grants 
Sub-total 
+ EIB own resource funds 
for lending 
Total 
7th EDF (1990-1995) 
433 
227 
2840 
134 
645 
2 666 
60 
1 418 
21 
609 
96 
1 791 
10 940 
1 200 
12 140* 
8th EDF (1995-2000) 
503 
275 
3000 
160 
750 
3 120 
80 
1 610 
37 
670 
125 
1 630 
340 
190 
350 
292 
160 
15 
13 307 
1 658 
14 965* 
1 The global figures ¡η the respective financial protocols are ECU 12bn and ECU 14.625bn. The discrepancy is accounted tor by 
the fact that the above figures include the contribution for overseas countries and territories and (in the second column), a 
sum for food aid. These are not, strictly speaking, part of the EDF. 
Table 2 : Where the money goes to (in ECU millions) 
7th EDF (1990-1995) 8th EDF (1995-2000) 
Grants 
(of which structural 
adjustment facility) 
Risk capital 
Stabex 
Sysmin 
Sub-total (EOF) 
+ OCT funds and food aid 
Sub-total 
+ EIB own resources for lending 
Total 
* OCT figure only 
7 995 
(1 150) 
825 
1 500 
480 
10 800 
140* 
10 940 
1 200 
12 140 
..:,..,.. . . ■ ■ ■ 
9 592 
(1 400) 
1 000 
1 800 
575 
12 967 
340 
13 307 
1 658 
14 965 
...... ■■■■· .......... 
more growth in regional markets, 15% of 
the content of an ACP product can be 
'cumulated' in a neighbouring nation, yet 
still benefit from ACP preference. Some 
sensitive items including canned tuna, rice, 
and certain textile products such as sweat-
shirts, are excluded from this arrangement. 
EU and ACP ministers agreed at 
the 30 June meeting on a compromise list 
of countries that will benefit from this 
system. In the Caribbean and Pacific areas, 
these are Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Venezuela and Nauru. In Africa, 
cumulation is extended to Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, together with 
South Africa on an ad hoc basis pending 
the outcome of talks on its possible 
'qualified membership' of Lomé IV. In this 
regard, the ministers also agreed that 
South Africa will have automatic entry to 
the Convention — on whatever terms are 
finally agreed — once the negotiations 
have been completed, thereby avoiding 
the lengthy Lomé ratification process. 
Two tranche method 
With France keen to end its six-
month period in the EU driving seat on a 
high note, eleventh hour debate at the 
meeting on June 30, the final day of the 
French Presidency, also resulted in com-
promise over the way in which funds are to 
be allocated under the 8th EDF. The 
novelty is that 70% of the total will be 
distributed in an initial three-year tranche 
with the remainder earmarked only after 
an assessment of how the first allocation 
has been spent. 
Development Commissioner, 
Professor João de Deus Pinheiro, said that 
this method was in keeping with the new 
Lomé motto of 'efficiency and effective-
ness' in promoting aid : He added that the 
'coordination and coherence' of aid with 
other donors and with Member State 
bilateral programmes would also be 
watchwords for the coming five years. He 
told journalists: 'The two-tranche pro-
cedure will give more to those who absorb 
money well. There will be no more sterile 
funds in the Convention.' 
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Debt, forestry and 
banana declarations 
ACP states will be able to draw 
encouragement from a new declaration on 
debt in Lomé IV. There is, however, no 
formal commitment from the EU side to 
cancel debt. The text reads: 'The Com-
munity reaffirms its willingness to con-
tribute constructively and actively to the 
alleviation of the debt burden of ACP 
States. In this context, it agrees to trans-
form into grants all the special loans of the 
previous Conventions which have not yet 
been committed. The Community also 
Tropical forest in Gabon 
The 'Protocol on Sustainable 
Management of Forest Resources' is 
one of the innovations to emerge from 
the mid-term review 
confirms its determination to pursue the 
discussion of these questions in the ap-
propriate fora, taking account of the 
specific difficulties of the ACP States.' 
Likewise, a general declaration 
on the protection of tropical forests will be 
inserted in the Convention, but without 
the extra funds attached for their preserv-
ation which ACP countries had requested 
at the outset. The new 'Protocol on 
Sustainable Management of Forest Re-
sources' refers to the use of 'relevant 
resources available under the Community 
budget', alongside funds from the national 
and regional indicative programmes, to 
halt desertification and preserve forests. 
The protocol contains plenty of 
ideas of how funds can be used : conserva-
tion of endangered forests shaped to the 
need of local populations, and 'buffer 
zones' to be set up to assist the conserva-
tion, regeneration and sustainable de-
velopment of tropical forests. Re-affores-
tation, forestry management and the 
restoration of degraded forests could all 
attract funding. So too can 'institution 
building', including training schemes for 
local people, forest managers and re-
searchers and support for organisations in 
the forestry sector. 
Most major ACP-EU meetings 
nowadays find it difficult to avoid discus-
sion of the thorny banana issue and the 
gathering on 30 June was no exception. 
Although no additional funds were specif-
ically set aside to improve the industry in 
the ACPs (notably in the Caribbean) the 
ministers did agree a declaration on the 
subject. This stated that special attention 
would be granted, 'when determining the 
volume of programmable assistance to 
ACP banana suppliers to the EU, where 
external circumstances beyond their con-
trol have led to the need for restructuring.' 
Human rights suspension 
clause 
One of the most significant poli-
tical changes was the introduction of a 
human rights 'suspension clause' in Article 
366 of the Convention. This states that if 
any of the essential human rights appear-
ing in Article 5 are violated, the partial or 
total suspension of development aid can 
follow. This can only happen, however, 
after prior consultation with ACP nations 
and the abusing party, other than in 
particular 'emergency circumstances' 
which are defined in a separate declar-
ation. 
The two sides also agreed that 
the ACP-EU political dialogue in the 
spheres of foreign and security policy 
needed to be strengthened. Over the next 
five years, its is planned that this should 
happen either with each of the three 
distinct Lomé 'regions' or on a thematic 
basis. 
Finally, mention should be made 
of the proposals concerning the Joint 
Assembly. There was agreement that 
every effort should be made to have ACP 
countries represented by parliamentarians 
— or at least by people designated by 
national parliaments — at the Assembly's 
biannual meetings in order to emphasise 
the democratic nature of the institution. 
Failing that, the participation of an ACP 
representative will have to meet with the 
prior approval of the Assembly. 
The final stage in the 15-month-
long 'mid-term review' will take place with 
the formal signature of the amended 
Convention. Mauritius has offered to host 
the ceremony, which will take place later 
this year. ■■ DP. 
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'culture' of nature* 
Culture and nature in Belize appear 
to be inseparable. It is rare for Third 
World countries, bogged down in 
insoluble problems, to show such 
concern for nature conservation 
and to closely associate this de-
votion with their concept of cul-
ture. One could almost speak of a 
culture of nature. On a more light-
hearted note, one could say that 
this Belizean culture/nature is the 
adopted daughter of Baron Bliss 
and Coca Cola. The latter company 
has given a great deal of sponsor-
ship money to 'Programme for 
Belize' (PFB), a private company operating 
as a foundation which is involved at the very 
crossroads of ecology and ancient archi-
tectural heritage, dealing with environ-
mental protection in the widest sense over a 
vast territory containing dozens of Maya 
sites. The American company has of course 
made use of the operation that it is 
sponsoring in its marketing. The programme 
entailed the purchase of several hundreds of 
thousands of acres, an act which provoked 
some unease among a number of Belizeans. 
Baron Bliss, however, was a true patron — a 
'benefactor' to use the term usually applied 
to him in Belize. His earlier legacy enabled 
the country to set up and run an arts centre 
which has been operating for several 
decades. Although modest, it is certainly 
worthy of the name. 
In the minds of many Belizeans, 
the nationality, the size of the bequest and 
the links which Baron Bliss had with their 
country are sometimes ill-defined. Some 
think he was Portuguese, others that he 
long ago 'adopted' this small Central 
American territory, and yet others that he 
left an immense fortune. No matter ! The 
benefactor has the status approaching that 
of a cult figure throughout the country, 
and particularly in Belize City. Baron Henry 
Edward Earnest Victor Bliss is referred to 
locally simply as Baron Bliss, even if his 
striking name gives rise to all kinds of 
embellishment. The true story is that he 
* See also 'Surprising Belize', Belize Country 
Report, The Courier, No. 152, pp 12-32. 
moored off Belize during a voyage, but 
never actually disembarked from his vessel. 
This British — indeed, quintessential^ 
English — nobleman arrived at the port of 
Belize City in 1926. Suffering from food 
poisoning contracted in Trinidad, he was 
unable to come ashore and he spent his 
time fishing. His health never recovered 
during the months spent offshore, but he 
was befriended by the city's citizens who 
would come to visit him, caring for him and 
bringing food. When he died, he left two 
million dollars to the country. As a kind of 
funeral monument, Belize City erected a 
lighthouse at the entrance to the port. This 
structure linking land and sea, is at the site 
where the Baron spent his last months. It is 
obviously very useful but, at least as far as 
art lovers are concerned, the most product-
ive part of the Baron's legacy is the Bliss 
Institute, home to a number of cultural and 
artistic institutions run with money from 
the same fund. These institutions include 
the National Library and the Belize Arts 
Council. The Institute is home to a per-
manent exhibition of Maya art. Belize even 
has a national holiday (9 March) dedicated 
to Baron Bliss. 
Defying the laws of 
probability 
A lot of the Baron's two million 
must presumably have been spent if the 
precarious existence of the Belize Arts 
Council is anything to go by. It has no 
permanent store of exhibits, apart from a 
few Maya works. However, this cultural 
institution manages to keep a range of 
activities going. Every year, it organises 
some 20 exhibitions, combining art and 
crafts. In addition, there are plans to build a 
'proper' museum in Belmopan, the capital. 
Some exhibitions are staged within the 
framework of exchange arrangements 
with other countries, particularly Mexico 
which is the only foreign country to have a 
Cultural Centre in Belize. The centre is 
proud to present the works of any Mexican 
The Xunantunich Maya site under 
restoration 
Culture and nature together 
who has succeeded abroad, but its limited 
means prevent it from doing so as often as 
it would like. The next event, according to 
Mrs Beverly Smith-Lopez, Director of the 
Belize Arts Council, which will be in 
November 1995, is an exhibition of the 
work of Pen Cayetano who lives in 
Germany. In the plastic arts, the local 'stars' 
are Terry! Gordon, whose works were on 
show during our visit, Benjamen Nicolas, 
another painter, Louis Belisle and, above 
all, the sculptor Georges Gable. The last-
mentioned, who is also a poet, has his own 
gallery and is akin to an 'official' artist 
under contract to the government. His 
works are often to be found adorning 
prestigious government offices. 
Most of the sculptures produced 
owe more to crafts than to art. The source 
is family workshops producing mahogany 
pieces amongst which an art lover's trained 
eye can sometimes pick out something 
which is obviously finer than the 
stereotype of mass-produced work. A 
dance company is also part of the Council, 
having a modern and a folklore section. It 
sometimes tours abroad, particularly in 
the Courier n° 153 · september-october 1995 r a c ρ 
Pen Cayetano 'Alagurahtina Fang', 
1991 
Pride in presenting citizens who have 
succeeded abroad 
Mexico and neighbouring Caribbean coun­
tries. The laws of probability being what 
they are, one would not expect a country 
of 200 000 inhabitants to produce hun­
dreds of great artists. But despite the 
limitations, the Belize Arts Council man­
ages to struggle on with its limited means. 
The dance company is responsible for 
giving courses in state schools and, by 
promoting a National Children's Art Fes­
tival, the Council hopes to stimulate young 
talent. In 1994, the Festival brought 
together4000 children from the Belize City 
district. This year, children from other 
districts will be invited to the economic 
capital, in anticipation of next year when 
each district will organise its own festival. 
The stage after that will be to coordinate a 
national festival scheduled for the year 
2000. 
Solving the Maya 
mystery 
The Programme for Belize began 
with the purchase of 110 000 acres (50 000 
hectares) of land, supplemented by 92 000 
acres donated by Coca Cola and a further 
10 000 acres in the area where the borders 
of Belize, Guatemala and Mexico meet. 
Those in charge aim to make this combined 
area part of a park spanning all three 
countries. The initial fund of $6 million has 
come from outside donors. Some of this 
amount has been rasied through an 
ingenious subscription scheme involving 
the 'adoption' of an acre of tropical forest. 
Foreigners, particularly from the USA and 
Europe, are encouraged to subscribe. A 
significant sum provided by USAID enabled 
the organisation to clear its debts in 1993. 
Other donors include the European Union 
which supports archeological research 
work at the La Milpa site. 
The area managed by the pro­
gramme contains about 60 known Maya 
sites. Research being carried out at La 
Milpa is concentrating on the reasons 
behind the collapse of the Maya civilis­
ation. This site is broadly typical of Maya 
cities as a whole and is one of the three 
largest in the country which, overall, has 
hundreds of such sites. High up, the 
ceremonial temple made up of 85 struc­
tures separated by 24 inner courtyards is 
the dominant feature. The immense 
'great' palace is flanked by four pyramid-
shaped temples and it was here that the 
sacred ball game took place. Dignitaries 
used to live within the first perimeter. At 
the very bottom of the slope were the 
living quarters of the masses and, between 
the two, the residences of the middle class. 
Four years of work at La Milpa have 
resulted in the deciphering of a number of 
the epigraphs on the steles. Researchers 
have also reached certain conclusions 
based on the study of the vegetation 
which has invaded the ruins. One of these is 
that one should be cautious in referring to 
'the Maya civilisation' or 'its' decline, since 
there were a number of stages involved. It 
is probable that settlements evolved 
completely independently of each other 
and without coordination. They also col­
lapsed at different times although, clearly, 
they all faced a series of similar crises. 
Construction at La Milpa began in 
approximately 400 BC and continued for 
about 1000 years. After a long decline, 
there was a short-lived revival in about the 
eighth century and then the site was 
completely abandoned. However, it must 
have been inhabited later by peoples other 
than the Mayas because the foundations 
of a ninth-century house, in a completely 
different style, have been found. It was 
frequented on and off at least up to the 
17th century, offerings deposited at that 
time having been found. The site was 
rediscovered in 1938 by a chiclero (a 
peasant farmer collecting sap to make 
chewing gum) who told a British specialist 
about his find. Unfortunately, more re­
cently, at the beginning of the 1970s, La 
Milpa was also the target of looters who 
completely devastated it. 
The greatest Maya centre in 
Belize was probably Caracol, a city-state 
extending over 100 square miles and 
which, at its height, had 200 000 inhab­
itants — as many as the entire country 
Mahogany carver in Belize City 
-ι 
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current territory of Belize is thought to 
have been about 750 000 although some 
researchers speak of figures as high as two 
million. What is increasingly certain is that 
this land was the centre of the Maya 
civilisation during the classical period (250 
to 900 AD). Caracol was discovered in 1938 
and was partially excavated in 1950. It was 
suspected that this site was more than just 
a great religious centre, but it was only in 
1986 that the deciphering of an epigraph 
on an altar stone enabled the archeologists 
to say for sure that Caracol had conquered 
the city of Tincal (Guatemala), hitherto 
regarded as the most powerful Maya 
metropolis. This discovery filled a gap of 
nearly a century and a half in Maya history 
and enabled Caracol's supremacy to be 
given due recognition. 
We were unable to visit Caracol 
which is difficult to reach, not being served 
by a major road. However, it is not so 
difficult to admire Altun Ha and Xunan-
tunich, both magnificent sites which have 
already been restored to a considerable 
degree. Work is still going on at Xunan-
tunich. Like Caracol, this is close to the 
border with Guatemala, a few kilometres 
to the south of the superb town of San 
Antonio. 
This impressive place exudes mys-
tery and magic, with the giant face of the 
Sun God at the centre of the newly 
renovated façade of El Castillo (The Castle) 
which is the central structure. This is a 
cathedral of stone, earth and vegetation, 
heaped in that order. Viewing the 
sequence of structures from the heights of 
El Castillo, the sight of blue tarpaulins 
protecting the parts under restoration 
adds to rather than detracts from the sense 
of mystery. The edifice takes on the 
appearance of an 'operating theatre' for a 
vast surgical operation ! In order to reach 
Xunantunich, one has to put one's vehicle 
on a tiny boat and cross a small shaded 
river which seems to act as the link 
between our century and the Maya world. 
It is possible to visit this site and the one at 
Altún Ha at night if one exchanges a few 
pleasantries with the guards. The evening 
light and the solitude add a special 
chemistry to the mystery of these Maya 
ceremonial places. 
Belize has been selected as the 
HQ for 'Mundo Maya', an organisation 
promoting tourism along the Maya Route. 
This is tourism at a high cultural level, 
grouping together the efforts of the five 
regions in question : Yucatán, Guatemala, 
El Salvador and Honduras, in addition to 
the host country. 
The tortoise's reproach 
Archeologica I research is only one 
aspect of the work of the Programme for 
Belize. The protection of animal and plant 
species and environmental conservation 
are in fact, the main elements. Indeed, it is 
the ecologically orientated exploitation of 
the forest and the highly controlled 
development of ecotourism which ulti-
mately will enable the Programme to 
finance itself. The PFB also acts as an 
educator with a mission which includes 
teaching young people about the ecology. 
It both receives students and goes out to 
speak to them in schools and educational 
centres. Young American and European 
university graduates also come to make 
their knowledge available to the centre 
and to complete their training under the 
direction of, among others, Roger Wilson, 
who is Technical Coordinator of the 
Programme. He came to Belize with a 
wealth of nature conservation experience 
gained in the Seychelles, Guinea and 
Rwanda. 
Although the PFB is the most 
important environmental protection 
scheme in Belize's cultural programme, it is 
far from being the only one. Among the 
many others, the Blue Hole National Park 
deserves a particular mention. This is 
sponsored by the Belize Audubon Society, 
a local branch of the US foundation (which 
also helps finance the PFB), the Belize 
government, the Worldwide Fund for 
Nature and the MacArthur Foundation. 
The park extends over an area of nearly 
600 acres of essentially rocky terrain with 
Restored façade at Xunantunich 
Impressive beauty, mystery and magic 
lakes, underground rivers and caves. Its 
main attractions are the 'Blue Hole', a 100-
foot-deep hole which is 300 feet in 
diameter and from which an underground 
river emerges, and St. Herman's Cave. The 
park is home to many rare species of fauna 
including jaguar, ocelot, jaguarundi, tapir, 
opossum and the howler monkey, a species 
related to the baboon. Added to this are 
many reptiles, including the boa constrictor 
and the iguana, and an infinite variety of 
birds. Other institutions devoted to de-
fending the ecology include the 
Cockscomb Basin Wildlife Sanctuary, 
Guanacaste National Park and the Crooked 
Tree Wildlife Sanctuary. 
One park particularly dear to the 
inhabitants of Belize is the Community 
Baboon Sanctuary inhabited by many 
thousands of monkeys (in fact, black 
howler monkeys rather than true 
baboons). Its management structure is 
highly original, being based on voluntary 
help from eight village communities, with 
aid from institutional sponsors. Each pro-
prietor undertakes to respect a strict code 
of conduct which includes protection of the 
forest along the riverbanks, maintaining 
fruit trees during felling, and maintaining a 
forest corridor between individual farms. 
The advantage for the farmer is that these 
techniques protect his land against erosion 
and prevent the silting-up of waterways 
which are essential to him. It also enables 
him to avoid the tortoise's reproach. 
In Belize, a widely appreciated 
West African legend relates that an old 
tortoise saved some men from a huge 
flood by advising them to plant palm trees 
to hold down the sand. That is why, when 
captured by man, the tortoise beats her 
breast for not having anticipated man's 
ingratitude. ■■ Hegel Goutier 
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Tackling the worst 
excesses 
by Manuela Varrasso* 
'To be Hutu or Tutsi in Burundi is to 
remember who killed someone 
close to you, 15 years ago, or to 
wonder who is going to kill your 
child ten years hence. Each time 
there is a different reply. This is not 
a fear without substance. For 30 
years, it has been invoked in this 
region of Africa to increase aware-
ness of one's own ethnic history — 
and the victimisation that goes 
with it — and as a means of denouncing 
others.' This quotation comes from a 1988 
text published by 'Reporters Sans Fron-
tières' (RSF), the international organisation 
for the defence of press freedom '. 
As a follow-up to the above, RSF 
has recently published an in-depth study, 
with support from the European Commis-
sion, entitled 'Burundi, the poison of 
hatred — a study of extremist media'
2. 
The aim is to alert international opinion to 
the 'interethnic confrontation' being 
played out in this small central African 
country with the full participation of much 
of the media. 
The authors, Barnabe Ndarishi-
kanye, assistant at the Faculty of Economic 
Sciences in Bujumbura, and Jean-François 
Dupaquier, a journalist, conducted their 
survey from July to October 1994. In their 
report, they make a series of accusations 
against the 'media of hatred' that exists in 
the country. They also draw attention to 
the non-application of ethical principles 
throughout the so-called 'democratic' or 
'independent' press. In Burundi, it appears, 
* Trainee In the Unit 'ACP-EU Courier, Communi-
cations and Publications', in the Commission's 
Directorate-General for Development. 
1 The organisation publishes a quarterly entitled : 
La lettre de Reporters Sans Frontières and an annual 
report (Le rapport sur la liberté de la presse dans le 
monde). These can be obtained, together with 
other specific studies from RSF at 5, rue Geoffroy-
Marie, 75009 Paris, France. Tel : 33 1 44 83 84 84 
Fax: 33 145 23 11 51. 
Λ 
the media is democratic and independent 
in name only ! 
Avoiding the ravages of 
'ethnisation' 
The so-called inescapable 'logic' 
of ethnic confrontation, which resulted in 
genocide in neighbouring Rwanda, was 
central to the propaganda broadcast by 
the infamous Radio Télévision des Mille 
Collines (Thousand Hills Radio and Televi-
sion). This study does not attempt to 
explain the crisis in Burundi by simplistic 
analogy with Rwanda, but rather to 
identify — and denounce — the political 
'manipulation' of ethnicity which is actively 
supported by elements in the extremist 
Burundi media. There is an awareness in 
Burundi of the dangers the country faces 
and this awareness could help ensure that 
the worst fears are not realised. 'In its 
misery, Burundi needs clear-cut media 
coverage... Only in denouncing death-
dealing proposals and projects can we stop 
the infernal yet resistible spiral of manipu-
lation on ethnic grounds'. These are the 
words of historian, Jean-Pierre Chrétien, in 
his introduction to the work. He con-
tinues : 'Hatred between Hutus and Tutsis 
has become a feature of society in Burundi 
nowadays. Is it that we are being forced to 
watch the emergence of a reality which has 
remained concealed for too long? Or are 
we entitled to express surprise at a 
phenomenon, portrayed as being perfectly 
natural, which was all but invisible in the 
culture of the old Burundi...? The ethnic 
conflict which inspires such dread would, in 
fact, appear to be quite a recent develop-
ment. It is thus essential to examine the 
contemporary situation, looking beyond 
the over-simplifications which imply that 
Hutus and Tutsis will be tearing each other 
apart until the end of time'. 
Independent press 
isolated 
With this in mind the authors 
observe that it is rare for the media to 
engage in proper research leading to the 
publication of the truth. Of the 29 publi-
cations covered by the study, only five 
appeared to meet strict ethical criteria. 
Three were private sector publications : 
La Semaine (neutral, ceased publication in 
September 1994), Panafrica (a satirical 
journal) and Le Phare (a neutral bi-
monthly). The other two are the govern-
ment dailies. Le Renouveau and Ubumwe. 
These provide the kind of national and 
international news which other journals 
ignore, the latter focusing heavily on 
partisan disputes. So the overall score is 
one publication in six, which is pretty poor ! 
Prohibiting extremist 
publications 
Reporters Sans Frontières argues 
in favour of banning those media oper-
ations that are being used as the tools of 
both Tutsi and Hutu extremism. (Tutsi —la 
Nation, le Carrefour des Idées, l'Etoile : 
Hutu — le Miroir, le Témoin, l'Eclaireur and 
Radio Rutomorangingo, which is the Bur-
undi equivalent of Rwanda's Radio Télévi-
sion des Mille Collines) 
RSF's objective, in the current 
emergency situation, is to point the finger 
of blame at a number of malevolent 
publications which have fanned the flames. 
One might cite here, the following text 
from Le Carrefour des Idées, a journal 
which has not hesitated to use the 
language of cannibalism to convey its 
message of hatred : 'After killing him, they 
cut out his heart and killed his ox. Then 
they mixed the two meats to make 
kebabs'. 
The excesses are so great as to 
seem almost caricatures. Incitements to 
hatred, whether on social, political or 
religious grounds, abound. 
Encouraging the 
'moderates' 
It is not enough to ban extremist 
publications of course. One must also 
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tradition of conviviality (much admired by 
visitors) which leads to spontaneous ex-
changes of information. As far as journal-
ists are concerned, according to the au-
thors, this needs to be backed up with 
more professionalism and a genuine in-
vestigative spirit. 
The assistance being provided by 
RSF is targeted at both the independent 
media and the above-mentioned publi-
cations linked to the authorities. With 
European Commission assistance, the or-
ganisation supports journals which reject 
the division of the press along tribal lines 
and which undertake to respect profes-
sional ethics. Any Burundi publication can 
approach RSF to request reimbursement of 
a portion of its printing costs, provided it 
signs the 'Ethical Charter' negotiated 
beforehand between the RSF and the 
Burundi press. Local RSF correspondents in 
Bujumbura are responsible for checking 
adherence to the Charter. Non-compliance 
leads to the withdrawal of aid from the 
journal in question. In addition, every 
month, a panel of professional representa-
tives from the Burundi press awards a 
modest prize to encourage the authors of 
the best articles which have appeared in 
the country's media, n M.V. 
Etude sur les médias extrémistes 
avec l'appui de la Commission Européenne 
encourage 'moderate' newspapers to treat 
journalistic ethics with respect. Although 
not all journals indulge in the excesses 
described above, many are seen as de-
liberately manipulating opinion : Thus, for 
example, according to the radical Tutsi 
publication Le Patriote ; 'It is out of the 
question that the next Head of State 
should come from the Frodebu' (10 May 
1994). 
In general terms, the authors of 
the study deplore the 'imbalance of 
information' that exists in Burundi. This is 
reflected in the one-sided presentation of 
'facts' and in partisan editorialising, which 
make it easy to identify the political or 
ethnic backing behind the publication in 
question. This is without even investigat-
ing their sources of finance, which would 
require a more in-depth enquiry. 
Gossip and rumour 
The study also highlights the use 
of 'gossip and rumour' as a key element in 
disinformation. 'Facts' presented are neith-
er verified nor confirmed. Often they are 
reproduced straight from conversations 
heard at the bar. This country has an oral 
cultural background and a Central Africa 
L. 'f 
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ground of economic recession is a mixture 
which would threaten to bring down any 
economy, however strong it might be. Yet, 
this is what Djibouti recently 'treated' itself 
to. In the same cynical vein, one might make 
the observation that this is nothing out of 
the ordinary in this part of the world. Who 
can forget the fratricidal struggle which 
gripped Ethiopia/Eritrea for so many de-
cades ? Not to mention the latest in a long 
line of conflicts that erupted just a few 
months ago pitting the brothers of North 
and South Yemen against each other. There 
must be few who are unaware of the 
internal struggle and continued disinteg-
ration of Somalia. And from time to time, 
one is offered a reminder, generally through 
shocking images of civilian populations in 
distress, that the North and South of Sudan 
seem more incompatible than ever. In fact, 
the situation in the Horn of Africa has more 
than a passing resemblance to that of 
another 'hot spot' that continues to con-
front us — the Balkans. 
Given the regional context, the 
fact that Djibouti also finally succumbed to 
what many see as the overriding ethnic 
factor is not entirely surprising. All of the 
countries in question, insofar as they 
genuinely 'exist', rely on calculated doses 
and precarious balances between ethnic 
groups, clans and subclans. Almost all have 
found themselves embroiled in a cyclical 
pattern of civil wars. These vary in intensity 
but the stakes are always the same : 
gaining power. Could it be that the 
infernal heat which sometimes descends 
on the countries bordering the Red Sea 
lead to a form of spiritual 'overheating'? 
Djibouti has the unenviable repu-
tation of being one of the world's hottest 
spots. On the political front, however, 
things have gone off the boil in the wake 
of direct negotiations between the war-
ring parties. After three years of fighting, 
the country has succeeded in reestablishing 
peace through an agreement that was 
signed on 26 December 1994. Less than six 
months later (on 8 June 1995), the new 
power-sharing arrangement was con-
solidated as members of the former rebel 
movement, the Front for the Restoration 
of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), took up 
posts in the government. The FRUD now 
looks more like a conventional political 
party once again. However, while political 
equilibrium may have been restored, the 
economic situation is more unbalanced 
than ever. In almost every respect the 
country has to get back on the rails in order 
to restart the engine of economic growth. 
To do this, stabilising measures 
followed by far-reaching economic reforms 
are required. This will have to be done in 
close collaboration with foreign partners. 
Radical structural adjustment is due to be 
discussed in detail at a Round Table 
scheduled for this autumn (having been 
postponed several times already). It will 
bring together all interested parties and.its 
main aim will be to ensure Djibouti's long-
term development, something which is 
viewed as a prerequisite for achieving a 
lasting peace. Reducing state control over 
the economy while making the govern-
ment apparatus more efficient, will entail 
sacrifices for everyone. Indeed, relaunching 
growth and creating sufficient jobs for the 
growing mass of young people may, in the 
longer term, prove just as challenging as 
the task of reconciling a divided people 
who, after all is said and done, must live 
together. 
Uncommon beauty 
Despite the torrid sun which 
beats down on its 23 000 square kilometres 
from May to October, Djibouti is engraved 
on the memory of most visitors on account 
of its uncommon beauty. One of the 
slogans used for attracting tourists is 'land 
of extremes' and the country really does 
deserve this description. It has a desert 
landscape which often resembles the 
surface of the moon. The earth's crust at 
this point is very thin, barely five kilometres 
in depth, as against several tens of 
kilometres normally, and for this reason, 
geologists and vulcanologists flock there. 
Djibouti continually experiences 
earthquakes although fortunately, these 
are of low magnitude. 
In 1978, the Ardoukoba volcano 
near Lake Assai erupted. At 155 metres 
below sea level, Lake Assai is the lowest 
point in Africa and one does not need to be 
a geophysicist to appreciate the grandiose 
beauty of this place — an expanse of salt 
almost 10 kilometres in length, contrasting 
with the deep blue, highly salinated water 
and the even deeper azure of the sky. This 
remote spot exudes desolation but one 
"I 
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that innumerable caravans set off to carry 
precious salt into the African interior. This 
happened well before the toubabs became 
interested in Djibouti for more obvious 
geostrategic reasons. 
Situated near the Gulf of Aden 
and the entrance to the Red Sea, Lake 
Assai, together with its neighbour, the 
Goubet-AI-Kharab (Demons' Gulley) and 
its Ile du Diable (Devil's Island) form the 
end of the Great Rift Valley which runs 
south across most of the continent. Nearby 
are the distinctive signs of the fault where 
the continents are drifting apart. The result 
will be a new Eritrean Ocean which is 
expected to appear gradually over the 
next few million years. 
Further into the interior of the 
country, which reaches a height of 
2000 metres near the northern border 
with Ethiopia, other equally spectacular 
wonders await the courageous visitor. In 
addition to the primal forest of Day, there 
are a number of extensive plains such as 
Hanlé, the biggest one, and the Petit and 
Grand Barra, not forgetting the 350-
square-kilometre doom-laden expanse of 
Lake Abbé, with its unmistakeable smell of 
sulphur. Although the landscape of 
Djibouti might appear harsh and some-
times hostile, the sea bed along its 370 
kilometres of coastline is renowned 
amongst divers as one of the most beauti-
ful. It is particularly rich in marine life 
although the large number of sharks might 
make it seem rather uninviting. 
Precarious balance 
Although the neighbouring 
waters are teeming with fish, the popu-
lation is little inclined to take advantage of 
the bounty of the sea, being largely 
nomadic in origin. Most of the 520 000 
inhabitants of Djibouti in fact share a 
nomadic culture and pastoral tradition 
dating from time immemorial, but more 
than half have in the meantime settled in 
Djibouti City, the capital. Their dignity and 
pride, however, remain undiminished, as 
does their propensity towards belligerence 
when they consider their interests have 
been harmed or the balances has been 
upset. The two largest communities which 
provide the most important counter-
weights in this political balancing act are (in 
alphabetical order), the Afars and Issas. In 
fact, even in colonial times, this order had a 
certain symbolism. French colonists first 
arrived here in 1862, shortly after construc-
tion began on De Lessep's great dream, the 
Suez Canal. This strategic colony was 
known initially as the French Somali Coast 
(the Issas are part of the wider Somali 
'family'). It then became the French 
Territory of the Afars and Issas, and it was 
not until independence on 27 June 1977 
that the name was changed to the 
Republic of Djibouti. 
Roughly speaking, the Afars orig-
inate mainly in the North and West while 
the Issas are from the South, but seeking to 
define 'ethnic territory' or indeed to 
estimate the proportions represented by 
the two main groups (there are those who 
believe the figures are 'manipulated' for 
political purposes) is a risky exercise. 
Indeed, it was this which was at the root of 
the conflict which engulfed the country 
between 1991 to 1994. It suffices to say 
that the overstaffed civil service (an 
obvious target for any adjustment meas-
ures) has a key role in the redistribution of 
resources. With this in mind, administrative 
positions are filled in the manner of an 
'apothecary's account' with great atten-
tion being paid to ethnic balance including 
membership of clans, sub-clans and so on. It 
should be mentioned in passing that most 
of the people belonging to the two main 
ethnic groups actually live outside 
Djibouti's national frontiers. 
The other components of the 
population are by no means insignificant in 
numerical terms and each group has a 
specific role to play in the national 
economy. In addition to some tens of 
thousands of Yemenis, (Arabs), there are 
also the Issaqs and the Gadaboursi, both of 
which are Somali clans. The first two are 
active in commerce whilst the last-men-
tioned are often to be found in the 
executive and clerical levels of the civil 
service. 
The presence of almost 11 000 
French citizens, including 4000 troops (the 
result of agreements made at the time of 
independence and due for review in 1997) 
has a very significant impact on the 
country's economy. Some even say that 
the French input represents up to 40% of 
the GDP. The anticipated withdrawal of 
between 450 and 500 soldiers between 
now and the end of 1996, and the 
suggestion that married soldiers with their 
families may be replaced by unmarried 
newcomers, is causing some concern in 
business circles. This is a French-speaking 
'island' in an area which is otherwise 
Anglo-Arab. One effect of the Gulf crisis 
has been to raise the issue of Djibouti's 
usefulness in military terms. While this is 
not perhaps yet being called into question, 
attention at least has been drawn to the 
issue. With France (the main overseas 
funder) also taking a close interest in the 
structural adjustment process, and much 
local debate over whether the country is 
going to follow the strict IMF guidelines, 
there are clearly good reasons to keep a 
watchful eye on the policy statements and 
intentions of the former colonial power — 
and its new President. 
The government's decision at the 
beginning of this year to close more than 
80 'bars' (often supplying 'services' other 
A country where the ethnic balance is 
precarious and there is massive 
unemployment than mere alcohol, which is still sold in 
hotels and restaurants) has caused some 
concern in French army circles and among 
the wider expatriot community. No-one 
has seriously suggested that this move is a 
manifestation of emerging Muslim fun-
damentalism or an attempt to reach a 
rapprochement with nearby Arab coun-
tries. Although Djibouti is a predominantly 
Muslim country (a member of the Arab 
League and of the Islamic Conference), the 
government's stated reasons for taking the 
action are decidely more prosaic. It was, in 
simple terms, a measure designed to 
combat the proliferation of alcohol and 
drug abuse, 'immoral' behaviour and the 
AIDS problem. Many of the bars were run 
by Ethiopians using Ethiopian employees 
working without a permit and it goes 
without saying that this community is 
unhappy with the decision. Elsewhere in 
the society, however, the questions are 
more about where the surplus 'energy' 
which still exists can be channelled now 
that this outlet has been closed off. 
Djibouti also has a serious re-
fugee problem — scarcely surprising in a 
region of endemic conflict. Estimated at 
120 000, the refugees have had a con-
siderable effect on the country's economic 
activity and on its administration and 
infrastructure. In fact, in combination with 
the high population growth rate for actual 
Djibouti citizens (about 3%), the result has 
been significantly increased pressure on all 
services and structures. It is not really 
surprising, therefore, to find that the 
government's traditional line of welcom-
ing displaced people has hardened some-
what. On top of the ad-hoc return of 
refugees and refusals to admit new ar-
rivals, large-scale repatriation operations 
have been launched, such as the one begun 
last July to send 15 000 Ethiopians home. 
War, peace and 
démocratisation 
From the standpoint of internal 
politics, the incoming tide of refugees has 
Djibouti's economy is based essentially 
on services, and it has an excellent 
telecommunications network 
inevitably had an impact, particularly in the 
context of the ethnic balance. While Issas 
have been arriving from Somalia, the fall of 
the Mengistu regime also caused the flight 
of Afars, many of whom belong to militias, 
from the Ethiopian side. We should also 
mention here the solidarity of the Issaqs 
with their 'brothers' in Somaliland (the 
north west of Somalia) which has declared 
its independence. Some argue that the 
origins of the Afar insurrection in Djibouti 
in 1991 areto be found in the proliferation 
of weapons and experienced fighters who 
found their way into the country as a result 
of conflict elsewhere in the region. This is 
disputed by the leaders of the rising. 
Whether true or not, it was at that time 
that the FRUD took up arms in its quest for 
a larger slice of the national 'cake'. Since 
independence, Djibouti has been governed 
by its veteran leader President Hassan 
Gouled Aptidon (who is interviewed later 
in this report). The Afars who rebelled took 
the view that their legitimate interests had 
been damaged, and were critical of the 
5aid Ibrahim Badoul, President of the 
National Assembly 
'We are still in the learning stage of 
democracy... but there is true freedom 
of expression' 
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regime for what they regarded as its 
political immobility and its alleged rejec-
tion of genuine democratic power-sharing. 
There is a very Djiboutian concept which 
incidentally is linked to this : that of the 
bras cassés (broken arms). This term is 
applied to civil servants, critical of the 
current system, who are often well-trained 
but, because they are from the 'wrong' 
ethnic group, feel marginalised and on a 
path to nowhere. 
With the spread of fighting in the 
hinterland, the first steps towards political 
reform, designed to bring about a multi-
party democracy were taken in the capital. 
In September 1992, a new pluralist consti-
tution was adopted. However, during the 
first new-style elections in November of 
the same year, the Rassemblement Popu-
laire du Progrès (People's Progress Party), 
of President Aptidon swept the board 
winning all 65 seats. The victors had a 
number of factors to their advantage — 
the fact that the voting system was the 
British model of 'first past the post', the 
importance of Djibouti City itself (with 37 
seats) and, not least, the opposition 
boycott. In fact only one party contested 
the election against the RPP. In the 
Presidential poll of May 1993, President 
Aptidon prevailed against two opposition 
candidates to win a fourth term of office. It 
is worth noting, however, that in both 
polls, the abstention rate was approxi-
mately 50%. 
Mohamed Djama Elabe, who was 
a minister between 1986 and 1991 and 
now leads the Democratic Renewal Party 
(PRD) which is one of the two main 
opposition groupings (the other is the 
National Democratic Party — NDP), said 
that 'the elections perpetuated the old 
one-party system' in the current par-
liamentary set-up. He believes 'that the old 
tribal structures that are so ingrained in 
people's minds must be abandoned.' 
Tribalism could, he thinks, be turned into a 
positive factor. Given the current economic 
situation, he is concerned that the future 
could be even more harsh. 'In extremis', he 
argues, 'we could go the way of Somalia. It 
is the very credibility of our ruling class 
which is at stake'. 
For Said Ibrahim Badoul, Pre-
sident of the National Assembly, Djibouti is 
still in the learning phase of democracy. 
Although it is true that the former single 
party won all the seats in the first multi-country report — Djibouti 
party elections, he says, this does not 
preclude it from entertaining a range of 
different ideas and ensuring genuine 
freedom of expression. As he also points 
out, the peace accord entails the FRUD 
becoming a political party — the fourth 
one in the country. The opposition, he 
observes, is expanding and becoming more 
active in view of the forthcoming de-
mocratic elections'. President Badoul also 
emphasises the role of 'traditional' de-
mocracy — the system of consultation 
with the forces within society such as the 
former sultanates, for example, designed 
to reach honourable compromises through 
dialogue. He says that this was an import-
ant element in achieving the peace agree-
ment. As an Afar who belongs to the 
national reconciliation committee, he saw 
the conflict first and foremost as 'a clash of 
generations against a tribal background'. 
Mercifully for the country, and 
somewhat unusually, the warring parties 
entered into direct negotiations. Con-
ducted largely in secret, these lasted 
almost a year, and finally led to the peace 
accord which was signed on 26 December 
1994. This ended a bloody struggle which 
had had disastrous effects on the socio-
economic fabric of the country, but the 
ground was now prepared for reconcili-
ation. The salient points of the peace 
accord included the FRUD's acceptance of 
the new constitution (which they had 
previously rejected), a review of the 
electoral rolls and of procedures for 
granting citizenship (subject to a policy of 
ethnic balance), a ministerial reshuffle 
which would bring FRUD representatives 
into government, integration of some of 
the rebels into the regular army, decentral-
isation of powers and the transformation 
of the FRUD into a genuine political party. 
Although, during the early 
months of this year, implementation of the 
terms of the accord seemed slow, various 
aspects of it were progressively applied, 
the most notable being the government 
reshuffle of 8 June 1995. Two FRUD 
representatives were given ministerial 
posts — Ali Mohamed Daoud the Pre-
sident of the FRUD, was allocated the 
Health and Social Affairs portfolio, and 
Ogouré Kiflé Ahmed, the General Sec-
retary (interviewed later in this Report) 
became Minister of Agriculture (an unre-
warding task in a country with such hostile 
natural conditions) and Water (a key sector 
in a predominantly pastoral country where 
rainfall is scarce and there are no per-
manent surface water courses). 
Economy in distress 
War in general does not pay — at 
least not for those who wage it. The costs 
to the participants are generally very high 
and this harsh reality is something that 
Djibouti cannot sidestep. On the other 
hand, some observers take the view, 
perhaps cynically, that the country has 
actually benefited from recent external 
crises such as the Gulf War and the conflicts 
in Yemen, Rwanda and Somalia. Djibouti's 
strategic situation and its service economy 
have made it a centre for the supply of 
humanitarian aid, the transit of aid work-
ers and the passage of evacuees. Some 
have even suggested that it was the 
'positive' effect of the Iraq/Kuwait conflict 
that enabled the government to mobilise 
8000 troops very quickly at the beginning 
of its own struggle. One result was that 
Djibouti acquired an unenviable reputation 
Mohamed Ali Mohamed, Finance and 
Economics Minister and the driving 
force behind the Round Table 
The state must find ways of reducing 
its expenditure without cutting the 
social sectors' 
— of having one of the highest ratios of 
troops and police to inhabitants in the 
world ! Nothing is without a price and now 
that peace has returned, the demobilis-
ation of several thousand men poses its 
own particular problems. This is not 
counting the personnel reductions implied 
in one of the provisions of the peace accord 
which foresees the incorporation of be-
tween 800 and 900 former FRUD rebels 
into the army. The war effort was very 
costly, placing a great deal of stress on the 
budget. In combination with other factors, 
both internal and external, it helped 
plunge the economy into a serious struc-
tural crisis. 
From an economic standpoint, 
Djibouti enjoys a number of distinct 
advantages. These include its strategic 
position, its very liberal economic system 
and its highly developed service infrastruc-
tures. The problem is that the economy is 
completely out of balance, with services 
representing almost three-quarters of 
GDP. Djibouti is also highly dependent on 
the outside world. The port, which is the 
lifeblood of the economy, and the railway, 
which is the vital artery with Ethiopia, are 
kept alive by others and have both 
experienced a marked drop in activity over 
the last few years. Djibouti produces very 
little itself and has very limited natural 
resources, an extremely restricted local 
market, high production factor costs and 
massive unemployment, estimated at 
more than 40%. Most of the jobless are 
unskilled young people. The country's 
service sector includes a high concentration 
of productive public enterprises (PPEs). 
Some of these appear to be overequipped 
while others are poorly maintained, often 
inefficient or overstaffed, and hence barely 
viable. Overall, the public sector's share of 
the economy is regarded as dispropor-
tionate. Djibouti also has its own currency, 
the Djibouti franc, which has been tied to 
the American dollar since 1949. ($1 = 
FD178). For a country which imports 
virtually everything, any depreciation of 
the greenback vis-à-vis the main European 
currencies (France being the most import-
ant trade partner) is keenly felt. 
Both internal and external finan-
cial balances are out of step and the deficits 
have reached such a level that, for Finance 
Minister Mohamed Ali Mohamed, (pre-
viously responsible for trade and the 
economy), 'the fate of the country is now 
at stake.' He stresses the need for in-depth 
reforms to restore the viability of the 
economy. Since the beginning of the 
1990s, the budget deficit, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP, has almost tripled and 
it has become increasingly difficult to 
finance. By the end of last year, Djibouti 
had run up a total external debt (including 
sums owed by its PPEs) of $267.5 million — 
this at a time of internal conflict when 
conventional budgetary aid was dwind-
ling. 'The priority is therefore to get public 
finances moving again and this cannot be 
done without sacrifices.The state must find 
ways of reducing its expenditure without 
cutting the social sectors, explained former 
Finance Minister, Ahmed Aden Youssouf. 
It is in this context that a first 
series of austerity measures totalling 
almost FD 800 million have already been 
elaborated. Together with proposals to 
boost revenue. An ambitious reform pro-
gramme has been proposed to meet the 
demands of the IMF and other donors, and 
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sions at the Round Table in the autumn 
(see article later in this report). The date 
has finally been fixed after two postpone-
ments. Although most politicians declare 
their conviction that Djibouti must 'reach a 
settlement' with the IMF and accom-
modate itself to their requirements, it is no 
secret that the prospect of having to slim 
down the state holds little attraction for 
those in power. They find themselves 
unhappily caught between the devil and 
the deep blue sea. Both the slow and 
complicated initial implementation of the 
peace accord and political change at the 
highest level in France generated a degree 
of hesitation. Today, however, the psycho-
logical block appears to have lifted. Indeed, 
some, such as Djama Mohamed Haïd, the 
Governor of the National Bank, are begin-
ning to express guarded confidence in the 
future : 'Admittedly, the economic picture 
is alarming, he says, but, because of 
adjustment, there won't be a catastrophe. 
Less state, more private 
sector 
Trimming the size of the state is 
undoubtedly one of the watchwords of 
the adjustment proces. This extends not 
only to tackling overstating but also and, 
indeed perhaps more significantly, to 
examining the very role of the state as an 
economic operator. 
The now widely-accepted con-
cept of 'good governance', in this context, 
goes well beyond the declared intention of 
tackling corruption, nepotism and bad 
management. It also implies that the state 
abandon its entrepreneurial functions to 
become mere facilitator of an environment 
favouring private enterprise, with a role in 
the promotion of job creation. To this end, 
a new equation must be found linking the 
employment market and training, which is 
deficient in many respects. Again, a change 
to structures and attitudes appears neces-
sary if the future isto be guaranteed. There 
Djibouti is experiencing increased 
competition from other ports in the 
region but it continues to modernise 
are complaints in the private sector about 
the lack of suitable training and a belief 
that the education system fails to match 
local requirements and concepts. Com-
plaints of this kind are not unique to 
Djibouti of course, but it would certainly 
appear that illiteracy levels are high and 
standards of schooling unsatisfactory in a 
country with more than 200 000 
youngsters of school age. One telling 
indicator is the staffing situation at the 
Djibouti Lycée. Of the school's 85 teachers, 
no fewer than 59 are (expatriate) technical 
assistants as against only 20 Djibouti 
citizens. The rest come from other African 
countries. There is also the thorny ethnic 
issue. Many members of the younger 
generation dare to hope that in the future, 
merit and competence will prevail over the 
need to maintain a strict ethnic balance, 
but this, too, is something that will take 
time. 
The current mood in the private 
sector is far from buoyant and there is talk 
of business slackening off. Those involved 
in the various aspects of the transit trade, 
who are the heaviest users of services in an 
economy which revolves round the transit 
of goods and people, face a range of 
difficulties. The state is reducing expendi-
ture, fiscal pressures are growing, costs are 
increasing, and there is increasing competi-
tion from neighbouring countries. There is 
some good business being done in the 
banking sector (Djibouti aspires to a 
reputation as a 'financial centre') but it is 
suggested that much more is possible. 
Mohamed Aden, who is Vice-Chairman 
and Managing Director of the Bank for 
Commerce and Industry of the Red Sea (a 
subsidiary of the BNP), emphasises the 
advantages of 'our very liberal economic 
system, a fully convertible currency, and 
the complete absence of both exchange 
control and income tax. Taken in combi-
The railway linking the port to Addis 
Ababa urgently needs renewal of 
equipment and management 
restructuring 
nation with our high-performance com-
munications network', he says, 'these 
could turn us into a little Switzerland'. 
Inflated lung, blocked 
artery 
The key barometers of economic 
activity in Djibouti are the port and the 
railway. Unfortunately, while recognising 
that the patient is on the mend, any 
diagnosis based on an examination of 
these two vital organs would suggest that 
recovery still has a long way to go. Of 
course we should recognise that the 
'illness' brought on by the internal conflict 
was a long and debilitating one. 
The competitiveness and ef-
ficiency of this transport corridor have 
been sorely tested by increased regional 
competition. The port employs some 650 
people and is relatively well equipped, but 
some think that it is oversized. Despite this, 
a renewal and modernisation programme 
for the petroleum facilities is currently 
underway. Operators are concerned at the 
port's reputation for being expensive and 
there is no doubt that competition from 
Berbeira in neighbouring Somaliland and 
Assab in Eritrea is being felt increasingly. 
An effort is under way to breath new life 
into the crucial landward link in the 
corridor which leads to Ethiopia. This 
suffers from customs procedures which are 
regarded, at the very least, as 'painful' by 
business people who use the route because 
of the delays and added costs that they 
entail. Add to this the shortcomings of the 
railway itself, and one soon discovers that 
this is the weakest link in the chain. This 
vital artery, with its reputation of imperial 
elegance, (having been started by the 
Ethiopian Emperor Ménélik II at the end of 
the last century), is 781 kilometres long. 
The Djibouti section is 100.6 km. No-
"I 
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wadays, it has lost much of its former glory. 
A lack of maintenance in the past means 
that most of the equipment and infrastruc-
ture is in need of major overhaul. Engines 
and rolling stock are prone to breakdown 
and there have been more serious prob-
lems resulting from the poor condition and 
unevenness of the permanent way. A 
major programme is anticipated to remedy 
the situation. The initial phase will be 
implemented by the French Development 
Fund, and the plan is f or this to be followed 
by Community intervention. 
In any discussion about the rail-
way, it is clear that the human factor — 
whether at operational or management 
level — should not be neglected. It is an 
enterprise run jointly by Djibouti and 
Ethiopia, and governed by a statute which 
implements the terms of a treaty con-
cluded in 1981. This foresees a sharing of 
responsibilities. At management level, a 
major initial step forward has been the 
creation of a joint administration council 
(as against two councils in former times). In 
the opinion of the former Minister of 
Transport, Ahmed Waberi Guedi, this is 
likely to accelerate the decision-making 
process to the obvious benefit of the 
railway in terms of improving its viability. 
Co-management, however, is not always 
easy. This was demonstrated in the (relat-
ively minor) divergence of view that 
occurred between the parties over the 
acceptability or otherwise of 'second 
hand', although entirely serviced, locomot-
ives for the first phase of the overhaul. The 
Ethiopian side was somewhat unenthusias-
tic about this proposal. As for staffing 
levels, the railway has 390 employees in 
Djibouti (where their 'railway workers' 
club' evokes a certain nostalgia) as against 
2200 in Addis Ababa. The overmanning at 
the Ethiopian end has been attributed by 
some to the 15-year reign of the Mengistu 
regime. Given possible future privatisation 
and a reduction in state control, a reduc-
tion in staff numbers, together with better 
targeted training would appear to be 
required. Put briefly, a degree of discipline 
has to be rediscovered. 
Even if there is no water, 
there is always khat 
In such a hostile environment, 
with water in short supply and where age-
old nomadic traditions mitigate against 
permanent settlement, it is difficult to 
make the agricultural sector flourish. It is 
therefore largely restricted to the produc-
tion of market-garden crops in the zone 
around Djibouti City, together with a few 
small cooperative farms in the interior. 
Nomadic stock-breeding is obviously 
heavily dependent on access to water 
supplies. Although some cattle ranching is 
being developed, this sector continues 
largely to be managed in the traditional 
way, with owners viewing their livestock 
as walking capital'. Fishing has some 
potential but again, a number of measures 
are needed if the traditional fisheries sector 
is to achieve a qualitative step forward. 
The above-mentioned sectors, 
where modest progress has already been 
made, could make an important contri-
bution to solving the country's enormous 
unemployment problem. There are also 
more limited possibilities in other areas 
such as, for example, the craft industry or 
tourism. These are sectors where the 
European Community is, or has been, 
active in its cooperation. Although the 
craft industry has become increasingly 
organised and structured, with greater 
emphasis on training workers in a range of 
skills, tourism was 'killed off', so to speak, 
by the civil war. Tourism was not par-
ticularly common even prior to the conflict, 
the country's image being based on 
geological or historical themes (such as the 
salt caravans) which are of interest only to 
a small and specialised market. As a result 
of the fighting, most of the necessary 
infrastructure has been destroyed and 
access to the interior of the country was all 
but impossible. 'We are looking forward to 
a new, more favourable atmosphere', 
stresses Ali Mohamed Abdallah, the 
Director of the National Office of Tourism 
and Craft Industries, who also highlights 
Djibouti's reputation as a top destination 
for diving. 
In fact, some of the strains of 
unemployment are moderated, in a 
manner of speaking by khat, the green 
leaves of a bush which many people in 
Djibouti chew from early afternoon. This is 
said to generate feelings of euphoria. 
Attempts to ban the 'drug' since indepen-
dence have come to nothing. Indeed, it is in 
such widespread use throughout the 
region, that nowadays it has virtually been 
legalised. A levy is charged on each bundle 
of leaves, which are sold as soon as possible 
after they have been picked in Ethiopia. 
Despite this, khat is regarded as a curse 
with many negative consequences from 
Sale of fresh khat, the local 'drug' that 
is widely used. This is the only 'sector' 
of the economy which does not appear 
to be in crisis 
the socio-economic standpoint. Narcotic 
effects aside, the fact that the leaves are 
imported, with 12 to 14 tonnes trans-
ported by air every day, represents a 
haemorrhage in foreign exchange. One 
tonne costs approximately DF 1 million 
and, it is said, the khat must get through, 
at any cost. In the current economic crisis, it 
would appear that the khat traders are the 
only ones who are coining it in ! ■■ 
Roger De Backer 
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reconstruction' 
An interview with President Hassan 
Gouled Aptidon 
I For someone who is said to have 
I been born in 1916, but who is 
¡ probably six to eight years older, 
¡ President Hassan Gouled Aptidon is 
| surprisingly nimble and quick-
| witted. Little appears to escape 
¡ him, and when he returned his 
¡ written replies to our preliminary 
ï questionnaire he was perfectly 
I willing to answer a few additional 
questions on the spot. The result was an 
exchange of ideas and opinions almost as 
rápidas a tennis ball skimming over the net. 
He has held the reins of power in Djibouti for 
a very long time. He became interested in 
politics after the Second World War, and 
very rapidly stood out as one of the principal 
leaders of the Issa community. After a long 
political career, which has had its ups and 
downs, he finally led the country to indepen-
dence on 27 June 1977 and became the first 
and, to date, only president Djibouti has 
known. Little happens in his country with-
out him knowing about it or without his 
approval. Combining the post of Head of 
State with that of Head of Government, this 
astute politician uses all his skills and 
experience to achieve a political balance and 
ethnic equilibrium. The task has proved far 
from easy, as witnessed unfortunately in the 
three years of civil war the country has 
recently suffered. Having succeeded in 
restoring peace, he is now issuing an appeal 
for reconstruction, both to the citizens of 
Djibouti themselves who will have to grow 
accustomed to a period of austerity and to 
external donors who will be called upon to 
support domestic efforts a t stabilisa tion and 
economic reform. 
■ After years of fratricidal struggle, the 
Government of Djibouti has signed a peace 
accord with FRUD representatives. What is 
the significance of this accord ? 
— For three years, our country 
was the theatre for violent armed confron-
tation between the FRUD and government 
troops. This conflict had severe con-
sequences both on the economy and the 
people of our country. 
It is rare in the history of conflict 
throughout the world to be able to enter 
into direct peace negotiations between 
opposing warring parties, but we were 
stimulated by the desire to spare our 
people and our nation the fate of some of 
our unfortunate brothers in Africa. We 
thus demonstrated our desire to keep a 
tight rein on our passions. Now is the time 
for reconstruction. The government has to 
do all it can to pick up the pieces and restart 
development projects which were halted 
or suspended because of the conflict. New 
projects must also be drawn up on the basis 
of new requirements. We now have to win 
the development war together and the 
efforts we will be called upon to make will 
not be enough if we do not receive support 
in the form of aid from the international 
community. 
■ The fact that the entire FRUD has not 
signed the peace accord and that part of it 
is still bent on continuing the armed 
struggle, might compromise peace and 
national reconciliation. Do you envisage 
initiatives to bring everyone to the ne-
gotiating table ? 
— We signed the peace accord 
on 26th December 1994 with an organis-
ation which is both political and military. If 
dissent exists within this organisation there 
is nothing we can do unfortunately except 
take note of the fact. However, it is 
apparent to everyone that virtually all the 
members of the FRUD have joined in the 
peace process and are today returning to 
Djibouti. Finally, since the accord was 
signed, no incident has been recorded 
anywhere in the country. That is the best 
illustration one can have of the fact that 
the vast majority of politicians and soldiers 
in the FRUD support the long-awaited 
peace agreement that was signed with my 
government. 
I should, nevertheless, point out 
that we have never excluded anyone from 
the process. Today, negotiations are com-
plete and peace has become a reality. 
Djibouti needs all its sons and I, for my part, 
will never close the door to those who 
would now like to return to take part in 
the reconstruction efforts we have before 
us. Our task is immense and I praise God for 
having guided us throughout with wisdom 
and reason. 
■ The internal conflict the country has 
experienced over the last three years has 
led to a financial crisis which is so profound 
that a structural adjustment programme 
has now become essential. It appears that 
the government is reluctant to sign such an 
agreement with the IMF although other 
donors have made this a precondition for 
their assistance. Why is that ? 
— We have no hesitation in 
committing ourselves to a reform policy 
and there is no question of our circum-
venting a structural adjustment prog-
ramme. My government is currently work-
ing on the measures advocated by the IMF. 
The Council of Ministers on 23 April 1995 
was also devoted to studying the recent 
report by the International Monetary 
"t 
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francs, due to take effect on 1 July 1995, 
are among the first measures intended to 
achieve a drastic reduction in state spend-
ing. The Geneva Round Table, which has 
been postponed until October, should 
finalise our undertakings. These may well 
include painful measures but they are 
necessary to bring about a more stable 
future for our country. We expect a great 
deal from this meeting in terms of develop-
ment and it is my personal wish that the 
donor community take an active part in it. 
We aim to achieve a positive result which 
will make it possible to relaunch our 
economy and our image as 'a land of 
exchange and encounter'. The objective is 
to restart the construction of a nation that 
wants to offer a better life for all and a 
future for its children. 
I expect a great deal from the 
French President, Jacques Chirac, and his 
government in the implementation of a 
new partnership with our continent. I hope 
they will continue to speak on our behalf 
within the international community and its 
institutions, particularly the IMF. 
■ You, Mr. President, are the region's 
elder statesman and recently you have met 
a number of leaders from factions in 
Somalia. In the wake of the failure of the 
United Nations operation in that country, 
will we soon see an initiative from neigh-
bouring countries in an attempt to find a 
solution to the Somalian crisis ? 
— You are quite right to use the 
term 'crisis' to describe what is happening 
in Somalia. Our human, historical and 
economic links with that country ensure 
that we cannot remain indifferent to what 
is happening there. For me, Somalia is an 
example of a country where state au-
thority has succumbed to tribal antagon-
isms, and this has been the cause of its 
downfall. 
I was in favour of United Nations 
intervention in Somalia. Djibouti has also 
always demonstrated its support for UN 
resolutions. We made our ports and 
airports available to the United States and 
France and to other countries taking part in 
UNOSOM operations. It must be ac-
knowledged, however, that the UNOSOM 
intervention was a failure. So too were the 
mediation attempts conducted within the 
framework of the OAU, the Arab League, 
IGADD and the Islamic Conference Or-
ganisation. 
I also regret the fact that the 
Somalian National Reconciliation Con-
ference, which we organised in July 1991 
and which brought together virtually all 
factions in Somalia, was not sufficiently 
supported at the time by international 
organisations, because we were so close to 
a joint solution. I am now convinced that, 
today, the only solution to the Somalian 
problem is to be found within the country 
itself. Somalia's fate is in the hands of its 
own people and the solution has to be a 
political one. It is regrettable that the 
Somali leaders, whoever they are, continue 
to fight each other so fiercely. They pay no 
heed to the misery and pain of their 
children and I cannot but regret this 
attitude. 
■ Your country has always been a place 
of asylum for refugees from Somalia and 
Ethiopia who are attracted by the stability 
and relative prosperity of Djibouti. Yet, 
recently, round-ups and expulsions across 
the border appear to have increased. Is 
your policy of accepting refugees chang-
ing ? 
— Firstly, you must allow me to 
take issue with the words 'round-ups and 
expulsions' because I cannot accept them, 
although neither implies any breach of the 
rules. I think it is necessary, firstly, to 
distinguish between genuine candidates 
Road sign, near Lake Assai, riddled with 
bullets — testimony to three years of 
civil war 
'It is rare in the history of conflict 
throughout the world to be able to 
enter into direct peace negotiations 
between opposing warring parties, but 
we were stimulated by the desire to 
spare our people and our nation the 
fate of some of our unfortunate 
brothers in Africa' 
for asylum as defined by the Geneva 
Convention — a convention we have 
signed and respect — and clandestine 
economic immigrants coming principally 
from Ethiopia and North West Somalia. 
One should also note the arrival in recent 
years of immigrants from West and Central 
Africa. 
Let us be realistic. The Republic of 
Djibouti cannot nowadays support such a 
flood of irregular immigrants. We have a 
floating population which, over the years, 
has come to exceed 120 000 people, and 
this is a burden we cannot sustain. The very 
survival of our country is now threatened. I 
would be surprised if you could tell me of a 
single country which now shelters as many 
foreigners — nearly 20% of our popu-
lation ! 
Every day we are faced with 
increasing problems of security in Djibouti 
City and our health, housing and planning 
infrastructures have become hopelessly 
inadequate to meet the needs of this 
population. Let me give you just one 
example : in the anti-TB Centre in Djibouti, 
eight out of ten beds are occupied by 
foreigners. 
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President Aptidon 'live' 
■■':;. 
■ Mr President, would it be 
right to say that Djibouti is now 
having to pay the price of 
peace ? 
— To summarise my reply, I 
would say that in order to have 
stability you must have a strong 
economy. That applies to all countries 
throughout the world. 
■ Is it Djibouti's aim to become an 
even better service economy in the 
future ? 
— Of course. We have to 
overhaul the services and ensure they 
operate normally, regardless of the 
regional situation which is in crisis. But 
that is not the fault of this country ! 
■ As elder statesman in this region... 
— I'll stop you there, if I 
may ! I may be the 'elder statesman', as 
you say, but each country is free to 
organise itself and follow its destiny. 
My regret is that, in Somalia for 
example, conditions are not yet right 
for reconciliation. Djibouti does not 
intend to go down that road again. As 
for the Somalis, they have requested 
that they be left in peace to settle 
their problems themselves, which they 
are now doing. 
■ You know virtually all the people 
involved — do you see your role as 
one of conciliator ? 
— You would have to ask the 
Somalis that question ! The situation in 
Somalia is regrettable and in fact is 
little more than a struggle for power. 
■ Djibouti's future appears to be 
linked, to a considerable extent, to that 
of its large neighbour, Ethiopia. How 
do you see your relations with Ethiopia 
developing ? 
— Djibouti has experienced 
many wars but what holds us together 
is the railway which was finished at the 
end of the last century. This railway has 
never been repaired despite the 
damage caused by the various conflicts 
around 'rt. Emphasis must be placed on 
repair. 
■ Despite multi-party elections here, 
the opposition is not represented in 
Parliament. What do you have to say 
about this? 
— Firstly, what does 
'democracy' mean? The democracy you 
speak of is based on universal suffrage. 
Elections are held and you win or you 
lose. It is not a war. So if you lose you 
have to wait your turn to be 
represented and if you are elected, 
well, good for you ! 
■ Is the fact that the opposition is not 
represented in part due to the voting 
system which has been kept non-
proportional? 
— That is a matter for 
Djibouti ! You must not attempt to 
impose on us ideas which are not or 
cannot be applicable to certain African 
countries. Africans must be left to 
define their own type of democracy. 
After all, the Europeans themselves 
have had many years over which to 
develop their own systems. 
■ Yesterday \ we saw a democratic 
change of power for one of your 
principal partners with the inauguration 
of President Chirac in France. Do you 
expect to see a change in France's 
attitude towards Djibouti? 
— What primarily interests us 
is that France should come to our aid 
on a bilateral level and that it should 
also play an active role at the Round 
Table talks. We now have to approach 
President Chirac and draw his attention 
to our situation in a region which is 
continually shifting and where there is 
no peace and a great many refugees. 
■ Within the same context of 
democratic transition, and I refer, here. 
to other instances in Africa, for 
example Senegal, have you any 
thoughts about your successor, given 
your advanced age, and taking into 
account the delicate balance between 
ethnic groups and clans in your 
country? 
— It is something we think 
about continually but it is obviously a 
problem for Djibouti to solve. 
■ Does Djibouti have anything to fear 
from the emergence of Muslim 
fundamentalism ? In this context, some 
people might think of the recent 
dosure of the bars, for example. 
— Our country is too small for 
such a movement to develop 
unnoticed. If they try anything, we will 
know immediately. 
■ Would you agree that Djibouti 
reflects Africa more broadly in the 
sense that it has nonsensical colonial 
frontiers. The majority of the major 
ethnic groups which make up your 
population live outside your borders ? 
— We were not the ones 
who fixed the borders ! And, despite 
our small size, we do not intend to 
give land away to bigger countries ! 
We will take care of the problems in 
our small patch of 23 000 square 
kilometres I Hü 
1 This interview took place on 18 May 1995. 
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Djibouti has acted and will continue to act 
as a regional humanitarian centre but we 
are bitter about the fact that the 
international community is losing interest 
in our country and our refugees after all 
we have done to assist our neighbours. 
Would Belgium accept a quarter of its 
own population as immigrants, mostly 
illegal ? 
International organisations, 
brother countries and friends must help in 
containing populations within the 
subregion by guaranteeing food supplies 
to their country of origin. This was my 
message at Addis Ababa on 18 April 1995 
at the extraordinary IGADD Summit. I also 
expressed my regret, on that occasion, 
that many African countries, including 
Djibouti, have seen donors turn away, in 
the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 
order to come to the aid of Eastern 
Europe. Encouragement is no longer 
sufficient. We need a genuine 
undertaking from our partners. 
■ IGADD's performance to date has 
been rather modest, although you and 
your fellow leaders in the region have just 
expanded its field of competence further. 
How do you imagine it will be able to take 
on these new tasks ? 
— In Addis Ababa, at the most 
recent extraordinary IGADD Summit, I 
believe I pointed out that the 
organisation, which is there to achieve 
development for our populations, was 
becoming increasingly a reality and an 
undeniable necessity. This opinion was 
shared by the other heads of state at the 
meeting. 
Subregional cooperation at all 
levels is a prerequisite for economic and 
social development. It contributes to 
political stability and consequently to the 
security of our country's populations. 
North West Somalia, Ethiopia 
and Eritrea are experiencing a period of 
peace. We must, therefore, act to keep 
the peoples of the subregion in their own 
countries, with the aid of international 
organisations, by guaranteeing theirfood 
supplies. 
In the past, the IGADD was 
more a tool permitting political 
settlement of disputes between member 
countries or enabling some of them to 
renew dialogue. However, the recent 
example of the GATT has shown us that it 
is difficult to reconcile the sometimes 
different interests of countries which are 
much more structured than ours. If, in the 
context of a calmer future, with the noise 
of weapons silenced, the countries in the 
Horn of Africa were to group together, 
they would have considerable economic 
potential. The West would then view our 
countries and our people differently — 
they would not have the image they so 
often do of emaciated bodies ravaged by 
famine. 
This is why, nowadays, the 
burden of recent conflict must give way 
to the reinforcement of institutions born 
of the desire for development, trade and 
regional cooperation. Both the IGADD 
and the PTA must fulfil their role. The 
survival of our economies depends on it. 
The role of the international 
organisations and the more important 
role of the EU is to come to our aid in 
reinforcing these institutions because, 
since Addis Ababa, member states have 
demonstrated a genuine will to construct. 
I therefore have confidence in the future 
of the IGADD. 
■ The presence of French troops on 
Djibouti soil generates significant income. 
Although the withdrawal of these troops 
is not currently on the agenda, has your 
government thought of alternative 
solutions? How do you view your 
country's long-term future ? 
— As you say, the withdrawal 
of French troops is not on the agenda. I 
can only confirm this and say it is not 
something we desire. 
We have to be realistic. Most of 
our working population is employed in 
the service sector — banking, commerce 
and administration — which is closely 
linked to the French presence and largely 
to the French military presence. This is also 
a balancing factor acknowledged by all 
countries in the Horn of Africa. French 
forces have, in particular, supported 
humanitarian operations throughout this 
part of Africa, in Somalia, Rwanda and 
even, more recently, in Yemen. The 
presence of French forces stationed in 
Djibouti must be seen in the context of 
agreements concluded between our two 
countries. We have enjoyed a long and 
friendly relationship with France and 
cooperation has been fruitful. Its history is 
closely linked with our country. 
For this reason I would draw 
your attention to the fact that, although 
the military presence is important, there is 
another aspect of this very close 
relationship between France and the 
Republic of Djibouti, namely French 
cooperation. It can be seen particularly in 
the priority areas of education and health 
and has long helped our country in more 
efficiently managing our human 
resources. France is often also the 
intermediary for other support coming 
'You must not attempt to impose on 
us ideas wich are not or cannot be 
applicable to certain African countries' 
from the EU. This has contributed to 
major town-planning operations in 
Djibouti City, water supplies, support for 
sports development and the relaunching 
of cooperative action in the field of 
agriculture. Mi Interview by R.D.B. 
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effort' 
An interview with Prime Minister 
Barkat Gourad Hamadou 
He says he was born in 1930 (but is 
probably older). Barkat Gourad 
Hamadou is a self-taught man who 
has worked both in the port and in 
the railway sectors. By 1958, he 
- had already begun his political 
career during which he was to hold 
a number of responsible positions, 
notably those of Minister of Edu-
cation and, later. Minister of 
Health. In September 1978, he was ap-
pointed Prime Minister, then responsible for 
the port — a charge again entrusted to him, 
as an interim measure, prior to the most 
recent ministerial reshuffle on 8 June 1995 
when his field of responsibility was widened 
to include planning. Prime Minister of Afar 
origin, he is not head of the government. 
This post is held by President Hassan Gouled 
Aptidon himself. On 15 May 1995, the Prime 
Minister granted us a brief interview at the 
Port Director's office. 
■ Prime Minister, you are currently acting 
Ports Minister, a post which you have 
occupied before. Is this a return to your 
'first love'? 
—Yes, I am currently acting Ports 
Minister having previously held this post. It 
is a very important task because the port, 
together with the airport, are the real 
üfeblood of Djibouti. Despite the keen 
competition we face from Assab in Eritrea 
and, to a lesser degree, Aden in the Yemen 
and Berbera in Somaliland, port activities 
are going pretty well. New facilities are 
currently being built, particularly with 
Japanese aid, and we are eager to start the 
work at the Fontainebleau wharf which 
France has promised us. We expect to 
begin this by the end of the year. 
■ Is the port really in such good shape ? 
There has been a drop in activity and some 
companies have been wound up. 
— Admittedly, at the beginning 
of this year, there was a drop in activity, 
but there has now been an upturn. A 
number of ships are en route to our port 
and others will follow. For example, we 
will soon be trans-shipping 45 000 head of 
cattle. This is because of the highly 
competitive conditions we are able to 
offer, and we are ready to agree just as 
competitive tariffs for other vessels. With 
assistance from French technicians, we are 
also currently studying our tariff structures 
so that we will be able to maintain our 
competitive edge in the future. Thousands 
of tons of goods could transit through 
here, particularly aid intended for Ethiopia. 
Our Port Director has held discussions with 
a number of aid agencies, notably in Rome, 
and we are prepared to offer favourable 
tariffs, especially for aid intended for 
neighbouring countries. We must, after all, 
do our bit. However, I cannot conceal the 
fact that there are problems with the 
railway which carries a certain amount of 
freight. 
■ Nevertheless, for a service economy, 
your production factor costs are relatively 
high. 
— We are aware of this and are 
attempting to bring them down. 
Λ On a more political note, as one of the 
highest placed Afar representatives in a 
country where there is a very delicate 
balance between different communities, 
howdoyousee this balance evolving in the 
future ? 
— For my part, I can assure you 
that everything is perfectly in balance. 
After three years of war against the FRUD, 
we have succeeded in achieving peace and 
we are now beginning to reestablish the 
equilibrium we had in the past. 
■ How should one interpret the recent 
closure of the bars ? Does this herald an 
emergence of Muslim fundamentalism ? 
— No, far from it! In Islamic 
terms, here in Djibouti we are very 
tolerant. What happened was that it came 
to our notice that these bars had become 
meeting places for people with bad repu-
tations — prostitutes, drug addicts and so 
on. In the evenings, some parts of the 
capital city looked like Pigalle! We have 
not banned alcohol as such — you can still 
find it in restaurants and hotels — but we 
wanted to do away with these places of ill 
repute which are a threat to our young 
people. You should therefore not interpret 
this as greater influence on the part of 
Arab countries or as the expression of 
increased religious feeling. 
■ There have been a number of incidents 
along the border with Somalia. Does this 
make you apprehensive ? 
— It does indeed pose a problem 
for us because they don't have a govern-
ment with whom we can discuss such 
incidents. There have, for example, been 
instances of Djibouti fishing vessels being 
attacked by pirates. In general, we have 
always had good relations with Somalia, 
but at present we have no contacts with 
whom we can have a meaningful discus-
sion. 
"f 
the Courier n° 153 ■ september-october 1995 country report — Djibouti 
■ Djibouti also seems to be sending 
increasingly large numbers of refugees 
back to their own countries. Does this 
signify the end of your traditional policy of 
welcoming the needy ? 
— Yes, we have been sending 
back a lot of Ethiopian refugees, but 
Ethiopia is happy to take them back. We 
also have a large number of refugees from 
Somalia and a number of sponsors are 
ready to help us send them back, but the 
Somalis are refusing to accept them. We 
just have to pray that there will soon be a 
government with which we can negotiate. 
■ Domestically, you have a problem with 
respect to the large numbers of young 
people entering the job market every year, 
where they simply increase the already 
very high level of unemployment. Is there a 
solution to this problem ? 
— Inch' Allah... Currently, 
Djibouti does not have any big companies 
which could absorb them but we are doing 
all we can, although I frankly cannot tell 
you how we are going to solve this 
problem. 
■ Would it be true to say that Djibouti is 
just 'surviving and no more' at the 
moment ? 
— Admittedly, we face very 
serious economic problems. We are hoping 
to solve them and are placing a great deal 
of faith in the Round Table which is to take 
place in the autumn. We ourselves have to 
make serious efforts to balance the 
budget, and our outside partners will help 
us to do this. We have already im-
plemented a number of austerity measures 
which the citizens of Djibouti will not like, 
but these measures have to be taken, am 
Interview by R. D. B. 
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Djibouti Port 
'We are attempting to bring down 
production factor costs' 
'We have to achieve a 
change in mentality' 
1 An interview with the General 
Secretary of the FRUD, 
Ogouré Kiflé Ahmed 
Ogouré Kiflé Ahmed was born in 1955 and, 
after finishing his education, began a career 
in what was then the 'colonial'army, joining 
the police force in 1977, after independence. 
He is a founder and the current General 
Secretary of the Front for the Restoration of 
Unity and Democracy (FRUD) and, between 
autumn 1991 and26December 1994, ledan 
armed rebellion of mainly Afar supporters. A 
peace accord ended the fratricidal conflict. In 
the interview which follows, which took 
place on 18 May 1995 (before he became 
Minister for Agriculture and Hydraulics), he 
gives his thoughts on the implementation of 
the peace accord and his country's future. 
■ How many members does the FRUD 
have? Some would say that you only 
represent a faction inside the country 
which signed the peace accord in De-
cember 1994, while those on the outside 
oppose the terms of this agreement. 
— First and foremost, I would like 
to state categorically that there is only one 
FRUD, not several ! When the FRUD began 
the peace process with the Djibouti 
government, there were personality cla-
shes but not an actual split. 
■ Given the age difference between you 
and those who are or were in power, was 
there a 'generation'problem ? 
— Not really. There was no conflict 
between the generations within the FRUD. 
The issue was clearly a political one and 
there were divergent points of view, but 
these divergences immediately attracted 
widespread coverage. Some of the press 
began to talk of a split or a break-up and 
the disagreement led to a highly publicised 
polemic conducted through press com-
muniqués broadcast on the national and 
international airwaves. So, you see, the 
FRUD I represent is the only authentic 
FRUD, the one which signed the peace 
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accord with the Aptidon government on 
26 December 1994. 
■ How do you explain the fact that a 
country which usually favours dialogue 
went through three years of civil war 
before going back to talking ? 
— It is true that we had a war 
that was waged for political reasons. 
Finally, we saw a renewed desire to open 
up a dialogue and reach a negotiated 
solution to the crisis — something the 
French had been advocating since 1992. In 
the beginning, the process did not go very 
well, although, on the FRUD side, there 
was always a wish to settle the dispute by 
peaceful means. Then, at the end of 1993, 
it became possible for direct contact to be 
initiated with the government. 
■ Six months after the signing of the 
peace accord, how do you assess the way in 
which it has been implemented ? 
— The peace accord has its own 
timetable, objectives and mode of appli-
cation. Up to the present time, it has been 
respected. That we cannot deny, although 
there are objective difficulties in particular 
relating to the financial crisis. Generally, we 
have to achieve a change in mentality 
because ¡t is not enough just to conclude a 
peace agreement or attempt reconcili-
ation. There also has to be a real political 
change and a new approach allowing 
everyone to start again. In this way, we will 
achieve the reconstruction, rehabilitation 
and consolidation of our country and 
return to being a state run along normal 
lines. Obviously, there are a number of 
procedures to be followed and conditions 
to be fulfilled. In order that change could 
take place, first and foremost, the FRUD 
had to end the rebellion. This is in the 
process of happening. After this stage, the 
President of the Republic will be able to 
bring in the next part of the programme 
which involves, for example, the formation 
of a new government
1 to include FRUD 
representatives. 
1 This interview took place on 18 May 1995. Since 
then, a new government which includes FRUD 
representatives has been formed (presidential 
decree of 8 June 1995) 
■ As a political movement, what changes 
do you advocate to promote your count-
ry's development ? 
— Primarily, we would recom-
mend a policy of decentralisation, that is to 
say a transfer of competence and resources 
towards organisations throughout the 
entire country. We need, in particular, to 
give greater responsibility to the various 
components making up our nation. We 
then have to clean up the administration 
and management of our state system, with 
far-reaching reforms at a number of levels. 
■ One of the principal terms of the peace 
accord was integration of some of the 
rebels into the regular army. 
— Between 750 and 800 of our 
troops have already been incorporated as 
part of the first phase of FRUD withdrawal 
from the rebel movement. Future stages 
will involve the reintegration of some 
members of our community who fled, 
were captured or who lost certain rights. 
■ Is it not ironic that, although de-
mocratic elections have taken place, the 
biggest opposition movement, the FRUD, 
is not represented in parliament ? 
— The problem is there are a 
great number of factions which have been 
unable to present a united front and 
thereby constitute an opposition force 
capable of confronting those in power. In 
the FRUD, we opted for armed rebellion to 
defend our interests, but the opposition in 
the wider sense has no national or regional 
policy. In point of fact, it is not enough to 
make promises or statements — you have 
to have an impact on events and constitute 
a united force which the people can trust 
and support. We are faced with a very 
complex situation, with a very varied 
opposition and often highly divergent 
personal ambitions. This is the cause of our 
isolation. We intend to transform our rebel 
movement into a political party as en-
visaged in the peace accord. We will 
become the country's fourth political 
party. I am convinced that the formation of 
a coalition government will be a major step 
forward in efforts to get Djibouti back on 
its feet and will also provide evidence for 
foreign donors of our political will to join 
forces and emerge from the current crisis. 
■ If the FRUD is transformed into a 
political party, how will you be able to 
prevent it becoming a mouthpiece of the 
Afars? 
— The FRUD does not just rep-
resent the Afars. Although Afars are in the 
majority within the FRUD, we also have 
Arab and Somali support. Admittedly, our 
demands have reflected the wishes of a 
particular community, but tribalism was 
not the sole raison d'être for our rebellion. 
If it had been, we would not be enjoying 
peace now. Our job at the moment is to 
transform our movement into a political 
party representing the whole nation. 
■ One criticism of the FRUD has been that 
it is made up of 'foreigners' from Eritrea 
and Ethiopia. 
— In times of war, many things 
are insinuated, but it was nevertheless 
with the FRUD that the peace agreement 
was duly concluded. The facts themselves 
therefore refute these allegations. 
■ To conclude, are you optimistic about 
Djibouti's future ? 
— Yes, I am, because things are 
evolving and changing all the time. We will 
be able to start again and I am truly 
optimistic although I do realise that there 
are problems involved in the essential 
change in outlook that people must adopt. 
Djibouti's citizens must realise that their 
country does not produce anything and 
that it is in their interests that they 
themselves should take initiatives to de-
monstrate to the international community 
how they want their country to evolve. ■■ 
Interview by R.D.B. 
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to structural adjustment 
. by Amadou Traoré* 
i ; The Round Table on 'reform and 
I development of the economy of 
the Republic of Djibouti' should 
take place, finally, in October 1995, 
in Geneva, as recently decided by 
the Djibouti authorities. Or, at 
least, it is to be hoped it will take 
place because absolutely every-
thing in Djibouti seems to be on 
hold pending this meeting which 
has already been postponed twice. 
It was scheduled originally for 
April 1995 and was put back to 
May, which would have coincided 
with the French presidential elec-
tions. The official reasons given for 
these successive postponements are firstly 
the need to put further finishing touches to 
preparations for the Round Table, by 
making the maximum number of contacts in 
advance and refining sectoral diagnoses 
and, secondly, the need to allow the new 
regime in France (the principal partner) time 
to familiarise itself with Djibouti's case. Both 
are plausible and valid reasons, but there 
may be a third reason linked to fears based 
on the possible social consequences of the 
proposed reforms. 
But, now, things are becoming 
really urgent. The Geneva meeting must 
take place without delay so that a solution 
can finally be found to the very grave 
financial crisis the country is in, because the 
more time passes the worse the public 
finance situation will become and the 
greater will be the costs of adjustment 
(even if one is reluctant to mention this 
word). This will, nevertheless, not be the 
first time such a policy has been proposed 
in Djibouti. 
In fact, the first attempt to 
implement a structural adjustment pro-
gramme in this small country in the Horn of 
Africa dates back to 1991, just before the 
start of the armed rebellion in the North 
and South-West of the country. It was a 
relatively limited exercise within the 
framework of Lomé IV and its structural 
adjustment fund. Djibouti's small size, the 
relatively simple nature of its economy and 
its problems at the time meant that Europe 
alone was in a position to finance the 
programme. Everyone, including the IMF 
whose financial involvement was not 
sought, was in agreement for Djibouti to 
be an example of adjustment 'after the 
European fashion'. The Commission had 
never before implemented an adjustment 
programme without the support of the 
Bretton Woods institutions, who are the 
'experts' in this field. 
The economic reforms proposed 
at the time entailed the continuation of a 
three-point financial stabilisation pro-
gramme concluded between France and 
the Djibouti government. This encom-
passed : 
— decreasing budgetary aid from France; 
— the repayment of arrears accumulated 
by the state of Djibouti ; 
— the setting-up by the latter of a reserve 
fund to enable it to deal with unforeseen 
expenses. 
The letter sent to the Finance 
Minister, who was the national authorising 
officer for the European Development 
Fund, concerning implementation of the 
adjustment programme was not an-
swered. In fact, initial signs were beginning 
to emerge at this stage of the conflict that 
was to come. This fratricidal struggle was 
to plunge the country into mourning for 
more than two years and cause a terrible 
drain on its finances. 
Today, more than three years 
later, the country's financial position is at 
such a low level that the task of restoring it 
far outstrips the capabilities of a single 
donor. This, at least, was the view of 
Philippe Soubestre, Deputy Director Gen-
eral for Development at the European 
Commission, when he spoke to a top-level 
Djibouti delegation that visited the Com-
mission in March to discuss implementation 
of the reform programme. Suspicious of 
IMF remedies, which have been so dis-
credited in some circles, Djibouti had been 
The easy times have passed 
Djibouti has resolutely to follow the 
path of austerity, endeavour and good 
management 
* Economic adviser at the EC delegation in 
Djibouti. 
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tempted to dispense with the participation 
of this institution. It was fearful of violent 
demonstrations similar to those experien-
ced in a number of other developing 
countries. At the same time, it was keen to 
obtain World Bank aid in areas such as the 
health sector. This was a vain hope. The 
Bank was very quick to peg any assistance 
it gave to a proper programme run with 
the IMF. This was also the position of 
France, the country's principal partner, 
and, more subtly, that of Europe, whose 
contribution was, in this case, more limited 
and more difficult to implement. 
The government had, in fact, 
implicitly accepted the need for adjust-
ment measures for some time by then. This 
is the only way of interpreting its decision 
to prepare the 'Report on the reform and 
development of the economy of the 
Republic of Djibouti', which the authorities 
describe as 'going beyond an adjustment 
programme'. This was adopted in Cabinet 
and, over a period of several months, the 
government came to accept that the 
Round Table, originally intended to deal 
only with health policy, should be ex-
panded to cover all sectors where the 
economy was at a standstill. This shift took 
place quite naturally towards the end of 
last year, from the moment it became 
obvious that health problems could not be 
dealt with outside a wider institutional and 
economic context. It was anticipated that 
sectoral meetings on health, education and 
transport matters would have to be 
organised subsequently. 
Djibouti airport — a productive 
public enterprise 
An important aspect of the reform 
programme relates to the restructuring 
of such enterprises 
The months to come will be 
crucial in fine-tuning the reforms, drawing 
up a timetable for achieving them, agree-
ing monitoring structures and formally 
negotiating the package with the Bretton 
Woods institutions. IMF and World Bank 
delegations are expected to arrive in 
Djibouti this summer. The European Union 
has promised to help the country in these 
delicate negotiations and later to support 
it through the various instruments pro-
vided in the Lomé Convention. In addition 
to the funding available under the Djibouti 
national indicative programme, the Com-
mission may use financing from the Con-
vention's structural adjustment fund. 
Djibouti will have automatic access to this 
once it has signed an agreement with the 
IMF. 
Despite these different sources 
for financing its reform programme, which 
is aimed at correcting the imbalances 
which have accumulated over a number of 
years, the country will not exactly be faced 
with an embarrassment of riches. Its 
budget deficit continues to grow — in one 
year this has increased from DF 2.9 billion 
(approximately ECU 12.6 million) to 
DF 7 billion, according to the latest World 
Bank estimates. The state can no longer 
finance the deficit, having exhausted all 
the resources at its disposal, including the 
assets of public enterprises that it has 
drawn upon. Internal payment arrears are 
put at DF 18 billion and there is an 
increasing balance of payments deficit. 
As the principal cause of these 
imbalances is the military spending con-
nected with the mobilisation of some 
8000 troops to put down the FRUD (Front 
for the Restoration of Unity and De-
mocracy) rebellion, the core of public 
finance stabilisation policy consists in 
demobilising this additional manpower 
rendered useless by the conclusion of the 
peace accord with the FRUD. This will be a 
tricky operation to carry out, because there 
is likely to be considerable discontent on 
the part of the military. The operation is, 
however, essential. 
Another important aspect of the 
reform programme relates to the re-
structuring of the EPPs (productive public 
enterprises) which, in 1993, represented 
16% of Djibouti's GDP and employed 2500 
of the 16 000 workers in the modern 
sector. Such enterprises included the auto-
nomous international port of Djibouti, the 
airport, Djibouti Power, the Djibouti 
National Water Authority and the Office of 
Posts and Telecommunications. It is pro-
posed to strengthen and guarantee their 
autonomy vis-à-vis the authorities by 
means of an undertaking on the part of the 
latter not to interfere in their manage-
ment, particularly in staff policy matters. 
For other companies, it will quite 
simply be a matter of privatisation or 
receivership. However, in all cases, there 
may be negative repercussions on employ-
ment levels which are already depressed. 
This will be the principal problem of this 
exercise which will be undertaken in 
parallel with an attempt to reduce the 
number of public-sector workers by 10% 
(by encouraging voluntary early retire-
ment). For Djibouti, the easy times have 
undoubtedly passed. The country must 
now resolutely follow the path of aus-
terity, endeavour and good management. 
The hope must be that this route 
will allow Djibouti to emerge from its 
current crisis and that it will be shorter and 
less tortuous than the road which led it to 
adopt the reforms in the first place, mm 
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by Frans Baan* 
Cooperation between Djibouti and 
the European Commission began in 
1959, well before the Republic's 
independence in 1977, and when 
the territory was still known as 
French Somaliland. With the cur-
rent Lomé Convention (Lomé IV), 
which came into force at the begin-
ning of 1990 and which is the basis 
for cooperation up to 2000, the 
various cooperation arrangements 
will soon have covered a period of 
40 years. 
Under the terms of the 
different instruments of the Con-
¡ ventions as well as of the Com-
mission's budget, the Republic of Djibouti 
has received approximately ECU 80 million 
at current rates. This figure does not take 
into account involvement in regional 
programmes, valued at approximately ECU 
35 million, from which Djibouti has also 
benefited. 
In financial terms, cooperation 
has increased considerably in the course of 
the more recent Lomé Conventions. This 
followed from Djibouti's independence 
and the decision to set up a properly 
autonomous Commission delegation in the 
country. Over 90% of the aid has been in 
the form of grants, the remainder being 
loans on concessional terms managed by 
the European Investment Bank. 
In these circumstances, and given 
the long-standing nature of the relation-
ship, it has been possible to integrate 
European cooperation into Djibouti's social 
and economic policy. The focal areas for 
cooperation, moreover, have not changed 
markedly over the years. When the re-
lationship began, the key sectors were 
much as they are today : urban and rural 
drinking water supplies, housing and 
drainage, health and education. The re-
lationships developed in these areas are 
therefore well-founded reflecting the 
outcome of an ongoing dialogue. 
The drinking water sector is an 
excellent example of EU/Djibouti cooper-
ation. The 'fight against thirst', as 
Djibouti's President has dubbed it, has 
been a vital subject from the outset. 
Initially, the emphasis was more on urban 
areas and, in particular, water supplies to 
Djibouti City with backing for the construc-
tion of water towers, and pipelines from 
bores in the Loyada coastal plain. The focus 
then gradually shifted to the countryside, 
with the sinking of wells and boreholes, 
and other works. An ambitious pro-
gramme aimed at setting up 61 water 
supply points throughout Djibouti was 
begun in 1991. Unfortunately, it has only 
been possible to complete part of this 
programme up to the present time, owing 
to the country's internal problems which 
began at the end of 1991. 
These achievements, and in par-
ticular the works to exploit surface water 
have, nevertheless, been a success. On the 
Grand Barra (a plain where there is very 
little height variation), the excavations 
have been filled with water several times 
since they were dug, providing some 
10 000 m
3 per excavation ! 
Urban sanitation is the other 
major field of involvement. An ambitious 
'Programme for the Urban Development 
of Djibouti City' (PDUD) aims to clean up 
the old quarters and develop expansion of 
the city towards the adjacent heights of 
Balbala. The Commission is involved in this 
programme together with bodies such as 
the French Cooperation Ministry, the 
World Bank and the African Development 
Bank. European finance is being channelled 
towards drainage provision in District 4 
(under Lomé III) and Districts 1 and 2 (under 
Lomé IV) of the old town. The project aims 
to remove waste water and rainwater. 
Given the site of the old town and its 
height above sea level, this removal 
problem is particularly acute. 
For other reasons and, in par-
ticular, owing to the difficulty of achieving 
alignment of building façades in the older 
districts (a prerequisite for the installation 
of pipelines), the programme has suffered 
delays. It now appears, however, that the 
problems have been overcome and work is 
shortly due to recommence. 
A major training/employment 
programme has also been instituted. This 
involves support for a range of training 
institutions as well as direct actions to help 
Djibouti's craft businesses. It has been 
decided to concentrate efforts mainly in 
this latter area. The first phase of this 
ambitious programme, which began in 
1993, aimed at assisting the National Office 
of Tourism and Crafts (ONTA) and provid-
ing technical and financial support for 
Djibouti's micro-businesses. The overall 
Water installation on the Grand Barra 
plain 
* Head of the European Commission Delegation 
in Djibouti. 
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Drainage in Djibouti City 
objective of the programme is to provide 
work for Djibouti's young people who 
make up the majority of the population 
and who currently have limited prospects. 
Micro-businesses in such varied fields as 
woodworking, metalworking, engineer-
ing, artistic crafts, leatherwork, and so on, 
offer genuine and tangible opportunities 
to improve the chances of finding a job. 
The Djibouti Chamber of Commerce 
(CICID) is also playing an increasingly 
dynamic role in this context, taking on 
responsibility for supporting a previously 
neglected sector by encouraging the 
training of groups of craftsmen in their 
respective trades. 
The field of public health has 
been supported by three types of interven-
tion. First, medicines and medical equip-
ment have been supplied to help the 
country deal with the influx of refugees 
and displaced persons. Second, a number 
of dispensaries have been or are due to be 
established in the interior of the country. 
Third, a decision has been made to 
concentrate on training in the field of 
health. This approach has resulted in the 
construction of the Health Personnel 
Training Centre in Djibouti and in a major 
ongoing training programme. Animal 
health has also received considerable 
assistance both nationally and regionally 
within the context of combating rinder-
pest. At a national level, Community aid 
has been spent on the construction of 
cattle enclosures and other buildings and 
on amenities for veterinary stations. 
The regeneration of plant cover, 
and through this, the production of fodder 
for the stock-breeding sector has been 
started up on the basis of a pilot project in 
the west of the country, on the broad 
Yoboki plains. The results are promising 
and major structures have been planned. 
Although the execution of these plans was 
interrupted by recent events, they will 
shortly be restarted. 
In the area of non-programmable 
aid, support for Djibouti has included 
assistance in combating the scourge of 
cholera, and in financing medicine imports 
to help the country deal with the problem 
of displaced persons and refugees. In 
addition, emergency assistance was pro-
vided to combat serious flooding at the 
end of 1994. Djibouti has also received 
considerable food aid, particularly in the 
form of wheat flour. This has allowed for 
the manufacture and sale of bread at a 
price the population can afford. 
At a regional level, EU aid to the 
republic has always been substantial. 
Firstly, mention should be made of the 
fight against rinderpest. Djibouti has 
received assistance in the context of the 
pan-African campaign to combat the 
disease in the form of assistance for 
vaccination campaigns, the construction 
and equipping of veterinary stations, 
training for technical staff and so on. 
The Djibouti-Ethiopia Railway 
has also benefited from substantial aid in 
the past. This has covered major rehabili-
tation works, training, the supply of tools, 
and even the provision of rails. The line 
running from Djibouti through Dire-Dawa 
to Addis Ababa is of crucial importance for 
Djibouti's economy. The transport 'chain' 
to the hinterland consisting of the port, the 
railway and the feeder roads can only 
function at the speed of its weakest link — 
and this has often been the railway owing 
to disturbances in regions through which 
the line runs. 
In terms of institutional relation-
ships, major emphasis has been placed on 
Cattle enclosure 
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deepening cooperation with IGADD, the 
inter-governmental authority for combat-
ing drought and desertification. Aid in this 
context has included support for cereal-
marketing programmes, remote sensing, 
domestic power supplies and artisanal 
fishing. The member countries of IGADD 
are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, 
Uganda, Kenya and Somalia. 
A programme to create a Re-
gional TelematicServer Centre is also being 
consolidated and is aimed at providing 
access to international databases, and the 
exchange of information and documents 
to support and stimulate trade. 
A regional radio link programme 
connecting the region's principal capitals, 
including Djibouti City, is currently being 
set up with help from the European 
Investment Bank. 
The future of EU/Djibouti 
cooperation looks promising after the 
difficult period the country has just ex-
perienced. 
The second Lomé IV protocol will 
help the Republic deal with problems in 
stimulating the economy so that it can face 
its future development with confidence. 
This involves promoting Djibouti as a major 
commercial port centre in the region. 
Special attention also needs to be given to 
the problem of the poorest members of 
society, providing assistance for them and 
ensuring that basic social welfare provision 
remains intact. 
At regional level, further involve-
ment in overhauling the railway is en-
visaged. This will involve a large-scale 
reconstruction programme which will in-
clude the railway in the Djibouti port area. 
The Commission's contribution to this 
effort is part of the Lomé IV regional 
programme. 
It is therefore fair to say that EU/ 
Djibouti cooperation is operating satisfac-
torily despite the recent slowdown. 
Trade relations between Djibouti 
and Europe are, however, still very one-
sided. In 1993, 40% of Djibouti's imports 
came from Europe but the latter was the 
destination for only about 2% of thè 
country's exports. 
Opportunities available to 
Djibouti in the commercial area are thus 
The development of the craft field will 
create jobs 
not yet being exploited to the full, 18 years 
after the country became independent. 
Djibouti, however, has plans to make 
greater use of the trade opportunities 
offered by Lomé IV. It has in mind, in 
particular, the construction of an industrial 
free zone with a view to exploiting its 
advantageous regional location. ■■ F.B. 
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Status quo and national 
reconciliation 
Traditionally, newly independent 
African countries mark their transition to a 
new era by obliterating colonial symbols 
and replacing them with ones of national 
significance. In these exercises, the streets of 
the capital are usually the first 'casualties'. 
Despite the emotions this subject evokes in 
the last African country to be decolonised, 
Namibia has gone against the grain. All but a 
few of the streets of the capital, Windhoek, 
have retained their colonial names, even 
those that evoked bitter memories like 
Coering and General Lother von Trotha. To 
critics, this symbolises the status quo. To 
others it demonstrates the Government's 
commitment to national reconciliation. 
It has been five years since Na-
mibia became independent following the 
UN-supervised elections of November 
1989. These brought SWAPO to power 
after 23 years of armed struggle against 
South Africa's illegal administration of the 
territory. As in South Africa following the 
ANC's electoral triumph in April 1994, 
SWAPO's victory raised high expectations 
among Namibians for social justice and 
improvements in living conditions. Their 
principal expectations were a radical land 
redistribution, access to better education 
and jobs, better wages and a narrowing of 
the gap in the standard of living between 
the white community and the black 
The Windhoek 'suburb' of Katatura. 
Still a place where misery abounds. 
population. Although independence has 
brought priceless freedoms — freedom of 
expression and freedom to live and work 
anywhere and with whoever one wishes, 
today those aspirations are far from being 
fulfilled. Despite having, on paper, one of 
the highest incomes per capita in Africa, 
abject poverty is widespread in Namibia. 
Indeed there is a growing army of child 
street beggars these days in Windhoek. 
A first-time visitor to the Na-
mibian capital can hardly fail to notice the 
inheritance of apartheid during the morn-
ing rush hour when Africans are bused in 
for work from the overcrowded township 
of Katatura. This 'suburb' of Windhoek, 
with few amenities, came into being in 
1959 when blacks were dumped there 
having being moved from the Old Location 
in Windhoek. Although Katutura has been 
accepted by the black population, many of 
whom have begun to put up better 
houses, and the Government has, over the 
past five years, been carryng out a pro-
gramme of renovations and rehousing, 
water provision, electrification and road 
construction, it is still a place where misery 
abounds. Large numbers of people arrive 
there daily from the countryside looking 
for non-existent jobs, putting a tremend-
ous strain on the township's meagre 
facilties and creating an atmosphere of 
insecurity. The coloured people, mean-
while, continue to live in Khomasdal which 
is a better-planned town with more 
facilities, while the whites live in the 
garden-city that is Windhoek itself. In this 
situation, there is a palpable sense of 
resentment and bitterness which must 
surely be undermining the government's 
policy of national reconciliation. 
This policy has been something of 
a one-way street, with SWAPO reaching 
out to the white community, so far 
unsuccessfully, to pull together and tackle 
Namibia's pressing problems of inequality, 
unemployment and poverty. Whether this 
lack of response is due to resentment over 
loss of political power or fear of losing 
economic dominance is difficult to as-
certain. White entrepreneurs have shown 
a distinct lack of interest in investing in job-
creating enterprises or in human resources. 
And matters are not helped by the 
provocative actions of some people. In 
August last year, there was a celebration 
by a group of rightwingers of the birthday 
of Adolf Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess. Some 
continue to hanker for a 'whites-only' 
homeland, while the white population of 
Walvis Bay has resisted the effective 
political and economic reintegration of the 
former enclave into Namibia. 
Unemployment crisis 
This obvious lack of cooperation 
has meant that, despite the government's 
dedication to job creation since coming to 
power five years ago, unemployment has 
reached crisis proportions. Indeed last May, 
unemployed former SWAPO guerrillas 
took to the streets in protest. It took the 
charisma and reassuring skills of President 
Sam Nujoma himself to calm their anger. 
Despite these economic problems 
and SWAPO's perceived lack of radicalism, 
Namibians gave a vote of confidence to the 
organisation by returning it to office with 
an increased majority in December last 
year. This suggests that that they do not 
lay the blame at the government's door-
step. In the elections, SWAPO won 53 of 
^ 
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the 72 seats in Parliament — 11 more than 
in 1989. President Nujoma performed even 
better, securing 76.3% of the votes cast in 
what was the first direct presidential 
election. 
SWAPO's victory at the polls 
stunned the main opposition party, the 
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) which 
won only 15 seats. Its presidential can-
didate attracted only 22% of the votes. The 
DTA, it should be recalled, has a colonial 
background ; it was considered almost as a 
creation of South African. Perceived often 
wrongly as a whites-only party, it began in 
fact as a coalition of all the ethnic groups 
that took part in the constitutional con-
ference called by South Africa in 1975 to 
discuss the future of Namibia. It contested 
the 1978 election organised by South 
Africa within the framework of its internal 
peace plan, an election which SWAPO 
boycotted and which the DTA, not surpris-
ingly, went on to win decisively. The 
alliance was involved in the territory's 
administration until 1985 when a trans-
itional government was formed under the 
UN. 
No longer financed by South 
Africa, the DTA has tried to broaden its 
appeal with policies that are not dissimilar 
to those of SWAPO in such areas as 
national reconciliation, affirmative action 
and environmental protection. However, 
as last December's elections showed, these 
policies failed to attract support. The DTA, 
in fact, may be in terminal decline. The fact 
that it is getting weaker is something that 
Hans Erik Staby, its financial spokesman, 
frankly admits. SWAPO, Mr Staby told The 
Courier, has no serious rival. 'Only when 
the movement is seen no longer as 
liberator from the colonial yoke but as 
purveyor of misery,' he argued, would the 
'roles of government and opposition be 
interchangeable.' Considering the depth of 
misery into which apartheid plunged the 
Namibian people, and the fact that the 
situation can only improve, not worsen, as 
one SWAPO official pointed out, it does 
indeed look as though the DTA faces a long 
time in political limbo. 
Inevitably this situation has given 
rise to concerns in certain quarters over the 
future of democracy in Namibia, especially 
when SWAPO has the majority it needs to 
change the Constitution if it desires. Such 
concerns, however, are not shared by 
western diplomats. Indeed the German 
ambassador has been quoted as saying 
that 'even if a one-party state develops, 
the democratic foundation of Namibia will 
remain unchanged.' 
That optimism is based on 
SWAPO's track record, since indepen-
dence, of respect for the rule of law and 
regard for the Constitution. Nowhere has 
this been more evident than on the 
question of land which, it is generally 
agreed, is at the root of the poverty of the 
black majority and of the inequalities in 
Namibian society. As in South Africa, 
colonialism and apartheid deprived Na-
mibians of most of their viable farm land. 
Two thirds of such land, made up largely of 
commercial ranches, was and still is owned 
by whites, half of whom live abroad. 
About 4500 white farmers work on these 
ranches. For years, Namibians were con-
fined to animal husbandry on communal 
lands : effectively providing reserves of 
cheap labour from where manpower could 
be drawn for the commercial ranches and 
mines. Only 5% of the entire country is 
suitable for crop cultivation. This is located 
in the far north where about 120 000 
families eke out a living. Virtually nothing 
was done to improve production in the 
communal lands during the colonial 
regime. As long as the commercial ranches 
produced for domestic consumption and 
for export, and the mines earned foreign 
exchange, everything could be (and was) 
imported from South Africa. Over the 
decades, the gap in incomes between 
indigenous Namibians and white people 
widened to such an extent that by 1990, it 
was estimated that whites earned an 
average of 20 times more than blacks. 
Land reform 
At independence, SWAPO was 
expected, as a matter of top priority, to 
carry out a radical land redistribution in 
order to redress the situation. However, 
the Land Reform Act, which was passed by 
Parliament in October 1994, was anything 
but radical, and government officials, in 
the face of growing criticism, appear 
understandably uneasy when the issue is 
broached. Prime Minister Hage Geingob 
explains the situation in terms of legality 
and justice. 'Unless you have won a war, 
your enemies have raised their arms in 
surrender and you seize their land', he told 
The Courier, 'you just cannot ignore other 
people's rights. We are saying that existing 
property rights will be respected. Of course 
we live in a new era with new morals, but it 
is all part and parcel of the government's 
national reconciliation drive which makes 
sound economic sense.' 
An issue of such economic im-
portance for the future of Namibia requires 
caution and above all consensus among the 
major players. Indeed in 1991 a national 
conference on land was convened. Al-
though the conference accepted the prin-
ciple of reform, it rejected expropriation as 
a solution, recommending instead a ban on 
foreign ownership of agricultural land and 
on the purchase of large tracts by in-
dividuals. The Reform Act took these 
recommendations on board. Foreigners 
who wish to acquire land in Namibia must 
prove beyond doubt that they intend to 
develop it and must receive the approval of 
the Minister of Lands. The Acts limits to 
5000 hectares the size of holding an 
individual can have and foresees taxes on 
unutilised large pieces of land. Although it 
prohibits expropriation, it nevertheless 
provides a mechanism to enable the 
Government to acquire land. Anyone 
wishing to sell his or her land must give the 
Government the first option and the 
Government is not obliged to accept the 
price quoted. 'That is the catch,' says Prime 
Minister Geingob, but he went on to point 
out that 'unfortunately we will be buying 
back our own land.' 
The sum of N$20 million was set 
aside in the last budget to enable the 
Government to start a buying programme. 
As and when the land becomes available, it 
will be bought and distributed to those 
who can develop it, according to Agricul-
ture Minister Mbumba, although it is not 
certain at what pace the land will become 
available. However, new jobs depend not 
so much on the availability of agricultural 
land as on the various measures which the 
Government has taken over the past five 
years to produce growth in fisheries, 
agriculture and tourism. With the return of 
Walvis Bay to Namibia the prospects for 
foreign investment in manufacturing are 
good. ■■ Augustin Oyowe 
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Struggling for the 'economic 
empowerment' of Namibians 
An interview with President Sam Nujoma 
For 23 years Sam Nujoma led the 
South West African People's Or-
ganisation (SWAPO) in a bitter 
armed struggle against apartheid 
South Africa for the independence 
of Namibia. South Africa had held 
on to the territory illegally despite 
the termination of its mandate in 
1966 by the United Nations. Follow-
ing a UN-brokered peace, Mr 
Nujoma returned from exile in 
September 1989 to lead SWAPO in 
ρ re-independence elections which the Or-
ganisation won by securing 42 seats in the 
72-seat Constituent Assembly. In February 
1990 Sam Nujoma was elected President by 
the Assembly and last year, in the first direct 
presidential election, he was returned to 
office by a huge majority winning 76.2% of 
the votes cast. 
Combative as ever for justice 
and equality. President Nujoma agreed to 
be interviewed by The Courier. Among 
other things, we discussed democracy, 
national reconciliation, and transparency 
and accountability in government. 
■ Mr President, you and SWAPO were 
returned to office by an overwhelming 
majority last December. However, the 
increasing weakness of the opposition has 
created a certain uneasiness about the 
future of democracy here with fears that 
Namibia may slowly drift into a de facto 
one-party state. Do you understand this 
uneasiness ? 
— In the first place, democracy, 
freedom and justice were brought about 
by SWAPO and SWAPO is committed to 
maintaining them through the involve-
ment of the people. Namibians must 
participate in the affairs of the State and be 
involved in the decision-making process 
and that is precisely what we are en-
couraging. Good governance demands 
that. For example, we believe in the 
equality of the sexes. In the 1992 regional 
and local government elections, SWAPO 
reserved a certain number of constituen-
cies for women to contest — which they 
won. That is clearly seen today in towns 
like Tsumeb, Grootfontein and Mariental 
where women are mayors. Windhoek also 
had a woman mayor for a while. This was 
the decision of the SWAPO party alone. It 
was not proposed to us or imposed on us 
by anybody and nobody had to preach to 
us about democracy. It stems from the fact 
that over 55% of our population are 
women and we could not tolerate a 
situation where men, who are in a mi-
nority, took all the decisions affecting the 
majority. It was obvious to us that women 
had to be brought along and encouraged 
to participate if we wanted to create a 
strong foundation of democratic culture in 
this country. This policy of involving people 
in the day-to-day decision-making that 
affects their lives was adopted when 
SWAPO was fighting for the liberation of 
Namibia. 
■ It is very heartening to hear about 
SWAPO's success in establishing social 
justice but I was referring to the inef-
fectiveness of the opposition party and the 
possibility of a de facto one-party state. 
Will SWAPO, in the light of that weakness, 
be relying more on open internal debate ? 
— We have democracy within 
SWAPO. Leaders are elected by the cong-
ress whether at a regional, district or 
branch level. So what is all this about 
democracy? Members of SWAPO have 
travelled all over the world — in the 
Americas, in Africa, in the former commun-
ist countries — and have seen different 
systems. We make our own decisions based 
on what is in the best interests of Na-
mibians. So you are being unduly con-
cerned about whether there will be or not 
a one-party state here. 
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■ SWAPO has the necessary majority to 
change the Constitution and, if I am not 
mistaken, you have indicated that it needs 
changing. Will you be doing that ? 
— Please don't put words in my 
mouth. We have here in Namibia, a 
Constitution which is a basic document 
guiding our nation, and it is respected. If 
there is a need for us to amend any clause 
we will call a referendum and invite the 
people to decide. If it is carried then that 
will be the wish of the majority of 
Namibians. SWAPO so far has not decided 
to change any clause, but if it becomes 
necessary it will be done. Constitutions are 
not binding forever ; they can be amended 
in the interests of the people. 
■ Devolution of powers to the regions 
was once at the forefront of political 
debate here. Somehow the issue seems to 
have disappeared. What is the govern-
ment's position on this ? 
— We have regional governors 
and local councillors, and we also have an 
upper house called the National Council, 
which is made up of representatives from 
all the regions in the Republic. All the 
institutions are functioning very well. I 
don't understand what you are talking 
about. Why don't you go to the regions 
and find out what is happening? 
■ How is national reconciliation going ? 
— We adopted the policy of 
national reconciliation while we were in 
exile. We fought a war that was imposed 
on us, a racial war against a minority of 
white settlers who came from Europe, 
occupied our territory and deprived us of 
land, freedom, justice and equality. We 
had no choice but to take up arms and 
fight. We fought for 23 years and defeated 
them. We, however, decided to offer to 
those who wanted to become Namibian 
nationals our hand of friendship through a 
policy of national reconciliation based on 
equality before the law. That policy, which 
has been accepted by the majority of our 
people, is flourishing in Namibia. 
We still have neo-Nazi elements 
here who celebrate Hitler's birthday and 
who sometimes cause trouble. But they are 
an insignificant minority and we have the 
capacity to deal with them. 
We also have racist Boers who 
want to divide our country. Some are even 
claiming territories stretching from the 
southern part of Windhoek, which they 
want to incorporate into a Boerland — a 
white South African homeland where the 
black man will never set foot. Certainly it 
will never happen. It is a dream that will 
not come true, but it is an insult to the 
integrity of the African people. We also 
have the capacity to deal with them. 
'A policy 
of national 
reconciliation based 
on equality 
before the law' 
■ You mentioned land. The Land Reform 
Act has been enacted but critics say it does 
not address the disportionate distribution 
of land between commercial farmers and 
communal farmers ? 
— Land reform is one of the most 
difficult issues we have had to face. I think 
our decision was taken in the interests of all 
concerned. We are dealing with it the 
Namibian way, with the aim of ensuring 
that every Namibian has accessio land. The 
process will be long, because we have only 
just started. Even countries which achieved 
independence long before us have still not 
resolved the land problem, but we are 
determined to resolve ours in the interest 
of all Namibians. 
■ Respect for human rights, transparency 
and accountability are now the yardsticks 
used by donors to determine a country's 
eligibility for assistance. How committed is 
your government to these principles ? 
— We do not want to be sub-
jected to this kind of thing by foreigners 
who want to impose their way of life on us. 
We fought for the liberation of our country 
and we know precisely what we want and 
how to get it. 
What we are advocating is trade 
and cooperation. We are not asking for 
assistance. Those who do not want to give 
us aid don't need to. We have resources 
which we want to sell to those who can 
buy them, and we can also make purchases 
from them. We welcome humanitarian 
assistance — and also give such assistance 
where we can, for example, to Rwanda 
when this was necessary. If we have a 
drought, and donors want to help those 
affected, we will accept the offers as 
genuine. But for them to impose their 
foreign policy because of aid is deplorable. 
We totally reject that in Namibia. 
Λ Are you applying a policy of affirmative 
action ? 
— Yes we are. The majority of 
Namibians were denied education and 
even employment for a long time. There 
were also whites who were denied rights, 
either because they were members of 
SWAPO or because they were sympa-
thisers who stood for the principles of 
equality and human rights. They were 
subjected to all kinds of mistreatment, 
their children could not go to school, they 
had no jobs and no money. So we employ 
them : I have ministers who are whites in 
my government and even some who are 
not members of SWAPO. 
■ The creation of jobs has been govern-
ment priority since independence. It is still a 
very serious problem. How confident are 
you of being able to overcome it ? 
— The problem is very acute in 
the sense that we inherited one and a half 
million of our own citizens who are 
uneducated, untrained and unskilled. We 
have vast resources — uranium, gold, 
copper, zinc and so on, and we are unable 
to exploit them for the benefit of our 
people because we do not have the 
necessary educated and trained workforce. 
We did not even have skilled workers like 
bricklayers, plumbers or electricians, be-
cause every profession was reserved for 
whites. 
We consider that having won the 
first phase of our struggle, for political 
emancipation, we are now in the seond 
phase. This is the struggle for the economic 
empowerment of the indigenous people. 
We have the weapons but not the ammu-
nition as yet. That ammunition is the 
education of our children as agricultural-
ists, veterinarians, geologists, marine biol-
ogists and so on. So we have been 
investing in and paying particular atten-
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probably continue to increase given the 
fact it has a larger population. For ex-
ample, we would like to increase our beef, 
mutton and fish supplies to South Africa, 
and buy some of the things we need from 
there. Trade cooperation with South Africa 
will certainly be promoted by my govern-
ment. 
■ Relations between the European Union 
and Namibia have strengthened since 
Namibia became independent five years 
ago. How do you see this relationship 
developing in future ? 
— Cooperation between Na-
mibia and the European Union since our 
independence has certainly been beneficial 
to Namibia. We sell our beef and other 
products to the EU and we receive substan-
tial humanitarian assistance. I would like to 
stress this excellent relationship for which 
we are grateful. H interview by A.o 
tion to education at all levels — primary, 
secondary and university. We established a 
university two years ago (although it has 
not yet got all the faculties), and we have 
created several technical institutions. Oth-
ers are being created at regional level. We 
set up the Development Brigade Corpor-
ation, a parastal, specifically to provide 
vocational training for electricians, me-
chanics, carpenters, bricklayers and so on. It 
is even helping to train people who are 
illiterate — and we are already beginning 
to see the results. Some of the graduates 
have gone on to set up their own small 
businesses. Of course, it will take at least 
ten years to train the real professionals. We 
are not sitting down with our arms crossed. 
We have a programme in this area which 
we will certainly carry out. 
■ Mr President, no country can develop in 
isolation. There has to be some form of 
regional cooperation and integration. 
Relations between Namibia and South 
Africa have historically been very close. The 
end of apartheid and the assumption of 
office by the ANC have opened a com-
pletely new chapter in that relationship. 
Do you see integration with South Africa 
going faster than overall regional integ-
ration ? 
'The problem of unemployment is very 
acute' 
This is Katutura, a sprawling suburb of 
Windhoek and home to many 
Namibians who cannot find jobs 
— Politically we in Namibia be-
lieve in the unity of Africa. First, we are 
striving to implement the Abuja Treaty of 
1991 which established the Economic 
Community of Africa. That is our top 
priority as far as our foreign and national 
policies are concerned. We also attach 
great importance to the regional economic 
groupings like SADC and COMESA in which 
we are involved and we want to work 
together with other African economic 
groupings like Ecowas in West Africa and 
the Arab-Maghreb Union in North Africa. 
We see these as the ladders we need to 
climb and finally end up implementing the 
Abuja Treaty. That is our main objective in 
this area. 
As to our relationship with South 
Africa, we are already together in the 
SADC family and we also have bilateral 
relations. As you say correctly, no country 
can live in isolation. South Africa is our 
closest neighbour and we have close 
economic ties. Much of our trade — over 
70% — is with that country, and this will 
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managing national 
resources 
One of the most shameful aspects of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia 
¡ was the inordinate exploitation, for decades, of the country's natural resources by 
f all comers. Even as recently as 1986, a commission of enquiry under South African 
I High Court Judge, Pieter Thirion, reported that mining companies were, among 
i other malpractices, rapidly depleting Namibia's mineral resources. In the country's 
¡ waters, which contain one of the richest fishing grounds in the world, fleets from 
I several nations plundered the stocks. The greatest challenge facing SWAPO, on 
I coming to power, was to put an end to this 'pillage', take control of the country's 
: natural resource base, particularly its minerals and fish stocks (which, together 
with livestock, make up the backbone of the economy) and get to grips with 
economic management. 
Namibia is effectively a 
.·., minerals 'paradise', coming high 
in the world rankings in a variety of 
products. It is the leading producer of gem-
diamonds (accounting for around 30% of 
the world's total output), has the largest 
uranium mine and some of the biggest 
known reserves of tin and lithium. It is also 
the world's second largest producer of 
lead, third in cadmium production and 
fourth in zinc and copper. Other important 
minerals include tungsten, silver, gold, 
vanadium and salt. Mining accounts for 
28% of the Gross Domestic Product and 
over 70% of export earnings. Three big 
foreign companies linked to South Africa 
dominate the sector — Consolidated 
Diamond Mines (CDM), owned by De 
Beers, in diamond mining, Rössing, part of 
the Rio Tinto-Zinc (RTZ) group, in uranium 
and The Tsumeb Corporation in base-
metals. 
Of all the new arrangements 
which the government has made with the 
mining companies, none is as interesting as 
the one with CDM. It has taken a 50% 
equity share alongside CDM in a new 
company called NAMDEB Corporation 
which began operation in November last 
year. The Government not only expects 
higher revenues from this arrangement, 
but also hopes, above all, to gain a better 
knowledge of how the diamond industry 
operates. 'We want to know what goes 
on, how much is produced and actually 
sold and eventually have a say as to where 
the diamonds go', says Trade and Industry 
Minister, Hidipo Hamutenya. He con-
responsible for no less than 98% of the 
conglomerate's gemstone output. In 1989, 
CDM transferred its sorting and valuation 
activities f rom South Africa to its gleaming, 
high-rise offices on Independence Avenue 
in Windhoek, bringing in the process, a 
number of jobs for Namibians. 
Fishing 
As already mentioned, Namibia 
has one of the richest fishing grounds in the 
the world. At one time, the sector was 
second only in importance to mining. 
However, it was dominated by foreign 
interests. Inshore fishing for pilchards, rock 
lobsters and anchovies was controlled by 
tinues ; 'We will also learn how diamonds 
are cut and polished. It would be very 
irresponsible of us not to do this as a 
diamond producing country. India, which 
has no diamond deposits, has a huge 
industry cutting and polishing our dia-
monds — which are then brought back 
here and sold to us. They only add value 
and we pay exorbitant prices. We can 
actually establish our own cutting and 
polishing industry.' 
CDM has shown pragmatism in 
coming to this type of arrangement in 
Southern Africa : it has a similar one with 
Botswana, for example. Although Namibia 
provides less than 5% of the De Beers 
group's overall diamond production, it is 
Ore crusher at the Rössing uranium 
mine 
Namibia is effectively a minerals 
'paradise' 
South African companies based in Walvis 
Bay and Lüderitz while offshore fishing 
was the exclusive domain of foreign 
(particularly Spanish) distant water fleets, 
who took their catches to their home ports 
for processing. 
The Government now appears to 
have established full control of the sector 
and has transformed fishing into a truly 
Namibian industry. It has done this mainly 
by stipulating that foreign fishing com-
panies operating in the country's waters 
must be in joint-ventures with Namibians. 
Although Namibians themselves are free 
the Courier n" 153 · september-october 1995 r to establish their own companies, they are 
also being urged to go into partnership 
with foreign operators. The response has 
been encouraging : there are now a good 
number of local fishing companies, en-
couraged no doubt by a further stipulation 
that a certain portion of the fishing quota 
must be reserved for newcomers to the 
industry. Investment capital may be a 
problem for the indigenous entrepreneur, 
but the special quota allocation is designed 
to give them a strong bargaining chip. 
'Once you have that piece of paper 
allocating you a quota, you can negotiate 
easily with a foreign partner, because you 
have the fish and they have the boats', says 
Agriculture Minister, Nagola Mbumba. 
'We have also tried as much as possible to 
ensure that fish processing is carried out 
onshore in Namibia, so that jobs can be 
created. That has helped to make it even 
more a Namibian industry.' In fact, fish 
processing offers great potential for job 
creation. The development of Walvis Bay, 
especially the Export Processing Zone, will 
present opportunities that should enable 
the country to realise its full potential in 
terms of both employment and foreign 
earnings. 
The government has been aware 
of the danger of overfishing since Na-
mibia's independence and conservation 
has been a top priority. It has established 
an annual catch quota system for certain 
varieties, especially sardines which are 
known to move up and down the coast. 
A scene from five years ago : a foreign 
trawler lies idle in Lüderitz harbour 
after being arrested for illegal fishing in 
Namibian waters 
Pirate fishing is no longer a serious 
problem thanks to effective surveillance 
and enforcement 
The result this year has been some unrest 
among fishermen because the quota was 
filled too early. Quotas are based on the 
results of scientific surveys. Although the 
1994/95 quota of 50 000 metric tonnes, 
distributed among 50 companies, has been 
adjusted upwards, it is still smaller than 
that of 1992/93 season. Having received 
scientific advice that the stocks are moving 
towards Angola, the government has 
refused to increase the allowable catch any 
further, illustrating in the process its 
commitment to conservation. 
The government is also in full 
control as far as the policing of Namibia's 
200-mile exclusive economic zone is con-
cerned. This is especially true, now that 
Walvis Bay has been transferred to Na-
mibian sovereignty. South Africa's con-
tinued occupation of the enclave had been 
a hindrance. Some 25 foreign deep-sea 
trawlers are licensed to fish within the EEZ. 
'We have taken action against those who 
challenged our 200-mile limit : we have 
arrested them and impounded their 
boats', says Mr Mbumba. 'It is well 
established that, for the past two years, no 
one has tried to fish illegally in our waters 
and we have had no trouble with anyone. 
We have been lucky enough to get 
powerful patrol boats from Norway and a 
helicopter from Japan. And now that we 
have friendly neighbours to the South and 
to the North, we are coordinating surveil-
lance and would catch anyone who tries 
any tricks.' 
The environment and 
wildlife 
Control has also been extended 
to the environment, which was con-
siderably damaged by the effects of the old 
apartheid regime, as well as to another 
precious resource — the country's wildlife. 
Namibia's fragile ecology suffered in the 
past from the fact that indigenous people 
were obliged to live in the communal areas 
under apartheid and the result was over-
crowding and deforestation. By contrast, 
the commercial farmlands, with just 4500 
farms, were thinly populated. The effects 
of the policy are vividly revealed in 
Ovambo which is the most densely popu-
lated region. In addition, under the col-
onial regime, farmers received neither 
training nor advice in the crucial area of 
environmental protection. Namibia's live-
stock industry is the country's second 
largest foreign earner and this is reflected 
in the animal 'population' figures - more 
than 2 million cattle, 2 million goats and 3 
million sheep. Overgrazing is a very serious 
problem, especially given that there are no 
possibilities of farming for fodder. Na-
mibia's annual rainfall, which ranges from 
as little as 50mm in the south to 700mm in 
the north, renders this type of cultivation 
impossible. 
In areas with some forest cover, 
deforestation is continuing due to demand 
for firewood. The government is taking 
measures to limit the damage. It provides 
agricultural advice services in communal 
areas and is encouraging small-scale tree 
planting and the use of alternative fuels 
such as biogas in Ovambo and elsewhere. 
Two years ago it began to encourage 
communal farmers to move to areas which 
provide better farming conditions and, in 
this regard, set up a loan scheme to enable 
them to buy the land. 
As part of a tourism develop-
ment programme which was drawn up 
with the assistance of the European Union, 
Namibia's wildlife resources are to be 
better managed. The aims are conserva-
"t 
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tion and the development of eco-tourism, 
particularly in the communal areas. The 
plan being drawn up by the Ministry of 
Wildlife and Tourism, which will be pre-
sented to Parliament for approval, involves 
giving responsibility for resource manage-
ment to the communal farmers. Currently 
all animals in the communal areas belong 
to the state. Under the plan, which has 
already been approved by the cabinet, 
game on any farm will belong to the 
farmer in question. It will be his respons-
ibility to protect and utilise the game. 'This 
will not only provide communal farmers 
with additional income but also help 
promote our policy of conservation,' says 
Minister of Wildlife and Tourism, Gert 
Hanekom. 
This move is no doubt in recog-
nition of the fact that game has always 
been an important source of food and 
income for Namibian farmers. Indeed, in 
the mid-1970s, when venison production 
reached its peak, a processing plant wasset 
up in Windhoek with the assistance of the 
EU and a certain quantity was even 
exported to the European market. There 
are hopes that the industry can be revived, 
bearing in mind that, as a matter of policy, 
culling is undertaken to maintain the 
country's ecological balance. 
Tourism: a major future 
player 
It should be noted that Namibia's 
tourist industry grew remarkably in the 
period immediately after independence. 
The interest generated by this event 
brought a wave of curious visitors. Al-
though numbers have fallen somewhat in 
past two years, Namibia has tasted the 
fruits of tourism and is serious about 
reversing this trend. It's objective is to 
attract more visitors and make the industry 
a major player in the country's economy. 
'We have a lot to offer,' Mr Hanekom told 
The Courier. 'We are one of a handful of 
countries that have balanced and wide-
spread attractions — desert, sea, game 
hunting, wildlife and so on. I feel sure that 
with the proper promotion, and expanded 
and improved services, we could attract 
more visitors.' Currently Namibia wel-
comes about 280 000 visitors a year. In Mr 
Hanekom's opinion, this figure could easily 
rise to 630 000 by 2002 in view of all the 
developments that are taking place. 
Tourism is one of the areas that 
investors have shown considerable interest 
in over the past five years, and the 
government is counting on the private 
sector to expand the sector further. 'We 
intend to create a parastatal, a sort of 
Tourism Board, which will be controlled by 
the private sector and will be responsible 
for promoting, marketing and grading of 
hotels. It will take over all government 
resources — resorts, camps, game lodges, 
nature reserve parks and so on, and if 
possible, privatise them,' says the Minister. 
As the government takes effect-
ive control of Namibia's resources and 
manages them rationally, revenues are 
beginning to come in. The country is not as 
cash-strapped as it was two or three years 
ago. That, in itself, has required the 
Aiming to attract the tourist dollar 
Namibia hopes to more than double 
the number of visitors by 2002 
government to exercise prudent economic 
management — an important factor in 
Namibia's good credit rating. It has bor-
rowed moderately and kept its inter-
national debts low. 
Although Namibia has intro-
duced its own currency, the Namibian 
dollar, this is kept at parity with the rand 
and the latter is still legal tender in the 
country. Being in the Rand Monetary Area 
has, of course, restricted the scope for an 
independent economic policy. Inflation is 
currently running at 12% per annum. 
However, the government has prevented 
it rising faster through the operation of a 
tight monetary policy. It has resisted the 
temptation to print more money in times 
of difficulty or to increase spending now 
that revenues have increased. 'We observe 
international standards because we do not 
live in isolation,' says Deputy Finance 
Minister, B. Kukuri. 'Even when we have 
deficits, we finance them in a way that 
does not endanger our future develop-
ment. We have been able to keep the 
deficits down to around 5% of GDP which is 
the internationally accepted level.' 
These five years of independence 
have been a period of establishment and 
consolidation. Despite the difficulties, the 
verdict appears to be that SWAPO has 
accomplished a great deal and is poised to 
realise its major goals of creating jobs and 
improving the standards of living of the 
majority black population, ne AO. 
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Improving living conditions: 
problems and prospects 
In 1990, when SWAPO came to 
power, it promised to improve 
living conditions and fight poverty 
and ignorance through job creation 
and education — a tall order for an 
organisation which had been fight-
ing in the bush for over 23 years. 
Namibia has a narrowly based 
economy and its population is 
largely uneducated, untrained and 
unskilled. Although it has a relat-
ively high GDP per capita of around 
US $1500, income distribution is 
highly distorted in favour of the 
white minority. 
Ask any Namibian minister what 
the achievements of the government have 
been during these five years of indepen-
dence and he will almost certainly refer, 
first and foremost, to the establishment of 
peace and harmony in the country — 'rare 
commodities in the world today and a 
prerequisite for whatever will follow,' says 
Prime Minister Hage Geingob. What has 
been achieved in terms of improved living 
conditions and better education may seem 
modest when measured against the mag-
nitude of the problems. Yet SWAPO's 
performance has been magnificent given 
the meagreness of the resources at its 
disposal. 
Projects such as the renovation 
and rehousing scheme in Katutura, con-
struction of better highways and rural 
roads, new schools, clinics and so on are 
visible evidence of the efforts that are 
being made. Measures have been taken 
that are quietly relieving the harsh living 
conditions and laying the foundations for 
sustained economic development. 
Land distribution 
The question of land distribution, 
which is at the root of the imbalance in 
income distribution, has been dealt with 
elsewhere in this Report. A Land Act has 
been passed which aims, in the long term, 
at giving indigenous Namibians greater 
access to land. In the meantime, the focus 
has been on boosting the agricultural 
production of the 980 000 Namibians who 
live on just 23% of the viable communal 
land. About a quarter of these (some 
250 000) are livestock producers in the 
north. For many years, these small-scale 
farmers were effectively denied particip-
ation in the mainstream cash economy 
thanks to a veterinary cordon fence that 
was erected to prevent their cattle moving 
southward where white commercial far-
mers produce for export. Livestock in 
Namibia graze on free range. 
Beef production is the most 
important agricultural activity, accounting 
for 90% of commercial output. 80% of the 
beef produced is exported to South Africa 
and the European Union, both of which 
impose strict health requirements. The 
amount of smallholder production 
reaching South Africa is less than 1% of 
total exports, the rest being sold domesti-
cally either live or as carcases. 
The veterinary cordon fence is 
designed to keep out foot and mouth 
disease to which northern Namibia is 
exposed from neighbouring countries. The 
purpose is to retain the country's inter-
national classification as a disease-free area 
and thus maintain its access for beef to the 
EU market where it has a quota and enjoys 
preferential prices. When the Government 
assumed office, it was faced with the 
dilemma of either removing the fence and 
risk ruining a vital industry, or tolerating 
the continuing injustice against communal 
farmers by taking no action. It came up 
instead with a creative scheme which 
involves intensive vaccination of smallhol-
der stocks. With the help of the EU, it has 
also been setting up new quarantine areas 
where farmers wishing to sell their animals 
can have them properly checked and 
declared fit before being sold to a farmers' 
meat processing company which the Min-
istry of Agriculture has helped set up. The 
company has processing plants in Wind-
hoek, Okahandja, Oshakati and elsewhere. 
'We are pleased that with this scheme, our 
farmers now have access to the market 
which they did not have previously,' says 
Minister of Agriculture, Nagola Mbumba. 
'If they want to sell their cattle, they can do 
so and get better prices. We are also 
providing a certain amount of subsidy to 
those whose animals are underweight.' 
Although Namibia is self-suf-
ficient in beef, it imports 90% of its other 
food requirements. This is a result of both 
history and geography. The colonial 
government did nothing to encourage 
cultivation of food crops which were easily 
Free range grazing 
The government faced a dilemma over 
the veterinary cordon fence 
"I 
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imported from South Africa. Furthermore, 
most of the country is only suitable for 
livestock. Just 5% of the land is arable, and 
this is situated in the far north where 
rainfall reaches 700mm per annum. Here, 
50% of Namibia's population is engaged in 
subsistence farming, producing mainly 
maize, millet and sorghum. There are also a 
few large-scale arable farms around 
Tsumeb. It has recently been discovered 
that grain could be grown in the south on 
the border with South Africa, along the 
Orange river basin where some farmers 
already produce grapes for export. The 
possibility of crop farming under irrigation 
exists on the Okavango and Zambezi rivers 
in the north. Despite this potential, it is 
generally agreed that Namibia will never 
produce enough grain to meet its needs. 
However, measures have been taken to 
help farmers increase output. These in-
clude the establishment of rural and 
agricultural development centres where 
they can buy seeds, fertilisers and cheap 
equipment and the provision of credit 
facilities. The aim, according to Mr 
Mbumba, is to ensure that domestic 
production covers at least 50% of require-
ments. Each farmer is being encouraged to 
produce more of what he or she is best at. 
These measures are already producing 
positive results : last year, Namibia, pro-
duced enough food to meet 60% of its 
domestic consumption, well above the 
target, but it is not known whether this is 
sustainable. However, the Government is 
going ahead with plans for greater mone-
tarisation of the sector. A scheme is now in 
place whereby surplus production is being 
bought from farmers. According to the 
Agriculture Minister, 'we have, for the first 
time, introduced a milling system for millet 
and have been able, as a result, to put 
millet meals on the supermarket shelves 
where they are selling well.' 
It should be noted that in both 
livestock and crop production, the ten-
dency is towards further processing. This 
fits neatly into the Government's plans for 
industry and the private sector as a whole 
and has played a significant role in creating 
a number of new employment opportu-
nities. 
Government resources 
These development activities 
have been strongly supported by donors 
who have taken a keen interest in Namibia 
over the past five years. International 
assistance to the country has doubled 
during the period to $140 million, ac-
cording to a UNDP source. However, 
inadequate resources have placed severe 
limitations on the scale and number of 
projects, and the lack of access to con-
cessionary loans has not helped. Namibia's 
high income per capita disqualifies it from 
such loans, an unjust situation given the 
huge income distortions in the country. 
The living conditions of the black majority 
are as bad as those in many of the least 
developed countries. 
Fortunately, the outlook for 
government finances is good. Studies have 
shown that there is considerable scope for 
expansion of the tax base and for increased 
revenues from the Southern African Cus-
toms Union (SACU) which Namibia joined 
at independence. The SACU currently 
provides one-third of all income (about 
one billion rand annually), but experts 
think that Namibia could earn considerably 
more. Since establishing its Customs and 
Exercise Department two years ago, the 
country has gained a better idea of what it 
is worth under the arrangements and it 
believes it is currently losing out. In support 
of this, Namibians cite the fact that there 
are bigger volumes of imports and exports 
passing through their country than 
through Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho 
— witness the heavy daily traffic of goods, 
particularly copper, from Zaire and 
Zambia, heading towards Walvis Bay for 
transshipment. Although Namibia expects 
to be compensated adequately when the 
review of SACU currently under way is 
completed, it has also commissioned a 
study from a British firm to determine how 
much customs revenues it could earn 
annually if it left the system. 
Job creation 
As large numbers of Namibians 
leave the rural areas daily for the cities, 
unemployment has become an extremely 
serious and even dangerous problem. 
Indeed had the government not been 
fortunate enough to have the civil service 
absorb the pressure, the situation would 
almost certainly have resulted in civil 
disorder. Through its policy of affirmative 
action aimed at correcting past injustices, 
the government has recruited massively, 
mainly from among SWAPO members and 
supporters. These were people who were 
barred from the civil service for nearly 
three decades for political reasons. Yet 
there are still quite a large number who 
could not be accommodated, as illustrated 
when former SWAPO guerillas took to the 
streets last May in protest against un-
employment. This is partly due, of course, 
to the fact that the authorities, in pursuit 
of their policy of national reconciliation, 
had to retain all the 48 000 civil servants 
already in post. The result is a public service 
that is clearly overmanned for a population 
of only 1.5 million. 
Namibia, unlike most other Af-
rican countries, does not have to account 
to the IMF. It is neither heavily in debt nor 
subject to any structural adjustment pro-
gramme. It owes less than US$150 million 
and has agreed with the new South African 
government that it is the latter's respons-
ibility to settle Namibia's modest colonial 
debt. But the country needs all the money 
it can get on the revenue side if it is to cope 
with public capital investment and wage 
bills without having to resort to large-scale 
borrowing. 
If unemployment is acute today, 
it is because the private sector in general 
has failed to create as many jobs as were 
hoped for at independence five years ago. 
Namibia's largely uneducated and un-
trained labour force has been a major 
factor in this situation. Not only has it 
represented a disincentive for possible 
investors : those enterprises already in the 
country have also had tremendous dif-
ficulties filling vacant positions, even for 
such skills as secretaries. According to Ryno 
Ritter, deputy general manager of Ohl-
thaver and List, Namibia's largest brewery, 
'a qualified secretary today can be sure of 
being snapped up immediately with a 
good salary.' But this is the legacy of 
apartheid about which the government 
can do little in the short to medium term. 
On the other hand, the tremendous efforts 
it has put into vocational training for self-
employment are happily beginning to 
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produce results as evidenced in the strong 
growth of the informal sector over the past 
three years. Additionally, the government 
is investing heavily in education, not just to 
provide a longer term solution to the 
unemployment crisis, but also to create 
what Deputy Minister of Finance, B. Kukuri 
describes as 'the enabling environment for 
future economic development.' 
Political calculations 
Aside from the skills shortage, 
calculations about political developments 
in both Namibia and South Africa have 
influenced the actions of possible em-
ployers. Shortly before independence, 
there was a flight of capital to South Africa 
reflecting the wariness of some investors 
about SWAPO's political orientation. On 
the other hand, a good number of foreign 
investors began, at the same time, to 
express interest in the country. Not all of 
the latter's plans materialised, however, 
on account of the changes taking place in 
South Africa. They had the idea of es-
tablishing in Namibia to tap into the South 
African market, but decided instead to 
bide their time. As Prime Minister Geingob 
frankly put it, 'with the end of apartheid in 
sight, why go for the second best. South 
Africa is more attractive.' 
To attract Namibian capital back to the 
country, the Ministry of Finance has 
introduced a regulation requiring financial 
institutions such as insurance companies 
and pension funds to invest at least 25% of 
their portfolios locally. Thanks to the 
Namibian Stock Exchange, which was set 
up over a year ago, investors have been 
able to comply by repatriating funds from 
South Africa to purchase shares in Namibia. 
Currently the problem is not so much a 
shortage of capital as the absence of viable 
areas for investment. 
As SWAPO begins its second term 
in office the overall outlook for the private 
sector is bright. Namibia has succeeded in 
diversifying its markets with preferential 
access, for example, to the European Union 
through the Lomé Convention. Mean-
while, the prospects for diversifying in the 
traditional livestock, food crops and fish-
eries sectors have never looked brighter. 
Last year's transfer of Walvis Bay to 
Namibian sovereignty, and the construc-
tion of the Trans-Caprivi and Trans-
Kalahari highways, which are due to be 
completed next year, should give the 
country comparative advantages and a 
competitive position which is much 
stronger than at the time of independence. 
Suddenly the smallness of Namibia's dom-
estic market seem less relevant as the 
't 
Exiles who returned to Namibia at the 
time of independence hoped for a 
brighter future. The government has 
done a lot to fulfil their hopes, on very 
limited resources, but the job queues 
are still too long 
country moves resolutely in an export-
oriented direction. It now has the regional 
(SADC), continental and European markets 
within easy reach. 'We see ourselves as 
ideally located in Southern Africa', explains 
Trade and Industry Minister Hidipo Hamu-
tenya. 'We have a common border with 
Angola, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
and Botswana, And we have up-to-date 
infrastructures which are among the best 
on the African continent, whether in terms 
of roads, telecommunications, banks, 
hotels, schools or medical facilities. Inves-
tors, who locate in Namibia, can send their 
goods across the border into the huge 
Angolan market which is emerging. We do 
not see any reason, for example, why a 
garment manufacturer cannot do as well 
here as in India, Malaysia or Hong Kong. 
We are also linked to Zaire via the Trans-
Caprivi highway.' 
Walvis Bay offers key to 
greater prosperity 
Walvis Bay lies at the heart of 
Namibia's integrated national industrial 
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strategy. The only deep-water port in the 
region, it currently deals with two million 
tons of cargo annually. This is largely 
thanks to the new bulk terminal, com-
pleted early this year, which handles 
export products such as manganese and 
fluorspar and imports of coal and grain. 
The plan is to increase capacity to 4.5m by 
dredging, building more berths and in-
creasing warehouse and cold storage 
facilities, thus making it even more attract-
ive vis-a-vis Cape Town or Durban. US$ 11 
million is understood already to have been 
provided by the German Government for 
the work, which Mr Hamutenya expects to 
begin early next year. 
Allied to this project is the es-
tablishment of an Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ) in Walvis Bay. This idea, which has 
been greeted enthusiastically in Namibia, 
includes the creation of linkages with 
industries elsewhere in the country. The 
Walvis Bay municipality has, on its own 
account, already earmarked a site and 
begun work on infrastructures. 'All the key 
elements are now in place,' says Mr 
Hamutenya. An 'Offshore Development 
Company', in which the Government 
currently has a 15% holding, has been set 
up under the EPZ Act to encourage would-
be operators. It will act as 'an umbrella 
service for all enterprises registered to 
operate in Namibia as offshore enterprises, 
including export processing zone enter-
prises and financial concerns.' 
The Government expects most of 
EPZ's infrastructures — factory shells, 
roads, water, sewerage and workers' 
housing — to be provided by private 
entrepreneurs. Several, understandably, 
have expressed an interest. In May, a 
meeting organised by the Trade and 
Industry Minister attracted a good atten-
dance of business executives from South 
Africa, Europe and North America, as well 
as officials from the International Finance 
Corporation and other funding agencies. 
The participants exchanged views on the 
government's business plans for the EPZ. 
Although no immediate concrete results 
emerged, the authorities are confident of a 
good response to its call for investments. It 
is offering a variety of incentives, notably 
full exemption from customs duties and 
taxes, inexpensive labour and a peaceful 
industrial climate. As regards the last-
mentioned, the government has enacted a 
statute exempting the EPZ from the 
application of certain aspects of Namibia's 
Industrial Relations Act. This move has 
infuriated trade union leaders who inter-
pret it as a licence to exploit workers. But 
as Mr Hamutenya stressed to The Courier, 
'just as the labour movement feels that 
Windhoek Railway Station 
'We have up-to-date infrastructures 
which are among the best on the 
African continent' 
workers will be exploited, there is a feeling 
that too much application of the labour 
laws can lead to instability. Investors do 
not want to invest their money in a place 
which is riddled with strikes and unrest.' 
Namibia is wagering on the success of 
Walvis Bay's EPZ — and if they win the bet, 
the result could be many more jobs and 
better living standards for many Namibian 
citizens. ■■ AO 
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Profile 
Natural features 
Namibia has a total land area of 
824 000 square kilometres and 
borders five countries — Angola, 
Botswana, South Africa, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. It is semi-arid and 
has erratic rainfall ranging from an 
annual average of 50mm in the 
south to 700mm in the Caprivi 
Strip in the north-east. Only half 
of the land area is suitable for 
farming. The Namib desert runs 
along the whole of the Atlantic 
seaboard (a distance of about 
1600 km) with a width ranging between 
65 km and 160 km. The country is 16% 
desert, 20% woodland and 64% savannah, 
the last-mentioned being characterised by 
grassland with some trees and shrubs. 
Population 
There are about 1.4 million Na-
mibians from 11 different ethnic groups. 
Just under 4% of the population is white. 
75% of those living in the country depend 
on livestock and agriculture for their 
livelihood. 
Main population centres 
Windhoek (the capital), Tsumeb, 
Lüderitz, Oranjemund, Walvis Bay, On-
dangwa, Keetmanshoop. 
Political system 
Multi-party democracy consisting 
of a directly-elected executive President 
(who is also Head of State) and a un-
icameral Parliament elected by propor-
tional representation. The current Pre-
sident is Sam Nujoma. 
Economy 
Namibia's economy is based on 
agriculture (10% of GDP), mining (29%) 
and fisheries (14%). The main agriculture 
commodity is livestock. Mineral deposits 
currently being exploited include dia-
monds, uranium, tin, lithium, cadmium, 
copper, zinc, lead, gold and silver. Manu-
facturing accounts for just 7% of GDP. Namibia-EU cooperation 
Helping to redress the 
imbalances 
I by Roger Leenders* 
The Republic of Namibia gained its 
i independence in March 1990 and its 
constitution is considered to be one 
of the most democratic in the 
history of Africa south of the 
Sahara. The country became, in 
December of the same year, the 
69th ACP State when it signed the 
Lomé Convention. Namibia has a 
very low population density — its 
estimated 1.5 million inhabitants 
are scattered across a vast territory 
of 825 000 square kilometres, of which only 
42% is usable for agricultural purposes. 
When one looks at the per capita 
income figures, Namibia does not appear 
to be a particularly poor country. From 
recent data, GNP per head is estimated at 
between US$1300 and US$1500. However, 
the distribution of income and wealth is 
extremely uneven. The population of 
certain parts of the country ranks among 
the poorest on the continent while a small 
percentage of the inhabitants can be 
classified among the richest in the world. 
Since independence, the Govern-
ment has adopted a policy of reconciliation 
and affirmative action. This entails attem-
pting, on the one hand, to favour the 
previously disadvantaged sections of the 
population while, on the other, seeking to 
create a more harmonious multi-racial 
society. By and large, the approach has 
been pragmatic, building on good things 
from the past and making development 
benefits available to a larger part of the 
population. 
The economic base of Namibia is 
somewhat limited. Mining, although in 
decline, remains an important source of 
revenue while fishing has gained in import-
ance in the five years since independence. 
Tourism is also a sector now recognised as 
having good potential for development, 
especially in the field of job creation. The 
* Head of the European Commission Delegation 
in Namibia 
private sector is relatively strong — 
certainly in comparison to most other 
African countries. 
Namibia's external debt amounts 
only to about US$130 million and it is 
Government policy to maintain the debt 
— and hence the servicing commitment — 
at a very low level. 
EC support in the early 
days 
Prior to independence, Namibia 
received assistance from the European 
Commission through various budget lines, 
with most of the aid being channelled 
through non-governmental organisations. 
The United Nations Institute for Namibia 
(UNIN), located in Lusaka, Zambia, also 
received substantial financial support. 
Although the country joined the 
Lomé system in December 1990, the first 
National Indicative Programme was not 
signed until March 1992. In order to assist 
Namibia before the financial resources 
allocated under Lomé IV could be utilised, 
the European Commission, exceptionally, 
made some ECU 33.5 million available 
under separate budget lines, during 1991 
and 1992. These funds were mobilised in 
support of 53 different projects. 
Lomé IV 
Under the first financial protocol 
of the Convention, ECU 50m has been 
made available to Namibia for program-
mable assistance in the form of grants (the 
National Indicative Programme). Agree-
ment was subsequently reached between 
the Government and the Commission to 
concentrate this funding on three focal 
sectors : agriculture and rural development 
(40% of the total), health (30%) and 
education/human resources (20%). The 
remaining 10% was to be made available 
for activities outwith these sectors. 
By May 1995, ECU 30.9m of the 
NIP had been allocated to projects while 
new financing proposals to the tune of ECU 
16.8m had been submitted to the Commis-
sion. This means that, by the end of the 
year, it is anticipated that 95 % of Namibia's 
financial envelope will have been commit-
ted. 
The country has also received 
various forms of non-programmable aid. In 
March 1993, the Commission approved a 
grant of ECU 40m under the Sysmin facility. 
The programme financed with these funds, 
which consists of a portfolio of 12 projects, 
aims at reversing the unfavourable trends 
experienced by the mining sector in recent 
years. It will contribute to : 
— safeguarding production and the earn-
ing capacity of the sector ; 
— broadening the production base, 
through diversification and integration of 
the mining sector into the wider economy ; 
— improving the geological and mineral 
data base, and; 
— expanding training facilities 
By May 1995, 44% of the allo-
cation had been committed. 
Within the framework of re-
gional cooperation between the European 
Community and the SADC member states, 
Namibia benefits from support in a number 
of areas, including the development of 
trade and services, the establishment of sea 
fisheries inspectorates, the creation of a 
regional marine data base and customs 
training. In the field of transport, Namibia 
also has a particular interest in the regional 
support provided for the Trans-Caprivi 
Highway. 
Another significant element of 
non-programmable assistance under Lomé 
IV is to be found in the Beef Protocol. 
When Namibia joined the Convention, it 
was granted a quota for export to the EU 
market of 60 000t of deboned beef over 
the period 1991-1995. In 1994, the country 
exported almost 11 000t to the Union, 
valued at some N$216m, under this ar-
rangement. Since 1994, Namibia has also 
had access to an import quota for seedless 
grapes. For the period December 1994-
January 1995 the Commission granted a 
duty-free concession of 400 tonnes and a 
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further reference quantity of 100 tonnes 
was provided for February-March 1995. 
Cooperation outside the 
Convention 
The Lomé Convention is not the 
only source of financial and other support 
made available to Namibia by the Euro-
pean Community. The country has been 
the recipient of food aid in the shape of 
15 000 tonnes of cereals, 427 tonnes of 
beans and 267 tonnes of dried fish. The 
counterpart funds generated from the 
domestic sale of two thirds of the cereals 
supplied amounted to N$4.4m. By May 
1995, 82% of these funds had been spent 
on 20 projects at the request of the 
National Authorising Officer. 
In the area of support for non-
governmental organisations, the Commis-
sion has co-financed more than 40 projects 
since independence with a financial com-
mitment of ECU 3.6m. Support and tech-
nical assistance have also been provided to 
the Ministry of Health and Social Services in 
the context of the Community's AIDSISTD 
Control Programme. In 1993, emergency 
aid was supplied in the shape of financial 
support for the drilling of 20 boreholes in 
the former Namaiand region. This region 
K 
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was badly affected by the drought of 1992-
93. A total of ECU 1.9m has been spent on 
a range of projects under other European 
Community budget lines covering nature 
conservation, human rights and democracy 
and rehabilitation in Southern Africa. 
Finally, the European Investment 
Bank has approved four loans at preferen­
tial interest rates for investments in 
■ . ! ""..■ 
European Community financial support to Namibia 
Uranium mining 
A programme funded under Sysmin 
aims at reversing the unfavourable 
trends experienced by the mining 
sector in recent years 
Namibia. The total sum involved here is 
ECU 22.5m of which ECU 17m comes from 
the bank's own resources (with an interest 
bonus of ECU 3.2m financed by the EDF). 
The remaining ECU 5.5m has been pro-
vided as risk capital, supplied by the EDF 
and managed by the EIB. se R.L. 
EC budget 
Various budget lines (mainly predating 
Namibia's accession to Lomé IV) 
Emergency aid 
Aids control programme 
Food aid 
NGO co-financing 
(Sub total 
Lomé IV 
National Indicative Programme 
Sysmin 
EIB funding from EDF resources 
(Sub total 
Total 
33 581 
180 
755 
4 470 
3 636 
42 622) 
50 000 
40 000 
8 735 
98 735) 
141 357 
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share of political, social and economic upheaval. Unlike other parts of Africa, decolonisation was long in coming and, for some, colonialism 
only finally ended in April 1994 with the first multiracial elections in South Africa. There are few areas of the world where racial criteria have, 
over time, acquired such significance and where the fight against racial discrimination has left in its wake so much suffering and displacement 
of peoples. Today, on the threshold of the 21st century. Southern Africa faces the same challenges as the rest of the planet but it appears to 
be more united and resolute than ever in confronting the problems it must solve. The winds of change — and hope — finally seem to be 
blowing over this end of the continent. 
The state of democracy 
The 11 member states of the SADC (Southern 
African Development Community) have, for 
some years, been undergoing far-reaching 
socio-economic and political transformations. 
Countries which, in the wake of indepen-
dence, had opted for Marxist-Leninist-in-
spired economic models, referred to by some 
as 'Afromarxism', have today turned towards 
economic liberalism and are implementing 
structural adjustment programmes. In parallel 
with this economic liberalisation, the world is 
also witnessing major political reforms. The 
authoritarian regimes established after in-
dependence have, with only a few excep-
tions, given way to democratically elected 
regimes. In the 1960s, Botswana was the 
democratic exception in the region. Today, it 
is only in Angola and Swaziland that fully-
fledged multi-party systems have not taken 
root. The most important milestone in this 
wave of démocratisation was undoubtedly 
the ending of apartheid in South Africa. The 
advent of democracy in that country put an 
end to several years of déstabilisation and 
warfare orchestrated by the racist Pretoria 
regime. The arrival as Head of State of 
Frederick de Klerk, less of a warmonger and 
more pragmatic than his predecessor, has had 
a direct influence on the destiny of neigh-
bouring countries. Namibia, which was under 
South African occupation, finally became 
independent in 1990. In Mozambique, peace 
was restored in 1992 — an event at least 
partly due to the withdrawal of financial and 
military aid previously supplied by Pretoria to 
the Renamo rebels. Recent political changes in 
South Africa have obviously left a deep 
impression on the region, but it should be 
recognised that the decisive factor affecting 
the political and economic destiny of the 
region — and above all, that of South Africa 
itself— has been the fall of communism and 
the ending of the Cold War. 
In order better to understand the 
changes which have affected the member 
countries of SADC, The Courier offers here 
a review of the political, economic and 
social situation currently prevailing in seven 
member states of this organisation. 
Angola, Mozambique and South Africa are 
not included because they are dealt with 
individually in other articles in the Dossier. 
Namibia, is dealt with in greater depth in a 
Country Report in this issue. 
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Zambia: still awaiting 
economie upturn 
Since independence in 1964, 
Zambia has had only two presidents: 
Kenneth Kaunda and Frederick Chiluba, 
and it was not until October 1991, after 
democratic elections, that the former 
finally took over the reins from the latter. 
This somewhat forced handover of powers 
occurred under the influence of combined 
pressure from international donors and a 
population weary of 27 years of 'mono-
poly' power, which had been disastrous 
both economically and socially. 
At the time of independence, the 
mood was more one of euphoria. Not only 
had Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia, 
shaken itself free of British rule, but the 
country also had enormous mineral re-
sources, particularly copper, which enabled 
it to look to the future with some 
confidence. The government of Kenneth 
Kaunda and the party he led, the United 
National Independence Party (UNIP) there-
fore set about an ambitious modernisation 
programme. The positive effects were 
rapidly felt and, by the end of the 1960s, 
the average income of Zambians was one 
of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. 
When, at the beginning of the 
1970s, the price of copper began to fall on 
international markets, a rapid decline set 
in. The country in fact depended absolutely 
Zambian copper mine 
Even today, over 80% of Zambia's 
export income comes from copper 
on this mineral. Even today, over 80% of 
Zambia's export income comes from 
copper mining. The government, which 
was not far-sighted enough to diversify the 
economy, sought to blame its difficulties 
on the outside world. At the time, the 
government of Ian Smith in Rhodesia, 
together with South Africa and the Por-
tuguese authorities still in power in Angola 
and Mozambique, were overtly hostile to 
the Lusaka regime. However, this alone is 
not enough to explain the deterioration of 
the Zambian economy. In the early 1980s, 
when two of these destabilising factors 
had disappeared (Mozambique and 
Angola had been independent since 1975 
and Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in 1980), 
the living conditions of the Zambian 
people continued to decline and economic 
crisis followed in its wake. 
In 1983, the Zambian govern-
ment approached the IMF and implemen-
ted a series of strict policies. The 
withdrawal of subsidies for maize flour, 
the staple foodstuff of the majority of 
Zambians, together with an increase in the 
price of fuel unleashed a general outcry 
from the population. Strikes and demonst-
rations took place throughout the country. 
Finally, at the beginning of the 1990s, 
President Kaunda, having progressively 
concentrated all power in his hands, was 
obliged to let go and he authorised the 
holding of multi-party elections which 
took place on 31 October 1991. The MMD 
(Movement for Multi-Party Democracy) 
took 125 of the 150 seats in the National 
Assembly. Its leader, Frederick Chiluba, a 
former trade union leader, became the 
country's new President, winning 76% of 
the vote. It is worth noting that the 
turnout was only 45.4%, a figure explained 
not only by material and technical de-
ficiencies at the time of the elections but 
also by the profound lassitude and dis-
illusionment of many Zambians vis-à-vis 
their political class. The choice offered to 
the population on the eve of the elections 
was not one to engender strong loyalties. 
The outgoing regime may have been 
almost moribund but the MMD campaign 
focused relentlessly on criticism of the 
Kaunda government's record with few 
solutions or ideas for solving the crisis. In 
addition, many politicians, seeing how the 
wind was blowing, left the UNIP to join the 
MMD. In general, those electors who cast a 
ballot did so to register a protest against 
the UNIP. They voted for change but not, it 
appears, to express any overwhelming 
enthusiasm for the MMD. 
Today, more than three years 
after the election, most observers agree 
that the changes introduced by the new 
regime have been slow and not particularly 
radical. The economic and financial situ-
ation has barely improved and Zambia still 
has one of the biggest debts per capita in 
the African continent (totalling $6.2 bil-
lion). Moreover, its dependence on copper 
is as great as ever and the population has 
seen no improvement in living conditions. 
The people have had to bear the brunt of 
the adjustment policy implemented by the 
government, at the energetic instigation 
of the international financial institutions. 
This policy, combined with an inflation rate 
of 60% in 1994, has had a damaging effect 
on Zambian society. The social costs of 
measures designed to relaunch the 
economy have seen the tolerance thres-
hold of ordinary Zambians sorely tested. 
Criminality and delinquency are on the 
increase in major towns and cities and 
budget cuts have affected health and 
education in particular. Rural dwellers, 
already hit by the 1992 drought, are 
finding it increasingly difficult to make 
ends meet. Finally, according to at least 
some observers, favouritism, embezzle-
ment and corruption remain in the system, 
allegedly to be found at all levels of society. 
-ι 
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The current leaders are finding it increas-
ingly difficult to justify the sacrifices they 
impose on the population in the name of 
economic revival and a more prosperous 
future and, although Zambia is today a 
democracy, the Zambians need to feel the 
benefits of it very rapidly if the democratic 
system is to take root in the longer term. 
Malawi : the ancien régime 
finally crumbles 
This small state at the centre of 
Southern Africa has also seen the advent of 
democracy after several decades of an 
authoritarian monopoly on power. For 
nearly 30 years, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, 
self-proclaimed president-for-life, and his 
party, the MCP (Malawi Congress Party) 
governed the country with an iron fist 
under the benevolent gaze of the West 
and of South Africa. At the height of the 
Cold War, President Banda's virulent 
anticommunism was welcomed and a 
election were the United Democratic Front 
(UDF) headed by Bakili Muluzi, the Alliance 
for Democracy (AFORD) with Chafukwa 
Chihana as leader, and the MCP of Kamuzu 
Banda. In the presidential poll, Muluzi win 
47% of the votes against 33% for Banda 
and 19.5% for Chihana. The outcome was 
similar in the legislative elections. Of the 
177 seats in parliament, the UDF took 85, 
the MCP took 56 and the AFORD 36. A 
more detailed analysis of the results reveals 
a sharp regional and ethnic divide. The 
North voted overwhelmingly for the 
AFORD, the centre (President Banda's 
homeland) not surprisingly stayed mainly 
with the MCP, while the South, where 50% 
of the population is concentrated, voted 
for the UDF. 
If President Muluzi is to avoid 
ethnic conflict and regional imbalances in 
the future, he will have to implement a 
more harmonious and egalitarian policy 
than his predecessor. The latter, when in 
power, outrageously favoured the centre 
blind eye was turned to the countless 
exactions and violations of human rights 
committed by his regime. However, with 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the near-
disappearance of communism, Malawi 
became less attractive to Western powers. 
Suddenly, more circumspect on matters of 
human rights, they finally suspended the 
economic aid Malawi depended on for its 
survival. Faced with international repudi-
ation and an increasingly explosive internal 
social situation, the regime had little 
choice. In 1993, President Banda announ-
ced a referendum on setting up a multi-
party system. With 63% of votes in favour, 
the regime's opponents won their first 
victory over the nonagenarian dictator. 
The breach thus opened could not be 
resealed and President Banda was com-
pelled to promise early free and de-
mocratic elections. They took place on 17 
May 1994. The three main parties in then 
Picking tea in Malawi 
The population is waiting for the anti-
poverty programme, launched by the 
government, to bear fruit 
and, notably, made his mother tongue 
(Chichewa) Malawi's official language, 
although it was spoken by only a minority 
of the people. In order to avoid increased 
regional fragmentation, the UDF needs to 
acquire a national dimension. After the 
elections, Muluzi's party allied itself with 
the AFORD, enabling them to have an 
absolute majority in parliament and to be 
more representative nationally. The two 
groups, however, have little in common. 
AFORD is seen by neutral commentators as 
a party untarnished by links with the 
ancien régime. The UDF, on the other 
hand, includes a number who were in-
volved, to a greater or lesser extent, with 
the government of former President Banda 
before falling out of favour. These people 
appear to have been ousted because they 
were seen as a threat to the dictator rather 
than on account of their reforming ideas. 
President Muluzi himself was a 
minister and then General Secretary of the 
MCP until his exclusion in 1982. This has 
prompted some local journalists to suggest 
that there has been more of a facelift than 
a real change. However, the very fact that 
it is possible overtly to express this kind of 
criticism reveals that something funda-
mental has changed in Malawi. 
The former dictatorship is now 
just a bad memory and democracy, with all 
it implies (freedom of association, freedom 
of expression, etc.), has become a reality. 
Moreover, the citizens of Malawi no longer 
refrain from expressing their criticism and 
their disappointments, which are many. 
The promises made on the eve of the 
elections are taking time to materialise and 
the people are still waiting for the anti-
poverty programme, officially launched by 
the government, to bear fruit. 
In economic terms, Malawi is still 
on a dripfeed. It depends heavily on 
external aid, a fact which prompts real 
questions about the extent of its indepen-
dence vis-à-vis the outside. In this, how-
ever, its situation is no different from that 
of many other developing countries. Like 
the majority of African states, it is having 
to implement an austerity plan strongly 
'recommended' to it by international 
donors while, at the same time, striving to 
meet the needs of its citizens, over 50% of 
whom live below the poverty line. 
To this, one might add rapid 
population growth, chronic malnutrition, a 
serious AIDS problem, a barely productive 
agricultural sector and the challenge of 
keeping corruption at bay. The depressing 
legacy of the Banda era is that Malawi is 
one of the world's poorest countries. On 
the other hand, the days of the govern-
ment doing exactly what it wanted, 
without being answerable to anyone, are 
well and truly over. The hope must be that 
now democracy is in place, the dynamic 
forces of the country and its people will 
come to the fore allowing them to take 
proper control of their own destiny and to 
become genuinely involved in running 
their own country. 
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Tanzania: multi-party 
system in the pipeline 
Unlike most African countries 
which have changed over from a single-
party regime to a multi-party system in a 
rapid and often disorderly fashion, Tan-
zania is making its transition to democracy 
both prudently and slowly — too slowly, 
according to some foreign donors. Once 
again, it is the latter who are exerting 
pressure on the Tanzanian regime to 
become more liberal. Interestingly, one of 
the earliest and most trenchant critics of 
the government is former President Julius 
Nyerere, who led the country from in-
dependence in 1961 until 1985, when he 
voluntarily left office. Nyerere is not slow 
to denounce what he sees as the faults and 
failings of the CCM (Chama cha Mapin-
duzi), the single party currently in power. 
He has been openly critical of the alleged 
slowness of the authorities, corruption, 
apathy and the government's apparent 
inability to take account of the popu-
lation's opinions and needs. These unflat-
tering comments, together with a stag-
nant economy, have helped to influence 
the government of his successor. Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi, in the direction of political and 
economic liberalisation. Opposition parties 
have been authorised, an independent 
press has developed and an electoral 
commission has been set up to organise 
and monitor the electoral process which 
should result in democratic general elec-
tions in October 1995. Since the Tanzanian 
parliament authorised the creation of new 
political formations in May 1992, 12 
opposition parties have sprung up. How-
ever, if supporters of these parties wish to 
avoid what happened in Kenya, where the 
outgoing party won in the face of a divided 
opposition, it will have to form alliances 
and present a more united front. Such a 
move has already been made by four par-
ties which have rallied round a single 
candidate (a former CCM minister). There 
is little doubt that in the run-up to the 
October election, Tanzanian politics will be 
dominated by the inevitable jostling for 
position as parties seek to come up with 
candidates capable of winning the pre-
sidential poll. 
With liberalisation, however, a 
whole series of latent problems has re-
surfaced. Religious and racial tensions have 
multiplied, particularly in Zanzibar where 
claims for autonomy are becoming increas-
ingly vehement. Some are calling into 
question the 1964 union between Tan-
ganyika and Zanzibar (the current Tan-
zania) and claim that a form of federation 
or confederation may be necessary. The 
new government to be elected in October 
will have to deal with this thorny problem 
very quickly. The advent of democracy 
could also spring a few nasty surprises on 
the new leaders. The freedom thus created 
will not, as was possible in the past, allow 
the 'evils' of Tanzanian society to be 
covered up. In this multi-denominational 
and multi-ethnic society, there is a great 
risk of seeing prejudices and rancour 
resurfacing, particularly if economic and 
social problems are exacerbated. In the 
long term, the territorial integrity of 
Tanzania may be threatened, particularly if 
the economic situation deteriorates any 
further. 
Zimbabwe: election 
result a foregone 
conclusion 
Political life in Zimbabwe holds 
very few surprises. For 15 years, Robert 
Mugabe has been Head of State and for 15 
years his party, ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe 
African National Union — Patriotic Front) 
has run the country. The incumbent party's 
victory in the legislative elections on 8 and 
9 April 1995 once again confirmed the 
President's firm grip on power. 
ZANU-PF's victory is not difficult 
to explain. Of the 150 seats in parliament, 
30 are nominated directly by the President. 
The government also controls the bulk of 
the media which gives it a distinct ad-
vantage in election campaigns. In addition, 
ZANU-PF is the only political group to 
receive government financing as the 
country's constitution states that a party 
must have at least 15 seats in parliament to 
receive campaign funds. Finally, there are 
divisions among the opposition — the 
parties involved lack credibility at times 
and their manifestos do not appear to 
offer a genuine alternative. The result of all 
this is that of the 120 directly elected MPs, 
only two are opponents of the ruling 
party. Democratic debate is accordingly 
skewed with the field clear for ZANU-PF to 
have its mandate automatically renewed 
every five years. This is not to say that the 
people have had the wool pulled over their 
eyes as election turnouts (which have 
never exceeded 60%) would seem to 
testify. Nevertheless, the stakes are high. 
Over the last five years, the country has 
experienced serious economic difficulties, 
the rate of unemployment having quad-
rupled since independence in 1980. Today, 
almost 45% of the population is out of 
work. The inflation rate is around 25% and 
the country has to devote more than 20% 
of its budget to servicing its external debt. 
Finally, and as one would expect, Zimbab-
weans too are paying the costs of the 
adjustment policies advocated by the 
Bretton Woods institutions. 
Although the President still at-
tracts support because of the role he 
played during the war of independence, he 
and his party must take care to avoid 
Most rural dwellers in Zimbabwe are 
still waiting for the promises of 
redistribution of land In their favour, 
made in the wake of independence, to 
be realised 
-ι 
, j the Courier n° 153 · september-october 1995 
van 
.a/ï^i -Α2-:->ί·ττ-
ir¿t- V "St-"*·-' W 
■''..'.";%■.·: '
;:·οΑ.-':1ώ?*5;: complacency. Without signs of political 
and economic recovery, they will have to 
deal with the growing exasperation felt by 
Zimbabweans many of whom are still 
awaiting the concrete outcome of prom-
ises made in the wake of independence. 
This is particularly true of rural smallholders 
who, for many years, have been tempted 
by the offer of a redistribution of land in 
their favour. Currently, 4000 white farmers 
own 11.2 million hectares compared with 
1 million black families eking out a living on 
barely 16.3 million hectares. 
The government is reluctant to 
expropriate white farmers' land, par-
ticularly if they have to be compensated, as 
promised. Firstly, the government does not 
have the funds. Secondly, there would be a 
risk of negative repercussions on agricul-
tural production and foreign investors who 
would look unfavourably on a government 
operating in this way. 
Zimbabwe, long regarded as an 
example of stability in the region, must 
today come to terms with a stagnant 
economic and financial situation, together 
with increasingly frequent social upheaval. 
The ZANU-PF government, unlike its 
neighbours, can scarcely blame its pre-
decessors. After 15 years in power, Robert 
Mugabe's government must accept most 
of the responsibility for the prevailing 
situation. New solutions have to be found. 
Some observers argue that a renewal of 
the political class is needed before anything 
can change in Zimbabwe. For the time 
being, however, those within the 
governing party who recommend a more 
dynamic democracy have an uphill 
struggle. As for the opposition, with its 
current divisions and inconsistencies, it is 
not in a position to change anything. 
Botswana: democracy on 
trial 
Botswana has always been seen 
as a model of stability and democracy in an 
Africa dominated until recently by single 
party and authoritarian regimes. Since 
independence in 1966, the country has 
regularly experienced free and democratic 
elections. Just as regularly, the BDP (Bot-
swana Democratic Party) has won these 
elections. This regularity and stability can 
be explained largely by the national 
consensus which has been established since 
independence between the political class, 
the big stock-breeders, the rural popu-
lation, traditional chiefs and members of 
the authorities. However, over the last two 
years, divisions have appeared within the 
leading team and society as a whole has 
been disrupted by growing tensions. 
Several corruption cases have come to 
light, affecting some members of the BDP. 
The opposition took advantage of this to 
gain ground at the most recent legislative 
elections (October 1994) where the BDP 
had its worst result since 1966. The 
electoral decline of the governing party is 
due principally to the economic recession 
which has been affecting the country for 
some time. With growing unemployment 
and few professional opportunities for the 
younger generations, many Botswanans 
are beginning to question the policies of 
President Ketumile Masire and his party. 
This mood change is particularly evident in 
towns and cities, where the population is 
younger, better educated and more politi-
cally aware. The most striking evidence of 
this is to be found in the capital, Gaborone, 
which voted decisively for the main oppo-
sition party, the Botswanan National Front 
(BNF) in 1994. If the BNF continues to gain 
popular support at the same rate, the next 
election in October 1999 could well spell 
the end of the BDP's monopoly. In fact, the 
successive BDP victories of the past 30 years 
have been based essentially on support 
from rural voters and traditional chiefs. The 
latter maintain a patron/client relationship 
with their 'subjects', enabling them to 
'indicate' the way they wish people to vote 
without too much difficulty. This is par-
ticularly the case when rural populations 
are unaware of or not up-to-date with 
political decisions taken in Gaborone. 
There is a tendency to follow the lead of 
the traditional chiefs who are their 'poli-
tical intermediaries'. This system, which has 
View of Gaborone 
An increasing number of Botswanans 
are migrating to urban centres 
helped the BDP to win absolute majorities 
in the past may not persist, however. 
Growing numbers of people are migrating 
to urban centres where they are exposed 
to more diverse political influences than in 
the rural environment. This new, more 
educated generation is also more demand-
ing and is seeking change. There are those 
who believe that the government must 
respond to the expectations of this emerg-
ing constituency if it is to avoid defeat at 
the next election. 
Of course, if the BDP does lose 
power next time round, this does not 
signify the end of democracy. On the 
contrary, alternation in politics is seen by 
many as one of the key components of a 
healthy and long-lasting democratic 
system. It seems fair to assume that the 
possibility of defeat at the polls will 
influence the BDP in a positive way. Far 
from resting on its laurels, one can assume 
that it will be actively seeking solutions to 
the political and economic unrest currently 
affecting Botswana. 
Lesotho : return of the 
King 
A small mountainous state en-
tirely surrounded by the Republic of South 
Africa, Lesotho has since its independence 
in 1966 been prey to chronic political 
instability. Between 1970 and 1988, the 
country had a single-party system under 
the firm rule of the Basutoland National 
Party (BNP) and its leader Leabua Jona-
than. He fell victim to a military coup 
fomented by General Justin Lekhanya who 
proceeded to take control of the country. 
A power struggle between the general 
and King Moshoeshoe II resulted in the 
latter being deposed and sent into exile. 
He was replaced by his son Letsie III in 1990. 
A year later, it was the turn of General 
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Lekhanya to be stripped of power — this 
time by disillusioned soldiers. Shortly 
afterwards, violent riots broke out in 
Maseru, the capital. More than 30 people 
died and nearly 100 were injured. By this 
time, the people had grown weary of the 
ever-worsening political and economic 
situation. In May 1991, the government 
authorised the formation of opposition 
parties and proposed elections for June 
1992. These were delayed and finally took 
place in March 1993. The victors were the 
Basuto Congress Party (BCP), which won 
nearly 75% of votes cast. Nevertheless, 
political and dynastic upheaval was still to 
come. In August 1994, King Letsie III dis-
missed the Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, 
and insisted his father be reinstated as 
monarch. By virtue of the mediating role 
played by South Africa, Zimbabwe and 
Botswana, this happened in January 1995, 
Moshoeshoe II became King once again, 
Letsie III abdicated and Mokhehle came 
back as Head of Government. For the time 
being, therefore, the political situation in 
the kingdom looks distinctly more promis-
ing. 
Lesotho has become a consti-
tutional monarchy and has revived de-
mocracy but, once again, only one party 
has virtually all power vested in it, albeit 
through the legitimate expression of the 
voters. This time, the King and the 
government will have to work together to 
restore the confidence of a people left with 
few illusions or aspirations after successive 
coups and palaces revolutions. 
Swaziland: a kingdom at 
the crossroads 
In Swaziland, the authorities and, 
in particular King Mswati III, are convinced 
that the multi-party system is a source of 
division and trouble. They take the view 
that the Tinkhundla system (see issue no 
147 of The Courier) is best suited to the 
needs of Swazi society. The complex voting 
procedure involves three stages. Candi-
dates for each jurisdiction are nominated 
(only 15 electors are required for each 
nomination). Primary elections are then 
held to choose a candidate for each 
jurisdiction. These are followed by secon-
dary elections at Tinkhundla level, group-
ing together several jurisdictions, to ap-
point the representative to the Lower 
Chamber. Although based on elections, 
this system does not conform to the 
concept of democracy as one would 
normally understand it in the western 
sense. Opposition parties are not author-
ised. In addition, the King is responsible for 
nominating 10 of the 55 members of the 
lower house and 20 of the 30 Senators. 
It is not at all clear whether 
Swaziland can maintain this form of 
political system in the longer term. There 
are signs of an increasingly strident oppo-
sition and the country has been affected by 
a number of strikes and demonstrations in 
recent years. 
There is also the likely impact of 
democratic changes in the neighbouring 
countries of South Africa and Mozam-
bique. Swaziland has many assets, includ-
ing a relatively dynamic economy com-
pared with other developing countries, 
and a homogenous population, but if it 
chooses not to introduce political reforms, 
it will find itself out on a limb in a region 
where multi-party democracy is now the 
norm. 
Furniture factory in Swaziland 
A dynamic economy compared with 
other developing countries 
Building a fairer and 
more balanced world 
Southern Africa has certainly 
been experiencing upheavals in the last 
few years but at least the changes have 
been more positive than negative overall. 
Political regimes have been liberalised, 
democracy is slowly beginning to take root 
and, with the exception of Angola, the 
guns are silent. However, if one looks more 
closely, the advent of multi-party systems 
and democracy have scarcely changed the 
day-to-day life of the majority of the 
region's inhabitants. Indeed, for many of 
them, the situation has dramatically de-
teriorated. 
In the eyes of the rest of the 
world, Southern Africa is also suffering 
from the effects of the world recession and 
from what some would regard as the 'new 
world disorder'. However, unlike the 
developed countries, Southern Africa and 
the Third World in general no longer seem 
to have control over their own destiny. 
Some countries, like Mozambique or 
Zambia, are literally at the mercy of 
Western donors. Although living con-
ditions for most of the region's inhabitants 
need specially adapted social programmes 
and greater commitment on the part of 
the state, it is the opposite that is 
happening. The state is withdrawing on a 
massive scale and aid and subsidies are 
being drastically reduced. International 
financial bodies justify the suffering and 
sacrifices thereby engendered in terms of 
macroeconomic equilibrium and a more 
prosperous future but it is becoming 
increasingly evident that a rapid improve-
ment in living conditions is urgently 
required if a generalised social explosion is 
to be avoided. In some countries, food 
riots, strikes, peasant revolts, the resur-
gence of ethnic conflict and rising crimi-
nality are already heralding this. 
Although political democracy is 
in itself an important and considerable step 
forward, it is not enough on its own. It 
must provoke a positive spillover in the 
social and economic spheres. The dis-
parities that are growing must be halted 
and reversed. This requires a genuine will 
to build a fairer and more balanced society. 
The lesson is one not just for Southern 
Africa but for the world as a whole. HB 
Francis Caas The prospects for consolidating the 
peace in Angola 
by P. Pierson-Mathy* 
The signing of the Lusaka Protocol 
on 20 November 1994 and the 
Security Council's decision of Feb-
ruary 1995 to undertake a new 
peace-keeping operation in Angola 
(UNAVEM III — United Nations 
Angola Verification Mission) are 
the starting points for a long 
process of re-establishing and con-
solidating peace after the unpre-
cedented trauma and devastation 
caused by two years of war which 
followed the first multi-party elec-
tions organised under international 
supervision in September 1992. 
The UN mission will have a 
maximum of 7000 armed men, 350 un-
armed military observers and 260 police 
observers. These 7610 personnel, drawn 
for the most part from UNAVEM II (the 
previous mission) will be supplemented by 
an appropriate number of civilians re-
cruited locally and internationally. The cost 
of UNAVEM III has been estimated at 
$1261 million, $65 million of which is to be 
provided by the Angolan government. The 
latter, of course, also faces the enormous 
cost of national reconstruction. UNAVEM 
III has thus been designed as a wide-
ranging operation which is radically dif-
ferent in both size and nature from the 
two earlier United Nations operations in 
Angola. 
In order to appreciate the scope 
of the mandate of UNAVEM III and to 
assess its likelihood of success, we think it 
essential firstly to recall the circumstances, 
objectives and mandate of the two pre-
vious operations, particularly UNAVEM II, 
which was linked to the disaster into which 
Angola sank and which was the pre-
decessor of the current mission. 
* Lecturer In International Law, Free University of 
Brussels. President of the European Information and 
Action Network on Southern Africa. 
UNAVEM I 
The first operation in Angola 
resulted from the international settlement 
of the conflict in South West Africa leading 
to the independence of the territory as 
Namibia. This conflict had been fuelled by 
the political aggression of South Africa's 
apartheid regime which opposed both the 
independence of Namibia and the con-
solidation of MPLA rule in Angola. The 
Angolan government had opted for a 
People's Republic and had pledged soli-
darity in the fight for national liberation in 
Southern Africa. This solidarity, also ex-
pressed by the other 'Front Line States' in 
the region posed a threat to the interests 
of the Pretoria regime which linked its own 
survival to the preservation, if necessary by 
force, of the status quo elsewhere in the 
sub-continent. 
South Africa was not wholly 
isolated in its hostility. Up until 1988, the 
year the first peace accords on Angola 
were concluded. Western nations, led by 
the United States, tolerated this aggression 
and rejected any proposal for sanctions 
against South Africa on account of its 
policy. The USA was also hostile to the 
Cuban presence in Angola. Since 1975, 
they had, on this pretext, been refusing to 
establish diplomatic relations with the 
Angolan government. From 1981, they 
linked Namibian independence to the 
departure of Cuban troops from Angola — 
a position of doubtful international legality 
— and in 1985 they agreed to give direct 
military aid to UNITA, which was already 
armed and supported in the field by South 
Africa. The irreversible crisis of the ap-
artheid regime at the end of the 1980s, 
coinciding with the weakening of the role 
of the USSR in international politics, 
provided the catalysts for the USA to 
intervene to speed up the conclusion of 
accords which would help to preserve 
certain geostrategic interests of the United 
States and its allies in Southern Africa. 
UNAVEM I was the product of 
the first peace accords signed on 22 
December 1988 between South Africa on 
the one hand and Angola and Cuba on the 
other. The mediator for this was not the 
United Nations but the United States, then 
effectively a party to the conflict. These 
accords linked the end of South African 
aggression against Angola and the in-
dependence of Namibia — hitherto pre-
vented by Pretoria — to the subsequent 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. 
The Cuban forces had arrived in 1975 to 
assist the new Angolan state in confront-
ing South African aggression. Angola and 
Cuba accepted this withdrawal and agreed 
to apply for support from the Security 
Council for this to take place under the 
supervision of the United Nations. 
UNAVEM I was the result, with the Security 
Council authorising a mission whose man-
date was limited to observing the 
withdrawal and departure of Cuban 
troops. This proved successful, with the 
Cuban and Angolan parties respecting 
their undertakings. 
The 1988 accords effectively 
ended South African aggression but did 
not put an end to the war in Angola nor to 
the intervention of the United States in the 
conflict. While forcing Pretoria to stop all 
military aid to UNITA, the agreements did 
not oblige the USA — which was not a 
party to them — to do likewise. American 
aid continued to flow via Zaire. Despite the 
departure of the Cuban troops, Washing-
ton persisted in its refusal to establish 
diplomatic relations with Angola. It now 
made the normalisation of relations with 
the country dependent on the ending of 
the single-party system and the legalis-
ation of UNITA. Angola had, in the 
meantime, abandoned its socialist stance. 
The 1991 accords and 
UNAVEM II 
The Angola Peace Accords, 
signed on 31 May 1991 between the 
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Angolan Government and UNITA, were 
negotiated in Lisbon under the auspices of 
Portugal. The United States and the USSR 
were party to the negotiations, although 
the former did not halt aid to UNITA while 
they were going on. The peace they 
envisaged was based on a cease-fire and 
the disarming and demobilisation both of 
the government army and of UNITA's 
forces. The United Nations was called upon 
to intervene in the process. The peace was 
to be consolidated by multi-party legislat-
ive and presidential elections to be or-
ganised in 17 months, under international 
supervision. 
In exchange for UNITA's recog-
nition of the Angolan state and of its 
institutions up to the elections, the govern-
ment was obliged to deal with this 
organisation, after the signing of the 
accords and before it had been disarmed 
and demobilised, as if it were a political 
party free to move and operate over the 
entire country. There were major risks 
inherent in relying on the sudden transfor-
mation of UNITA, a totalitarian and 
militaristic organisation whose leader de-
manded power as a 'right', into a de-
mocratic party. However, the intervention 
of the United Nations and of the three 
states which had taken part in the negoti-
ations reassured the government and 
population of Angola. In fact, the UN's 
role, as defined in the accords, was severely 
circumscribed. The UN was not nominated 
in the accords to supervise the elections. It 
was nevertheless invited to act as principal 
observer by the government, acting in 
consultation with UNITA, although with-
out the composition of UNAVEM II being 
significantly increased. Thus UNAVEM II 
consisted of just 450 unarmed soldiers, 
police and civilians supplemented at the 
height of its mission in March 1993, by 400 
additional personnel. 
In fact, UNITA was able to take 
advantage of the 1991 accords, whose 
implementation was to be supervised by 
UNAVEM II under the authority of the 
Security Council, and with the backing of 
the guarantor states. Against the back-
ground of the installation of a multi-party 
system and of democracy in Angola, it was 
able legally to set itself up in strategic 
centres and towns throughout the country 
— while fraudulently retaining its charac-
ter as an essentially armed movement 
whose objective was to take power either 
through the ballot box or by force of arms. 
No preventive measures were envisaged 
by the Security Council in the event of 
UNITA losing the election, although it was 
well known that, unlike the government 
forces, Jonas Savimbi's movement was 
only partially disarmed and demilitarised. 
Some countries were convinced that the 
MPLA, worn out by years in power, would 
be abandoned by a population tired of the 
horrors of war. This analysis proved false. 
So tragically, did the 'hopes' expressed by 
the three observer states and the UN in 
their diplomatic initiatives, after the elec-
tions. These were aimed at persuading 
UNITA, already on a war footing, to accept 
the results and assume the main opposition 
role. The polls were deemed free and fair 
by the UN. 
The Lusaka Protocol and 
UNAVEM III 
The MPLA won the legislative 
elections with 53.8 %of the vote as against 
UNITA's 34.1 %. In the Presidential race. 
President Dos Santos received 49.5 % (just 
short of the required absolute majority) 
with 40.7 % going to Jonas Savimbi. Rather 
than face the likely outcome of a second 
round in the presidential election and 
ignoring the legitimacy of the vote, UNITA 
reverted to military means in an attempt 
to take power. The United Nations and the 
guarantor states were slow to condemn 
UNITA's actions. By ignoring the de-
mocratic choice of the Angolan people, 
UNITA forced the country back into a 
disastrous war. 
Condemned by the Security 
Council for recommencing hostilities, 
UNITA was asked on 15 July 1993 to 
withdraw its armed forces from all ter-
ritories occupied since the election. Its 
refusal to do so led the Council, on 15 
September 1993, to adopt a military and 
oil embargo against the rebels. Mean-
while, the Angolan institutions established 
as a result of the elections saw themselves 
endowed with new legitimacy. 
The Lusaka Protocol was pre-
ceded by several attempts at negotiation, 
led by UNAVEM II and assisted by the three 
guarantor states. Such attempts, however, 
were doomed to failure as long as the 
military balance favoured UNITA and 
international pressure on the latter re-
mained limited. Among the failed efforts 
were the so-called 'Namibe ceasefire' (26 
November 1992), the Addis Ababa negoti-
ations (January/February 1993) and the 
Abidjan talks (April/May 1993). In Abidjan, 
the United States sought to induce UNITA 
to accept the cease-fire in exchange for 
political gains. Through the mediation of 
the United Nations, they obtained major 
concessions from the government which 
was then in a poor position militarily 
speaking. In the interests of 'national 
reconciliation', UNITA was assured that it 
could take part in government at all levels. 
However, after 40 days of talking, UNITA 
withdrew from the process and again took 
up its offensive against provincial capitals. 
This intransigence was finally to lead to a 
reversal of the USA's attitude. Following 
the failure of the Abidjan negotiations and 
20 years of diplomatic 'boycott', Washing-
ton normalised its relations with Luanda in 
May 1993. Obstacles to the acquisition of 
military equipment by the Angolan 
government were removed and American 
objections to limited but obligatory sanc-
tions against UNITA were lifted. Mean-
while, the government re-formed the 
national army. 
Negotiations began again in Nov-
ember 1993, this time in Lusaka. UNITA 
had had to make a formal preliminary 
undertaking to accept the principle of the 
withdrawal of its forces from all territories 
occupied after the elections. Conducted 
under the auspices of the new representat-
ive of the Secretary General, A.B. Beye, the 
negotiations were to last a full year. The 
UN played a major role in the process, 
alongside the observer states. The Lusaka 
Protocol was finally signed on 20 Novem-
ber 1994, despite the absence of Jonas 
Savimbi. This was mainly because the 
military situation now decisively favoured 
the government which was coming under 
strong pressure from the United States and 
the Security Council not to 'humiliate' 
Mr Savimbi. UNITA had, in the meantime, 
lost most of the provincial capitals it had 
seized and no longer had access to most of 
the diamond-mining areas it had exploited 
to finance the war. Finally, the regional 
context had also changed with the ANC's 
^ 
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election victory in 1994 and Nelson Man­
dela's accession as President of South 
Africa. 
Main provisions 
The Lusaka Protocol set out the 
principles and conditions of the ceasefire 
and of national reconciliation. It establi­
shed the role of the bodies responsible for 
monitoring application of these provisions, 
namely the joint commission, the three 
observer states and the UN. 
The cessation of hostilities firstly 
implied the limited disengagement, under 
the supervision of the United Nations, of 
the fighting forces. At the same time, there 
was to be free movement of people and 
goods. The second phase entailed the 
quartering and disarming of UNITA forces 
under UN supervision. 
A third set of actions was to 
involve completing the training of the FAA 
(Angolan Armed Forces), with the in­
corporation of UNITA personnel at all levels 
into this body. Implementation of these 
provisions has been extremely slow coming 
up against numerous obstacles, including 
hundreds of cease-fire violations per­
petrated, for the most part, by UNITA. The 
situation did not ease until April 1995. 
The subsequent Lusaka meeting 
on 6 May between President Dos Santos 
and Jonas Savimbi improved matters 
further. Despite this, by July 1995, the 
process was five months behind schedule. 
No quartering or disarming of UNITA had 
commenced by that date. 
The provisions relating to 
'national reconciliation' formed the other 
pillar of the peace process. These provisions 
set the number and the nature of the posts 
to be allocated to UNITA, both within the 
government and in provincial and local 
authorities, which were now to be decen­
tralised. 
A post of Vice-President was 
offered to Jonas Savimbi by the Angolan 
government after the Lusaka meeting. The 
appropriate amendments were made to 
the constitution but the UNITA leader was 
slow to agree. The participation of UNITA 
members in government and adminis­
trative structures was made subject to the 
disarming of this organisation's forces. It 
should be noted that an amnesty had been 
agreed by Parliament before the protocol 
was signed. 
Role of the United 
Nations 
The specific nature of the peace 
process lies particularly in the importance 
of the tasks allocated to the United 
Nations. This time, the UN presided over 
the joint commission, the body responsible 
for monitoring application of all the 
political, administrative and military 
aspects of the 1991 peace accords which 
had still not been applied and all the 
provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. The 
other members of the joint commission are 
the government, UNITA and the three 
observer states, with decisions being taken 
on the basis of consensus. 
In the context of national re­
conciliation, the UN has been invited, after 
the departure of UNITA forces from 
occupied areas, to monitor compliance 
with the security conditions required for 
normalisation of state administration. 
It is also to be involved in the 
electoral process which was begun in 
September 1992 and which was due to be 
concluded in a second round of presidential 
elections. It is the UN which, in consultation 
with the joint commission, has the task of 
declaring at the appropriate time that the 
political and material conditions set out in 
the protocol have been achieved. 
Deployment of UNAVEM 
III and future prospects 
Despite being afforded the basic 
means to control implementation of the 
protocol, UNAVEM III has taken a long time 
to be deployed. At the time of writing, 
seven months after the cease-fire came 
into effect, it was still far from complete. 
On 7 February, the Security Council author­
ised the deployment of advance elements 
of UNAVEM III to prepare for the arrival of 
infantry units and the subsequent arrival of 
the personnel needed for setting up the 
areas where UNITA forces would be 
billeted. 
However, various conditions 
needed to be met for the deployment of 
the 7000 armed men to go ahead. Some of 
these depend on the cooperation of the 
government and UNITA in complying with 
their respective obligations and others are 
linked to material obstacles resulting from 
the devastating effects of war. The UN has 
a very big task but it must be seen through 
if the ceasefire and the overall peace 
process is to be consolidated. In this 
context, the delays encountered are bound 
to be a cause for concern. 
There can be no guarantee of 
long-lasting peace while UNITA retains its 
weapons and has not been integrated into 
the military and institutional processes of 
the Angolan state. UNAVEM III has a major 
role to play in this respect. Everything 
humanly and materially possible should 
therefore be done to accelerate its deploy­
ment. After UNAVEM II, which was a 
dramatic failure for Angola, its peace 
process and the credibility of the United 
Nations, the Angolans have legitimate 
reason to expect more from the inter­
national community this time. H P.P-M. 
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of Mozambique 
'Every day, you have to work for 
democracy' 
October 1994 saw the first de-
mocratic elections in Mozambique 
and, since then, the country has, at 
it were, become 'normal' once 
again. Well, almost. It is still one of 
the world's poorest countries and 
depends for the most part on 
international aid. Frelimo, which 
now holds the reins of power, has 
the hard task of setting the country 
back on the road to economic growth and of 
inspiring hope in the millions of Mozam-
bique citizens tested by several decades of 
war. Frances Rodrigues, Deputy Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, knows 
that the years to come will be decisive in 
terms of her country's future. In an inter-
view in the capital, Maputo, she gave us her 
views about the future of Mozambique. 
■ Do you think that democracy will be 
maintained in Mozambique and is it 
possible to speak of true democracy ? 
— We naturally want democracy 
to be maintained and consolidated but, as 
this is a continuous process and not a static 
one, we have to work for it and do more 
every day. Even in Western countries, 
nothing guarantees that democracy will be 
maintained, and the same applies to 
Mozambique. 
In any case, the government and 
institutions are doing everything necessary 
for democracy to be maintained. A con-
structive dialogue has started between 
Frelimo, which won the elections, and the 
other parties, particularly Renamo. The 
first session of Parliament went well, the 
government's programme and budget 
have been approved and it can now begin 
its work. The conditions are in place for it 
to be able to pursue its démocratisation 
policy and to encourage other state 
institutions to do likewise. 
■ What is the status of these institutions, 
particularly the Parliament and the new 
judicial bodies ? 
— These institutions are quite 
new. They have only just been set up and 
have not yet acquired the status one might 
wish them to have. However, we have 
already established a relationship with 
similar institutions in other countries with a 
view to promoting cooperation. We have 
also asked our foreign partners to provide 
specific aid in this area. Such cooperation 
should make it possible to consolidate and 
stabilise Mozambican institutions. 
■ Is it your wish that the European Union 
should assist you in this area ? 
It is not only our wish but also 
that of the EU. This type of cooperation 
was raised in debates at the Joint Assembly 
in Dakar as well as in the more general 
context of strengthening the political 
dialogue between the ACP countries and 
the Union. 
■ Why hasn't Mozambique followed 
South Africa's example and set up a 
government of national unity based on 
Frelimo and Renamo ?Don'tyou think that 
failure to do this might have a destabilising 
effect in the future ? 
— In South Africa, the parties 
involved decided before the elections to 
share power and set up a government of 
national unity. This was not the case in 
Mozambique where Frelimo won the 
elections, formed the government and is 
now in power. Mozambique's experience 
is no different from that of other de-
mocracies such as Sweden, Denmark or 
more recently, France. I have never come 
across anything in the history of democracy 
where a party winning the elections asks its 
opponents if they would like to take part in 
government. 
■ You gave the example of Sweden, but 
that country has not had to fight an 
adversary like Renamo, which has a very 
violent and controversial past. Do you 
think that Renamo is prepared to respect 
the democratic rules ? 
— We can only hope. In any case, 
for the time being, Mr Dhlakama's party is 
supporting democracy. The government, 
for its part, is doing all it can for the 
democratically agreed programme to be 
implemented and for all institutions to 
work together in harmony. 
■ At present, Mozambique depends 
almost entirely on outside aid. How can 
you speak about true independence ? 
— Mozambique is not the only 
country to be heavily dependent on 
outside aid. You also have to take into 
consideration the fact that we have only 
been independent for about 20 years and 
Mrs Rodriguez accompanied by 
Commissioner Pinheiro during the 
latter's visit to Mozambique 
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Mozambique : peace at last  I
The first democratic elections in 
Mozambique's history took place 
on 27-29 October 1994. These 
were organised under the 
auspices of the United Nations 
and were declared free and fair by 
international observers. After several 
decades of war, Mozambique is finally 
savouring peace and has set out 
resolutely on the path to democracy. 
Mozambique became independent on 25 
June 1975, after an 11-year war of 
liberation which set the Frente de 
Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) 
against Portugal, the colonial power. As 
soon as it became independent, 
Mozambique found itself faced with a 
deplorable socio-economic legacy. Few 
Mozambicans had been to university and 
93% of the population was illiterate. 
Overall, the country sorely lacked qualified 
personnel, health services were virtually 
nonexistent and, as they fled the country, 
the Portuguese settlers destroyed much of 
the agricultural and industrial 
infrastructure. The government set up by 
Frelimo has therefore, from the outset, 
been confronted with an extremely 
difficult situation. On top of all this, they 
found themselves fighting a war against 
the Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana 
(Renamo), supported by Rhodesia and 
South Africa. The conflict lasted almost 
16 years and had a disastrous effect on 
the Mozambican population and 
economy. Finally, Frelimo's increasingly 
autocratic Marxist-Leninist politics caused 
serious disorganisation in the agricultural 
sector, the country's principal source of 
revenue, leading to a net fall in 
investment. Towards the end of the 
1980s, the country was on its knees. The 
war had killed a million people, displaced 
over 5 million Mozambicans and forced 
almost 2 million others to take refuge in 
neighbouring countries. In economic 
terms, the cost of the conflict has been 
estimated at $15 billion. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, the average per capita 
income was barely 80 dollars a year. 
However, from 1989 onwards, the winds 
of change began to blow in Mozambique 
and the wider region. With the end of 
the Cold War and the arrival in power of 
President De Klerk, a less bellicose leader 
than his predecessor, both the Frelimo 
government and Renamo saw their 
traditional allies melt away. Pressure from 
international aid agencies combined with 
exhaustion on the part of the combatants 
forced the opposing parties to enter into 
negotiations and, finally, to sign a peace 
agreement on 4 October 1992. 
Elections were held two years later and, 
according to all observers, they were a 
model of calm and organisation. Even the 
announcement by Renamo leader Afonso 
Dhlakama, a few hours before the polling 
stations opened, that his party was 
withdrawing from the elections on the 
grounds of fraud, failed to disrupt the 
process. The Mozambican people had 
waited for this day for too long to let the 
opportunity slip. Dhlakama consulted the 
South African Vice-President, Thabo 
Mbeki, President Mugabe and other 
international leaders who all urged him to 
take part in the elections. On 28 October, 
he announced that his party was once 
again a competitor in the race for power. 
A paradoxical result 
The population's enthusiasm for these first 
democratic elections was demonstrated in 
a very high turnout. Almost 90% of the 
possible electorate cast a ballot. In the 
Presidential poll, the outgoing candidate, 
Joachim Chissano, won 53.3% of the votes 
as against 33.7% for Afonso Dhlakama. In 
the legislative elections, Frelimo won 
44.3% and Renamo 37.8%. The latter 
party won the majority of votes in the 
five central provinces (Nampula, 
Zambezia, Tete, Manica and Sofala). The 
relatively high vote in favour of Renamo 
may have come as a surprise to some 
since the organisation had been viewed 
by many as South Africa's puppet, 
infamous throughout the region for 
atrocities committed against the civilian 
population. In fact, the explanation for 
Renamo's good result is probably to be 
found in the increasing disillusionment felt 
by a significant section of the population 
over the policies of Frelimo. This 
discontent was particularly strong among 
the peasants who had suffered 
considerably as a result of the 
government's collectivisation measures. 
Allegations of increasing corruption within 
the ruling party and a perceived drift 
towards more authoritarian policies also 
prompted some of the electorate to vote 
for the opposition. Renamo's victory in 
the centre of the country was explained 
by the fact that the population in these 
regions saw Frelimo as being dominated 
by the Shangaans, an ethnic group from 
Southern Mozambique. Finally, according 
to one observer, generalised 'moral 
amnesia' had taken hold of the 
population, leading it to forget both the 
demands exacted by Renamo and the 
positive changes achieved by Frelimo in 
the days after independence. By the eve 
of the elections, there was little to choose 
between the two parties in the minds of 
the electorate. 
Some journalists covering the events also 
commented that many Mozambicans had 
voted for Renamo through fear of seeing 
it taking up the armed struggle again if it 
lost the elections. The spectre of a 
situation similar to that in Angola was 
constantly hovering over Mozambique. 
However, the situation in these two 
countries is very different in many 
respects. Renamo, for example, does not 
have access to the kind of resources 
available to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA 
(diamonds and oil), which would have 
been needed to restart the war. 
Moreover, Renamo's leader who is, in the 
final analysis, a tactician, is well aware 
that time is on his side. In the 1999 
elections, he could well become the next 
President of Mozambique, particularly if 
the present government does not meet 
the pressing needs of the population. 
Relaunching the 
economy and 
consolidating 
democracy 
Mozambique's transition to democracy 
has thus been a success, but the hardest 
part is still to come. The country is 
confronted by a host of major problems. 
There is an urgent need to reintegrate 
millions of refugees and displaced people, 
not to mention large numbers of 
demobilised soldiers, into Mozambican 
society. This is going to be difficult given 
the very high unemployment and limited 
work opportunities. As regards the 
economy, Mozambique is in rough waters 
and it will have to deal with socio-
economic imperatives which are difficult 
to reconcile. The country is having to 
implement a very strict recovery policy 
imposed by the international financial 
authorities while, at the same time, 
seeking to improve the everyday life of 
millions of Mozambicans who live in very 
precarious conditions. Finally, despite a 
growth rate of 5.4% in 1994, the country 
is a long way from overcoming the 
economic crisis into which it was plunged 
by years of conflict and drought. If one 
adds to this an external debt of over $5 
billion and a rate of inflation which, last 
year, exceeded 70%, the next few years 
are bound to be painful, particularly for 
the underprivileged. 
To get the country back on its feet, the 
government must overhaul industrial and 
agricultural infrastructures which are in a 
lamentable state, improve and repair land 
communications and port facilities (which 
has already been done in the case of the 
port of Beira), inspire new confidence in 
foreign investors, promote its unexploited 
natural resources and continue to attract 
essential international aid. The country 
today has considerable assets to help it 
achieve these objectives. It is at peace and 
the regional environment is stable at last. 
The people know all about the ruinous 
effects of war and are therefeore 
determined to ensure that their efforts 
bear fruit this time. Perhaps most 
importantly, while Mozambique may be 
one of the world's poorest countries, 
hope for a better future seems, once 
again, to have become part of the fabric 
of everyday life. ■■ F.C 
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these have been very troubled years. 
Shortly after independence, we had to deal 
with Renamo's attempts at déstabilisation 
orchestrated by the former Rhodesia. From 
the outset, Mozambique had to fight to 
preserve its territorial integrity. 
It also had to make a considerable 
effort in helping Zimbabwe finally to 
achieve independence and democratic 
government. Mozambique then suffered a 
great deal because of the apartheid regime 
in South Africa. Lastly, a very long and very 
painful war has just come to an end and all 
A well-equipped orphanage in Maputo 
Hope for a better futwe seems to have 
become part of the fabric of everyday 
life 
this has meant that we are currently one of 
the world's poorest countries. Our 
essential tasks at the moment are to 
relaunch the economy, restore the social 
fabric, consolidate democracy and enable 
Mozambique to develop as a nation in its 
own right. 
■ You put a lot of emphasis on the 
negative role played by South Africa, 
Rhodesia and Renamo, but don't you think 
that Frelimo's management is also partly 
responsible for the country's economic and 
social decline ? 
— If you weigh everything up, it 
is undoubtedly the war which has had the 
most pernicious and disastrous effects. 
Frelimo has had to deal with an extremely 
difficult situation and has tried to run the 
country as best it can. 
■ Frelimo's politics and ideology appear 
to have undergone a complete U-turn in 
recent years. Nowadays it advocates 
market economics whereas, before, the 
ideology was Marxist-Leninist. How do you 
explain this? 
—Frelimo has adjusted its politics 
to the current world situation. We have 
had to adapt to the new world order, but 
we have tried to do this gradually. Our 
ultimate objective must be to get the 
country back on its feet both in economic 
and social terms. Young people make up 
40% of the population and we have to 
inspire hope in them as well as in the 
millions of displaced people and refugees in 
neighbouring countries. We also need to 
integrate large numbers of demobilised 
soldiers back into society. 
■ What is Mozambique's role within 
Southern Africa and particularly SADC, and 
what is its relationship with its powerful 
neighbour, South Africa ? 
— We are totally committed to 
strengthening our relationship with all 
SADC countries. Within that organisation, 
Mozambique coordinates a vital sector for 
regional integration, namely transport and 
communications. South Africa is now a 
member of SADC and the South African 
government has made a commitment to 
support cooperation. Of course, there are 
very different levels of development, not 
only between South Africa and 
Mozambique, but also between South 
Africa and other SADC countries. 
Our objective is to reduce this 
huge discrepancy and to create synergies 
between the countries in the region. 
Although South Africa has a higher level of 
development, other SADC countries also 
have assets which South Africa needs in 
order to go on developing, and we will 
therefore try to use everyone's assets as 
harmoniously as possible. You see a similar 
situation within the EU where there are 
considerable differences in development 
between Member States. We in Southern 
Africa hope to be able to follow Europe's 
example and help one another. The Union 
is an example we could copy. 
■ Your government has been very bold in 
the undertakings it has made to the IMF 
and the World Bank. Do you think you will 
be able to stand by these undertakings ? 
— We intend to make every 
effort to keep our word. We had our 
Consultative Group Meeting last March 
and the results of this were positive. Up to 
the present time, things seem to be on the 
right track, but Mozambicans will, of 
course, have to accept the many sacrifices 
these undertakings will require to get the 
country back on its feet. 
■ Are Mozambique's citizens prepared to 
make additional sacrifices ? 
— Do they have any choice ? You 
know as well as I that the conditions are 
difficult and there is no other option, tarn 
Interview by F.C 
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Southern Africa 
by Dr Greg Mills* 
Now that South Africa has enjoyed 
over a year of democratic govern-
ment since the elections in April 
1994, the 'rainbow nation' is ex-
pected to focus its attention, not 
only on the priority of internal 
nation-building, but on efforts at 
rebuilding the Southern African 
region. It is anticipated that South 
Africa will play a role in this by 
increased regional economic 
cooperation and closer integration 
through a variety of regional insti-
tutions. This involvement is ex-
pected to have a positive impact on 
the living conditions of the mass of 
the population in Southern Africa. 
In this new era, away from the 
confines of the Cold War and the destabil-
ising effects of apartheid, regional re-
lations are now defined on the basis of an 
interdependent, mutually beneficial and 
non-hegemonic philosophy. Areas of 
common interest, whether in the economic 
or security domains, are seen as the catalyst 
for the states of Southern Africa to draw 
closer together and become collectively 
stronger. The non-hegemonic philosophy 
is in line with the ANC's position on foreign 
policy presented in their working docu-
ment prior to the 1994 elections. This 
provided an insight into the future com-
mitments and direction of the Government 
of National Unity. The document placed 
great emphasis on South Africa's role in the 
region and the African continent as a 
whole. In particular, it identified 'a special 
relationship with the peoples of Southern 
Africa all of whom have suffered under 
apartheid'. The focus was to be on 
balanced regional economic development 
aimed at transforming the 'exploitative 
and socially undesirable features of the 
existing regional economy'. 
* This is an abridged version of an article 
submitted by the author, who is Director of Studies 
at the South Africa Institute of International Affairs, 
Jan Smuts House, Johannesburg. Some of the issues 
raised in the article are expanded on in Dr Mills' 
edited volume on South Africa in the Global 
Economy, published by the Institute earlier this year. 
He writes in a personal capacity. 
According to President Mandela, 
South Africa will, in this quest, have to 
exercise self-restraint and sensitivity in 
achieving the necessary balance between 
giving assistance to the region and regional 
domination. As Table 1 reveals. South 
Africa is clearly the most powerful state in 
Southern Africa. As such it has a strong 
international voice and will exert a decisive 
influence on the destiny of the region. 
Trade with African countries can now take 
place freely and openly. However, there 
are still both political and economic factors 
which inhibit regional prosperity. These 
include the marginalisation of Africa from 
the international mainstream, limits on the 
expansion of intra-African trade (due, 
among other things, to credit and infra-
structural conditions), the continuing mi-
litary and social insecurity in the region 
and, most importantly, the problems of 
transition that face South Africa as the 
dominant regional actor. 
South Africa's 
development challenges 
Although a giant on the con-
tinent and in Southern Africa — where 
with under 40% of the population, it 
produces 80% of the region's economic 
product — South Africa is still a relatively 
small player in world terms. It ranks at the 
lower end of the 'upper-middle-income' 
countries, below Mauritius, Brazil, Mexico, 
Gabon, Greece and Portugal. If one takes 
the figures for economic growth per capita 
— generally seen as a leading indicator for 
stable political development — the picture 
for South and Southern Africa is not at all 
rosy. As Table 2 indicates, growth in sub-
Saharan Africa has lagged well behind that 
of other regions, both developed and 
developing. And between 1980 and 1992, 
South Africa managed only 60% of the 
growth rate achieved by sub-Saharan 
countries as a whole. 
The low growth rate of sub-
Saharan Africa is undoubtedly linked to 
demographic trends. The population of 
the region has more than doubled from 
294 million in 1970 to nearly 600 million in 
1994. It is projected that the figure will rise 
to 940 million by 2010 and 1.36 billion by 
2025. Southern Africa accounts for a 
consistent 25%of these totals. As for South 
Africa itself, the population rose from 22.5 
million in 1970 to around 41 million in 
1994. The projections for 2010 and 2025 
are 58.4 million and 73 million respectively. 
Although mankind's adaptability, com-
bined with new technologies in areas such 
as plant breeding and fertilisers, have kept 
the means of subsistence ahead of popu-
lation growth in South Africa, there is 
justification for a Malthusian pessimism 
about its chances of staying ahead. 
Given the decline in the avail-
ability of natural resources per capita as a 
result of this increase in population, some 
radical changes are necessary if the socio-
economic situation is to be stabilised. 
Assuming the formula of the Asian coun-
tries and other 'success stories' is adopted, 
this should rely on export-driven growth. 
Technological skills are, of course, required 
Southern Africa: population and GNP (1992) 
Country 
Angola 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Population 
(thousands) 
9 732 
1 360 
1 860 
9 085 
16 565 
1 529 
39 763 
860 
25 965 
8 589 
10 352 
GNP total 
(USS) 
6000 
3 797 
1 090 
1 896 
1 034 
2 502 
106 019 
930 
2 561 
2 580 
5 896 
GNP per capita 
(USS) 
620* 
2 790 
590 
210 
60 
1 610 
2 670 
1 080 
110 
290 
570 
* 1989 figures 
Source Esterhuysen, P. (ed), South Africa in Sub-EquatorialAfrica .Economic Interaction. InstituteofSouth Africa, Pretoria, 1994 
pp3,14. 
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Performance indicators in the world economy 
Group and region 
Industrial countries 
Less developed 
countries 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
East Asia & Pacific 
South Asia 
Middle East, North 
Africa etc. 
Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
South Africa 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
1970-80 
3.3 
4.5 
3.6 
6.6 
3.5 
5.2 
5.4 
3.0 
1980-92 
2.9 
6.0 
1.8 
7.7 
5.2 
2.2 
1.8 
1.1 ■ 
Growth In 
exports (%) 
1970-80 
5.4 
3.9 
2.8 
9.5 
3.6 
3.9 
-0.1 
11.1 
1980-92 
4.9 
4.4 
2.4 
10.5 
6.8 
0.8 
2.9 
0.7 
Growth in gross domestic 
investment (%) 
1970-80 
2.0 
7.0 
5.1 
9.7 
4.6 
n/a 
6.8 
2.5 
1980-92 
4.0 
7.0 
-3.0 
10.1 
5.0 
n/a 
-0.5 
-4.4 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1994, New York, Oxford University Press 
for this to happen. Yet South Africa has a 
deplorable lack of technically skilled, educ-
ated workers. This is a debilitating legacy 
of apartheid and of Bantu Education in 
particular. Although, in the past, the 
government spent a relatively large 
amount on schooling by global standards 
(the 1992-93 figure was 5.4% of GDP), this 
has been racially biased. In 1992, spending 
on whites was 3.5 times that on blacks. 
And the prospects of achieving expendi-
ture parity at the higher level are slight. In 
South Africa in 1993, an estimated 12.5 
million people were defined as illiterate. 
Education is related both to 
skewed income distribution patterns and 
low productivity ratios in South Africa. 
While the standard of living indicators for 
the white, coloured and Asian sectors of 
the population compare favourably with 
those of developed countries, the figures 
for black South Africans (around 75% of 
the total) are among the worst in the 
world. Around half of the black population 
is below the age of 20, living in an 
environment where there are high expec-
tations but a lack of economic develop-
ment, and hence of opportunities. In 1990, 
some 16 million South Africans lived below 
the breadline figure of R600 (ECU 125) per 
family per month. Most of these people 
were living in rural areas. 
It is estimated that an annual 
growth rate of less than 4.0% will not 
create sufficient jobs to keep pace with the 
population increase. Around 400 000 peo-
ple are entering the labour market each 
year, yet between 1985 and 1989, only 
31 000 jobs were created annually. 95% of 
these were in the formal sector. By 
contrast, a shortfall of 920 000 skilled 
workers is forecast by the year 2005, 
although there will be a surplus of 11.5 
million unskilled or semi-skilled workers. 
South Africa's unemployment rate for 
1994 was 32.6%, according to the first-ever 
official figures issued in March. Unofficial 
estimates (including from Government 
sources such as the Foreign Ministry) have 
put the figure at 45-50%. According to the 
official statistics, about 1.5 million people 
were employed in the informal economy 
while some 4.7 million people indicated 
they were unemployed. 
Productivity is an indirect func-
tion of skills, technology, capital and 
labour, taken in combination. Against such 
a poor educational backdrop, it is not 
surprising to find that labour productivity 
has improved only slowly in South Africa — 
at an average of about 0.4% and 0.5% in 
the 1970s and 1980s respectively. Wage 
increases have been much higher — 
around 10% per annum in the 1970s and 
16% during the 1980s. The result, despite 
abundant labour reserves, was that South 
Africa became increasingly capital intens-
ive and labour-saving from the 1970s 
onwards, and unemployment went up. 
This is an important factor for the South 
African government as it seeks to en-
courage investment in areas that ideally 
should create jobs and simultaneously 
generate export-driven wealth. 
The African burden 
South Africa's future ties with the 
international global economy, which are 
crucial in seeking to surmount the above-
mentioned structural difficulties, are in-
escapably linked to international percep-
tions of the region. The question that 
investors ask is — 'are these stable and 
profitable places in which to invest.' In this 
context, Nelson Mandela has observed 
that 'South Africa cannot escape its African 
destiny'. The country does, however, 
benefit from an increasing trading relation-
ship within the continent. According to 
Raymond Suttner, who chairs the South 
Africa Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, South African exports 
to the rest of Africa amounted to 31.7% of 
the country's total exports in 1993. During 
the first half of 1994 there was a 30% 
increase in such trade to a projected R5 
billion. But this positive situation is still 
offset to a large extent by South Africa's 
geographic location and perceptions of the 
continent as a whole. Africa has been 
described by some as 'The Third World's 
Third World' - regarded as marginal in the 
international economy and incapable of 
solving its own difficulties. Unfortunately 
South Africa, if only by dint of geography, 
is part of that mindset. 
Together, South and Southern 
Africa represent a contradiction of frust-
ration and hope. A prosperous Southern 
Africa would obviously benefit South 
Africa as it seeks to expand trading links, 
partners and profits. Yet as Angola and 
Mozambique struggle to get back into 
their independence starting blocks, that 
vision is some way off. Table 3 gives some 
indication of the problems facing the 
region in its efforts to get to grips with life 
after apartheid. 
Without wider regional pros-
perity, the gains for South Africa are likely 
to be small, and the extra burdens high. By 
way of example, the cost of dealing with 
illegal immigrants to South Africa from the 
region was estimated at more than R200m 
in 1994. In the same year, it was projected 
that these costs would rise to R1bn by the 
year 2000. This figure has since been 
revised upwards to an estimated R4bn. 
This is measured in terms of the costs of 
clothing, housing, feeding and educating 
the migrants. Add to this the costs related 
to smuggling, whether of drugs, vehicles, 
weapons or general contraband (which 
alone represents an annual loss of around 
R1bn in uncollected customs revenue) and 
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South Africa and its neighbours: the socio-economic picture 
South Africa 
Angola 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Real GDP 
growth (%) 
2.0 (1994) 
Inflation 
<%) 
Population External debt 
growth (%) (USS billions) 
-22.6 
-0.7 
2.5 
-9.4 
5.8 
-2.2 
1.0 
1.6 
5.0 
-5.4 
3.5 
(1993) 
(1993) 
(1993) 
(1994) 
(1993) 
(1993) 
(1993) 
(1992) 
(1994) 
(1994) 
(1994) 
9.7 
1840 
14.3 
13.9 
40.5 
50.0 
8.6 
12.9 
0.4 
(1994) 
(1993) 
(1993) 
(1993) 
(1994) 
(1994) 
(1993) 
(1993) 
(1993) 
11 000 (1994) 
55.0 (1994) 
22.5  (1994) 
2.5 
2.0 
3.5 
2.6 
3.0 
2.7 
3.0 
2.2 
2.8 
3.0 
3.7 
3.2 
1.7 (1993) 
10.9 
0.545 
0.472 
1.82 
5.3 
0.350 
0.240 
6.7 
11.28 
6.79 
4.2 
(1993) 
(1992) 
(1994) 
(1994) 
(1993) 
(1993) 
(1993) 
(1992) 
(1993) 
(1993) 
(1993) 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and various press reports. 
it is clear that South Africa cannot afford to 
ignore the plight of the wider region. The 
number of official refugees in South Africa 
is only around 10 000, but illegal migration 
from neighbouring states rose from 45 000 
in 1988 to nearly 100 000 in 1993. Es-
timates of the total number of such 
migrants in the country vary widely — 
from 2 million to 9 million (mainly Mozam-
bicans) - but the South African Police 
Service believes that the latter is the more 
accurate figure. 
This influx has predictably, pro-
voked xenophobic reactions among some 
South Africans, and this is likely to have 
political implications for the ANC. In 
developing a policy response, the govern-
ment obviously has to be mindful of the 
impact on their constituencies. They may 
react to the crisis by strengthening immig-
ration controls, by addressing the root 
Contrasting ¡mages of South Africa 
The standard of living indicators for 
white, coloured and Asian people 
compare favourably with those of 
developed countries, but the figures for 
black South Africans are among the 
worst in the world 
causes or perhaps a combination of the 
two. In any event, they are likely to favour 
the cheapest option. It could be that, far 
being a politically incorrect solution, the 
idea of a 'fortress South Africa' will become 
something of a socio-economic necessity. 
Many initiatives have been put forward by 
South Africans, neighbouring states and 
the international community to address 
some of the insecurities present in the 
region. These include : 
— The so-called 'British' initiative 
mooted by John Major during his visit last 
September when he called for new mecha-
nisms to head off conflicts before they 
become unstoppable ; 
— The OAU Mechanism for Con-
flict Prevention, Management and Resol-
ution, formally established at the Tunis 
Summit in 1994, which focuses on prevent-
ive diplomacy and crisis management; 
— The Association of Southern 
African States established as part of the 
Southern African Development Com-
munity (SADC) grouping. 
— The Inter-State Defence and 
Security Conference ; 
— The SADC sector on Political 
Cooperation, Democracy, Peace and Se-
curity. 
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All these so-called security mech-
anisms are designed to work in tandem 
with the development thrust of regional 
organisations such as SADC. As the new 
South African National Defence Force 
reorganises itself and strives to create a 
new image externally and domestically, it 
is likely that this arm of the government 
will become involved outside the Repub-
lic's borders : in peace support missions, 
disaster relief, training missions, and in-
evitably, in joint military operations. 
The RDP 
It is clear that something extra-
ordinary is needed for South Africa to 
break out of the straightjacket. The 
government's chosen solution is the Re-
construction and Development Prog-
ramme (RDP) which sets out to transform 
South Africa and make amends for the 
years of apartheid. This will be done 
through the building of some 1 million 
houses, the electrification of 2.5 million 
dwellings, the provision of free and 
compulsory education for all children, the 
creation of 2.5 million jobs, and the 
redistribution of 30% of all arable land ·— 
all within the next five years. 
The management of the RDP is 
going to be crucial, as South Africa strives 
to meet short-term demands through 
consumption while seeking to portray an 
image of financial rectitude. If one has to 
borrow heavily, then one must spend 
wisely and ensure transparency and ac-
countability every step of the way. This will 
be difficult for a government now largely 
representative of the very poor, among 
whom high expectations have created a 
culture of entitlement. 
Given the insecurity affecting 
both South and Southern Africa, which is 
largely based on economic problems, the 
impact of the RDP across South Africa's 
borders will be central in creating con-
ditions of sustainable economic develop-
ment in the region. Integration through 
SADC, the Southern Africa Customs Union, 
the proposed Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (Comesa), and a 
variety of special bilateral trade relation-
ships could assist in this process. Of course, 
while South Africa's economic dominance 
will inevitably shape the region's fortunes, 
the neighbouring states also have a key 
role in determining their own future. They 
are not passive spectators in an inter-
national game involving South Africa and 
the global community. They should be 
actively seeking to turn their economies 
into viable trading entities that are attract-
ive to outside investors. 
It is clear that South Africa has 
overcome some big challenges but in many 
respects, the most difficult ones still lie 
ahead. It must capitalise on both the 
domestic and external goodwill generated 
by the success of its transition, in confront-
ing its own difficulties. In this endeavour, 
the fortunes of South Africa and the 
Southern African region are closely inter-
twined. ■■ G.M. 
A school in Mozambique 
South Africa's neighbours are not just 
passive spectators — they have a key 
role in determining their own future In search of a common 
security 
by Fernando Gonçalves 
777e Foreign Ministers of the 11-nation Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) recently took a decision to transform the Frontline Group of States (FLS) 
into an Association of Southern African States (ASAS), as a security, conflict 
resolution and defence arm of SADC. In this article, the author, who is Senior Editor 
of the 'Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly' (SAPEM) analyses some of 
the general aspects of setting up common security systems and looks at the specific 
issues facing Southern Africa in this context. This is an abridged version of an article 
first published in Volume 8 No. 7 of SAPEM in April 1995. 
At conferences through-
out the world, politicians, dip-
lomats, academics and intellec-
tuals ponder the issues of conflict 
resolution, and common defence and 
security, particularly for countries sharing 
the same geographical space. But just how 
such mechanisms are to be implemented 
continues to be the subject of heated 
debate. At their annual summit in Tunis 
last year, OAU leaders endorsed a decision 
to set up a continental conflict resolution 
mechanism. This reflected a political desire 
to deal with conflicts but very little seems 
to be happening on the ground. This is 
partly due to the financial paralysis affect-
ing the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa, 
but more seriously, reflects differences 
among the member states on the me-
chanics of implementing the plan. Similarly, 
in November last year, at a Francophone 
summit in Biarritz, African leaders found it 
difficult to endorse a French proposal to set 
up a continental peacekeeping force, 
despite widespread agreement among 
them that such a mechanism would help 
prevent the recurrence of Rwanda-type 
situations. Nor does the issue of collective 
security always lead to consensus outside 
Africa. Last year in Budapest, Boris Yeltsin 
and Bill Clinton were unable to hide their 
disagreements over America's desire to 
incorporate the former Warsaw Pact 
members into the NATO. 
These failed attempts illustrate 
the point that the issue of collective 
security, whether regional, continental or 
international, is more complex than might 
initially appear. The complexity has 
become even more pronounced since the 
end of the Cold War. Previously, capitalist 
states were motivated to group together 
against what they perceived as the threat 
from communism, and vice versa. 
National sovereignty and 
pride 
At the heart of the problem, are 
the issues of national sovereignty and 
pride, together with the desire of states to 
take care of their own security affairs 
rather than placing them in the hands of a 
supranational structure, which most fear 
they will be unable to control. In Southern 
Africa, although the need for coordination 
on matters of regional security has been 
recognised, it is apparent that SADC will 
not, at least in the foreseeable future, 
move beyond the level of rhetoric. The 
controversy that surrounds the question of 
regional security is heightened because 
conventionally, it is viewed by people 
solely in military and police terms, rather 
than in a wider context encompassing 
aspects of economic and social develop-
ment. 
The collective use of force for the 
purpose of preserving international peace 
and security is permissible under the UN 
Charter, which also allows for the use of 
force at a regional level, after author-
isation by the Security Council. But smaller 
and weaker countries may have a legi-
timate concern that, in establishing re-
gional systems of collective security, they 
lay themselves open to possible bullying 
tactics by their stronger neighbours. A 
good example is the political crisis that 
affected Lesotho last year. According to 
sources in the Kingdom, this was partially 
caused by a confidential letter sent by the 
Prime Minister to the leaders of Botswana, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe, in which he 
sought military intervention to protect his 
government from a faction of the army 
that had sided with the King. 
Some students of international 
relations have also challenged the validity 
of the regional security concept, citing the 
fact of unequal economic and social 
development both within and between 
states. Where such imbalances within a 
country lead to internal strife, intervention 
by outside forces is likely to be viewed as 
interference in the affairs of a sovereign 
state. Where there is unequal develop-
ment between nations — even if they are 
in the same geographical region — this is 
likely to result in their having different 
foreign policy perceptions and goals. And if 
the goals differ, so too will the means to 
achieve them. Finally, there is an argument 
linked to the fact it is more difficult to 
intervene in conflicts that occur in larger 
and stronger nations. Smaller and weaker 
states are, therefore, unlikely to receive 
equal treatment. 
Groups of nations seek collective 
security because they have common values 
and interests that need to be preserved. It 
may an ideology that they are seeking to 
protect — or perhaps their accumulated 
wealth. NATO was set up to protect 
Western democracies against a perceived 
communist threat, while the Warsaw Pact 
came into being as a security belt for the 
former Soviet Union, designed to ensure 
that satellite nations could not be used to 
stage attacks against it. 
Regional cooperation and integ-
ration in Southern Africa has mainly been 
seen in terms of infrastructure develop-
ment and economic coordination. It has 
also provided a common platform for 
soliciting aid from the North. To date, 
however, it has excluded one of the most 
important integrationist elements, namely 
the human being. The 100 million or so 
inhabitants of the SADC area remain 
alienated from the 'integration' process, as 
evidenced recently, when the organisation 
decided to give its bureaucrats visa facilities 
to travel throughout the region. The 
business community, which is supposed to 
the Courier n° 153 · september-october 1995 r dossier 
be the engine of growth in any process of 
economic integration, received no such 
concession. 
Previous attempts 
Southern Africa has seen previous 
attempts at common regional security. 
Indeed, the former colonial powers re-
gularly consulted each other on how best 
to combat the liberation movements, in 
the period prior to independence. The role 
played by the Frontline States in the 
decolonisation of Angola, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe was 
also essentially a recognition of the need 
for an integrated approach to political and 
security issues in the region. It was in the 
same context that Tanzania and Zim-
babwe committed troops to help the 
Mozambican government fight Renamo, 
then regarded as an instrument of South 
African déstabilisation against Mozam-
bique. Even the idea floated by South 
Africa in the 1980s for a Constellation of 
Southern African States (CONSAS), may be 
viewed in this light although it is quite clear 
that what was envisaged was South 
African dominance rather than cooper-
ation with its neighbours. 
With the coming of indepen-
dence in South Africa, peace in Mozam-
bique and the prospect of an end to the 
conflict in Angola, the notion of regional 
security now needs some redefinition. 
Previously, almost 100 million people 
(including 30 million black South Africans), 
faced a common enemy with the military 
and economic capability to destabilise the 
entire region. But although South Africa 
has now joined the regional fraternity, its 
role will still have to defined by reference 
its own national interests as a regional 
'superpower'. The smaller and weaker 
countries have adopted a cautious policy : 
one which does not give South Africa the 
right — even under the guise of regional 
security — to undermine their national 
sovereignty. President Mandela is very 
much aware of this and, in the first year of 
his presidency, has acted judiciously to allay 
such fears. 
Thus South Africa has been dis-
creet and responsible when the question of 
playing the role of regional policeman has 
arisen. During the Lesotho crisis, it joined 
Botswana and Zimbabwe in the mediation 
effort, but opted for a total blockade to 
put pressure on the landlocked nation, 
rather than the military intervention 
contemplated by its partners. Similarly, 
when Renamo pulled out of the Mozam-
bique election in October 1994, South 
Africa speedily intervened at the highest 
diplomatic level to prevent a crisis. But 
when requested to send 1000 
peacekeepers to Angola, it refused. The 
reason it gave was that it was still 
reforming the defence forces, which were 
dominated by elements of the past regi me. 
Technical explanations of this kind are a 
convenient cover for concealing consider-
ations of a more political nature. They 
could have sent a small contingent of 
former Mks, the ANC's guerilla wing, who 
have been integrated into the new South 
African National Defence Forces. This 
would have been a powerful signal that 
Pretoria is willing to cooperate in regional 
peacekeeping efforts. 
An important point here is that 
South Africa cannot play the leading role 
which many expect of it because it does 
not currently have the financial capacity to 
do so. The authorities are under increasing 
internal pressure to redistribute wealth, 
and the ANC cannot turn a blind eye to this 
if it wants to retain its position as the main 
political force in South Africa in the longer 
term. 
Possible first steps 
João Honwana, of the Cape 
Town-based Centre for Conflict Resol-
ution, who was formerly a commander in 
the Mozambique Air Force, says that in the 
short term, any attempt to set up a formal 
collective security mechanism in Southern 
Africa could be counter-productive. 'It 
would be a cooperation between insti-
tutionally fragile states both in terms of 
human and financial resources,' he argues. 
Honwana, who is the co-author of a study 
on the feasibility of establishing a SADC 
Sector for Political and Security Cooper-
ation, believes that a first step should be to 
reinforce diplomatic cooperation in the 
region. Military commanders could, in the 
meantime, start by training small special-
ised units with the participation of all the 
SADC countries. 'Security cooperation 
could also take the form of information 
exchanges and participation in joint mi-
litary manoeuvres', he suggests. 
Given the many possible pitfalls 
in the process of bringing about a formal 
common security arrangement, it is hard to 
see how the system could work. But there 
must be a starting point. It would be 
possible, for example, to create a common 
defence force based on contributions of 
human and material resources from the 
member states. This would not be an 
intervention force, but one that could 
function as a deterrent and that could be 
called on to assist in non-military oper-
ations such as rescue operations in cases of 
natural disaster. A regional security mecha-
nism that is not based entirely on a fighting 
component could also encompass research 
with the long term objective of reducing 
the region's dependence on the northern 
hemisphere for the supply of defence 
equipment. 
Some in the region are not just 
calling for non-military means of conflict 
resolution, but even contemplate the 
possibility of abolishing national armies 
altogether. This was a suggestion put 
forward by a church leader at a recent 
meeting on regional security in Malawi. He 
argued that the resources could be re-
directed towards improving the economic 
and social conditions of the people. 'Real 
security,' said a speaker at the meeting, 
'comes in the form of economic and social 
development of the masses.' There can be 
little doubt that national security and 
stability, which are key elements in achiev-
ing regional security, largely depend on the 
ability of states to meet their people's 
economic and social needs. They also need 
to observe human rights and give all their 
citizens the chance to participate in their 
nations' decision-making processes. 
Those who believe in the scrap-
ping of armies in Southern Africa argue 
that their role is to safeguard their 
countries against external aggression. In 
the absence of such threats in present-day 
Southern Africa, they insist, the role of 
maintaining law and order within a 
country should be vested in the police 
force, not the military. It would be a hard 
task, however, to convince the soldiers 
that they no longer have a role. Some 
military experts stress that a potential for 
Λ 
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conflict remains, citing the Namibia-Bot-
swana border dispute over Sidudu island, 
and the disagreement between Zambia 
and Zimbabwe over the Kariba Dam and 
the ownership of a small island on the 
Zambezi River. On the other hand, there is 
a fear that maintaining large military 
contingents in a time of relative peace 
could result in the soldiers themselves 
becoming a source of instability as they 
increasingly seek ways of interfering in the 
political process. 
High military spending 
Over the years, most African 
countries have increased military spending 
at the expense of the socio-economic 
sectors, either because of legitimate con-
cerns about defence and internal security, 
or out of a desire for 'prestige'. According 
to the United Stated Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACTA), between 
1985 and 1989, sub-Saharan Africa im-
ported nearly $15 billion-worth of arms, a 
sum that is equivalent to the combined 
GDPs of Chad, Ethiopia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia and Tan-
zania. Indeed, real spending may be much 
Pointing to a future without national 
armies? 
/t would be a hard task to convince the 
soldiers that they no longer have a role 
higher taking into account the subsidies 
granted to African military establishments 
and the military-related expenditure that 
is not classified as such. 
The Washington-based Global 
Coalition for Africa estimates that 'if 
African governments were to reduce their 
military budgets by 50% between 1993 
and 2000, they would have an additional 
$7 billion to devote to poverty alleviation, 
improving health and education, and 
supporting productive investments.' 
Given this scenario, it is also 
necessary to conceive of regional security in 
terms of diplomacy coordination, joint 
mechanisms for preventing and combat-
ting crime, exchange of information on 
drug trafficking, immigration matters, 
exchange of intelligence information, and 
most importantly, eliminating the root 
causes leading to conflict. Improved social 
and economic conditions, promotion of 
human rights and the equal participation 
of all ethnic groups in the decision-making 
process can greatly reduce the potential for 
conflict in any society. Greater cooperation 
among the countries of the region in these 
areas is essential as a confidence-building 
measure in the context of promoting 
regional cooperation and developing col-
lective security mechanisms. In the same 
vein, governments in Southern Africa may 
need to set up a durable mechanism to 
deal with minor border disputes that 
might arise in future, as well as establish a 
credible system that can allow them to 
mediate in conflicts within and between 
the countries of the region. 
As regards the calls for massive 
disarmament and demilitarisation, most 
governments are likely to be wary of the 
prospect of demobilising tens of thousands 
of soldiers who may find themselves 
deprived of any means of subsistence. But 
by all accounts, the price of offering 
attractive demobilisation packages to 
these soldiers over a certain period of time 
— say five to ten years — to allow them a 
gradual return to productive civilian life, is 
much less in the longer term than having to 
keep them idle in the barracks. 
There have also been calls for the 
formation of a regional military contingent 
under a regional command. While such a 
contingent would be desirable only as a 
deterrent factor and would be used to 
respond to emergency situations, including 
natural calamities, its practical operational 
aspects would need some further careful 
thought. This should include consideration 
of mechanisms designed to strengthen 
control of it by civilian institutions. 
Security, be it regional or 
national, cannot be viewed merely in terms 
of the political and military dimensions, nor 
should it be confined to issues of crime and 
other forms of civil violence. It should be 
seen in a broader context so as to include 
important aspects of the people's econ-
omic and social development. 
Identifying common 
interests 
At another level, and as in the 
field of economic cooperation, SADC 
members states need to identify and 
articulate clearly their interests where 
regional security cooperation is concerned. 
On the basis of that, they must then be 
able to strike a balance between the costs 
and benefits of such cooperation. One 
immediate task will be that of setting 
targets and timetables, before embarking 
on the path of formal collective security 
mechanisms. In this regard, it is essential 
that all countries hold a common belief in, 
and are committed to, systems that allow 
for popular participation in major political 
decision-making, transparency and public 
accountability. 
There can be no collective se-
curity where those who are supposed to 
participate and benefit from it pursue 
different systems and values. In such 
circumstances, regional security can easily 
turn into insecurity, with each individual 
member state seeking regional endorse-
ment of its own policies, which may include 
repression of internal dissent. WÊÊ F.G. 
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Securing Southern Africa 
by Peter Vale* 
For ail its promise of peace and security, Southern Africa remains an enigma. Poorly 
served by its infrastructure, the region boasts world class highways. Bounded by 
water on three sides, its land is permanently parched. Rich in agricultural resources, 
it can no longer feed its people. Committed to blurring ethnic differences, these are 
apparent at almost every corner. And, although more secure than ever, the 
region's strongest state has electric fences on its borders. What will determine 
Southern Africa's security concerns in the 21st century? Will it turn into another 
global powder-keg ? Or can the lessons of political change in the region inspire fresh 
approaches to the challenge of security? 
Colonialism bequeathed 
1 Southern Africa a cruel legacy. 
¡ European powers left behind 
them division, destitution and 
desperately poor states. As a 
result, when colonialism ended, it 
was not so much a moment of creation as a 
false dawn. Free at last, the states of the 
sub-continent were drawn not towards 
democracy but to authoritarianism. Post-
independence governments used coercion 
and corruption to meld disparate forces 
within uncomfortable borders. The anal-
ytical point is as simple as it is brutal — 
strong methods were used to build weak 
states. Because South Africa's historical 
trajectory is so pointedly different from 
that of its neighbours, it is important to 
note that apartheid's cruel madness pro-
duced much the same result. 
Since the mid-1980s, state-build-
ing processes in the region have faced new 
pressures in the form of externally driven 
measures to reconstruct their economies. 
The results have been uneven but the 
instruments used have further weakened 
Southern African states. Certainly, mainly 
wasteful economic programmes were shed 
but the human price — in countries 
without a recognisable social net — has 
been high. The secondary implications 
have also been serious : political legitimacy 
has weakened and the state's coercive 
capacity increased. Additionally, conflict 
over scarce resources has engendered 
debilitating tertiary effects. Thus, ethnicity 
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has been sharpened and irredentism en-
couraged. 
Paralleling economic adjustment, 
Southern African governments have been 
driven towards 'good governance' under 
'external conditionalities'. Again, the out-
come has been uneven. Weak states 
invariably lack the plural culture necessary 
for healthy democracy. In some countries a 
democratic purpose has been rekindled but 
sustaining it is proving very difficult. The 
predatory ambitions of weak state 
bureaucracies drain the leadership upon 
which effective civil society grows. 
If external pressure forced 
change upon the states of Southern Africa, 
the most significant pressure on the region 
itself has come from within. The ending of 
apartheid and the emergence of a 'new' 
South Africa have completely changed 
people's understanding of the region's 
future. Assumptions of permanent conflict 
have given way to a moment of profound 
rediscovery and exploration. As it searches 
for new points to build stability. Southern 
Africa is having to balance the pathologies 
of weak states and failing polities against 
the increasing self-assurance of post-
apartheid South Africa. Not only is South 
Africa the world's 'darling', it is also in the 
throes of a potent nation-building project 
which has seen the country draw together 
in both celebration and economic re-
construction. In its exuberance, its sheer 
size and its military and economic power, 
the 'new' South Africa promises to distort, 
not balance, the equation for regional 
security. The lure of South Africa, for 
example, is fast changing the region's 
demographics. Armed with their under-
standings of the past and anticipating a 
better future, Southern Africa's people are 
marching on South Africa. As elsewhere, 
migration is at the root of a series of 'new' 
security concerns, narcotics and illegal 
weapons being the most visible. 
Migration 
Can South Africa carry the 
burden ? Estimates suggest that there are 
anywhere between 2 million and 9 million 
migrants in the country. Statistics — it is 
said — reveal everything and the variance 
in this particular one may point to disaster. 
A hard, but certain lesson of contemporary 
public policy is that states which cannot 
collect reliable statistics are unlikely to be 
able to deliver to their citizens let alone to 
the millions who live deeper in the 
shadows. This influx has also revealed the 
unacceptable face of nationalism in a 
region which — certainly formally — is 
intent on forging a unity of purpose. The 
portrayal of migrants in the 'new' South 
Africa has been very negative. Opposing 
illegal migration has become a powerful 
unifying force in South Africa's search for 
common national values. 
But however powerful South 
Africa may be, its efforts to halt the flow of 
migrants in search of material well-being 
will fail. The people of Southern Africa are 
caught in a fundamental paradox : al-
though divided into a dozen countries, 
Southern Africa revolves round a common 
source of wealth. This is why prospects for 
work in places as far apart as Ladybrand, 
Lüderitz, Luanda and Lusaka, are in-
fluenced by prices on the Johannesburg 
stock exchange. Does the movement of 
Southern Africa's people threaten the 
region's stability in the 21st century? The 
answer lies in how carefully the people of 
the region are prepared to understand the 
lessons of their collective past. Threats to 
the security of states in Southern Africa 
were traditionally met with force, which 
explains why war has been such a per-
manent feature of life in the region. And 
the legacy they have left is harsh. Even 
after the formal end to hostilities, the 
aftermath of war is to be found every-
where. The ICRC estimates that there are 
nine million landmines in Angola waiting 
to maim and kill civilians. On the other 
seaboard, in Mozambique, slow progress is 
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being made in the clearance of two million 
landmines. Both these countries, like much 
of the rest of the region, were devastated 
by the déstabilisation measures of ap-
artheid carried out for the 'security' of its 
ruling minority. 
Meeting security threats with 
force invariably produces unhappy results. 
If the region wants to fashion political 
outcomes commensurate with the pros-
perity its people deserve, individual states 
can no longer avoid the challenge posed by 
demilitarisation. This will not be easy, 
however. Encrypted in colonialism was the 
understanding that armies are synonym-
ous with 'the state'. In Southern Africa, this 
idea has been used with devastating 
effect. The military have dispossessed 
ordinary people and empowered en-
trenched elites. Their claims on budgets 
have helped curtail development, directing 
limited state resources to an unproductive 
sector. The entrenched power of the 
military explains two immediate strands of 
insecurity in contemporary Southern 
Africa. First, the region's economic dis-
parities are reinforced by a military imbal-
ance. Second, the region's strongest mi-
litary force — that of South Africa — is still 
almost entirely geared to fighting the Cold 
War, a war which polarised the region's 
people. 
This situation has to change if 
Southern Africa is to be secure in the 21st 
century. But can it change? The key lies in 
the link between security, accountability 
and the democratic process. Because weak 
states are invariably intolerant, state 
institutions in Southern Africa have proved 
to be malleable. The simple goal of control 
leads to rupture — in other words, efforts 
to establish and sustain order often ge-
nerate deep disorder. The lesson is clear. 
Lasting security is to be found in the hopes 
of the people not in the control offered by 
institutions. 
What does this mean for 
Southern Africa? Experts know that to 
understand security, there are some pre-
liminary 'tests' that need to be run. For all 
its current success, Southern Africa is not 
exempt from these. Take the test of 
geography. How will the region feed and 
water its people ? The very heart of the 
region's economy, South Africa's economi-
cally productive Gauteng Province (where 
Johannesburg is situated) faces an un-
precedented water shortage. In mid-
winter 1995, its water authority launched 
an appeal asking the public to save water, 
noting that reserves had fallen to the 
'uncomfortably low level of 33% of total 
capacity'. This plea came after a rainy 
season in which the spectre of drought 
haunted all of Southern Africa. An es-
timated 10 million people faced hunger 
and deepening poverty. In some countries, 
up to 90% of the crops grown by small 
farmers failed. Urbanisation provides 
another 'test'. Contrary to accepted ortho-
doxy, the region's population is no longer 
rural. Deepening social crises have forced 
millions off the land. Paralleling global 
trends, by the year 2025, more than 60% of 
the region's people will be concentrated in 
its cities. Demographic projections suggest 
that the greater number of them will be 
living in South Africa. Meeting the security 
challenges posed by both geography and 
urbanisation in Southern Africa is not 
possible by military means. So what can be 
done? 
Reuniting the region 
The search for future security 
must begin by reuniting the region around 
its single economy. The key lies with the 
region's borders. Throughout the world, 
the maps which both comforted and 
excited the Cold Warriors are changing. In 
some places — the old Czechoslovakia for 
instance — fragmentation has been pain-
less. In others — such as former Yugoslavia 
— it has been horrific. But the process of 
change seems unstoppable. In Southern 
Africa, the cues for reknitting the region 
together have been provided by the ease 
with which Walvis Bay was restored to 
Namibia and by Nelson Mandela's offer to 
consider Lesotho's desire for access to the 
sea. 
In Southern Africa, the integ-
ration — through a mechanism still to be 
determined — of Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and South Africa into a common 
political entity will speed security not by 
enhancing the power of the last-men-
tioned but by protecting the most vul-
nerable. This initial step should be followed 
by others under the principle which dilutes 
state power and enhances the authority 
and transparency of local democratic 
institutions. Of course the militaries will 
resist this approach, but globalisation has 
destroyed their arguments. Lasting se-
curity in Southern Africa is linked to 
widening the distributive capacity of its 
single source of wealth. The way to do this 
is to change the way in which the present 
political units are linked to it; to sharing 
the region's wealth without destroying its 
growth potential. 
The embryonic forces of civil 
society well understand the importance of 
this for Southern Africa's security. In quiet 
ways, the trade unions have assiduously 
worked to enhance the power of their 
regional 'personality'. Women's groups are 
reaching both far and near in the cause of 
greater empowerment. Businesses are 
discovering the profitability of previously 
unexploitable Southern African markets. In 
remarkable ways, states are no longer in 
the lead. It is the people of the region who 
are showing the way. 
For five years, the world has been 
in the throes of a dramatic unravelling. 
Southern Africa has not been exempt; 
indeed it has been at the forefront of 
change. Multiracial Zimbabwe, indepen-
dent Namibia and post-apartheid South 
Africa all attest to the possibility of 
tolerance in a part of the world where race 
was, for centuries, the single most de-
termining factor in human life. Although 
the process has been painful, these suc-
cesses have relied on challenging the very 
foundations of much that was thought to 
be immutable. 
Securing Southern Africa in the 
next century will require great courage ; it 
will entail more 'unlearning' than learn-
ing ; more questions than answers. Anal-
ysts, policy makers and politicians will have 
to show that they have the foresight to 
change the region rather than simply 
reform it. Outsiders ■— like the EU and the 
ACP Group — can help in limited ways but 
the moment of discovery in the search for 
lasting security lies ultimately with the 
region's own remarkable people. M p.v. 
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SADC's new role — 
development through 
economic integration 
Many regions of the world have 
seen dramatic changes during the 
last five years and none more so 
than Southern Africa. Namibia has 
thrown off the colonial yoke, the 
civil war in Mozambique has 
ended, democracy has been re-
stored to Malawi and there are 
hopeful signs for an end to An-
gola's seemingly interminable con-
flict. Above all. South Africa's apartheid 
system has been consigned to history. 
Throughout the region, democracy and the 
rule of law are taking root and politicians 
are, in many cases for the first time, able to 
focus their main efforts on tackling the 
development challenges facing their coun-
tries. 
Dr Kaire Mbuende has been no 
mere witness to these events. A native of 
Namibia, he joined SWAPO at the age of 
18. He spent many years in exile, working 
at the SWAPO headquarters in Lusaka 
and studying and lecturing in Scandi-
navia. Throughout this time, he was 
active in the cause of Namibian indepen-
dence, seeking to mobilise international 
opinion. In 1989, with nationhood finally 
in sight, he was able to return to his 
country where he became head one of 
SWAPO's regional election directorates. 
He went on to win a seat in the Con-
stituent Assembly which subsequently 
became the country's Parliament, joining 
the government as Deputy Agriculture 
Minister. In January 1994, he was ap-
pointed Executive Secretary of the 
Southern Africa Development Com-
munity (SADC), the successor to the 
Southern Africa Development Coordi-
nation Conference (SADCC). 
SADC may only have lost one 
initial but it has nonetheless undergone a 
metamorphosis. The old SADCC was a 
grouping which brought the 'Front-Line 
States' together in a cooperative effort 
designed to provide a counterbalance 
against apartheid South Africa. The new 
SADC has South A frica as a full and active 
member. In this interview, we sought Dr 
Mbuende's views on the prospects for the 
region and for the organisation that he 
heads. We began by asking him about 
SADC's current objectives now that South 
Africa has become a member 
— It is important to bear in mind 
that South Africa joined SADC at a time 
when the organisation was being re-
constituted. The old SADCC had the 
objective of reducing the member states' 
economic dependence on South Africa in 
particular. This was done through a variety 
of projects which were economic but, at 
the same time, political. The idea was that 
you could not effectively support the 
struggle against apartheid when you were, 
at the same time, dependent on the 
apartheid regime. Thus, for example, there 
were transport and communication pro-
jects designed to create alternative trade 
routes: instead of being dependent on 
South African ports, exports from Zim-
babwe were rerouted through Mozam-
bique, while Zambian products went via 
Tanzania. 
Now, of course. South Africa is 
part of SADC. When it was clear that 
democracy was imminent there, it was 
necessary to consider what the future 
might hold for the organisation. Meeting 
in Maputo in 1992, the Council of Ministers 
decided that the cooperation had been 
beneficial to its members and that it should 
be deepened, not abandoned. Today, the 
objective is to have closer cooperation and 
integration in various fields. We are 
looking at the organisation as a vehicle for 
development through the economic integ-
ration of the countries in the region. 
■ South Africa is very much the 'giant' of 
the region. Isn't there a danger that the 
other SADC members might be swamped 
politically and economically by such a 
powerful neighbour ? 
— I should say first that we 
believe in the sovereign equality of 
nations. That is the basis upon which we 
conduct business in the organisation. So 
formally, South Africa has no more say 
than Lesotho in the running of SADC. 
Obviously, at the economic level, it is a 
different ball game. Market forces work 
independently and not necessarily in line 
with politicians' intentions. But even here 
we don't see the threat of the smaller 
economies being swamped. Of course, we 
are linked together in terms of infrastruc-
ture, transport and communications, fi nan-
cial institutions and so. But we believe that 
mutually beneficial trading relations can be 
developed. South Africa may be powerful 
but there is room for manoeuvre in the 
smaller countries provided that the playing 
field is level. If we can achieve market 
liberalisation for example, we will see 
South African products going to neigh-
bouring countries but also the reverse 
happening. It won't be a matter of 
competing with the big South African 
corporations but of exploiting market 
niches. This can bring substantial benefits 
to the region's smaller economies. And it is 
clear that South African politicians are 
committed to equitable regional develop-
ment. 
■ In the EU, member states that are less 
economically advanced receive extra re-
gionalfunds. Is there any mechanism of this 
kind existing or foreseen under SADC? 
— I think the question of regional 
funds will become relevant once we reach 
a higher level of integration. We haven't 
got to that stage yet. We also need to try 
and avoid the kind of situation that has 
developed under the Southern Africa 
Customs Union (SACU) where there are 
simply fiscal transfers from the resources of 
the customs union — in practice, from 
South Africa — to the other members. 
These have done nothing to address the 
imbalances. There have been 30 years of 
financial transfers under SACU and the 
imbalances in industrial development are 
still there. What we need is mechanisms 
that can serve as corrective measures. We 
are at a preliminary stage in our thinking, 
-ι 
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but there is, for example, the notion of 
differential application of rules of origin 
depending on the size of the economy, the 
level of industrial development and so on. 
This type of measure would favour the 
smaller economies. The next stage is to 
look at developing financial institutions for 
funding infrastructure projects, providing 
credits for economic activities — industrial 
development especially — in the least 
developed countries. It might not be the 
same kind of fund that the EU has but I 
think there are various possibilities in this 
area. We can of course look at providing 
financial compensation but it should be 
tied to the stimulation of economic ac-
tivity. If transfers are used simply to 
subsidise budget deficits, then that doesn't 
solve the problem. 
■ Despite the efforts of SADC since it was 
set up in 1980, most member states are no 
better off today. How do you explain this 
and what do you think can be done to 
improve the situation ? 
— The main explanation was the 
political instability in the region, although 
there were other factors such as falling 
commodity prices and global recession. But 
it is clear that a stable environment is 
absolutely crucial, whether it be overall 
political stability, an atmosphere of peace 
and security or stable macro-economic 
policies. 
In terms of maintaining political 
stability we have created a conflict resol-
ution mechanism. Through that we are 
able to intervene in conflicts such as those 
that occurred in Lesotho and Mozam-
bique. We are also monitoring the situ-
ation in Angola closely. A committee has 
been set up to work with the UN and help 
the process in that country. So that is one 
level at which we are working. 
We also think that now that the 
political and security considerations are less 
dominant we can seriously address the 
question of development. There is a 
related issue here to do with spending 
priorities. In a number of our countries, 
large amounts have been spent on de-
fence, and that now needs be looked at in 
the context of the new Southern Africa. Do 
we actually need such large and expensive 
armies now that South Africa is democratic 
and we have mechanisms in place for 
conflict resolution and political cooper-
ation? We hope that resources will be 
diverted from military spending to de-
velopment and social objectives. 
Another important aspect that I 
mentioned is having a stable macro-
economic framework. We are currently 
instituting a new SADC 'sector' on finance 
and investment, to be coordinated by 
South Africa. This will look at questions of 
harmonising macro-economic policy, mo-
netary policy and so on. The whole political 
environment has changed and the con-
ditions are much better so we now want to 
move forward and create a larger regional 
market. This implies trade liberalisation — 
enhancing competition within the region 
so as to improve the efficiency and 
productivity of industries. The creation of a 
regional market of 120 million people 
should also help to attract foreign direct 
investment. 
■ On this subject, given that sanctions 
have been lifted, are you concerned that 
South Africa might draw foreign invest-
ment away from the smaller SADC coun-
tries ? 
Canning plant in Swaziland 
The smaller economies in the region 
may initially have difficulty competing 
with South Africa for foreign 
investment but Dr Mbuende believes 
that they will benefit in the longer 
term 
There has clearly been a lot of interest in 
South Africa as a new and emerging 
country. I don't think, however, that the 
funds that would have gone to Zimbabwe 
say, will now be diverted to South Africa. 
Traditionally, foreign direct investment in 
the region has largely been resource-based 
— in primary industries such as mining and 
agriculture and we foresee this continuing 
as investors take advantage of the re-
sources that are available. What we want 
to see now is a different kind of investment 
focusing on secondary industries where 
value is added. Competition for funds here 
is bound to be fierce. And that is some-
thing that is very important for the smaller 
economies, like Lesotho's for example, that 
have few natural resources. There will be 
manufacturing investment in South Africa 
and it may initially be to the detriment of 
other countries in the region, but the more 
investment that comes to South Africa, the 
more competitive the environment be-
comes. I think the result will be greater 
mobility of South African capital within the 
region. So we do not really fear that the 
opening up of South Africa will be damag-
ing to the wider region. By attracting 
investment to South Africa initially, we are 
setting in motion a whole new process. 
South African investors, and indeed fore-
ign investors who start out there, will soon 
discover the comparative advantages 
available in the neighbouring countries. 
■ Turning to the question of regional 
organisations, are you concerned about 
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the possibility of rivalry between SADC and 
other regional structures such as Comesa 
(the former PTA) and SA CU ? Is there room 
for more than one organisation ? 
— Talking first about the old 
PTA, as its title indicates, it was originally 
conceived as a preferential trade area and 
it co-existed fairly well with SADCC. The 
transformation of the PTA into Comesa 
and of SADCC into SADC, have changed 
the situation, however. The two organis-
ations have the same objectives and an 
overlapping membership, and that is a 
contradiction in terms. It is difficult to see 
how it can work in the long run and there is 
a need for a re-examination. 
■ How do you see that inconsistency 
resolving itself? 
— Two ideas have been put 
forward. The PTA, as it was at the time, 
proposed merging with SADCC to form 
Comesa. That would have eliminated any 
duplication. There were two elements, 
however, that had to be considered, one 
economic and the other political. 
In the context of trade liberalis-
ation, a merger might have been possible 
involving such a large geographical area. 
But the pace of liberalisation would have 
been affected. Practical experience shows 
that you can progress much more quickly in 
a smaller area. So while the idea might 
have worked at the market level, we 
would have needed to apply a principle of 
variable geometry allowing some regions 
to move faster than others. There is also 
the point that in macro-economic policy 
terms, it is difficult to talk about harmonis-
ation when the levels of development of 
the countries involved are so different. 
■ There are echoes here of the 'widening 
versus deepening' debate in the EU. 
— That is correct. When you go 
on to talk about political cooperation on 
the basis of shared value systems, you have 
a further problem. In Southern Africa, we 
now have democracy, political pluralism 
and multi-party systems as the basis of our 
political stability. If SADC had been merged 
into the larger Comesa area, which in-
cludes countries like Somalia and Sudan, 
there would have been difficulties. We 
think that those values, which are dear to 
us, might have had to be sacrificed, and we 
were unwilling to do that. So SADC felt 
that the merger idea was not a solution 
because the area involved was too large. 
The second proposition was one 
put forward by the SADC leaders. They 
suggested that the best solution was to 
have organisations working for integration 
at a regional level — East Africa, Southern 
Africa and so on — not as an end in itself 
but as stepping stones towards the ul-
timate objective of integrating the whole 
African continent as set out in the Abuja 
Treaty. The idea is that you need to 
strengthen these units as a first step and 
create a mechanism for trade relations and 
other links between them. Given the 
present level of development of our 
societies, we think that would be a much 
more reasonable way of proceeding. 
Turning to the Customs Union, 
the situation is quite different. Unlike 
SADC, SACU does not have central coordi-
nation in areas like infrastructure, mining, 
human resource development and so on. It 
focuses on operating a trade regime 
among its members. On the other hand, it 
represents a more advanced form of 
integration in that particular field, with its 
system of revenue-sharing derived from 
the common external tariff. I don't think it 
would be right to sacrifice that in the 
interests of a larger unit. Once we reach a 
higher level of integration within SADC, 
the existence of SACU may be open to 
question but at present there isn't really 
any rivalry or contradiction. SACU is 
effectively a more advanced 'sub-set' in the 
region. What is of interest to us is 
expanding the free movement of goods 
and services between the SACU market 
and the broader SADC one. 
■ The Lomé IV mid-term review has 
finally been concluded. How satisfied are 
you with the outcome ? 
— Thinking specifically of the 
Southern Africa regional programme, we 
certainly were hoping for more resources 
— for the simple reason that the situation 
here has changed and we now are poised 
for take-off. Stability has been restored 
and programmes that were not previously 
possible can now be undertaken. For 
instance, roads and railways that were not 
built because of the security situation can 
now go ahead. This points to a need for 
more resources, which would be used to 
good effect, but unfortunately, it doesn't 
look as if there will be an increase. We 
cannot say we are satisfied, but we have to 
be realistic. What the experience brings 
home to us is that we should not base our 
development strategy on development 
assistance. If you do that, you are vul-
nerable to fluctuations in resource flows 
from the developed nations. That is why 
we attach great importance to trade and 
investment. SADC has also been working 
on a strategy to involve the private sector 
more in infrastructure development. Up to 
now, such programmes have been the 
exclusive domain of governments. 
■ It seems ironic that when South Africa 
had apartheid and the region had a high 
political profile, donors felt the need to 
make a strong commitment to the Front 
Line States. Now that the political situation 
has stabilised and, as you point out, new 
investment opportunities have arisen, the 
imperative to provide support seems to 
have receded ? 
— There is definitely some truth 
in that. Of course, the démocratisation of 
South Africa coincided also with big 
developments in Eastern Europe. I don't 
think we are talking about donor fatigue 
as such. What we see is a diversion of 
resources from Africa into other areas. In 
terms of aid volumes, there may even have 
been an overall increase, but our share is 
declining and that is unfortunate. 
We have to accept that the 
significance of Southern Africa on the 
global political scene is declining. With the 
end of the Cold War, the region has lost its 
strategic significance. The importance of 
Southern Africa as a front against the 
inhuman system of apartheid has also 
gone. We are saying that the region needs 
assistance today for different and more 
positive reasons. The potential for success is 
greater than ever before. If you come to 
the aid of Southern Africa now you can be 
sure that you are helping a qualitatively 
different process with a real prospect of 
economic take-off. That is why there is a 
need for a 'final push'. The alternative is for 
us to remain in a situation of perpetual 
dependency. I should say, despite this, that 
there is still a lot of interest in Southern 
Africa. The problem is that it is not 
commensurate with our current needs. ■■ 
Interview by S.H. 
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international economy 
by Rashad Cassini' 
The economic prospects for 
Southern Africa have never re-
ceived as much attention as today, 
partly at least, as a result of 
diminishing war and conflict in the 
region. Previously, this oversha-
dowed any debate about the re-
gion's economic future. 
The experience of 
Southern Africa in the last decade 
leaves much to be desired. Most 
countries have experienced ne-
gative real economic growth, 
balance of payments problems 
and high unemployment rates. In 1994, 
Africa's manufacturing exports amounted 
to around 2.6% of all developing country 
exports. Clearly, SADC countries only 
contributed a proportion of this very low 
figure. South Africa's share of total world 
trade has also been in decline since the 
1960s. 
By contrast, developing countries 
as a group have increased their share of 
world trade enormously in recent years. 
They now account for an estimated 25% of 
of the total, double the level of a decade 
ago. Moreover, in the aftermath of the 
international debt crisis in the 1980s, a 
large amount of capital and foreign direct 
investment began flowing into the de-
veloping economies. But Southern Africa 
has been unable to attract even a small 
proportion of these flows. Manufactured 
products constitute only around 10% of 
Southern Africa's total exports and most of 
these are low value consumer items and 
other light manufactures. In most Southern 
African countries, excluding South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, between one and three 
commodities account for the bulk of 
exports. Moreover, the region's share in 
primary commodities has been declining. 
Despite such a discouraging sce-
nario, the prospects for the region over the 
next ten years — while they may not be 
fantastic — appear far better. According 
* Development Policy Research Unit, University 
of Cape Town. 
to the World Bank, growth between 1994 
and 2003 is projected to average 4.8% per 
annum for all developing countries, with 
East and Southern Asia expanding most 
rapidly at 7.6% annually. Annual GDP 
growth in Africa is projected to grow at 
3.9%per annum. Although this seems low 
compared to the projections for develop-
ing countries generally, it would represent 
an improvement on previous years. 
Another important point is that 
Southern Africa has experienced differen-
tial growth rates in the last decade. 
Botswana saw growth averaging almost 
10% between 1980 and 1992 but the figure 
for Mozambique was actually negative 
(-1.1%). The prospects for growth also vary 
considerably for individual countries within 
the region. In Botswana, it is slowing down 
while in South Africa, the rate is expected 
to pick up during the next few years. 
Enhancing the prospects 
for industrialisation 
Economists have long argued 
that the engine for economic growth and 
development in the region is the industrial 
sector. Policy makers in Southern Africa are 
currently exploring different avenues to 
enhance the prospects for industrialisation. 
Industry in the SADC area exemplifies the 
structural problems endemic to Africa as a 
whole. The sector is underdeveloped and 
dependent on imports from industrialised 
countries. Only three countries have signi-
ficant manufacturing capabilities — South 
Africa, Zimbabwe and (to a lesser extent) 
Zambia. South Africa's manufacturing 
sector, in value-added terms, is more than 
five times larger than the combined total 
for the rest of the SADC region. It is also 
nearly 15 times greater than that of the 
second largest manufacturer, Zimbabwe. 
South Africa accounts for more than three-
quarters of the GNP of Southern Africa. 
In most SADC countries, manu-
facturing constitutes a very small part of 
total economic activity. As the table 
shows, this sector's share of total GDP 
averages 14% with Angola recording the 
lowest figure (4%), and Zimbabwe and 
South Africa sharing the top position 
(26%). While the figure of 14% is not 
abnormally low it could be misleading. 
Most economies in the region are small and 
a 15% contribution to GDP in the case of 
Lesotho, for example, does not mean that 
this country has a substantial manufactur-
ing sector. 
Clearly, if countries in Southern 
Africa have any comparative advantage in 
international markets, it is in resource-
intensive and labour-intensive products, 
and not in sectors like capital goods. The 
region's immediate priority is not to 
attempt to improve its comparative ad-
vantage in the international markets for 
capital goods. SADC countries are not 
endowed with the skills or human re-
sources and lack the capital that is a 
necessary precondition to compete in this 
field. Instead, the aim is to minimise the 
cost that capital goods impose on the 
industrialisation process in SADC. 
The question of comparative 
advantage has to be seriously revisited by 
policy makers in Southern Africa. The 
biggest challenge is to create a responsible 
system of macro-economic management 
that is sensitive to the growth prospects of 
The manufacturing sector's 
contribution to overall GDP in 
the SADC countries 
Country 
% share 
of GDP from 
manufacturing 
Angola 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Average 
4 
5 
15 
14 
ri/a 
e 
26 
18 
6 
20 
26 
14 
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all sectors of the economy, but particularly 
agriculture and industry. 
Economic integration 
A much-debated issue nowadays 
is how economic integration might alter 
the prospects of Southern Africa. It is vital 
to understand that deeper forms of such 
integration would not be a panacea for the 
region's economic ills. The prospects for 
increasing intra-regional trade in the short 
to medium term are limited and the success 
of individual SADC countries will continue 
to depend, to a large extent, on national 
economic policies. Regional cooperation, 
however, could act as an important im-
petus to stimulate economic growth in the 
longer term while economic integration 
might play an important role in attracting 
much needed foreign direct investment to 
the region. 
Although attempts to increase 
intra-regional trade could play a very 
positive role in enhancing the growth 
prospects of Southern African countries, 
they must not be a seen as a substitute to 
expanding extra-regional exports. In the 
short to medium term, the most significant 
export growth is likely to come in external 
markets, notably the EU and other indus-
trialised countries. 
South Africa's accession to SADC 
could also provide new momentum for 
regional integration by virtue of the fact 
that it may have resources, albeit limited, 
to facilitate industrial linkages in the 
region. However, a critical question is 
posed by the asymmetry that exists be-
tween South Africa and the rest of the 
region. In relative terms, the former may 
have a more sophisticated infrastructure 
and broader industrial capabilities, but by 
international standards, South Africa is 
lacking significantly in all the fundamentals 
that make up a successful industrial 
economy. In particular, it has a limited skills 
base and productivity is poor. This offers a 
sober message to the country's regional 
partners. South Africa could doubtless be 
the locomotive for regional growth but 
there are gross inequalities within the 
country that need addressing. These could 
seriously undermine the positive economic 
spin-offs that high growth in South Africa 
might otherwise yield for the region. 
The problem with disparate 
levels of development is that industrial 
capabilities in the respective SADC coun-
tries differ considerably. In Mozambique 
and Angola, where manufacturing ca-
pacity is severely limited, some import 
substitution activities may be required. In 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, the urgent 
need is to rationalise highly diversified 
industrial structures. The key question is 
how to harmonise the needs of different 
countries through a regional programme. 
Future prospects 
Regional economic growth will 
depend on the ability of Southern Africa to 
attract capital inflows (particularly in the 
light of the fact that the savings rate is 
below 10%), expand the range of exports 
and increase levels of private investment. 
While most policymakers agree 
that diversification is a fundamental chal-
lenge facing the regional economy, there is 
no similar consensus as to how this can be 
achieved. The much maligned structural 
adjustment programmes in many Southern 
African countries have, by and large, been 
unsuccessful — characterised by basic 
disagreements about the sequencing and 
pace of economic liberalisation. Economists 
do agree, however, on the need to achieve 
macro-economic stability in order to pre-
vent large fiscal deficits and on the 
importance of expanding exports to mi-
nimise balance of payments constraints. 
Macro-economic instability is often a 
consequence of f ailing foreign reserves, net 
negative resource flows and lack of invest-
ment. 
This implies that Southern Af-
rican countries need to go beyond macro-
economic policy to resuscitate the regional 
economy. More imaginative policies on the 
part of governments are needed to faci-
litate growth and development. On the 
issue of diversification, for example, much 
can be learnt from the experience of the 
recently successful resource-rich East Asian 
countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. 
With resource endowments not unlike 
those of Southern Africa, these countries 
continued to invest in the primary sectors 
of the economy. 
Indeed, their exports of primary 
commodities played an important role in 
financing industrial development. In 
Southern Africa, more vision is also needed 
in looking at other growth sectors such as 
tourism which is often less vulnerable to 
fluctuations than primary commodities. 
Finally, the countries in question should 
look at market as well as product diversifi-
cation. International evidence shows that 
market diversification can often boost 
efforts at diversifying one's product base. It 
is this kind of innovative idea that could 
usher the Southern African region into a 
new era of economic growth. ■■ R.C 
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South Africa — the link 
between rich and poor 
'Over half of mankind has never 
dialled a telephone number. There 
are more telephone lines in Man-
hattan than in the whole of sub-
Saharan Africa.' These words were 
spoken by South African Vice-
President, Thabo Mbeki, at a G-7 
meeting in Brussels in February. It is 
difficult to imagine a better way of 
alerting the leaders of the world's 
most powerful nations to the 
danger facing the developing coun-
tries in a world which is on the threshold of a 
new information age. The danger, quite 
simply, is that these countries risk being 
disconnected. It was an appropriate 
moment to make the point as the G7 had on 
their agenda, the definition of future world 
communications networks. 
Mbeki's call appears to have been 
heeded. The proposals offered by this 
notable guest at the gathering of the 
world's seven richest countries and of the 
European Commission have been taken 
into consideration. Even better, they have 
been followed up quite quickly, at least by 
the Commission which has relayed the 
demands of its South African partner to 
the G7. The position of Nelson Mandela's 
South Africa as a pole of attraction and a 
driving force for development in the 
Southern African region is in step with the 
Commission's development policy, which 
has long favoured regional intervention. It 
is also in keeping with the options taken up 
by the EU, in the context of various 
Councils of Ministers, to make telecom-
munications the focus of Community 
development and an important element of 
its policy of cooperation with the develop-
ing countries. 
Many politicians in these coun-
tries, not to mention some European 
specialists, see information and communi-
cations technologies as superfluous — or at 
least as a luxury rather than a priority. 
What they fail to take into account is that 
the world economic context, with its 
emphasis on liberalisation, priv-
atisation and the globalisation of com-
merce, leaves little choice but to par-
ticipate in new methods of communi-
cation. The alternative would be economi-
cally disastrous. Nor do they mention in 
their analyses the example of the South 
East Asian nations, which are growing 
apace, now that the telephone has been 
made available to their people. 
The experience of the EU may be 
of particular interest to developing coun-
tries. It has had to tackle a number of issues 
on a regional scale — issues such as 
liberalisation versus monopoly, the balance 
between public and private sector particip-
ation, providing services to rural areas, 
modernising networks and so on. Gen-
erally speaking, the EU encourages re-
gional integration among its developing 
country partners and this aspect is seen as 
an important factor in development. 
Telecommunications are in the vanguard 
of this support for regional integration. 
SADC, for example, which recently wel-
comed South Africa as a full member, is 
receiving more than ECU 120 million in 
Community aid for the period 1990-1995, 
the first item being the Transport & 
Communications sector. 
In the field of communications 
technology, there is obviously a great 
disparity between the developing and the 
industrialised nations. 'Teledensity' (the 
number of telephone lines per 100 inhab-
itants) stands at 44 in the European Union, 
with relatively significant variations — 
from 32 in Portugal to 57 in Denmark. The 
figure is above 30 in all industrialised 
countries but averages less than 5 in 
African states. There is also an astonishing 
disparity between developing countries as 
well as within them - notably as between 
urban and rural areas. For example, 
teledensity in Argentina is 11 as against 2 in 
Botswana, while 90% of the telephone 
lines in India are in urban areas. 
EU aid to developing countries in 
the field of telecommunications is covered 
by the Commission's own budget and by 
the European Development Fund (EDF), 
with possible injections of cash from the 
European investment Bank (EIB). The 
Commission budget relates more specif-
ically to association and cooperation agree-
ments with third countries, while ACP 
states are eligible for resources under the 
Lomé Convention. These come in the form 
of grants from the EDF (paid into by EU 
Member States) which are managed by the 
Commission, and loans from the EIB, either 
from its own resources or from risk capital 
provided under the Convention. For the 
period 1990-95, the Lomé Convention 
funds amounted to ECU 12 billion. The 
breakdown was ECU 10.8bn in the EDF 
which includes risk capital (ECU 825m) and 
interest rebates (ECU 280m) and ECU 1.2bn 
from the ElB's own resources. The recently 
concluded mid-term review of Lomé IV, 
which has still to be ratified, sets aside ECU 
12.6bnforthe EDF (including risk capital of 
ECU 1 bn and interest rebates of ECU 370m) 
and ECU 1.6bn under the ElB's own 
resources. 
In ACP countries and more par-
ticularly in Africa, the Commission has 
promoted the development of rural tele-
communications services and equipment 
for satellite transmissions. There have been 
major EDF-financed projects for rural areas 
in Mozambique (ECU 13m) and Tanzania 
(ECU 25m). In the field of satellite com-
munications, ECU 38m has been spent on a 
project for civil aviation safety in West and 
Central Africa, while there have been four 
projects aimed at solving the specific 
problems of small island countries in the 
Pacific. The latter include funding for 
Intelstat Β land stations for satellite 
telecommunications serving Western 
Samoa, Papua New Guinea and Kiribati. 
The EIB has contributed to projects in 
Kenya, Senegal and Zimbabwe, as well as 
to regional schemes. Between 1975 and 
1993, the total amount allocated for 
Commission and EIB telecommunications 
projects in the ACPs and overseas ter-
ritories was ECU 418m. This represents 
almost half the total funds provided for 
this sector under the EU's cooperation 
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policy covering the developing countries 
and the nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
The 'lead' department for the 
Commission's telecom projects in ACP 
countries is DG VIII (the Development 
Directorate General) and the focus here is 
mainly on providing infrastructures. Pro-
grammes implemented in other develop-
ing countries are the responsibility of either 
DG I (External Economic Relations) or DG 
XIII (Telecommunications, Information 
Market and Exploitation of Research). DG I 
deals with projects in the context of 
economic cooperation and generally oper-
ates in liaison with DG XIII. The latter also 
acts alone in areas relating to research and 
development or the diffusion of innovative 
technologies. One programme worth a 
mention is the support being provided for 
the organisation and management of 
various operators, currently in progress in 
Developing countries are eager to 
acquire sophisticated technologies but 
refuse to become mere importers and 
consumers 
the six countries of the Central American 
isthmus. This is being financed by the 
Commission to the tune of almost ECU 14m 
and actions successfully undertaken have 
included a telecommunications dialogue, 
structuring of the sector, regulation, un-
iversal access and standardisation, on both 
a bilateral and a regional level. Finally, in 
the context of research, telecommuni-
cations will henceforth be part of 'Ac-
tion 2' of the IVth Framework Programme 
for international cooperation with the 
developing countries. This new situation 
should make it possible to develop joint 
R&D actions with new partners and to 
strengthen links which already exist in 
these fields. 
South Africa : the ideal 
intermediary 
The evolution of relations be-
tween the EU and South Africa, which will 
probably result in total or partial particip-
ation by the latter in the Lomé Convention, 
seems to herald a change in cooperation 
activities in the field of telecommuni-
cations between the EU and the whole of 
Southern Africa. This previously segre-
gated country is like the missing link 
between developing countries in Africa 
and the industrialised countries, in the 
sense that it is made up of a patchwork of 
areas which are lagging far behind and 
others which have full telecommunications 
facilities, with the same standards as the 
developed world. This was a dichotomy 
made possible by decades of apartheid. 
Another dilemma lies in the nature of 
town/country relationships. These are 
atypical, because the rural properties of 
large-scale farmers are far more technically 
advanced than the township urban areas. 
If 'telepenetration' is taken as a criterion, 
the national average is 8.9, which ap-
proaches the figure for the most advanced 
developing countries in Latin America. But 
in the townships and black rural areas the 
figure drops to just 2. In white districts of 
Durban, the figure is as high as 75, a level 
comparable to the Manhattan or Tokyo 
business districts. 
South Africa has the potential to 
play a leading role in regional cooperation. 
The country has already joined the Inter-
national Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
and will soon be taking an active part in 
the Pan-African Telecommunications 
Union (PATU) and in the Southern Africa 
Transport and Telecommunications Com-
munity (SATTC). Its initiatives at the 
Brussels G-7 meeting are a good illustration 
of its potential. Firstly, it announced its 
intention to organise a conference in 1996 
on the information society and developing 
countries. For this purpose, it has re-
quested assistance from the European 
Commission — which has already re-
sponded positively. In addition to G-7 
members and representatives from other 
developed countries, this event will bring 
together a selection of developing coun-
tries. It is planned for the end of the first 
quarter of 1996, in conjunction with two 
major meetings. The first, 'European 
Health Telematics' (18-20 April 1996), is a 
seminar organised by the Commission and 
financed by the DG XIII Telematic Pro-
gramme (independently of the Com-
munity's 1995 commitment of ECU 125 
million destined for the Programme for the 
Development and Reconstruction of South 
Africa). It will present the results of 
European research and an exhibition 
featuring some 15 projects. The South 
African government asked for it to be an 
illustration of the Community's AIM pro-
gramme. The other meeting, 'Health 
Informatics in Africa' (15-17 April 1996), isa 
pan-African conference organised by 
South Africa's Medical Research Council. 
Further major meetings are planned. 
At the Brussels G-7 meeting, 
Vice-President Mbeki emphasised that 
developing countries are eager to acquire 
sophisticated technologies but that they 
refuse to become mere importers and 
consumers. This was one of the 'five 
principles' that he formulated. The other 
four relate to the dynamic role which the 
TICs have to play in reconstruction and 
development, the need for a major initia-
tive for the Southern African region, the 
need for a global approach and the 
essential involvement of the developing 
countries in the creation, production and 
formulation of options in international 
cooperation. The opening up of 11 G-7 
pilot projects to external partners is a good 
sign. From the very start of the conference, 
South Africa put itself forward as a 
candidate to take part in most of them. 
South African officials say that 
they rely strongly on the European Union 
as their contact with the other developed 
countries. In a letter to Mr Mbeki, Commis-
sion President Jacques Santer undertook 
to work with the South African govern-
ment to promote the success of the 'five 
principles'. A G7 meeting to prepare the 
ground for the Halifax summit was held 
shortly after the Brussels meeting and the 
Commission succeeded here in gaining 
official support for the South African 
conference on the information society and 
the developing countries. This was re-
flected in the final resolution adopted in 
Halifax. WEM Hegel Goutier 
^ 
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and refugees 
This article is a summary of a study 
of the causes and effects of mig-
ration in Southern Africa, by 
Hussein Solomon, a researcher at 
the Centre for African Studies at 
the University of the Western 
Cape. Details were first published 
in 'Africa Insight'. The author 
begins by making a distinction 
between true emigration and tem-
porary migration, the latter being a 
frequent phenomenon in the 
region and one which is not taken 
into account here. 
The civil wars which 
have ravaged Mozambique and 
Angola have Officially' ended and repatri-
ation is now being organised under the 
aegis of the UNHCR — with some con-
siderable success in the case of the former. 
Thousands of refugees are quitting their 
host countries (principally Malawi, Zim-
babwe and Zambia) and returning to their 
places of origin. Also returning are those 
who fled a violent situation brought about 
by external influences. Instability in coun-
tries bordering South Africa owing to the 
latter's support for groups such as Super-
Zapu in Zimbabwe or the Mashala Gang in 
Zambia during the 1980s are the best 
examples of this. They are joined by yet 
others, forced by past events to leave their 
region under threat from a repressive 
political regime. 
Although these refugees from 
conflict and oppression have mostly been 
well received in their country of asylum, 
this does not always apply to other 
categories of migrant. Indeed, the pheno-
menon of migration in Southern Africa has 
not halted now that peace has been 
restored. In fact, the return of 'war' 
refugees to their home country may help 
to mask a new type of migration, which 
takes place for other reasons and to other 
destinations. 
The millions of people arriving in 
Johannesburg and elsewhere in South 
Africa from other countries in region — 
and also, increasingly, from Central Africa 
— are often 'illegals', hoping to achieve 
refugee status, find employment and see 
an improvement in their living conditions. 
South Africa alone hosts an estimated five 
million people in this category. 
The principal driving force behind 
these new movements can be summed up 
precisely — the future. In their home 
countries, the future is synonymous with 
poverty. Their home lands have been 
devastated by war. Ecological conditions 
are also unfavourable, due to events such 
as the serious drought which struck the 
region in 1992. Populations are also 
growing by between 2.5% and 3.5% each 
year. The phenomenon of migration has 
been exacerbated by drastic economic 
reforms imposed by the North — the 
structural adjustment programmes set up 
by the World Bank and the IMF to tackle 
the economic crisis that has struck most of 
Southern Africa. Other factors include, 
galloping inflation, tens of thousands of 
job losses in both the public and private 
sectors and a general impoverishment of 
the population 
Brain drain 
Not all refugees are illegal im-
migrants, however. Recent years have seen 
a stream of doctors, engineers, teachers 
and other intellectuals leaving their coun-
tries of origin for South Africa and its 
immediate neighbours which have more 
robust economies (Botswana, Swaziland 
and Namibia). Others have left for the 
West. Such people are frequently received 
with open arms in their country of asylum. 
This represents a 'brain drain' with serious 
consequences for those states whose 
intellectuals are leaving. On the other 
hand, some countries are happy to 'export' 
their excess unskilled manpower. In the 
case of Lesotho, for example, this ensures 
an influx of foreign currency from nationals 
working in the mines or on the farms of 
South Africa who send money to their 
families back home. 
Although a boon for an em-
ployer, who sees the new arrivals as cheap 
labour, free from trade union interference, 
the arrival en masse of refugees can be a 
source of serious tension in the destination 
country. There are economic tensions in 
Malawi for example, where 8000 arrive 
every month to swell the population, 10% 
of which is already made up of refugees. 
Sen/ices such as water supplies and sani-
tation are under threat and hundreds of 
hectares of forest are being destroyed for 
housing, leading to soil erosion and agricul-
tural decline. Socio-cultural tensions in-
clude fear within the local labour force of 
unemployment, and this can lead to an 
increase in nationalism and xenophobic 
feelings. This has been seen in South Africa 
which has approximately 250 000 Mozam-
bican refugees. There are also political 
tensions, both within states and between 
them. A past example of this was where 
South Africa used Mozambican refugees to 
reinforce Renamo. Indeed, Mozambican 
refugees have been poorly treated by 
Pretoria, having been refused refugee 
status which is vital for them to be able to 
receive the necessary assistance. This action 
was criticised by the international com-
munity. . ... 
How, then, can migration be 
halted? Solomon suggests two possible 
approaches. The first entails deterring 
immigrants by forced repatriation, better 
patrolling of frontiers or the use of electric 
fences — there are many different meth-
ods available and a number of them have 
already been used, particularly in South 
Africa. The problem is that although these 
measures are effective in limiting 'legal' 
migration, they have virtually no impact on 
illegal movements. The second approach is 
more interesting. It involves tackling the 
underlying causes of migration in order to 
render it pointless and thereby to en-
courage a return to the home country. This 
is, of course, a long-term process since 
states need to build up the capacity to 
grant meaningful rights linked to social 
and economic development. To this end, 
the author emphasises the need for 
Southern Africa to encourage regional 
integration, but he stresses that this will 
only be possible if there is a restructuring of 
North/South international relations. This 
too is a long-term process whose antici-
pated results will take some years, perhaps 
decades, to become apparent. But So-
lomon believes that it is a process that 
cannot be avoided. Southern Africa, he 
points out, has millions of people who are 
'potential migrants'. ■■ T.G. 
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Dar es Salaam 
A journey of discovery 
by Lance Greyling 
Having lived all his life at the 
'bottom' of Africa, Lance Greyling 
— who is a young South African 
journalist — has always felt the 
need to venture north and discover 
what life is really like in the rest of 
the continent. During the apartheid 
years, the information available 
about countries to the north was 
very one-sided, focusing on ac-
counts of political and economic 
devastation. Far from contributing 
to his understanding, these reports, he says 
'merely served to enhance my existing view 
of Africa as a complete enigma.' On com-
pletion of a Postgraduate Diploma in African 
Studies, Greyling decided to undertake a 
journey of discovery which took him from 
Cape Town through Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. The 
following is an account of some of his 
experiences and observations as he travel-
led from Cape Town to Dar-es-Salaam. 
Throughout our journey, our 
policy was to travel only on local transport. 
As well as being the cheapest mode 
available, this allowed us an opportunity to 
converse with the people and discover the 
realities of the country from their perspec-
tive. Nowhere did this prove more fruitful 
than in Zimbabwe where we became 
embroiled in a political discussion on the 
train from Bulawayo to Victoria Falls. This 
discussion made me aware of a truth that 
would constantly resonate throughout our 
travels in Africa, namely that people 
necessarily have a greater understanding 
of politics in situations where the political 
environment permeates every aspect of 
their daily lives. I found the most common 
lament of Zimbabweans to be that of the 
hardships which the World Bank's struc-
tural adjustment programme (ESAP) had 
wrought on the population. This reaction 
was understandable when one considered 
that after four years of structural adjust-
ment, the economy had still not managed 
to reduce its inflation rate, which was 
running at about 25%. Coupled with the 
rising cost of living was the fact that under 
the ESAP, the government had been 
forced to withdraw subsidies on many 
essential goods and services. Structural 
adjustment also meant that local busi-
nesses were forced to become more 
internationally competitive, which neces-
sarily translates into job losses. Govern-
ment figures released in November 1994 
revealed that, since 1990, the unemploy-
ment rate had risen from 37% to 45% with 
an accompanying retrenchment of around 
25 000 workers. In my view, the most 
The railway bridge between Zambia 
and Zimbabwe at the Victoria Falls 
disheartening reflection of this situation 
was among the university graduates to 
whom we spoke, who did not hold out 
much hope of acquiring a job in the near 
future. 
Legacy of drought 
To be fair, however, one cannot 
lay all the blame on the ESAP. The crippling 
drought of 1992 clearly played some part 
in Zimbabwe's current economic malaise. I 
also found it slightly ironic that amidst all 
the talk about the need to curb public 
spending, one could still witness the rather 
bizarre sight of traffic officers driving 
around in the latest model Mercedes Benz. 
To my mind, this was a manifestation of 
another great lament voiced by Zimbab-
weans, namely the lack of government 
accountability. The problem, as it was 
related to me, lay in the big divisions 
among the opposition parties, and the 
concomitant fact that there was no force in 
Zimbabwean politics strong enough to 
present any real challenge to the power of 
the ruling ZANU party. 
Zambia was the next country 
that we travelled through and unfortu-
nately, I became aware of an even greater 
spirit of disillusionment than that which 
pervaded Zimbabwe. This was a reflection 
of the dismal state of the economy and the 
severe lack of employment opportunities 
in the formal sector. Although Zambia's 
new government under President Chiluba 
had managed to bring about macro-
economic stability by bringing down inf-
lation and interest rates, this still needed to 
be translated into improved living stan-
dards for the majority of the population. 
Unfortunately, one deleterious effect of 
the economic reforms has been deindus-
trialisation. More than 100 businesses had 
been forced to close in the previous few 
years as a result of stiff international 
competition. Besides the obvious loss of 
jobs that this entailed (more than 55 000 
altogether), it also meant that Zambia's 
manufacturing and textile sector was 
greatly diminished. As one trader, who we 
met on the bus between Lusaka and 
Lilongwe, affirmed, Zambia had been 
reduced to a state where it was no longer 
able to manufacture its own goods. The 
trader in question was taking this bus trip dossier 
— a journey of 11 hours — twice a week, 
just so he could buy goods from Malawi to 
sell on Zambia's informal markets. The 
huge informal economy of Zambia was 
another reflection of that country's high 
unemployment. We met recently retren-
ched workers and university graduates 
selling cigarettes and other assorted items 
at Lusaka bus station. 
One graduate whom we en-
countered related to us how he used to see 
the ANC's Chris Hani, when he was in exile, 
jogging on the streets of Lusaka every 
morning. This reminded us of Zambia's 
former role as a 'front-line state'. It was not 
just the ANC that depended on the help of 
Zambia during its liberation war: ZAPU 
(Zimbabwe) and SWAPO (Namibia) also 
benefited. The support which Kenneth 
Kaunda offered to these organisations 
often led to violent reprisals from the 
regimes in the countries in question. There 
was, for example, the air attack on Lusaka 
by the South African Defence Force in May 
1985. Such acts of reprisal were very costly 
for the Zambian population in human and 
material terms and, in my view, underline 
the great debt which the region, and South 
Africa in particular, owes them for the part 
they played in the liberation process. 
Consolidating democracy 
Malawi was a country which I 
was particularly interested in visiting, as I 
often recall tales from my schooldays of the 
'benevolent' dictator Hastings Banda, who 
had 'wisely' chosen to align himself with 
South Africa and, in the process, secure a 
prosperous future for his country. The 
reality of the situation was very different. 
When Banda's rule came to an end in 1994, 
he left a bitter legacy with which the 
present government now has to contend. 
One aspect of this is Malawi's present lack 
of both a strong civil society and a tradition 
of competitive politics, two essential 
cornerstones of political democracy. The 
task of consolidating democracy in a 
country where repression was the order of 
the day for 30 years will certainly not be 
easy. The feeling that I got from speaking 
to Malawians was that they were certainly 
happy with the changes, but still felt some 
trepidation over whether the new order 
would be able to deal with the country's 
host of economic problems. The economic 
strategy which Banda adopted involved 
exploiting its land and labour endow-
ments. This entailed incomes, migration 
and manpower policies which reinforced 
the cheap labour supply syndrome. As 
regards wages, the government initially 
set minimum rates that were to remain 
constant for lengthy periods despite inf-
lation. In the early years, these might more 
aptly have been described as maximum 
wages, as permission was required if the 
pay was to exceed the prescribed levels. 
Union leaders also used to be appointed by 
Banda himself, which meant that workers 
had very little recourse in terms of fighting 
for higher wages. The scale of the problem 
was illustrated to me by a schoolteacher 
who informed me that his present monthly 
wage was the equivalent of US $30. 
It was also in Malawi that I was 
made more acutely aware of an issue that 
has a marked effect on the entire African 
continent, namely the problem of endemic 
diseases. Sitting around a campfire one 
evening, one of the locals quite casually 
remarked to me that he thought he had 
just contracted malaria. This is a malady 
that can be fatal but the tone in which he 
spoke seemed to indicate that he had 
caught nothing more than the equivalent 
of a common cold. A doctor working in the 
field of AIDS education in Uganda later 
told me about the difficulties she faced in 
her work, including the fatalistic attitude 
of people when informed about the new 
disease that kills people indiscriminately 
and on a large scale. Their response is 
simply that there are already many dis-
eases in Africa that have been doing that 
for years. 
Tanzania was the last SADC state 
that we passed through. Although I was 
only there for a short time, one aspect I 
noticed was the extent to which former 
President Julius Nyerere still plays a role in 
that country's politics. As is customary in all 
African countries, the photograph of the 
President can be seen hanging in banks and 
government offices. The difference in 
Tanzania is that Nyerere's photograph is 
invariably hung alongside it. Although he 
left office in 1985,1 still sensed a great deal 
of respect for him among the population. 
Indeed, his influence is so great that many 
people believe the person he endorses in 
A second-hand clothes market in 
Malawi 
Democracy has been restored but the 
country still faces a host of economic 
problems 
the forthcoming elections will ultimately 
become President. 
Throughout my travels in East 
and Southern Africa, I became aware of 
one common feature that all the countries 
seem to possess. This is the resilience of the 
people and their ability to survive times of 
extreme economic and political adversity. 
The ordinary people of the continent are 
truly its greatest resource. But it remains to 
be seen whether their talents can be 
harnessed in a way which will allow them 
to emerge from their present con-
dition. Mi LG. 
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Southern Africa are taking the first steps 
towards cooperation in tourism — de-
spite fears that South Africa will get the 
lion's share of the benefits. 
'We have held several high level 
Indabas (meetings), all very fruitful and 
cordial, 'says Zambian Tourism Minister 
General Criston Tembo. From Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania to Zambia, Namibia 
and South Africa, the resolve is that we 
need, not just want, a single regional 
tourism body now, to coordinate and 
promote tourism. We have no doubt that 
it will work and help our economies to 
grow.' 
After the first meeting of the 
Regional Tourism Council for East and 
Southern Africa, in Swaziland, the new 
organisation's executive will formulate a 
policy and make recommendations. 
Tembo is confident. 'I am sure that won't 
be a problem considering so much ground 
has already been covered.' 
Buoyed by tourism success in 
South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe, and 
confident that the era of liberation strug-
gles and civil wars is over, governments 
and tourist operators believe the time is 
ripe for a new approach. Mike Matóla, 
Malawi's chief tourism officer, says that 
'we are all weak and fragmented econ-
omies', but, 'by putting our tourism act 
* Zambian freelance journalist. Article from 
Gemini News Service, 9 White Lion Street, GB — 
London, N1 9PD 
together', it will be possible to build up 
regional activities. 
Leading Malawi businessman 
Andrea Bizzaro says that 'since the idea 
began to filter down there has been 
tremendous activity on the ground and as 
a matter of fact, we already have the 
blueprint — regional packages will mean 
tourists will travel on a single cheaper 
ticket from the Cape to Mombasa. What 
we need is to harmonise standards, swal-
low national pride and create a single 
regional airline and so on, so that we can 
compete favourably.' 
Harmonisation will not be easy. 
Regional development initiatives do not 
have a history of success in Africa. Even the 
two groupings which have come together 
to form the Tourism Council — the 
Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) and the Common Market for East 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) — have a 
patchy record. 
Mike Harvey, Zambian chairman 
of the Tours and Lodges Association 
admits : 'Our major worry is how to get all 
the nations to agree on policy issues, to 
reduce taxes, harmonise tariffs, remove 
visa restrictions and divorce the industry 
from politics.' 
In addition, many countries will 
find it difficult to raise money for the 
estimated S10 billion needed to renovate 
run-down infrastructure to international 
standards. 'The private sector is the only 
hope/ says a Tanzanian economist, but in 
countries with particularly weak econ-
The Victoria Falls 
Some fear that South Africa will 
capture the lion's share of any benefits 
from the current tourism initiative but 
other countries in the region have 
many attractions to offer visitors 
omies — such as Tanzania — even the 
private sector is crippled by high taxes, 
import duties and interest rates. 
Nevertheless, commercial oper-
ators are particularly pleased by the 
intention of the governments concerned, 
in the words of Ian Jones, chairman of the 
Malawi Hotel and Catering Association, 'to 
involve the private sector at every stage of 
planning. In the last six months,' he says, 
'we already have in Malawi fresh tourism 
investment of up to $1.3 million. There are 
more applications to put worn-out faci-
lities right and get new projects going. We 
can't go wrong.' 
In Zambia, 33 new lodges are 
being built by private investment at a cost 
of more than $2 million. Another $1 m will 
be spent by the government this year on 
refurbishing infrastructure. 
Some critics warn that the winner 
will be South Africa's well-oiled $2 bn a 
year tourism industry, with the rest of the 
region left to share the crumbs. Zambian 
hotelier Herman Streidl dismisses such 
fears: 'South Africa is not the big issue. 
They will naturally get a lion's share, but 
tourists want to see the Great Lakes, the 
Victoria Falls and other attractions which 
are not in South Africa. So we have our 
share of the cake.' m EN. 
-I 
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Development Programme 
nn by Paul Needham* 
I The Caribbean has become one of 
I the most popular tourist desti-
I nations in the world in recent years 
I thanks to a positive general image, 
I favourable dollar exchange rates 
I and low airline prices. Many Carib-
I bean states and territories are 
I increasingly looking to tourism as 
I the provider of long-term economic 
I growth and employment at a time 
I of uncertain future prospects in 
I other industries such as the fruit 
I trade. However, the region's tour-
I ism industry still suffers from struc-
tural weaknesses such as over-
dependence on the North American market, 
an unbalanced level of destination aware-
ness in Europe, and insufficient training and 
research data within the Caribbean. In 
particular, smaller destinations have yet to 
fulfil their tourism potential. 
In Lomé IV, the European Union 
committed itself to four main areas of 
assistance : human resources and insti-
tutional development, product develop-
ment, market development, and research 
and information. Philippe Darmuzey, head 
of the European Commission delegation in 
Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, says 
the fundamental objective is to assist the 
Caribbean to establish a sustainable tour-
ism industry based on public-private part-
nerships, and to help small destinations 
with little opportunity for economic diver-
sification to develop a tourism sector. 
Stimulating market 
demand 
In an initial series of tourism 
development programmes from 1983-87, 
ECU 9.2 million was spent, partly on the 
European market with the establishment 
of a Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO) 
office in London and associated marketing 
activities, and partly on research and 
smaller projects in the Caribbean. In 1993, 
the EU launched a more ambitious three-
year ECU 9 million Caribbean Tourism 
Freelance journalist based in Germany. 
Development Programme (CTDP) covering 
24 beneficiary states and territories. The 
objectives were to achieve long-term 
growth in tourism earnings and visitor 
arrivals from Europe, improve tourism 
products to match European market 
needs, and promote smaller destinations. 
A vital element was to aim for project self-
sustainability beyond the lifetime of the 
programme. At present, Caribbean desti-
nations welcome just 17-18% of their 
visitors from Europe, although these ac-
count for at least 40% of room nights since 
European tourists generally stay longer 
and spend slightly more than their Amer-
ican counterparts. 
Steigenberger Consulting, a 
German tourism consultancy, was com-
missioned to oversee the programme, with 
the CTO in charge of day-to-day adminis-
tration. Well over half of the funding was 
for investment in Europe rather than the 
Caribbean but Steigenberger's managing 
director, Dr Peter Agel, insists this is 
absolutely vital for tourism development. 
'With tourism, we help more if we invest 
money in Europe because tourists are 
generated for the region and then they 
spend their money there,' he points out. 
However, 'this was very difficult for the EU, 
and particularly for its development aims, 
because the general understanding of aid is 
that the money should be spent in the 
developing region.' 
There was a switch away from 
the so-called 'hard-sell' approach under 
which tour operators had been subsidised 
to include particular destinations in their 
holiday brochures, but which generated 
relatively few extra sales. Only a small 
number of specialist tour operators have 
been given support under the current 
programme. Instead, it has targeted 
demand by concentrating on travel agents. 
As Dr Agel explains : 'Travel agents are the 
point of sale and that is where the 
decisions are made today. We must have 
influence at the point of sale.' 
The largest project was a cor-
respondence seminar on the Caribbean 
which will have been completed by about 
6000 travel agents from eight European 
countries by the end of the programme 
next February. Programme-funded CTO 
Chapters (national branches) were success-
fully formed by tour operators, hotels and 
other travel organisations in Germany and 
Italy in addition to the existing UK Chapter, 
but the French operation folded due to 
lack of trade support. A multimedia CD 
database of Caribbean destinations and 
hotels was also initiated during the pro-
gramme and successfully transferred to 
private sector partners for further develop-
ment. 
Other projects out of the 83 in 
Europe have included study and work 
placements for some 30 Caribbean travel 
industry professionals in Britain and the 
Netherlands, a voucher programme for 
small hotels, marketing back-up for travel 
trade fairs and roadshows, and press and 
travel agents' destination trips. 
Training for Caribbean 
professionals 
In the Caribbean, about 1500 
participants have been trained in over 50 
workshops in subjects such as tourism 
information services, professional guiding, 
customer relations for customs officials and 
even passenger friendliness and service for 
taxi drivers. Reports completed under 
short-term consultancies include a series of 
visitors' surveys, tourism development 
policies for Bonaire, Guyana, Montserrat, 
St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia and Suriname, and 
studies in regional airline cooperation, the 
impact of tourism on the marine environ-
ment, tourism sector taxation and visitor 
harassment. 
CTO Marketing Director for 
Europe, David Barber, says : 'The biggest 
success of the programme was the cor-
respondence seminar which really raised 
the profile of the CTO in Europe. The 
development of the German chapter was 
another major achievement. In the Carib-
bean, we had the visitors' survey and the 
training of Caribbean private and public 
sector professionals. This is the first time 
the CTO has had the resources to carry this 
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Correspondence seminar for 
European travel agents  I
The seminar targeted travel agents whose advice to consumers is often derisive in 
the choice of a holiday destination. Up to 6000 travel agents from eight 
countries, indude 1800 in Germany, 1300 in the Netherlands, 900 in the UK and 
800 in Italy, studied brochures and completed questionnaires on 32 Caribbean 
destinations in courses lasting eight months. All successful participants gained certificates as 
'Caribbean tourism experts". A tombola competition generated 15000 additional 
Caribbean bookings in German-speaking countries alone. 
Although the seminar costs amounted to ECU. 2 million, the CEO is delighted at the travel 
trade's reaction and say participation numbers were generally above expectation apart 
from in France. 
out.' Philippe Darmuzey adds: 'Broadly 
speaking, the programme has been satis-
factory. It has certainly been successful in all 
areas of training, and the correspondence 
seminar in particular has done much to 
increase understanding of the region's 
characteristics by the European travel 
trade.' 
The visitor survey system is likely 
to be continued in several Caribbean 
countries and the creation of European 
CTO chapters offers the prospect of 
sustainable private sector partnership, but 
continuation of the 'pump-priming' tour 
operator financial support scheme is more 
open to question, he adds. 
On specific objectives, the CTDP 
has easily achieved its target of an annual 
rise of 60 000-90 000 European visitors. 
Some 2.6 million European tourists visited 
the Caribbean in 1994, a rise of 13% 
(300 000) on the previous year. The 1993 
figures were themselves, 10% higher than 
in 1992. The target of boosting the 
Caribbean's gross tourism earnings by 
US $65m will also be substantially ex-
ceeded. German visitor spending alone 
rose by about $50m to some $800m last 
year. 
Whereas in the Caribbean, pro-
jects could be targeted fairly easily at the 
24 beneficiary states and OCTs, a more 
broad-brush regional approach was neces-
sary at the European end. As Dr Agel 
explains: 'The execution of the pro-
gramme has always borne in mind that we 
have to concentrate on the beneficiaries 
and not the Caribbean in general. In terms 
of marketing in Europe, however, you 
cannot tell a tour operator the difference 
between beneficiaries and non-bene-
ficiaries. In the correspondence seminar, it 
would have been impossible to omit the 
non-beneficiaries because people at the 
point of sale view the Caribbean as a 
whole.' 
An ECU 11 m three-year successor 
programme is now being planned. This will 
concentrate on human resource develop-
ment in the Caribbean to consolidate the 
achievements of the 1993-96 programme. 
Particular assistance will be given to new 
ACP states Haiti and the Dominican Re-
public, as well as Suriname, whose tourism 
industry is under-developed. Philippe Dar-
muzey explains : 'This new programme will 
continue certain marketing activities but 
will shift strongly in emphasis towards the 
strengthening of regional capacity to 
deliver education and training and to 
monitor sector developments.' Activities 
will include in-service and institutional 
tourism training, product diversification to 
cover ecological, heritage and special 
interest tourism, establishment of a re-
gional CTO research unit, and a possible 
management information system. 
Still a long haul for 
smaller islands 
While clear progress is being 
made in the development of the region's 
tourism industry and in the growth of 
European markets, substantial challenges 
remain as the Caribbean competes in the 
long-haul tourism market with fast-grow-
ing Asian destinations. Awareness of 
smaller islands remains low in Europe and 
will require long-term marketing support 
to transform a public perception that 
holidays in the Caribbean mean mass 
tourism to cheap destinations such as the 
Dominican Republic, Cuba and Jamaica. 
In addition, Peter Agel claims 
that many Caribbean hoteliers and the 
Caribbean Hotel Association (CHA) still do 
not see Europe as a 'serious market' 
compared to the 'bread-and-butter' North 
American business on the doorstep, and 
thus give the continent a low marketing 
priority. David Barber accepts that in the 
long-term, the European market share is 
not likely to rise much above 20% or 25% at 
the very most, but stresses the European 
length of stay, which is double that of 
Americans. As Philippe Darmuzey points 
out, achievement of the EU's long-term 
goals of a sustainable Caribbean tourism 
industry requires an integrated approach 
covering assistance for both product and 
market development. Beneficiary states 
and OCTs in the Caribbean still face a long 
haul before their tourism future is se-
cured, em PM. 
-i 
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European Commission 
ECHO Flight: an 'airline' 
with a difference 
When the 'ECHO Flight' system 
began operation last year, some 
people wondered whether it was 
appropriate for the European Com-
mission to set up what appeared, in 
effect, to be an airline. This ap-
prehension has been offset by the 
many instances of praise from 
beneficiaries of the service, the 
NGOs operating under difficult 
field conditions in Somalia, Rwanda and 
Sudan. The forceful stance of the new 
European Commissioner for humanitarian 
matters, Emma Bonino, and her declared 
wish for ECHO (the European Community 
Humanitarian Office) to have a higher 
profile, have probably helped in allaying any 
concerns. 
It is unlikely that you will come 
across an aircraft bearing the ECHO 
emblem at a major commercial airport. The 
nine planes that display the Humanitarian 
Office's logo together with the EU flag, 
usually take off from and land on mud 
runways or austere airports in quite 
unfavourable conditions. Their bases are 
Lokichoggio, Maldera, Djibouti and Mo-
gadishu, the nerve centre being Nairobi. 
The luggage carried consists of equipment 
for NGOs and food aid, while the passen-
gers are humanitarian workers rather than 
tourists. An exception to this is where 
ECHO organises a special flight in the 
context of one of its public relations 
operations aimed at making citizens in 
donor countries more aware of what 
happens to their money. It was an event of 
this kind which allowed a group of about 
30 children, surrounded by a mass of 
journalists, to experience the thrill (and 
discomfort !) of a flight in a noisy, unpress-
urised C130 Hercules of the Belgian Air 
Force. Summer had arrived early for these 
latitudes and the atmosphere on the 
tarmac of the Brussels airfield was torrid as 
the group assembled one afternoon in 
June. They will probably remember for a 
long time the striking images of their 
country as seen from the strange 'balcony' 
of an aircraft flying at low altitude. The 
stern of the plane was opened — left 
gaping like the mouth of a shark — so that 
the passengers could understand how aid 
packages are dropped over areas where it 
is not possible to make a landing. This f light 
was the children's reward for having won a 
drawing competition on the theme of 
humanitarian flights. It was also an oppor-
tunity for the partners in the operation — 
the Humanitarian Office and the Belgian 
Air Force — to explain to the press what 
they were doing. 
Link man 
A key person in the ECHO Flight 
team is the service's technical coordinator 
in Brussels. Poly Stevens is a tall man — 
perhaps two metres — and as he passed 
back and forth between the cockpit and 
the passenger section his head touched the 
the ceiling of the compartment. Mr 
Stevens acts as the link between 'off-
icialdom' and the military. Himself a former 
military pilot, he was a logical choice for 
the European Commission when it was 
seeking to recruit someone to carry out this 
important liaison task. The Commission's 
aim was to improve the efficiency of its 
support in the transport field offered to 
NGOs involved in regions of Africa afflicted 
by conflict and famine. Since the beginning 
of 1994, Mr Stevens has been based at 
ECHO'S HQ in Brussels, and, working with 
ECHO officials, he has helped to define the 
basis for the operation of this 'free' airline 
which made its first flight in May 1994. 
Prior to that time, each NGO received a 
transport budget and duplication of tasks 
was unavoidable. In the absence of coordi-
nation, it was often the case that two half-
empty aircraft, chartered by two different 
Reward for young 'artists' in a drawing 
competition featuring humanitarian aid. 
The thrill (and discomfort) of a flight in 
a military plane 
organisations, were flying between the 
same places at virtually the same time. It 
was essential to achieve better cost ef-
ficiency in the use of European aid. To 
begin with, requirements had to be 
identified — a difficult task given the 
essentially random nature of emergency 
situations. An efficient coordinating struc-
ture between the NGOs and the service 
providers also had to be defined. The 
specifications included a safety guarantee 
at least as good as that for private airlines, 
since the Commission's image could suffer 
badly should any instances of negligence 
arise. According to Poly Stevens, 'We had 
to fulfil a mission which was not clearly 
defined and for which flexibility is still the 
primary characteristic. At the same time 
we had to offer maximum safety stand-
ards.' It was relatively easy to lease small 
aircraft capable of operating out of make-
shift aerodromes, but for large trans-
porters, capable of providing the link with 
Europe and conveying large quantities to 
difficult areas, the issue was more complex. 
It was here that Poly Stevens' links with 
former air force colleagues proved par-
ticularly useful. He acted as 'matchmaker', 
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convincing the Air Force of the image-
boosting advantages of supporting huma-
nitarian work. Belgian officials were quick 
to agree. 
The Belgian military came up not 
only with the equipment — a C130 
Hercules replaced every five weeks for 
maintenance, and the benefit of their long 
experience of providing succour in humani-
tarian crises. They were also able to offer 
their revolutionary system of precision 
jettisoning without a parachute (Very Low 
Altitude Gravity Extraction System). The 
system is simple in essence but also highly 
accurate with a 99.5 % success rate. This 
surpasses any other methods used hith-
erto. The keys to achieving such an 
impressive result are the very low flight 
altitude, the low speed and the packaging 
of the parcels. The goods are packed in a 
double nylon bag and loaded on pallets 
which may carry up to two tonnes. When 
approaching the jettisoning point, the 
aircraft's speed is considerably reduced, 
landing gear and flaps are put down, the 
big ramp at the stern is lowered and the 
nose is lifted by between eight and ten 
degrees. The pallets, which have been held 
only by straps then slide until the straps 
break. The bags separate and hit the 
ground individually with a low kinetic 
energy in comparison with that of a 
homogeneous packet. The outer bag tears 
but inner one remains intact. Even the 
wooden pallets can be recovered and used 
A Belgian Air Force C130 Hercules, In 
the service of ECHO Flight 
Remarkable precision in dropping food 
aid 
by NGOs or local people. ECHO Flight 
began its work at a time when serious 
questions were being asked about similar 
operations carried out with questionable 
efficiency by the US Air Force. In these, the 
parcels were often damaged or landed 
outside the target area in 'hostile' ter-
ritory. 
Another plane used by ECHO 
Flight is the Cessna Caravan, which is also 
employed to transport food aid, although 
in smaller quantities. This is a single engine 
turbine aircraft with higher performance 
levels than a conventional piston twin-
engine aircraft. More importantly, it is 
safer, owing to the use of a fuel which is 
less inflammable than petroleum spirit, 
something which can be important in 
certain countries where it may be difficult 
to guarantee fuel quality. There are also 
two Beechcraft King Air 200s which have a 
greater range than the Cessnas. The one 
based in Djibouti, for example, is able to 
cover Northern Somalia. Lastly, there is a 
small, fast jet aircraft. 
ECHO Flight's other f unction is to 
bring NGO workers out of difficult situ-
ations. About 50 such evacuations have 
taken place on safety grounds during the 
last year and these have given a con-
siderable boost to the Humanitarian Off-
ice's profile. 
Southern Sudan — a 
major operation with a 
low profile 
Currently, the largest theatre of 
operations for ECHO Flight is Southern 
Sudan, where a particularly vicious war has 
been taking place, largely out of the public 
eye, for more than 10 years. The army of 
the Islamic Khartoum regime aims to 
'normalise' this zone which harbours a 
number of guerrilla groups. In 1988 alone. 
Southern Sudan recorded 200 000 deaths 
— mostly civilians — in the conflict. 
Together with the specialised UN agencies 
such as Unicef and the World Food 
Programme (WFP) and the ICRC, ECHO is 
involved in Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), 
which was launched at the end of the 
1980s. This is a purely humanitarian 
operation, although one of uncommon 
scope. This year alone, the OLS has a 
budget of $100 million. Its headquarters 
are in Nairobi, Kenya, which is also home to 
the ECHO Flight coordination centre. The 
actual operational base is at Lokichoggio in 
north west Kenya, close to the border with 
Sudan. The village has been transformed in 
recent years with its airport, installations 
for managing food stockpiles (running to 
thousands of tonnes), seeds and farm 
implements, not to mention the Red Cross 
hospital. Lokichoggio airport is the depar-
ture point for the Belgian Air Force's big 
transporter and also the place of arrival for 
medical flights bringing the wounded from 
Southern Sudan. Although the NGOs 
receive ECHO'S services free of charge, the 
transport of supplies for the WFP has to be 
paid for. Last year, the latter used ECHO 
Flight to transport some 10 000 tonnes of 
food to Sudan. 
In order to be able to deploy its 
aircraft over Sudan, ECHO Flight, and the 
OLS as a whole, have had to keep a low 
profile. ECHO adheres to a policy of strict 
political neutrality, and northern areas of 
the country receive aid in the same way as 
southern areas affected by the cata-
strophe. This is a government requirement. 
The relevant authorisations have to come 
not only from the latter but also from the 
guerrilla factions controlling the region — 
a situation which inevitably gives rise to 
difficulties, with both parties having to be 
reconciled. At the beginning of this year, 
flights by the Belgian C130 were sus-
^ 
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pended on the pretext that it had dropped 
40 tonnes of weapons for the rebels. 
According to Poly Stevens, this is techni-
cally impossible. 'It was a misunderstan-
ding', he told us in measured tones, 'which 
we have fortunately now resolved. The 
payload of a C130 is only 20 tonnes, 16 
when jettisoning, not 40. Moreover, the 
weapons would have been damaged 
unless we used parachutes, which are not 
part of the aircraft's equipment.' He went 
on to stress; 'What ECHO Flight cannot 
afford is for a case of negligence, a 
misunderstanding or a lack of effort to 
cause a breakdown in the agreement and 
for the aircraft to be prohibited to enter 
the relevant airspace. Sudan is a country 
which has rights and these rights are 
respected'. 
The other centres for the ECHO 
Flight network are Mogadishu (Somalia) 
serving the south of that country and 
Djibouti covering Northern Somalia. How-
ever, ECHO Flight's terms of reference are 
fairly wide and it is flexible enough to be 
able to intervene in other areas where 
humanitarian aid is required. Initially, the 
machine took some time to run smoothly, 
not least because of the human and 
cultural aspects of working in multi-
national groups and the administrative 
difficulties arising from the fact that the 
teams were based in one country whilst 
the services were provided to another. 
Nowadays, it appears to operate fault-
lessly. 
The ECHO Flight people say they 
are delighted with the results achieved in 
the first year. Aircraft loadings vary 
between 60% and 80% of capacity which is 
very high for this type of flight. There is 
close coordination with the NGOs, who are 
regulated by a set of strict procedures. 
These include penalties on passengers who 
fail to turn up for check-in. Such passengers 
lose their priority in the reservation list for 
a certain period. The effect is that the 
proportion of 'no-shows', which generally 
run at about 25% for flights of this nature, 
has fallen to just 7%. The cost of transport-
ing passengers or freight, calculated on the 
basis of weight per unit of distance, has 
also been reduced by 36%. Although there 
are still no precise figures available, it is 
thought that substantial savings have been 
achieved. The evidence for this is that 
ECHO Flight manages, with four aircraft, to 
do what 10 NGOs subsidised by the Office 
used to achieve with 10. And as for any 
criticism about the possible waste of 
resources entailed in having certain aircraft 
immobilised on the ground for too long. 
Poly Stevens offers a categorical rebuttal. 
Firstly, he points out that great care was 
taken in anticipating the needs when the 
small fleet was set up. In addition, the fact 
that an aircraft is on the ground does not 
necessarily mean that it is not in use. Given 
the particular constraints of humanitarian 
operations, the time is employed pro-
fitably in extensive servicing. He also 
observes that the aircraft have perman-
ently to be on standby to deal with any 
problem situations that arise. 
ECHO Flight in Maridi (Southern Sudan) 
A large scale deployment but a low 
profile. Account has to be taken of all 
the factions in this terrible conflict 
Another very important gain is in 
the area of safety. Up to the present time, 
ECHO Flight has had no accidents, whereas, 
in the past, the inexperience of crew 
members, mechanical failures in aircraft 
that were inspected in a somewhat 
random fashion, overloading and non-
compliance with security requirements 
gave rise to one or two — which of course 
is one or two too many. ■■ Hegel Goutier 
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Official development assistance 
from the North to the South is still 
declining but not as fast as before. 
This was the conclusion reached by 
the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), when it published provi-
sional figures in June showing the 
flows of development aid in 1994 
from the members of its Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC). 
In nominal terms, the 
amount of assistance provided by 
the 21 member countries rose by 
$1.4 billion to a total of $57.8bn. Allowing 
for inflation, this represented a decrease of 
1.8% which compares with a 5% fail in the 
previous year. Taken as a whole, the 
European Union is the major provider of 
development aid to the Third World. 
However, the DAC figures show Japan 
consolidating its position as the largest 
individual donor in absolute terms. The 
amounts paid into the European Com-
munity's development cooperation policy 
by each Member State are added to 'their' 
totals although nowadays, the OECD 
provides additional information in the 
form of a 'composite' EU figure. All EU 
countries except Greece participate in the 
DAC. 
In its communiqué, the OECD 
notes sharp falls in the amount of develop-
ment aid provided by Belgium, Italy and 
Finland, attributing this to overall public 
expenditure reductions in these countries. 
It also observes that four states — three of 
which are EU members — continued to 
exceed the UN 0.7% GDP target (Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden and The Netherlands). 
However, the overall percentage of GDP 
allocated for development assistance by 
DAC countries fell to just 0.29% — a 21-
year low. To be fair, it should be recognised 
that a number of contributing states 
nowadays have significant aid commit-
ments to countries of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union which are not 
formally regarded as 'developing' but 
nonetheless face major economic challen-
ges. The OECD recognises this and seeks to 
provide a more balanced picture by also 
publishing the amount of official aid given 
by DAC members to these so-called 'Part II' 
countries (See Table II). 
Although ODA to developing 
countries declined, there was better news 
in the area of private capital flows. These 
rose for the fourth successive year to reach 
$97bn. HI s.H. 
Table 1 - ODA from DAC countries 
Country 
EU 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Netherlands 
France 
Luxembourg 
Germany 
Finland 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Austria 
Portugal 
Spain 
Ireland 
Italy 
EU average/total 
Non-EU 
Norway 
Canada 
Australia 
Switzerland 
Japan 
New Zealand 
United States 
Total DAC 
ODA as °, 
1993 
1.03 
0.99 
0.82 
0.63 
0.35 
0.36 
0.45 
0.39 
0.31 
0.30 
0.29 
0.25 
0.20 
0.31 
0.45 
1.16 
0.45 
0.35 
0.33 
0.27 
0.25 
0.16 
0.31 
o of GDP 
1994 
1.03 
0.90 
0.76 
0.64 
0.40 
0.33 
0.31 
0.30 
0.30 
0.29 
0.28* 
0.26 
0.24 
0.20 
0.43 
1.05 
0.42 
0.38 
0.36 
0.29 
0.24 
0.15 
0.29 
ODA in 5bn 
1993 1994 
1.34 
1.77 
2.53 
7.92 
0.05 
6.95 
0.36 
0.81 
2.92 
0.54 
0.25 
1.21 
0.08 
3.04 
29.77 
1.01 
2.37 
0.95 
0.79 
11.26 
0.10 
10.15 
56.40 
1.45 
1.70 
2.53 
8.45 
0.06 
6.75 
0.29 
0.68 
3.09 
0.56 
0.25* 
1.25 
0.10 
1.97 
29.12 
1.14 
2.23 
1.09 
0.98 
13.24 
0.11 
9.85 
57.75 
Table 2: Official aid to 'Part II' 
countries in 1994* (in $bn) 
Germany 
United States 
France 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Japan 
Switzerland 
Austria 
Denmark 
Italy 
Spain 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Canada 
Finland 
Norway 
Portugal 
Ireland 
Total 
2.30 
2.25 
0.65 
0.28 
0.27 
0.25 
0.24 
0.23 
0.20 
0.16 
0.09 
0.08 
0.08 
0.06 
0.06 
0.04 
0.01 
0.01 
7.25 
' estimate 
- - -.·. 
' Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic and 
Ukraine) 
"Ï 
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Cameroon 
A participatory approach 
by Asit K. Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada* 
During the past decade, many 
developing countries have embar-
ked on the preparation of national 
environmental management plans 
(NEMPs), primarily with the assist-
| ance of the UNDP, the World Bank 
and certain bilateral aid agencies. 
When analysed only on a technical 
basis, these plans — as to be 
! expected — are of varying quality. 
When considered in terms of their 
implementation, however, the vast majority 
have been paper exercises with very limited 
impact on national policies and program-
mes. Only in a few selected countries have 
NEMPs had a discernable impact. One of 
these is Cameroon. Cameroon's success has 
been somewhat unexpected since the 
country is a relative newcomer to the 
environmental field. In this article we 
examine the process leading to the prepar-
ation of the Cameroon NEMP, since the 
process has been largely instrumental in the 
success of the plan to date. 
Prior to 1992, Cameroon did not 
have a national environmental manage-
ment policy. Environmental protection 
was a part of various sectoral policies and, 
not surprisingly, the different sectors and 
ministries responsible for managing them, 
placed varying degrees of emphasis on the 
relevant environmental factors. Con-
sequently, at the normative level, a variety 
of legislative and regulatory policies were 
adopted, which tended to focus primarily 
on the exploitation rather than on the 
holistic management of the ecosystem. 
Cameroon's environmental legis-
lation comprised various rules and regu-
lations, reflecting the above-mentioned 
* Professor Biswas is President of the Inter-
national Society of Ecological Modeling, Chairman 
of the Middle East Water Commission and past 
President of the International Water Resources 
Association. Cecilia Tortajada is an environmental 
specialist with the National Water of Commission of 
Mexico, and Vice-Chair of the Committee on 
International Cooperation of the International 
Association for Impact Assessment. 
sectoral fragmentation, and the comp-
lexity of the legal system in general. The 
legal system is notable in that traditional 
customary rules and modern laws exists 
side by side. This is especially the case as 
regards forest and wildlife management. 
Integral approach 
One of the most important fac-
tors leading to the preparation of the 
NEMP was the Cameroon government's 
realisation that it was essential to take an 
integrated overview of the environmental 
management process, on a long-term 
basis, for the sustainable development of 
the country's extensive natural resources. 
The authorities also recognised that such 
an approach was needed to prevent the 
environmental degradation currently 
taking place. A new institutional structure 
was thought necessary offering a com-
prehensive approach to environmental 
management in place of the fragmented, 
dispersed and sometimes even contradic-
tory efforts made prior to 1992, the results 
of which had been somewhat limited. 
The need for both a new insti-
tutional structure and the preparation of a 
holistic national plan for the environmental 
management of the country was accepted 
at a very high level — by the President 
himself. In April 1992, a Presidential decree 
was issued which revised the adminis-
trative structure of the Government. It 
created a new Ministry of the Environment 
and Forests (MINEF), with a specific man-
date to develop a comprehensive national 
strategic action plan which would protect 
the environment and manage the cur-
rently abundant natural resources of the 
country in a sustainable manner for the use 
and enjoyment of present and future 
generations. Cameroon has, after Zaire, 
the second largest area of tropical forest in 
Africa. 
The preparation of the national 
plan was facilitated by the Resident 
Representative of the UNDP in Cameroon 
through policy dialogues with the Govern-
ment and the donor community. With the 
converging interests of the Government of 
Cameroon and the UNDP, discussions were 
initiated by both sides on how best a 
national environmental management 
policy could be formulated and implemen-
ted. 
Since environmental issues affect 
all sectors, a Groupe de réflexion (Reflec-
tion Group) was established which in-
cluded various UN agencies active in 
Cameroon in the environmental field. The 
primary objective of the Groupe was to 
assist the government in identifying and 
managing priority environmental issues. It 
was later expanded, under continuing 
UNDP chairmanship, to include other 
interested bilateral donors. The aim was to 
exchange views and ideas on a regular 
basis and thus facilitate the environmental 
management process in Cameroon. In 
retrospect, it can be seen that the Groupe 
made a very substantial contribution to 
achieving effective donor coordination — 
something which is often a challenge in 
many developing countries. 
The Groupe and a national inter-
ministerial working group on the environ-
ment jointly formulated the terms of 
reference for a major multidisciplinary and 
multi-institutional mission on the environ-
ment. This mission took place in Sep-
tember-October 1992 following six 
months of preparatory work. It was 
headed by one of the co-authors of this 
article (Professor Biswas) on behalf of the 
UNDP with Mesack Tchana, Inspector-
General of MINEF, as the National Coordi-
nator. Among the other UN agencies 
taking part were UNSO, FAP, UNESCO and 
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Road-bullding through the Cameroon 
tropical forest 
The government recognised the need 
for an integrated and long-term 
approach to environmental 
management, for the sustainable 
development of the country's extensive 
natural resources 
UNIDO. Bilateral donors who fully par­
ticipated in the mission included Canada, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the United States while the 
World Bank was also actively involved in 
the discussions. 
The mission included both 
national and international experts. Teams 
were set up to cover all the priority areas 
identified by the Mission, each consisting 
of one expert from the UN or a bilateral 
agency and at least one national counter­
part. The final report was drafted by the 
mission leader based on the analyses and 
recommendations prepared by the in­
dividual mini-teams, which were given 
specific assignments within an overall 
agreed framework. The report included 
the following chapters : 
— Environment in the prevailing economic 
context ; 
— Analysis of critical environmental 
issues ; 
— Industry and environment; 
— Health and environment ; 
— Legal and institutional framework ; 
— Socio-anthropological framework ; 
— Environmental training, education, re­
search and communications ; 
— Women, environment and develop­
ment. 
From the outset, the aim of the 
mission was to prepare an operational and 
¡mplementable report, which would result 
in significant numbers of follow-up ac-
tivities. In fact, the Report did not end with 
a series of recommendations but rather 
with a set of national and international 
actions necessary to implement the recom-
mendations in terms of substantive and 
extensive follow-up activities. 
Ensuring continuity of 
the process 
Bearing in mind that the NEMP 
should be prepared by Cameroonian ex-
perts for the Cameroonian people, the 
mission suggested that the process should 
entail a 'bottom-up' rather than a 'top-
down' approach and that foreign experts 
should be used only when absolutely 
essential. To date, the process has involved 
60 national consultants and the number 
will increase to 100 by the end of the year. 
Following the preparation of the pro-
gramme support document for the NEMP 
process, a team of national and inter-
national experts was quickly assembled to 
formulate the plan, ensuring continuity of 
the process and follow-up actions. 
To define the general orient-
ation, planning methodology and work 
programme for formulating the NEMP, the 
project organised a national consultation, 
followed by a target-oriented planning 
workshop which was held in Garoua in July 
1993. Following the preparation of the 
work programme, nine regional studies 
were conducted, each culminating in an 
intensive regional consultation (with the 
participation of about 3500 people) and 
planning exercise. The consultative process 
has now been completed, and the results 
are currently being synthesised. 
The important aspect of the 
regional consultation process was the 
overwhelming emphasis placed on the 
views of local people, provincial and 
divisional services, universities and research 
institutions, and environmental NGOs. 
These local participants outlined the critical 
environmental issues for their regions and 
recommended priority actions for identi-
fied ecological zones. Concurrent with the 
regional consultations, the following sec-
toral studies were initiated : 
— Biodiversity and forest resources ; 
— Geology and mineral resources ; 
— Industrialisation and its environmental 
impacts; 
— Urban and institutional issues; 
— Harmonisation of sectoral environ-
mental policies; 
— Land use ; 
— Research programme. 
In addition, three support ac-
tivities are in progress. These deal with 
'sensitisation' of the population and deci-
sion-makers to environmental issues, the 
development of an environmental inform-
ation system and the implementation of 
micro-projects identified during the re-
gional consultations. All these activities are 
designed to provide the policy framework 
and strategies for environmental manage-
ment. 
The idea of implementing micro-
projects during the NEMP process is an 
approach that is being tried for the first 
time. These were considered essential to 
ensure a continuing high level of interest 
from local people — who are being 
consulted throughout the entire process. 
Equally, the donors supporting the NEMP 
are keen to see some development ac-
tivities. The effect of linking the 'sen-
sitisation' programme to the implemen-
tation of micro-projects, and of providing 
funds to NGOs to execute these, is that 
various parties have now become 'stake-
holders' in the exercise. 
This is the first time such a 
genuinely consultative process has been 
organised to develop a national plan for 
any sector in Cameroon, and the results so 
far indicate that it has been an extraordi-
nary success. Many developing countries 
are now embarking on the preparation of 
NEMPs, generally with the assistance of 
bilateral or multilateral aid agencies, and 
those involved might benefit from a closer 
study of the Cameroon experience. ■■ 
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Festival 
The rise of the critical age 
Cinema is 100 years old in 1995. The 
Brussels African Film Festival is just 
two years old, but this small event 
is sure to grow in the future if the 
success achieved in film's centenary 
year can be sustained. 16 films, 
including 10 feature-length offer-
ings, were screened in the week of 
16 to 23 June, at the prestigious 
Palais des Beaux Arts in Brussels. 
Those attending included all the 
directors, a number of the actors 
and various other protagonists of 
African cinema — the term being taken in 
the widest sense because, like last year, 
Caribbean cinema was also represented, not 
to mention a presence from the Pacific. The 
festival, which is supported by the ACP 
Committee of Ambassadors (linked to the 
EU through the Lomé Convention), receives 
the bulk of its financial support under the 
cultural cooperation provided for in the 
Convention. As well as eclectic program-
ming and high quality standards, the 
Brussels Festival is distinguished by its 
conviviality, far removed from the protocol 
and fuss surrounding most film festivals. 
Although cinema is in relatively 
poor health almost everywhere, absorbed 
from within by 'popular' films, a term 
often used to conceal its mediocrity, or 
parasitised by television, film festivals are 
on the increase. New ones are born every 
year, at least in Europe and America, and 
they are always greeted by a frustrated 
'And here's another one'. However, as 
regards African work, the story is truly one 
of austerity and parsimony. It is possible to 
count on the fingers of one hand the 
number of African film festivals worthy of 
the name. An African film festival in 
Brussels, a city which played a pioneering 
role in the creation of cinema and the first 
foreign city where the Lumière brothers 
presented their new invention, is symbolic 
of the organisers' desire to show that 
Africa made a very early contribution to 
the great adventure of cinema. The first 
time round, the event was favourably 
received. But this was perhaps something 
of a pro forma welcome — an attraction 
based on novelty and on this occasion, 
therefore, it faced a more decisive test 
which could determine whether it will 
survive. 'The results', confided Pape Mbaye 
Sene, ('Pape' to his film-maker friends), 
who was President of the organising 
committee, 'have been beyond all expec-
tations. The Festival began under 
favourable auspices. It opened on the 
evening of a public holiday, but we were 
unsure whether audience numbers could 
be maintained throughout the week. In 
fact, the afternoon screenings proved 
almost as successful as the evening ones. 
The public just kept on coming'. On the last 
day, a mock-up of the poster for the 1996 
Festival, whose dates have already been 
fixed, was distributed. 
It would be difficult to comment 
on all the films on offer at the Palais des 
Beaux-Arts, but the selection did have a 
central theme, the same as that chosen by 
the first Pan-African Film Festival in 
Ouagadougou (Fespaco 95), namely 
'cinema and history'. On the opening 
night, the curtain-raiser was Guimba by 
Sheik Oumar Cissoko of Mali. This is a kind 
of X-ray of a tinpot dictatorship ; a study of 
the appropriation of power in a village. It 
describes the gloom weighing down on 
the community, and by analogy on entire 
countries or continents, and presents an 
alarming portrayal of the permanent 
nature of the threat. Positive changes in 
terms of freedom of speech which have 
occurred in Africa in recent years are too 
precious to be taken for granted, and to 
safeguard them requires patient and 
ongoing commitment. Rest assured, the 
director makes use of many more images. 
His film is, first and foremost, a serenade to 
Africa and its beauty, the feeling of 
wonder and the story of the thousand and 
one days leading to the birth of freedom. 
The event and the artists who 
attended it were well matched. The 'star' 
participant was probably Idrissa Oued-
raogo, the Burkinabé director whose 
successes have included, in order of appear-
ance, Yaaba, Tilai (the Grand Prix winner at 
Cannes in 1990), and Samba Traoré, which 
was awarded the Silver Bear in Berlin in 
1993. In Le cri du cœur, screened in Brussels, 
he gives a portrayal of a character who is 
fairly unusual in African films and opts for 
an original treatment of the plot. He 
describes the joys and disappointments of 
a fairly well-off African family living in 
Lyons, who would be perfectly happy were 
it not for the fact that Africa was indelibly 
marked on the skin of their child. He is a 
disturbed character who, in his mind, 
repeatedly encounters a hyena in the 
streets of Lyons. This causes despair for his 
parents for whom a foreigner has to adopt 
a 'low profile' if he wants to go unnoticed. 
Can a black child afford psychological 
problems, those diversions reserved for 
whites? The parents are obliged to put 
their child into the care of a psychiatrist, 
but it turns out to be in vain. Only the 
understanding of a French neighbour, an 
artist who is himself somewhat ostracised 
by society, offers a psychological refuge 
and last hope for the child. In one fell 
swoop, he sweeps away many of the 
common prejudices. The film is an oppor-
tunity for the director to make an incursion 
into French society. There is no ethnograp-
hic affectation, and the result is a perspec-
tive on Europe — something which sadly is 
rarely attempted by African film-makers. 
This approach prompted concerns which 
were voiced during the post-screening 
debates. There is a certain 'Africanist' 
audience, which may be African or Euro-
pean, which sees Ouedraogo's open-
mindedness almost as a kind of betrayal or 
a desertion from some undefined struggle. 
Such an attitude tends to put film-makers 
in a creative straitjacket. 
Another Festival success was 
Keita de bouche à oreille by Dani Kouyaté 
(Burkina Faso). Burkina has certainly made 
film-making one of the raw materials of its 
development. This is a superb story which 
begins with 'Pay attention and listen 
carefully. Even/thing began with the trials 
and tribulations of a poor antelope. One 
day, the antelope was having trouble 
finding a source of water to quench its 
thirst, when it came across a great hunter 
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and fortune-teller'. With this introduction, 
you enter into the mysterious world of a 
griot (witch-doctor cum minstrel) and his 
family. The viewer is captivated right up to 
the end (or non-end!) of a story which 
transcends time and eternity. 
Another film which might, on 
account of its original approach, be com-
pared with Cri du cœur is Jit by the 
Zimbabwean film-maker Michael Raeburn, 
who relies on comedy. It would be wrong 
to describe this as a film without preten-
sion, buts its pretension is unusual in 
seeking to offer amusement. This is some-
thing which is frequently lacking in African 
cinema which has become so involved in 
the tribulations of the continent that it 
sometimes forgets the overriding joviality 
and absence of morosity that prevails, 
despite all the problems. The film was 
presented as a musical story. The music is 
quite good and the story very good but 
ultimately, it is not a musical story. 
It is widely believed that artists 
are attracted to festivals because of the 
prizes. Brussels does not hand out awards. 
Pape Sene is against their introduction 
because he believes that competition 
would encourage superficial courtesy be-
tween professionals and would detract 
from the convivial nature of the event. To 
be fair to the artists, many of those who 
were in Brussels came because they enjoy 
the rare opportunity to meet one another 
in such an easy-going atmosphere. This 
explains why the organisers invite some 
directors and actors even when their films 
are not on the bill. Contacts are important 
of course. In Brussels, Bamba Bacary, the 
male lead in Bal Poussière (by the Ivoirian 
film-maker Henry Duparc), met with Idrissa 
Ouédraogo who promptly hired him for La 
traversée du jour to be made in Southern 
Africa. 
This was just one of the 'suc-
cesses' cited by Pape Sene, the driving force 
behind the festival. As he looks forward to 
future developments, the only 'problem' 
we hope he might encounter is having to 
deal with an influx of film professionals 
hoping to land contracts in Brussels, in 
A meeting with actress France Zobda, 
from Martinique 
France Zobda, the Martiniquen actress, has 
enjoyed an international career in Europe, 
the United States and Latin America. With 
'L'exil de Béhanzin ', by Guy Deslauriers — a 
milestone in West Indian cinema — she 
returns to the cinema of her own country. 
Previously, she says, her involvement in the 
film sector of her region had been limited to 
stereotype roles as a pretty mulatto girl. She 
was mentioned in the 1992 Guinness Book 
of Records, after being featured on French 
TV, on account of the many shades of colour 
in her eyes — seven in the left and four in 
the right. 
This publicity obviously did little 
to lessen the superficial image of her as a sex 
symbol. In 'L'exil de Béhanzin', the role of 
the female lead could have been specially 
written for her. She portrays a multi-faceted 
character and is Martinique in essence — the 
long-forgotten or ungrateful daughter of 
Africa whom historical chance has brought 
face-to-face with her past, personified in the 
Dahomean king, Béhanzin, who was exiled 
in the Caribbean at the end of the last 
century. The small island encounters its 
'Alma Mater' when the distracted gaze of 
the King meets the pale eyes of a beautiful 
washerwoman. 
We took advantage of the screen-
ing of the film at the Brussels Festival to find 
out more, together with France Zobda, 
about the cinema in Martinique and 
Guadeloupe. It is currently in the doldrums 
even if production is substantially increas-
ing. Could the relative successes of the 
region's four major exponents of film — 
Euzhan Palcy, Julius Amédé Laou, Christian 
Lara and Guy Deslauriers — be obscuring a 
host of less publicised problems ? 
"I 
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— We are aware of the problems 
that a West Indian encounters in this 
business. We are just happy, when there 
are films like Béhanzin and Rue Case Nègre, 
and others that people have liked, to be 
able to say that there are some films which 
make headway and enjoy a degree of 
success at festivals or in cinemas. 
■ What are the current main strengths 
and weaknesses of West Indian cinema ? 
— Well, you could say that a film 
is made now every three to four years 
instead of every 10 years, which was the 
case in the Lara era. This means that we 
have more productions and more directors. 
We do have a problem with the National 
Film Centre (CNC) relating to advances on 
ticket sales and subsidies. The French West 
Indies do not have access to Cooperation 
Ministries nor do we really enjoy the same 
advantages as French film makers. Com-
pared with the cinema in Africa or Quebec 
for example, you will see that we have very 
specific problems which are related to the 
legislation that applies. As long as the 
situation remains unresolved, we will not 
make any great leaps forward. All that we 
can do is stumble along. 
■ There was a law passed recently which 
expanded the scope of application of the 
TSA — the supplementary tax which forms 
the basis for aid to the cinema — to the 
Antilles. Am I right in thinking that you are 
sceptical about this ? 
— We wanted this law to be 
applied so that we could be incorporated 
into the CNC's cinematographic circuit. But 
the tax paid by the Antilles will not go back 
to them. It will go to support French 
cinema managed from Paris. Once again 
we will find ourselves financing films by 
Berry or Miller because they direct bigger 
films, with better known actors, and 
takings are expected to be higher than 
ours. The money will not be allocated to 
films like Béhanzin or Simeon. 
The person in charge of the Elizé 
circuit, the only film distributor in the West 
Indies, French Guyana (and Haiti), opposed 
the tax. He thought it was better to help 
the local film industry with direct financial 
contributions. But now that he has to pay 
the tax, he is not going to provide any 
more funds. This means that, under the 
current situation, the film sector in the 
Antilles loses out both ways. 
Another problem in the Antilles 
cinema is that we are criticised for being 
inward-looking despite the very small size 
of our audience. A film which is a major 
success may attract 60 000 cinema-goers 
across the three French departments in the 
Americas. There is some merit in this 
criticism. We need to be more outward-
looking. 
■ Could the production of films with very 
low budgets, perhaps even videos — 
enabling you to build up your audience — 
be one possible solution ? 
—That would be very difficult, in 
my opinion. You are right in saying that 
television is something completely dif-
ferent. It is the future, it is affordable, 
popular and is quick to bring you fame, 
but, as I see it, you need the big screen to 
enable people to dream. There is also the 
fact that the kind of budget savings 
possible in Africa cannot be achieved in 
Martinique. You cannot pay a skilled 
technician a pittance. Whether we like it or 
not, we are involved in an arena corrupted 
by money. Béhanzin cost only 20 million 
French francs, and that was a historical 
portrait. What's that compared with 
Germinali We could, I suppose, work in 
Betacam, as many of the Jamaicans do, but 
you have to remember that Jamaica places 
its video productions in the United States. 
People in the English-speaking world are 
more supportive, in this sense. 
1
7 do not want to 
beheld 
back by a country, 
culture or language' 
■ You yourself do not appear to have 
gone through very lean times. Do you 
think you have had the right breaks ? 
— Yes, I have been lucky. It all 
began, thanks to Christian Lara, with 
Adieu Foulard. I started off in this film with 
just a minor role but ended up being billed 
alongside Gregg Germain. I was then able 
to set up a dramatic arts school and started 
working with the director of The Towering 
Inferno and Death on the Nile on a film 
called Shina, Reine de la Jungle, in which I 
played one of the principal roles. The next 
step was to work in theatre, television and 
French cinema, filming with Carole Laure, 
Sammy Frey and Jeanne Moreau in Sauve-
toi Lola. After that, I had a part in a 
Canadian series which lasted three years, 
called Cogne et Gagne, about a Haitian 
doctor. This was followed by an American 
series filmed in Italy which lasted eight 
months before I returned to the West 
Indies for Béhanzin. In between times, I 
have done a lot of TV work in Italy, Spain 
and Germany. This experience has 
strengthened my sense of being a citizen of 
the world. I do not regard myself as French. 
I speak and work in French, English, Italian 
and Creole and, if I have to, I will work in 
other languages and will study them. I do 
not want to be held back by a country, 
culture or language. In the West Indies, we 
have the advantage of being of mixed race 
so I have been able to play Puerto Ricans, 
Brazilians, Ethiopians, and so on. If I am 
lucky enough to portray a West Indian, so 
much the better, but I won't be typecast. 
Work for me has no colour, flavour or smell 
— it is just me offering my personality, 
individuality and my West Indian character 
in my roles, in my films and in other 
countries. 
■ There is an impression that artistes in 
films in the South are sometimes hostages 
to their audiences, be they home-grown or 
foreign, who want to impose creative 
models on them. 
— That is absolutely true. But as I 
have always said, I will reject what people 
want to make of me whether it is a colour, 
a stereotype or an archetype. This has 
happened to so many actresses who have 
allowed themselves to be swallowed up 
without ever seeking to open the door to 
their wider talents. 
■ Ver, in 'Béhanzin', you couldn't be 
more West Indian, could you ? 
— Having been able to achieve 
my independence in the face of pressure 
from West Indian audiences, I was happy 
enough to take on a totally West Indian 
role in Béhanzin. At that time I came back 
with a greater desire to show people what 
I have done but I am first and foremost 
what I am and I can find myself whenever I 
want to. In other words, I can portray 
various roles, but I am aware of who I am 
and I never lose sight of that. That's the 
most important thing for an actress, 
particularly one who has to carry the flag as 
we do, like ambassadors for our countries. 
We work under close surveillance and 
there is always the West Indian public 
judging you and watching you — more 
than French audiences would judge their 
actors. We have a kind of torch to pass on 
and, when interpreting a role, we are 
necessarily forced to think about West 
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have just finished a slightly risqué film — 
compared with what I have done up to 
now — and my greatest joy but also my 
greatest fear at the moment is to find out 
how the West Indian public will react to it. 
The saying 'no one is a prophet in his own 
country' is particularly apposite to the 
Antilles. 
■ In playing Regina in 'Béhanzin', you 
appeared to give your all to your West 
Indian character. Would you say that it was 
your finest role ? 
— It really is a good role. In this 
profession, you spend a lot of time 
'superficialising' yourself, so to speak — 
building yourself up to be an all-purpose 
actress, to be manipulable in the physical 
sense of the word. Then when you get a 
role like this, where you have to divest 
yourself of any artifice and be completely 
authentic — to be a real person — you 
wonder whether you will be able to do it. I 
have spent so many years getting rid of my 
accent and walking with a rolling gait as 
required by so many typecast roles. I have 
had to acquire a 'cheap' side over the 
years. You are always being told to 'watch 
your accent', 'remember to speak in a 
slightly sing-song way', 'pay attention to 
your movements' and so on. Then, sud-
denly you have to forget all this, walk 
normally and find yourself again, because 
you are being asked to offer freshness, 
truth and splendour. It's good if you can do 
it because then you feel that there is a 
purpose to life. You tell yourself 'I am in 
this profession, and although I may have 
lost myself I can find myself again'. You are 
happy that you can get this across fully to 
the public and, in a role like Regina, let the 
audience know that you are there to 
remember things about yourself which you 
might one day forget. 
■ 'L'exil de Béhanzin' is an encounter 
between Africa and Martinique by means 
of a fine love story between two people 
who should not have met. Is this juxtapo-
sition of Martinique and Africa a climactic 
relationship; one of attraction and repul-
sion ? 
— Yes and rightly so. When we 
were at school, Africa had a flavour and 
¡mage of savagery. It had negative conno-
tations, conjuring up everything that 
shouldn't happen and everything that was 
different. I remember, as a child, being 
addressed as a 'Congo black'. As a student, 
I had my first opportunity to discover 
Africa, thanks to my African colleagues. In 
being able to portray Regina, where love 
triggers a collision between two worlds, 
and where a page of history that had been 
torn out is replaced, I regarded it as a 
stroke of luck. For many years I had told my 
compatriots 'you don't know Africa at all. 
Go there and discover what Africans are 
really like. They are our brothers. You will 
see where our true roots lie and realise that 
'the savage' is not what you think'. I was 
confronted with this character who tells an 
African black that Africa is not home and is 
not me and, at the same time, falls in love 
with this Africa which is so complex and so 
close, such a mixture of myself. The 
character reminds you of all the old clichés 
about Africa handed down from the last 
century. At the same time, the film 
criticises the fact that, at that time, we 
were prevented from really knowing who 
this exiled King was and why he was in 
Martinique. The shock of the arrival of King 
Béhanzin was suppressed. So the film is 
there to remind us that nowadays we are 
Creoles more than Africans, West Indians 
or blacks: Creoles, according to 
Chamoiseau, with our own identity, which 
is a mixture of several cultures. We have to 
accept all those who have come back and 
who have lived off our cultures. We have 
to incorporate this collision between 
different worlds. 
■ Briefly, what will be your next appear-
ance on screen ? 
— I have just finished filming Les 
caprices d'un fleuve for Bernard Giraudaux. 
The film is also about the colonial period, 
this time in Dakar. It deals with both the 
scorn and fascination evoked by Africa in 
the white man arriving there. We cover 
revolts by the Moors and the tribulations 
of the Gorée slaves, but it's also the story of 
mulatto women in Saint-Louis who man-
ipulated the whole scene: colonists and 
rebels, whites and blacks. They did this by 
using the weapons at their disposal, 
namely their beauty and their knowledge 
of the two worlds. They employ both the 
dignity of black women and the 'magnifi-
cence of white women'. That's the kind of 
character I play, which is the opposite of 
Regina. When all is said and done, the 
woman featured in this role is only an 
agent, the intermediary who enables the 
colonist to learn about life before falling in 
love with a slave girl who will enable him 
to realise his dreams. 
■ It would appear that you are also 
involved in the perfume business ? 
— Yes. Two months ago in 
Martinique I opened a flower fragrance 
shop, where we use the remedies our 
grandmothers used to treat disease. We 
make use of what we have to hand locally. 
I have been studying plants for a year now, 
organising courses and giving lectures. The 
good thing about this is that it gives me the 
opportunity to think about other people 
rather than myself, which is what happens 
in my career as an actress. 
■ This work as a businesswoman is not 
going to interfere with your career as an 
actress, then ? 
— Film work leaves you with lots 
of spare time. I wanted to share it and to 
give some of it to Martinique and the West 
Indies. I create dreams through film, but I 
wanted to offer something specific. People 
have a great need to be listened to. But 
rest assured, I don't think of myself as a 
businesswoman. This activity will not make 
my fortune, only give me inner happi-
ness. k^H Interview by Hégel Goutler 
"I 
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The peoples of the Horn of Africa 
by Xavier Van der Stappen* 
The 'Cultures and Communications' 
Association will be presenting a 
major exhibition, lasting six 
months, on the Horn of Africa at 
the Royal African Museum in Bel-
gium. A large number of European 
museums are participating in this 
event which is intended to reflect 
the cultures of the many ethnic 
groups inhabiting this part of 
Africa. 
While it is true that 
Ethiopia, Southern Sudan, Eritrea and, 
most recently, Djibouti have experienced a 
certain amount of unrest, it is also the case 
that media reports about these countries 
often focus exclusively on negative images, 
leading to a pronounced bias in the view 
that the European public may have of 
these countries. The exhibition's aim will, 
therefore, be to reveal the diversity and 
cultural richness of this region. Some may 
say that it is wrong to talk about culture 
under the current circumstances, but how 
can we understand the hopes and aspir-
ations of peoples who are so far away, if 
we do not take account of their identity 
and of their most enduring possession : 
their culture? After all, it is cultural 
differences and more particularly their 
historical, social, physical, economic and 
religious elements which produce both ties 
and conflicts. 
The cultures of the Horn of Africa 
are amazingly diverse and are a good 
illustration of the interdependence of 
economics and culture. Most of the ethnic 
groups in question are highly specialised in 
their production of goods although the 
overall effect is variety. They are thus able 
to preserve their independence while 
remaining open to other groups through 
trade. At the markets, where most of the 
trade takes place, one soon discovers that 
while external appearance is determined 
by the religion to which one belongs, it is 
also a function of the economic activity of 
the group. The finery, hairstyles, scarifi-
cation, body painting and tattoos are all 
signs which indicate membership of an 
ethnic group. The burgeoning industrialis-
ation of East Africa has not yet eradicated 
the very varied craft activity of this area. To 
make light of this truth is to display a lack 
of awareness. 
The name 'ÆTHIOPIA', the Latin 
term for Ethiopia, was given by Mediter-
ranean visitors to the Christian Empire of 
Africa. In ancient documents, this term was 
used to cover what was later called 
Negricia, or 'the country of black people'. 
This was a region which had poorly defined 
borders but which aroused particular 
curiosity as it was shrouded in enduring 
myths and legends. The use of the term 
'the Ethiops' in the title is intended to 
illustrate the diversity and poetry of the 
peoples inhabiting this part of the world. 
For those with a fascination for 
the past and for an empire long gone, or 
who want to see beyond the tragic media 
images, a visit to the exhibition will be a 
time of discovery. As they pass through the 
various sections, visitors will go back in 
time to discover a rich past which will help 
them to gain a better understanding of the 
present : extraordinary geological form-
ations, the distant beginnings of the first 
A diversity of peoples 
* Organiser of the 'ÆTHIOPIA and the Ethiops : 
the peoples of the Horn of Africa' exhibition. 
hominids, thousands of stelae which have 
not been published before and the forgot-
ten kingdom of the legendary Queen of 
Sheba. The story then goes on to show the 
adventure of Judaism. On the high 
plateaus, Christianity succeeded in shaping 
the isolated descendants of King Solomon ; 
then Islam appeared and allied itself with 
Christianity to overcome the pagan tribes. 
A succession of kings tried, with varying 
degrees of success, to dominate the Horn 
of Africa politically during a period of over 
4000 years. Then the first Europeans 
arrived, determined to penetrate the 
mysteries of a world both close in faith and 
distant in its rites. 
A plough, some teff, sesame and 
neuk plants, a grindstone and a collection 
of ceramic articles reveal the everyday life 
of the millions who have cultivated the 
high plateaus. Opposite, a richly decorated 
Afar tent emphasises the pastoral side of 
Ethiopean life. The decorated surfaces of 
everyday objects speak volumes about 
these men and women who worked every 
day just to survive. Thousands of varied 
and surprising objects bear witness to an 
existence characterised by know-how, skill 
and ingenuity, but also to the differences 
from our own lives. 
Previously unseen collections are 
brought together for the first time in 
Europe, at a prestigious location with an 
international reputation. It took a team of 
specialists two years to go through this 
vast region and collect all the evidence of 
cultural richness, which was previously not 
known to exist. Potten/, personal adorn-
ments, weapons, neckrests and seats, 
wickerwork and weaving, clothes and 
examples of the goldsmith's and silver-
smith's art breathe life into a section 
organised according to subject. A street in 
Addis Ababa and a gallery of modern and 
contemporary art enables the artists of the 
towns to express themselves. Craftsman-
ship from churches, bibles, manuscripts, 
processional crosses and polychrome paint-
ings from the thirteenth Century tell of 
centuries of Christianity in isolation. Con-
cluding with a lavish collection of photo-
graphs to place the various sections of the 
population back in context, the exhibition 
will be a comprehensive source of inform-
ation about the Horn of Africa and the 
many and varied communities which in-
habit it. ■■ X.V.d.S. 
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regulations 
by Ivar Virgin and Robert J. Frederick* 
••1 
As we approach the year 2000, an 
environmentally-conscious world 
greets technological developments 
with mixed emotions. Excitement 
and fascination are tempered with 
large measures of scepticism, un-
certainty and fear. People are 
sceptical about claims that new is 
better; uncertain that benefits will 
be shared equally and not enjoyed 
by only a few; and afraid that a 
new technology brings with it 
unacceptable adverse impacts. 
Such reactions have, at least in 
part, put pressure on national governments 
and international organisations to monitor 
and regulate new technology applications. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
field of modern biotechnology. In the 
following article we attempt to illustrate 
this by briefly discussing some of the current 
thinking on biotechnology regulation and its 
implications for the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific states. 
We must start with at least a 
basic understanding of biotechnology. 
Simply put, it is the use of biological 
materials (organisms or parts of organisms) 
to achieve some purpose. Like many 
technologies, it is not new, but it is 
constantly changing. The majority of these 
* The Biotechnology Advisory Commission, 
Stockholm Environment Institute, Sweden. 
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changes are incremental : for example, a 
more productive series of antibiotic pro-
ducing microbes is developed that in-
creases yield by 10%, then 20% and so on. 
These changes occur generally unnoticed 
except by those directly involved. Other 
changes, however, can be much more 
dramatic, even revolutionary in form and 
scope. Such was the discovery of recombin-
ant DNA techniques in the early 1970s. 
Suddenly, it seemed, powerful genetic 
modification tools became available to 
even/ laboratory in the world and with 
them, the capacity to produce 'new 
combinations' of genetic information. The 
techniques allowed genes to be transfer-
red across species barriers and these 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
attracted everyone's attention. The poten-
tial was very great — modern biotech-
nology would find applications in areas as 
diverse as medicine, agriculture, food 
processing, chemical production and en-
vironmental improvement. Concentrating 
only on the potential, however, was not 
enough. In order to derive the most 
benefits for the most people, it had to be 
developed and applied judiciously. Policies 
and procedures were created to ensure 
environmentally safe application of bio-
technology and with them, the concept of 
'biosafety' was defined. 
In developed countries, biotech-
nology regulations, and how they are used 
to evaluate biosafety or — put another 
way — to make risk/benefit analyses, have 
been evolving over the last eight years. As 
regulators have become more comfortable 
with answers to 'old' issues, 'new' ones 
seem to keep arising. One of these 
emerged when biotechnology was highli-
ghted in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. This was signed in parallel with 
Agenda 21 at the Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro in January 1992. It couples access to 
genetic resources with scientific cooper-
ation and transfer of technology from 
developed to developing countries. Its 
objective is to stimulate the conservation 
and ecologically sound use of biological 
resources. Jeffrey McNeely recently de-
scribed the issues in this way : 'The new 
biotechnologies may increase the value of 
the world's biodiversity if they allow 
increased use of the genetic diversity of 
both wild and domestic species, thereby 
increasing their economic importance. But 
biotechnology also poses significant ecol-
ogical and economic risks that could 
ultimately undermine its potential contri-
bution to the conservation of biodiversity. 
The introduction of any new organism 
poses a risk to the environment and many 
of the world's known extinctions have 
been caused primarily by the introduction 
of exotic species. The release of genetically 
engineered organisms into the environ-
ment thus deserves the most careful 
oversight and monitoring.'
1 
In articles 8(g) and 19 of the 
Convention, developing country concerns 
for biotechnology were clearly expressed 
and the call for regulations clearly stated. 
The former requires the establishment or 
maintenance of biosafety regulations by 
each contracting party. The latter includes 
a call to examine the need for an inter-
national protocol. Just exactly what form 
such a protocol would take is still not 
decided. The issue was discussed at the first 
conference of parties to the Convention 
last December, but was referred to an 
intergovernmental meeting of experts for 
further consideration. After the experts 
met in Madrid in July of this year, the 
recommendations drafted to the next 
conference of parties included strong 
support for a protocol. This would address 
all activities related to organisms resulting 
from modern biotechnology, their trans-
boundary movement and use in centres of 
origin and the issue of genetic diversity. 
Among the suggested items for consider-
ation were procedures for advanced in-
formed agreement, facilitation of inform-
ation exchange and national regulations 
for risk assessment and risk management. 
1 McNeely, J.A. 1994. Critical Issues in the 
Implementation of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, pp 7-10. In Widening Perspectives on 
Biodiversity (Krattiger, A.F., et al. Eds.) lUCN, Gland, 
Switzerland and International Academy of the 
Environment, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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How important are biosafety 
regulations for a country's biotechnology 
development ? It has been argued that the 
absence of established biosafety pro-
cedures is a major constraint to the 
development of biotechnology in develop-
ing countries. Generally, most research 
scientists will not transfer GMOs to coun-
tries that lack such regulations. Without 
regulations, an important part of the 
development process such as field testing is 
blocked. Biotechnology industry and re-
search institutes therefore are reluctant or 
refuse to develop transgenic plants with-
out government sanction or regulatory 
What is the level of activity of 
biotechnology and what is the status of 
biosafety regulations in the ACP countries ? 
In most, research and development in this 
area has been concentrated in the agricul-
tural sector. There is no doubt that 
agricultural biotechnology has an import-
ant role to play in ACP countries' develop-
ment. In many African states, for example, 
traditional agriculture and plant breeding 
can be and is being supplemented by 
agricultural biotechnology. This includes 
tissue culture and micropropagation tech-
niques producing disease-free seedlings, 
development of live animal vaccines and, 
more recently, the development of trans-
genic plants. So far, most of the research in 
Africa has taken place in national agricul-
tural research facilities or universities with 
very little being carried out in the private 
sector. 
In a recent article by Ahi Goy and 
Duesing
 2, the authors list more than 1025 
field trials with genetically modified plants 
between 1986 and 1993 in a total of 32 
countries. The majority of these trials were 
carried out in the United States and 
Europe. None, however, was conducted in 
an ACP country. Elsewhere in Africa, Egypt 
and South Africa have run field trials on 
transgenic plants. Kenya, Zimbabwe and 
Nigeria seem poised to follow this year. 
Recognising the potential of bio-
technology on the one hand and the need 
to proceed using a precautionary ap-
proach, ACP countries are searching for 
national regulatory mechanisms approp-
riate to their needs. Since 1993, a series of 
meetings related to biosafety has taken 
place in Africa (See Table). The interest in 
biosafety regulation mechanisms is ex-
pressed in conference statements such as : 
'Participants wish to urge the Govern-
ments of Southern and Eastern Africa to 
facilitate and give priority to biotech-
nology policies including safety mecha-
nisms... including guidelines and/or regu-
lations, as well as biosafety committees at 
the national and institutional level...'
3 and 
'...without biosafety guidelines, countries 
are being denied the opportunity to access 
the full potential that the application of 
biotechnology offers through public and 
private sector research, development and 
implementation...'
 4 A prime objective for 
some of these workshops has been to build 
institutional and human capacity in risk 
assessment and management by sharing 
industrialised countries' experience in bio-
safety regulations and field releases of 
GMOs. In other meetings, scientists, policy 
makers and special interest groups have 
gathered to discuss common frameworks 
2 Ahl Goy, P. and Duesing, J.H. 1995. Pots to 
Plots : Recombinant Plants on Trial, Biotechnology, 
13, 454-458. 
3 From the Conference Statement of the African 
Regional Conference for International Cooperation 
on Safety in Biotechnology, October 1993, Harare, 
Zimbabwe 
4 From the Conference Resolution of: Bio-
technology and Biosafety : Benefit and Risk Assess-
ment in an African Perspective, May 1995, Nairobi, 
Kenya 
Micropropagation of coffee plants at 
the Kawanda Agricultural Research 
Institute, Uganda 
that can be developed to serve particular 
national needs. 
Despite the growing number of 
such efforts, fewer than 10% of developing 
countries worldwide have biosafety regu-
lations in place. There are, of course, 
agricultural regulations, such as animal 
health acts and plant quarantine rules, in 
ACP countries, but these do not deal with 
GMOs. Among the ACPs, only Nigeria has 
biosafety guidelines signed by the national 
ministry. Zimbabwe, however, has a text 
awaiting approval while Kenya has an 
early draft of guidelines prepared. Uganda 
has set up a biosafety committee with 
responsibility to develop national biosafety 
guidelines and Zambia is reviewing existing 
regulations to determine if these can be 
adapted. 
In response to this lack of guide-
lines, a Regional Focal Point for Safety in 
Biotechnology has recently been establi-
shed in Harare, Zimbabwe. Its members are 
Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tan-
zania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
The principal objective of the focal point is 
to coordinate the implementation of 
regional safety measures in the conduct of 
biotechnology. It is presently involved in 
the process of collecting information on 
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Recent regional meetings and workshops on biosafety that have included 
ACP countries 
Meeting 
African Regional Conference for International 
Cooperation on Safety ¡n Biotechnology 
(Harare, Zimbabwe) 
AGERI/ABSP/UNIDO Regional Biosafety 
Workshop (Cairo, Egypt) 
BAC/IITA Biosafety Training Workshop 
(Ibadan, Nigeria) 
Benefit and Risk Assessment in an African 
Perspective (ISAAA) (Nairobi, Kenya) 
Biodiversity and Harmonisation of Biosafety 
in Central America and the Dominican 
Republic (IICA) (San Jose, Costa Rica) 
Turning Priorities into Feasible Programs : 
Regional Seminar on Planning, Priorities 
and Policies for Agricultural Biotechnology 
(South Africa) 
African Regional Focal Point for Safety 
in Biotechnology : First Steering Committee 
Meeting (Harare, Zimbabwe) 
Date 
October 1993 
January 1994 
January 1995 
February 1995 
February 1995 
April 1995 
May 1995 
Persley: 'Biotechnology regulation in 
Africa is an opportunity or a constraint. It is 
an opportunity to develop and implement 
scientifically based guidelines in individual 
countries which will accelerate the de-
velopment and access to new biotechno-
logies... However, it may be a constraint 
where the absence of a regulatory frame-
work, or the adoption of a costly bureauc-
ratic, or inflexible biosafety system will 
delay the use of biotechnology in Africa.'
5
 
In other words, there must be a balance 
between protection against possible risks 
and allowing biotechnology to develop to 
its fullest potential. It is up to ACP countries 
individually to determine how they meet 
the challenge. ■■ i.v. & R.J.F. 
biosafety from international organisations 
to establish an information network and 
library that it will make available to 
national focal points. This information will 
help the individual nations to formulate, 
develop and implement their own bio-
safety guidelines and regulations. 
Consistent with the pre-
cautionary approach mentioned above, it 
is clear that in and of themselves, biosafety 
regulations will not facilitate the develop-
ment of a technology nor ensure its safety. 
They must be viewed, instead, as an 
integral part of national biotechnology 
policies and strategies. They should apply 
to both locally developed biotechnology 
techniques and those acquired from other 
countries, be implemented with con-
sistency, and be based on sound scientific 
principles. As with any new technology, 
the rate of transfer and the level of success 
is dependent not only on human capacity 
building but also on the ability to create a 
supporting infrastructure and an 'ac-
cepting' environment. Efficient technology 
transfer requires interaction between va-
rious national sectors including private 
research organisations and academic insti-
tutions, and public sector bodies including 
ministries and other agencies. 
For ACP countries to benefit fully 
from their genetic resources and from the 
rapid development of modern biotech-
nology, science policies must include safety 
mechanisms such as biosafety guidelines 
and/or regulations. To assist the process of 
establishing these, there are many ac-
tivities ongoing at the regional and global 
level that ACP countries can take ad-
vantage of. Regional meetings and bio-
safety workshops in Africa have already 
been mentioned. There are also a number 
of 'general principles' documents which 
take the form of position papers or 
consensus reports. These help to focus 
international discussions and provide in-
dividual countries with a framework for 
biosafety regulations. The UNIDO/UNEP/ 
WHO/FAO Code of Conduct and the 
International Technical Guidelines for 
Safety in Biotechnology are good ex-
amples. The latter was originally de-
veloped by a joint effort of the UK 
Department of the Environment and the 
Netherlands Environment Ministry and is 
nowadays refined at regional meetings 
sponsored by UNEP. Finally, many inter-
national bodies such as the Biotechnology 
Advisory Commission, ISNAR, UNIDO and 
ISAAA are directly or indirectly providing 
independent advice and assisting in in-
formation. 
As a final note, we would like to 
sum up with the words of Gabrielle 
5 In : Proceedings of the African Regional Con-
ference for International Cooperation on Safety in 
Biotechnology, 1993, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
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and foreign 
investment 
Policies to attract foreign private 
investment have been the focus of 
attention in many developing coun-
tries. Most aspire to create an 
attractive investment climate and 
the incentives necessary for attract-
ing foreign capital. In Nigeria for 
example, generous concessions to 
investors include tax holidays for 
periods of three to seven years, 
accelerated capital depreciation and 
import duty exemptions. In my 
view, much of the current concern 
with incentives is misplaced. Pro-
perly designed, they can play an 
important role in stimulating invest-
ment and increasing capital inflows, thus 
creating employment, promoting risk-sharing 
and enhancing technology transfers. But 
insufficient attention is often paid to the 
consistency of the incentives with the stated 
policy objectives. As a result, the cost 
effectiveness of such measures escapes public 
scrutiny. 
Recent studies show that it is 
shortage of resources and not inadequate 
incentives which limit the pace of economic 
development in developing countries. It is 
obvious that tax incentives alone cannot 
be effective in attracting foreign invest-
ment. In most cases, they result in revenue 
losses for the government, and create 
inequities and distortions in economic 
operations. Abuses are widespread be-
cause the authorities seldom monitor their 
use by investors. Many goods claiming 
exemptions or reduced tax rates have been 
used for purposes other than those for 
which they were qualified to receive 
preferential tax treatment. 
The importance of public re-
venue for enhancing development cannot 
be overstated. Irrespective of the political 
colour of its government, the economic 
and cultural development of a country 
requires the efficient and steadily expand-
ing provision of a host of non-revenue-
yielding services such as communications 
systems, education and health. These must 
be publicly financed and without them, 
foreign investment cannot hope to be 
successful. With mounting external debts, 
developing countries are increasingly re-
quired to finance expenditure through 
internal resources. And with a reduced tax 
base resulting from excessive tax conces-
sions, they often resort to inflationary 
measures to do this — thus worsening the 
investment climate. 
It could be argued that a country 
gains from foreign capital inflows even if 
they are untaxed in the sense that income 
is generated locally and export earnings 
increase. But the amount of money inves-
tors are ready to commit depends on a 
much broader view of the market possibi-
lities. It is unlikely that special concessions 
will have an appreciable effect on total 
foreign investment flows. In short, invest-
ment is much more responsive to political 
stability, the availability of infrastructures 
and the stability of investment laws than 
to tax concessions. The provision of fiscal 
incentives alone simply reduces revenue 
and hence the amounts available for vital 
infrastructures. 
In recognition of this, many 
experts, including from the IMF, have 
suggested limiting tax holidays to the 
initial stages of the investment, avoiding 
open-ended customs reliefs and restricting 
the tax exemption on export-related 
profits to five years. There are also calls for 
closer monitoring of the exemptions that 
are granted. I support these proposals and 
would put forward another — that there 
should be better control of financial 
transfers. Many foreign companies use 
these to evade tax and, in the process, 
deprive developing countries of much-
needed revenue. 
Bashir Obasekola, Friendship University, 
Moscow, Russia. 
Putting the record 
straight 
We greatly appreciate The 
Courier and always look forward to receiv-
ing it. It keeps us well informed about the 
progress of ACP-EU projects. May we just 
point out an error in the front cover 
caption of issue 149 (French version). The 
town of Djenné in Mali has not been built 
using baked clay but natural clay (using the 
'adobe' technique involving a clay coat-
ing). 
Philippe Gamier, Architect, Coordinator of 
the Building Advisory Service and Infor-
mation Network (BASIN), Villefontaine, 
France. 
Safe landing in Guyana 
/ read with great interest your 
report on Guyana published in issue 150. 
As the manufacturer of the 'Islander' 
aircraft, we were pleased that you survived 
the short take offs and landings. Luckily, 
that is what it was designed for. The 
picture on page 32 clearly shows the 
shabby state in which some of the aircraft 
are flown. They have usually been pur-
chased sixth hand! Since air transport is an 
important factor in the economic develop-
ment of Guyana I shall be writing to the 
Commission office in Georgetown to see if 
we could discuss ways of upgrading these 
aircraft. 
Walter M. Stark, Sales and Marketing 
Director, Pilatus Britten Norman, Aircraft 
Manufacturers, Isle of Wight, United 
Kingdom 
Working to avoid future 
human tragedies 
/ found issue no. 151 of The 
Courier, which focuses on social develop-
ment, to be rich in both discussion and 
analysis. In the 'ACP' section, I read with 
great interest the excellent article on the 
'Rwanda Memorial Days ' written by one of 
your stagiaires, Massamba Mboup. This 
describes the events in question in a 
manner that is both relevant and engag-
ing. The authors pleads, in his conclusion, 
for the countries of North and South to 
help in the reconstruction of Rwanda and 
to find ways of preventing similar human 
tragedies occurring in the future. This gives 
real food for thought to all of us who work 
tirelessly in the field of EU-ACP develop-
ment cooperation. 
Bernard Kouchner, President of the Com-
mittee on Development and Cooperation, 
European Parliament. 
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Rapport Annuel 
Mondial sur le 
Système 
Economique et les 
Stratégies 
(Annual World Report on the 
Economie System and Economie 
Strategies) 
Under the direction of Thierry de 
Montbrial and Pierre Jacquet — 
published by Dunod for the In-
stitut français de relations inter-
nationales — 411 pp. —159 FF, 
1081 BF— 1994. 
As in past years, this report, 
which ¡s the fourteenth in the 
series, contains a number of 
essays by various authors on 
major topics of current interest. 
This annual summary of world 
events is a reflection based on 
well-presented documentation 
offered in the form of inserts, 
tables, graphs, maps and bibliog-
raphies. 
The volume was finished in mid-
July 1994 and, as usual, is inev-
itably slightly out of date. It is di-
vided into three parts : 'frag-
ments of a third post-war peri-
od', 'growth and competition 
(economies in a time of globali-
sation)' and 'the United King-
dom, Europe's laboratory?' This 
well-documented third part pres-
ents a good illustration of the 
need for and difficulties involved 
in regional integration as well as 
the problems involved in reconci-
ling tradition and modernity. 
Although this thematic third part 
can stand independently and rep-
resents a choice made this year 
by the authors, the other two 
parts, on the other hand, are 
complementary. In the wake of 
the end of the Cold War and the 
disappearance of the USSR as an 
entity, they describe the new di-
visions arising between developed 
areas and poorer regions. The 
former enjoy peace in a context 
of relatively stable political re-
gimes. The latter are prey to all 
kinds of crises. These observations 
must, admittedly, be qualified by 
emphasising the often remarkable 
development of some countries in 
Asia, the still fragile recovery of 
Latin America and the major 
structural difficulties still encoun-
tered throughout Africa. 
According to the authors, 'the 
consolidation of a truly multila-
teral international economic 
framework is still, as at the end 
of the Second World War, the 
best way to ensure international 
economic and political harmony. 
It can no longer, however, be 
limited to trade between the 
United States, Europe and Japan'. 
In the context of monitoring 
economic revival, managing com-
petition and reducing unemploy-
ment significantly, this would 
appear to be an accurate observ-
ation, m Alain Lacroix 
L'Europe et 
l'Afrique — siècle 
d'échanges 
économiques 
(Europe and Africa — a century 
of economic exchanges) 
By Hélène dAlmeida-Topor and 
Monique Lakroum. Publisher : 
Armand Colin, 103 boulevard 
Saint Michel, 75240 Paris Cedex 
05 —235 pp. — 902FB—1994 
The authors are highly qualified 
teachers. Hélène d'Almeida Topor 
is a lecturer in African history at 
the University of Paris I and Mo-
nique Lakroum is a lecturer in 
Contemporary History at the Un-
iversity of Reims. Topor, notably, 
has published among other 
things, a work entitled 'L'Afrique 
au XXème siècle' (Africa in the 
XX century) while Lakroum is au-
thor of 'Les transports en Af-
rique' (Transport in Africa). They 
therefore know Africa very well 
and their qualifications reflect 
both the interest of their joint 
work and its limits. 
The book has six chapters : com-
partmented economic areas, frag-
mentation of infrastructures and 
networks, the end of the empires 
(1890-1955), Africa in the face of 
world trade (1956-1973), imbal-
ance in economic exchange 
(1973-1993), and marginalised 
Africa. 
The reader will benefit from 
studying the more directly histo-
rical parts which are clearly writ-
ten and didactic. Those chapters 
dealing with trade and the 
economy are a less easy read. Es-
sential topics are described in 
terms of unequal exchange which 
is not, however, all 'one-way'. 
It is true, as the authors say, that 
Africa no longer holds the same 
interest for Europe in terms of 
control over raw materials or rare 
products, although it is seen as a 
potential outlet for products 
manufactured in Europe. Africa is 
having to tackle head on, the 
competition from Asia with its 
large pool of available man-
power. Perhaps this work might 
have been more satisfying if it 
had placed greater emphasis on 
the renewed hope which is emer-
ging in a number of countries 
south of the Sahara. UJJJJJ1 A.L 
Le capital, 
suite et fin 
(Capital: a follow-up) 
By Guy Sorman - Librairie Ar-
thème Fayard - 566 pages - FF 
150, Bfrs 1040 - 1994 
There ¡s no denying that Mr 
Sorman, a journalist and writer, 
has a lively style, an enquiring 
mind, a vast political and econ-
omic culture and a feeling for a 
good formula — many of our re-
aders have already had the op-
portunity of appreciating it in 'La 
nouvelle richesse des nations' and 
'Sortir du socialisme' — and con-
siderably more time for the vir-
tues of private enterprise than 
those of Marxist and totalitarian 
ideologies. At the age of 50, he 
has completed a series begun in 
1983 and his latest book, a par-
tisan and impassioned work, is a 
vast fresco of economic policy in 
the world today. 
No effort has been spared in this 
most recent work, the result of 
two years of meetings and en-
quiries taking in 20 countries and 
five continents ; an itinerary start-
ing at Lenin's now little-visited 
house in Ulyanorsk and Andrei 
Sakharov's home in Nizhni Nov-
gorod (Gorki until 1992), working 
its way through Africa and 
ending in Amazonia. 
Mr Sorman deals with Africa (un-
thinkable capitalism) in Chapter 
6. One of his ideas is that Euro-
peans introduced four things — 
hygiene, schooling, consumption 
and the State — which did not 
exist there before and that hy-
giene was one of the causes of 
the population growth absorbing 
the continent's savings and prev-
enting the accumulation of ca-
pital. One could also mention the 
role of the extended family or 
the consumer habits of the col-
onials which persisted after in-
dependence and created such ex-
pense for the African economies, 
or that exports are ill-adapted to 
the needs of the international 
market, despite the efforts of the 
IMF, which has headquarters in 
Washington, the new financial 
capital of Africa. What this writer 
thinks, in fact, is that although 
capitalism is an experiment of the 
past and a wager on the future, 
Africans live mainly in the past 
and the present and private pro-
perty, which is decisive in a capi-
talist system, is a rarity in Africa. 
And ultimately, he is fairly 
pessimistic, for Africa will never 
have capitalism to combine the 
essential individualism of the bu-
sinessman with tribal solidarity. 
The Sorman philosophy can be 
summed up thus : Capitalism puts 
down roots in every culture. The 
seed first germinated in Calvinistic 
soil and became acclimatised in 
Catholic Spain, Moslem Turkey 
and Taoist China. It does not just 
produce goods. It also shapes 
new kinds of behaviour, without 
which its strength would fade. A 
passion for consumption, non-vio-
lence, adherence to contracts and 
personal responsibility may not 
be features of the original 
society, but, when capitalism 
comes, they thrive and thus the 
machine produces its own fuel. 
But it also produces its own 
toxins in the shape of amorality 
and competition between hedon-
ism and the work ethic. These 
may well kill capitalism, although 
it is far from dead yet. ■■ A.L 
Other 
publications 
received 
La République de Tile Maurice -
Dans le sillage de la délocalis-
ation 
The Republic of Mauritius — in 
the wake of relocation 
(By Rajendra Paratian. Editions 
L'Harmattan, 5-7, rue de l'Ecole 
Polytechnique — F — 75005 
Paris. 1994, 333 p. 180 FF. ISBN 2-
7384-2903-3.) 
In this book we are told about 
Mauritius, the homeland of the 
author, who has specialised in 
sociology and development econ-
omics. Sugar cane was introduced 
there over 350 years ago, but 
Mauritius has been able to 
modify the burden inherited from 
the colonial period and consti-
tutes something of an exception. 
Whereas most Third World coun-
tries are just managing to keep 
ticking over, Mauritius has en-
gineered a spectacular change of 
direction by ridding itself of its 
monoculture and making manuf-
acturing the main growth sector 
since 1986. But the author also 
describes the impact of this trans-
ition on the social and cultural 
life of the island, which has over-
turned the old ties based on the 
'sugar civilisation'. 
Continued on inside back cover 
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AT WORK 
EUROPEAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
FUND 
Following, where required, favourable 
opinions from the EDF Committee, the Com-
mission has decided to provide grants and 
special loans from the 5th, 6th and 7th EDFs 
to finance the following operations (grants 
unless otherwise stated). Major projects and 
programmes are highlighted : 
Economic and 
social infrastructure 
Kenya : ECU 1.966 million for urgent rehabili-
tation work on the Nairobi-Mombasa road. 
Madagascar : ECU 1.9 million for the first de-
centralised cooperation programme covering, 
notably, the health field. 
Mauritania : ECU 58 million for the rehabili-
tation and rationalisation of the national 
industrial and mining company (SNIM). 
St Kitts & Nevis : ECU 4.5 million for airport 
extension works. 
Trade promotion/structural 
adjustment 
Burkina Faso : ECU 25 million to support the 
1995-96 structural adjustment programme. 
Compres : ECU 300 000 for a project designed 
to strengthen the organisation and function-
ing of the CNAC (National Artisanal Centre of 
the Comores). 
Côte d'Ivoire : ECU 20.5 million to support 
the structural adjustment programme. 
Malawi : ECU 26.1 million in support of 
structural adjustment (ECU 8.8 million from 
the Structural Adjustment Facility, ECU 4.9 
million from the Transfrontier Initiative 
Fund, ECU 3.2 million from the 7th EDF and 
ECU 9.2 million as a loan under the 6th 
EDF). 
Mali: ECU 25 million to support the 1995-96 
structural adjustment programme (ECU 12.9 
from the Structural Adjustment Facility and 
ECU 12.1 million from programmable resour-
ces). 
Namibia : ECU 1.882 million for the implemen-
tation of the tourism development pro-
gramme. 
Senegal : ECU 20.1 million to support the 
structural adjustment programme (ECU 8.7 
million from the Structural Adjustment Fa-
dlity and ECU 11.4 million from program-
mable resources). 
Indian Ocean countries (Madagascar, Com-
ores, Seychelles, Mauritius and Réunion) : 
ECU 9.3 million for the integrated regional 
trade development programme (PRIDE). 
Dominica : ECU 500 000 for the development 
of eco-tourism at the Emerald Pool and Tra-
falgar Falls sites. 
Papua-New Guinea : ECU 2 million to finance 
priority infrastructures in East New Britain in 
favour of students and academic staff, dis-
placed as a result of volcanic eruptions which 
devastated Rabaul, the province's main town. 
Agriculture 
Tanzania : ECU 1.98 million to support re-
search in the coffee sector, in particular at the 
Lyamungu station. 
Health 
Burkina Faso : ECU 1.6 million for a project to 
support reform of the pharmaceutical sector. 
Central African Republic : ECU 1.8 million for 
a project designed to improve the health of 
the people in the Basse-Kotto prefecture, 
within the framework of a global anti-poverty 
programme. 
Mali : ECU 1.41 million for a programme to 
support safe blood transfusion and for edu-
cation into sexually transmittable diseases and 
Aids, in village areas. 
Central Africa (Cameroon, Central African Re-
public, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, 
Chad) : ECU 1.98 million for a training pro-
gramme for health service managers in the 
form of support for CIESPAC (the Central 
Africa Inter-State Centre for Higher Education 
in Public Health). 
Education 
Netherlands Antilles : ECU 650 000 to support 
the Curaçao public library, notably through 
the purchase of a mobile library vehicle. 
Environment 
Ghana : ECU 4.6 million for a programme to 
develop and improve the two national parks 
in the western part of the country with the 
aim of preserving the biodiversity of the tropi-
cal forest zone. 
Guinea Bissau : ECU 1.35 million for the con-
servation and rational use of fragile ecosys-
tems, in particular through the creation of the 
Centre for Protected Areas in Buba and the 
Lagoas Park at Cufada 
Guinea Bissau : ECU 550 000 to support the 
drawing up of environmental legislation. 
Institutional support 
Congo : ECU 500 000 to support the popu-
lation and habitat census. 
Mauritania : ECU 700 000 in institutional sup-
port for the economic and agricultural devel-
opment of the Tagant region. 
Uganda : ECU 1.95 million to support the par-
liamentary and presidential elections. 
East Africa, Southern Africa, Indian Ocean 
(Burundi, Comores, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Sey-
chelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe) : ECU 2 million to support 
technical working groups and for the implem-
entation of policies under the CBI (Cross-
Border Initiative) designed to facilitate cross-
border trade and financial exchanges among 
the countries concerned. 
Miscellaneous 
Niger : ECU 1.5 million for a decentralised 
cooperation programme aimed at financing 
about 100 projects. The projects, which will 
include significant local financing, will be 
undertaken by craftsmen and others. 
UEOMA (West African Economic and Mo-
netary Union) countries : ECU 1.62 million for 
a project designed to produce reliable and 
standardised monthly figures for consumer 
price movements in the seven countries of the 
Union (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo) 
Zambia : ECU 950 000 for the printing and 
publishing of geological maps. 
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million to improve the alert system for cyc-
lones in the region. 
EUROPEAN 
INVESTMENT 
BANK 
Loan 
Namibia : ECU 12.7 million to Telecom Na-
mibia to finance the modernisation of essen-
tial elements of the telephone system and, in 
particular, for the establishment of fibre optic 
links between Windhoek and the coastal areas 
including Walvis Bay. 
VISIT 
The national authorising 
officers of the PALOP 
(Portuguese-speaking) ACP 
countries. 
On 8 June, Commissioner Pinheiro had a 
meeting with the ministers from the five 
PALOP countries — Angola, Mozambique, 
Guinea Bissau, Cap Verde, São Tomé & Prin-
cipe — who have responsibility for dealing 
with EU aid (the national authorising officers). 
This meeting, which was the first of its kind, 
came at the end of two days of discussions on 
the current state of play in the first (non-
geographical) PALOP regional programme and 
on preparations for implementing the second. 
They included talks among the ministers 
themselves and meetings with the relevant 
Commission services. 
Together with Professor Pinheiro, the minis-
ters reviewed the implementation of the first 
PALOP programme. This was launched in 
1992, with ECU 25 million being provided for 
seven different projects. While recognising the 
positive aspects of the programme's oper-
ation, they also looked at the implementation 
difficulties stemming from the geographical 
dispersion of the five beneficiary countries, 
the need for training and motivation of 
national administrations, and the importance 
of coherence and complementarity in respect 
of both the national indicative programmes 
and the activities of other donors. 
It is foreseen that the second programme will 
seek to optimise the objectives set out in the 
current programme, focusing on only a limited 
number of new sectors. Significant additional 
resources are hoped for in the framework of 
the programming of the 8th EDF. 
In conclusion, the PALOP Ministers confirmed 
their political commitment to maintaining 
traditional regional cooperation as set out in 
the Lomé Convention. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Resumption of aid 
to Rwanda 
Following a proposal by Professor Pinheiro, 
the Commission has decided to lift the partial 
suspension on aid to the Government of 
Rwanda in force since 26 April and to resume 
fully all areas of cooperation with a view to 
assisting in the process of national reconcili-
ation and the economic and social rehabili-
tation of that country. 
The Commission has taken this decision in the 
light of the positive response of the Govern-
ment of Rwanda to the report of the Inter-
national Commission of Inquiry into the kil-
lings in Kibeho on 22-24 April, and on the 
basis of an exchange of letters agreed bet-
ween the Commission and the Government 
following a high-level mission to Kigali on 3-4 
July. In this exchange of letters, the Govern-
ment has restated its commitment to the pur-
suit of national reconciliation, including the in-
tensification of dialogue with opposition 
groups committed to that objective, and has 
undertaken to implement concrete measures 
to enable the return of refugees, the proces-
sing of cases against those currently in deten-
tion, the release of children from prison and 
the establishment of a climate of greater con-
fidence and cooperation with international 
non-governmental organisations operating in 
Rwanda. 
The resumption of full cooperation will allow 
the Commission to pursue its programme of 
rehabilitation for Rwanda agreed in December 
1994 for a total of ECU 67m and to envisage 
further assistance in order to enable the 
Government to fulfil the commitments it has 
undertaken in the areas already outlined. Fin-
ally, in order to strengthen its support for the 
consolidation of respect for human rights and 
the rule of law, the Commission is also consi-
dering making a contribution of up to ECU 
1.5m in the very near future towards the 
operation of the International tribunal for 
Rwanda. 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
PARLIAMENT 
The Holocaust : a day of com-
memoration 
During its June session, the European Parlia-
ment adopted a joint resolution (supported 
by all groups apart from members from the 
far right) seeking the designation of a Euro-
pean 'Day' to commemorate the Holocaust in 
all the countries of the EU. 
On the designated day, a variety of activities 
and events would be staged aimed at remind-
ing people about the Second World War and 
the Holocaust and explaining, to young peo-
ple above all, the dangers of totalitarian and 
racist ideologies. 
The Parliament has asked the Commission to 
prepare a pilot project and has invited the 
Member States of the Council of Europe to 
participate in the initiative. 
! COMMISSION 
Death of former President 
Sicco Mansholt, the former Commission Presi-
dent, died on 30 June at the age of 86. Mr 
Mansholt held the post of Minister of Agricul-
ture in the Netherlands from 1945 to 1957, 
and became the European Commissioner for 
Agriculture in 1958. He held this post for 15 
years during which time he was highly in-
fluential in developing the Community's 
Common Agricultural Policy. 
Mr Mansholt held the Presidency of the Com-
mission from 1972 to 1974, succeeding Mr 
Malfatti. 
¡ COMMON 
FOREIGN AND 
SECURITY 
POLICY 
Within the framework of its Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Union 
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details of which are set out below : 
South Africa : abolition of the 
death penalty 
Declaration of 16 June 1995 
The European Union has taken note of the 
verdict of 6 June 1995 by the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of South Africa, judging 
the death penalty to be incompatible with 
the new constitution of the country. Such a 
decision gives concrete and visible expression 
to South Africa's commitment to the rule of 
law. 
Burundi : support for efforts 
to restore confidence 
Declaration of 23 June 1995 
Three months after setting out its objectives 
and priorities with regard to Burundi (Car-
cassonne statement of 19 March and common 
position of 24 March 1995), the European 
Union commends the efforts being made by 
the leaders of the country — in particular the 
President of the Republic and the Prime Minis-
ter — to restore confidence, as well as the re-
solute action by the special representatives of 
the UN and OAU Secretaries-General. 
It is nevertheless increasingly concerned at the 
proliferation of acts of violence and the desta-
bilising activities of extremists on all sides. It 
vigorously condemns such acts and deplores 
the excessive number of victims. It condemns 
the behaviour of certain military units during 
disarmament operations in areas of Bujum-
bura and points, in this connection, to the 
Burundi Government's responsibility for the 
proper conduct of such operations. 
It reaffirms that the situation can return to 
normal only if there is respect, and support 
from all sections of the population, for the 
government convention of 10 September 1994 
establishing the conditions for power-sharing, 
as pointed out by the President of the Re-
public and the Prime Minister in their joint 
statement of 30 March 1995. 
In this connection, it takes note of the special 
measures announced by the President on 18 
June, which show the authorities' resolve to 
restore order, while hoping that they will be 
implemented in strict compliance with human 
rights. 
The unreserved commitment of all the Bur-
undi people and of the international com-
munity is needed if this serious crisis is to be 
overcome. 
The EU remains determined to give its re-
solute support to the efforts of the Burundi 
authorities to restore peace and their actions 
against all trouble-makers. It reaffirms its op-
position to extremists. 
The decisions taken by the EU in support of 
the process of national reconciliation are 
being implemented : 
— Support is being provided for increasing 
the staff of the OAU observer mission. 
— Assistance for the dispatch of human rights 
experts by the UN High Commissioner is being 
prepared. 
— The aid requirements for rebuilding the 
legal system have been identified. 
— The action plan for assistance to refugees, 
displaced and repatriated persons, adopted in 
Bujumbura, can be implemented with the as-
sistance of the EU. 
— The principle of a round table of providers 
of funds has been the subject of a protocol of 
agreement, complete with time limits, bet-
ween the UNDP and the Burundi government. 
It is now for the government to draw up a 
clear programme of economic and social re-
covery to be placed before the fund provi-
ders. 
— Measures banning travel by extremists to 
the Member States are being applied. 
The EU considers that the states in the region 
have a particular responsibility and it urges 
them, together with all states in the inter-
national community, to support the stabilis-
ation efforts being made by the Burundi au-
thorities and to take the measures required to 
prevent the arming and movement of extre-
mists. 
The EU reaffirms the need for a well-prepared 
regional conference as soon as possible, under 
the aegis of the United Nations, on peace, se-
curity and stability in the Great Lakes region, 
since a conference of this kind is the only 
means of reducing the deep-seated causes of 
instability in the region. 
Haiti : hopes expressed for a 
successful second-round ballot 
Declaration of 30 June 1995 
The European Union welcomes the good con-
duct of the ballot on 25 June, which consti-
tutes an important step along the road to de-
mocracy and the consolidation of the rule of 
law in Haiti. It nevertheless deplores that the 
elections became the scene of acts of violence, 
and in particular, the assassination of a former 
officer of the armed forces and of an election 
candidate. 
It notes that the proper conduct of the elec-
toral campaign and of the ballot has clearly 
demonstrated the population's wish to ex-
press itself freely and responsibly. 
The EU, which supported the organisation of 
those elections, in particular by preparing the 
elections and by dispatching observers, notes 
that international solidarity has helped to 
ensure that the ballot has gone smoothly. 
It hopes that the administrative and logistical 
shortcomings noted on 25 June can be correc-
ted in the second-round ballot on 23 July, and 
in the presidential elections at the end of the 
year, both of which constitute decisive steps 
for Haiti. 
Nigeria: Appeal for political 
prisoners to be freed 
Declaration of 30 June 1995 
The European Union points out that it is now 
more than two years since the Nigerian presi-
dential elections of 12 June 1993 were annul-
led despite the fact that observers both at 
home and abroad had judged them to be 
free and fair. 
Since that time, Nigeria has increasingly failed 
to honour its commitments on human rights, 
commitments freely entered into by Nigeria as 
a party to a number of international instru-
ments. Continual and widespread recourse to 
detention without trial is a cause for grave 
concern, as are restrictions on freedom of ex-
pression and association. The EU strongly con-
demns the recent arrests of civilian politicians. 
It is also concerned at the prolonged deten-
tion of eminent persons and by the recourse 
to procedures which are illegal or lacking in 
any legal basis. The EU calls on the Nigerian 
authorities to make sure that all detainees are 
treated humanely and receive a proper trial, 
which includes the right to appeal to a higher 
court. 
As it has underlined in its declaration of 22 
March 1995, the EU is of the firm conviction 
that Nigeria's current difficulties stem from a 
lack of political progress. On taking office in 
November 1993, President Abacha proclaimed 
his intention of restoring civilian, democratic 
rule. While it has taken note of the announ-
cement of 27 June on the lifting of the ban 
on political activities, the EU regrets that the 
announcement of a timetable for a return to 
constitutional rule has once again been defer-
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released. 
The EU will continue to keep a careful watch 
on the situation in Nigeria to assess any fur-
ther decisions which might be necessary to 
face up to developments in the political situ-
ation and in the human rights situation. 
Zaire: concern about 
operation of Constitutional 
Act 
Declaration of 7 July 1995 
Since the agreement between parties in Zaire 
on the Constitutional Act, which laid down 
the powers of Zairean state institutions so 
that transition to the Third Republic could be 
managed in a spirit of cooperation, the Euro-
pean Union has been closely following the at-
titudes of parties in this process of transition. 
It continues to be concerned at the fact that 
both the spirit and the letter of the Consti-
tutional Act are frequently violated. 
The EU notes that the question of the Presi-
dency of the HCR-PT at its sitting on 1 July 
1995 has created confusion, particularly as re-
gards the regularity of the procedures fol-
lowed. The EU wishes to make known its 
deep concern at this situation and the result-
ing uncertainty. It would again stress the en-
ormous importance which it attaches to re-
spect for the principles of a state of law with-
out which democracy cannot be established. 
In this context, it would strongly urge each of 
the transitional institutions to ensure that any 
ambivalence is removed and the act of trans-
ition applied in its entirety. 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia associate themselves with this declar-
ation. 
Gabon: Referendum 
successfully staged 
Declaration of 31 July 1995 
The European Union, which is an observer 
with regard to the Paris agreements, wel-
comes the successful completion of the consti-
tutional referendum held in Gabon on 23 July 
1995 with a view to making possible full ap-
plication of those Agreements. 
It is pleased with the result and hopes that 
the process of dialogue and consultation bet-
ween Gabon's political forces will continue, in 
order to consolidate the achievements of dé-
mocratisation, which are a fundamental con-
dition for the economic and social develop-
ment of the country. 
The Central and Eastern European countries 
associated with the Union align themselves 
with this declaration. 
GENERAL 
INFORMATION 
Long term cooperation 
between South Africa and the 
EU 
On 30 June, Commissioner Pinheiro, South Af-
rican Minister Trevor Manuel and Minister Jac-
ques Godfrain (representing the French Presi-
dency), formally opened negotiations between 
the EU and South Africa. The meeting took 
place in Brussels in the presence of representa-
tives from the EU Member States, ACP coun-
tries, the European Investment Bank and the 
European Parliament. In a cordial atmosphere, 
the two sides declared their political commit-
ment to take part in the negotiations with a 
view to establishing a long-term relationship. 
Following the Council's decision of 19 June, 
Professor Pinheiro was able to present his ne-
gotiating proposals on behalf of the Commis-
sion. These envisage a two-pronged approach 
consisting of a Protocol to the Lomé Conven-
tion setting out the conditions and modalities 
for South African accession, and a bilateral ag-
reement on trade and cooperation between 
South Africa and the European Community. 
Mr Manuel, who is South Africa's Minister of 
Trade and Industry, indicated his agreement 
with the broad thrust of what the Commis-
sion was proposing. He also underlined the 
importance he attached to obtaining the EU's 
acceptance of a special agreement which 
should help his country to reintegrate into the 
global economy. He went on to stress the 
need for support for rehabilitation and devel-
opment in South Africa, something which he 
said would have benefits for the wider 
Southern African region. Echoing Professor 
Pinheiro, Mr Manuel spoke of his interest in 
the ACP countries and gave an assurance that 
they would be consulted throughout the 
negotiations. 
The talks are expected to last several months. 
Professor Pinheiro and Mr Manuel will meet 
again before the end of the year to take 
stock of progress in the work of their negot-
iators. The Commission's negotiator will be 
Steffen Smidt, Director-General for Develop-
ment. 
Conference on new EU-
Southern Africa relations : the 
role of enterprises 
The first Club de Bruxelles conference on EU-
Southern Africa relations, held in October 
1993, brought together 360 participants and 
32 speakers including Manuel Marin and se-
veral ministers and leading figures from the 
Southern African region. Two years later, the 
Club is preparing to stage a second confer-
ence taking into account the numerous 
changes that have occurred in the region. Less 
'political' than its predecessor, this gathering 
will mainly be directed towards aspects of 
concrete cooperation between Europe and 
Southern Africa — in particular, underlining 
the role that EU and SADC companies can 
play in the development of the region. 
The event will take place in Brussels on 19 
and 20 October 1995, benefiting from the 
support of the new Commissioner in charge of 
the dossier. Professor Pinheiro. Some 40 high 
level speakers representing the private sector 
in Southern Africa and Europe, governments 
and other institutions, will take the floor. It is 
expected that 300-400 people will participate 
in the conference. To coincide with the event, 
the Club de Bruxelles will also be publishing a 
100-page study in English and French which 
will be distributed to all participants. 
The following draft programme gives a preli-
minary indication of the areas that will be 
emphasised at the conference. The aim is to 
interest European companies in collaborating 
with enterprises and authorities in the 
Southern Africa region, in particular in sectors 
where the development of infrastructure will 
be a driving force for economic development 
(energy, transport and communications, infor-
mation technology etc.) 
Thursday 19 October 
First session : Overview of the new relations 
between the EU and Southern Africa and pro-
spects for European companies. 
Second session : Regional cooperation bet-
ween the Southern African countries focusing 
especially on health, agriculture, food security, 
trade and industry (in particular within the 
mining sector). 
Third session : Relations between the EU and 
the RSA (the bilateral Trade and Cooperation 
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the Lomé Convention ; European support pro-
grammes etc.) 
Fourth session : EU aid programmes for the 
Southern African region and the role of 
enterprises. 
Special evening session : Transport and tour-
ism in Southern Africa. 
Friday 20 October 
Fifth session : Direct investment in Southern 
Africa : conditions, priority sectors, govern-
ment support, deregulation, privatisation etc. 
Sixth session : Cooperation between Euro-
pean and Southern African companies, trans-
fer of technology, the role of SMEs, European 
industrial cooperation support programmes. 
Seventh session : First case study — energy. 
Electricity, hydro-electric power, coal, nuclear 
power, oil and renewable energies (solar and 
wind power). The role that European com-
panies can play. 
Eighth session : Second case study — the role 
of information technology and telecommuni-
cations. The potential impact of the inform-
ation society on Southern Africa, networks, 
telematics services to be installed, Euro-African 
cooperation within the framework of Euro-
pean programmes, the role that companies 
can play in this sector in the region. 
Further information about the conference can 
be obtained from the Club de Bruxelles, 
10 rue du Collège St. Michel, B-1050 Brussels, 
Belgium. Tel : (322) 771 98 90, 
Fax: (322) 770 66 71. 
UNHCR plans boycott of mine 
producers 
Calling for bold international action to rid the 
world of anti-personnel mines, the UNHCR an-
nounced on 6 July that it would henceforth 
refuse to do business with companies involved 
in the sale or manufacture of such weapons. 
In a speech to the International Meeting on 
Mine Clearance, in Geneva, the UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, said 
that 'the scourge of land mines' posed a se-
rious obstacle to the return of millions of re-
fugees and displaced people around the 
world. Mines indiscriminately kill and maim 
tens of thousands of civilians annually. Mrs 
Ogata believes that their production and sale 
must be stopped. 'For my part,' she stated, 'I 
see little difference between those who use 
them and those who produce them.' 
Although banning mines requires action by 
governments, Mrs Ogata said that the UNHCR 
could still play its part by refusing to deal 
with manufacturers. 'With respect to UNHCR, 
we shall not knowingly purchase the products 
of companies that sell or manufacture anti-
personnel mines or their components,' she as-
serted. 'Whatever the present legality of 
manufacturing such weapons, the toll they 
take on innocent civilians amounts to a crime 
against mankind. Those who make, sell and 
export them bear a direct and heavy respons-
ibility which has to be recognised and dealt 
with by the international community.' 
Somalia: from emergency aid 
to rehabilitation 
The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) organised a meeting in Brussels on 6 
July, the purpose of which was to inform par-
ticipants about the current situation in So-
malia. Chaired by Erling Dessau, of the UN co-
ordination team for Somalia (UNCT) — which 
has been based in Nairobi (for security re-
asons) since October 1994 — the meeting 
brought together representatives of a variety 
of organisations including UN agencies, Euro-
pean institutions, universities and NGOs. 
'We are working on the transition between 
emergency aid and rehabilitation in Somalia,' 
declared Mr Dessau in his address. He added 
that the United Nations had not suspended its 
activities in the country following the depar-
ture of UNOSOM forces last March. Operation 
Restore Hope had undoubtedly been controv-
ersial but, he stressed, 'it cannot be denied 
that it nonetheless saved the lives of many 
people.' Now, he said, was the time for 'rule 
rehabilitation'. 
The UNDP is the lead agency, working along-
side other UN bodies, NGOs and local actors 
to restore the situation in Somalia. The work 
involves a series of targeted actions in the 
fields of nutrition, health and education, and 
in the reintegration of refugees and displaced 
people. 
But the priority is clearly to strengthen the 
local authorities and to support various move-
ments bringing together women, intellectuals 
and religious groups, in the project of rebuild-
ing the country. 
In this context, one thing is certain, according 
to Mr Dessau, namely that 'the people want 
no more war.' This was confirmed by Mr 
llling, the EU representative in Somalia. Ac-
cording to him, living conditions in the 
country are getting back to normal. 'It is our 
belief that the work we (in the international 
community) have undertaken is beginning to 
have an impact,' he asserted. 'We will con-
tinue to do our work. I may not know yet 
how we are going to proceed but I do know 
that there is a great deal more that we could 
do in both the humanitarian and develop-
ment fields.' 
This view was shared by Waba Leba, the 
OAU's director in Brussels. He stressed that 
'Africa must be the first to invest in itself. 
Following this meeting, one can only hope 
that the nine UN agencies and 30 or so NGOs 
still present in Somalia will be able to help 
meet the Somali people's aspirations for 
peace. 
HUMANITARIAN 
AID 
ACP countries 
Central and East Africa : ECU 3.5 million for 
the extension, until February 1996, of the 
ECHO Flight operation designed to transport 
personnel and supplies within this region. 
Cape Verde : ECU 100 000 for the victims of 
the Fogo volcanic eruption which occurred at 
the beginning of April. 
Cape Verde : ECU 20 000 for a project to train 
local personnel in surveillance techniques in re-
spect of the Fogo volcano, whose activity 
threatens the population of the island. 
Kenya : ECU 820 000 for preventive action 
aimed at stopping the spread of cholera 
Kenya : ECU 329 000 for essential equipment 
and health assistance to Somali refugees who 
have fled from their country. 
Liberia : ECU 300 000 for basic essentials (such 
as shelters and drinking water) and medical/ 
nutritional assistance to displaced people in 
Harbel and Buchanan. 
Sierra Leone : ECU 750 000 to support the 
medical services in the cities of Freetown and 
Bo. 
Sierra Leone : ECU 700 000 to provide food 
aid for impoverished, displaced people in the 
capital. 
Rwanda/Burundi : ECU 25 million to provide 
food aid for the next three months to dis-
placed people in these two countries and in 
neighbouring states. 
Sudan : ECU 950 000 for medical aid destined, 
in particular, for war-wounded patients in the 
south of the country. 
Sudan/Uganda : ECU 9 million for a six-month 
global aid plan in favour of Sudanese people 
affected by the conflict in their country. 
the Courier no. 153 · september-october 1995 ti Non-ACP countries 
Cuba : ECU 15 million to support the sani-
tation system through improvements to drink-
ing water and food quality, and the provision 
of medical supplies and hygiene products. 
Guatemala : ECU 415 000 to help displaced 
people living in the capital achieve self-
sufficiency. 
Mexico : ECU 600 000 to help Guatemalan re-
fugees in the country achieve self-sufficiency. 
Mexico : ECU 435 000 for food and medical 
assistance and the provision of basic products 
to civilians who have fled the fighting in the 
Chiapas region. 
Nicaragua : ECU 780 000 to help people who 
have been uprooted achieve self-sufficiency, 
for a project to reintegrate demobilised sol-
diers, for livestock and agricultural support 
and for a project to rehabilitate small-scale 
health facilities. 
Peru: ECU 750 000 for medical aid in the 
form of vaccination against rabies. This is 
being spread by bats and poses a threat to 
some 30 000 people. 
El Salvador : ECU 370 000 for a project to im-
prove the health of displaced people living in 
the Marazan region in the north of the 
country, which was previously a combat zone. 
Former USSR: ECU 2.6 million for a diptheria 
vaccination campaign. An epidemic of this dis-
ease began in 1991 and the aim is to prevent 
its further spread. 
Former USSR : ECU 630 000 to purchase 
equipment for the children's hospital in Minsk 
for victims of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. 
Bangladesh : ECU 1.4 million to help victims 
of the recent floods which have affected 60% 
of the country's territory and rendered more 
than 15 million people homeless. 
Nepal : ECU 350 000 to provide basic essentials 
and ambulance services for eight camps in the 
south of the country occupied by refugees of 
Nepalese origin from Bhutan who have fled 
their homes since the adoption, in 1989, of a 
policy of 'national consolidation' by the 
Bhutan government. 
Cambodia : ECU 155 000 to improve the 
health care of people who have fled from the 
conflict zone. 
Philippines: ECU 120 000 for a year-long 
training programme aimed at preparing for 
national disasters. 
Sri Lanka: ECU 305 000 for medical and phar-
maceutical assistance, covering a six-month 
period, for patients at the university hospital 
in Jaffna. 
FOOD AID 
New regulation 
The Commission has adopted a proposal for a 
new Council Regulation on food aid policy 
and food aid management and special oper-
ations in support of food security. 
The Commission proposal represents a res-
ponse to the new challenges facing EU food 
aid. Rapid population growth, difficulties with 
the development of the agricultural sector in 
several third world countries, the continuation 
and escalation of conflicts or economic and 
political instability and the new requirements 
caused by the break-up of the former Soviet 
Union necessarily entail the revision of legal 
instruments in order to make them more ef-
fective. The overall objective of combating 
poverty, confirmed on several occasions by 
the Union, and the specific role of food aid in 
this area, are the final factors which ensure 
that revision of the legislation is a necessity. 
The new Regulation has three main themes : 
(1 ) Food aid as a key component of long-term 
food security strategy. Priority in this respect 
is to be given to instruments such as structural 
food aid, local purchasing and triangular oper-
ations with the aim of contributing to the de-
velopment of agriculture, food security, the 
promotion of local trade and the inter-re-
gional economy in the developing countries. 
In addition to the allocation of staple food-
stuffs, the aid can also be used to supply 
seeds, fertilisers, tools and other inputs or raw 
materials, to build up reserves and conduct 
public information and training campaigns. 
(2) Amending the list of potential recipients 
of Community aid. To take account of the 
recent changes in the world geopolitical map, 
especially those resulting from the break-up of 
the former Soviet Union, the new Regulation 
adds considerably to the list of countries elig-
ible for EU food aid. It will now include over 
120 countries. 
(3) Bringing together all the existing legal in-
struments on food aid in a single body of 
rules. 
Decisions 
The Commission has recently taken a decision 
to finance food aid as set out in the chart 
which follows : 
Country Cerea|s Milk Veget- Buttero¡| Beans Qthers  Sn" tonnes) j™£ (tonnes) g¿¿ (tonnes) (tonnes) (ECUm) 
WFP 
normal 
WFP 
P.R.O. 
WFP 
I.E.F.R. 
Mozambique 
Malawi 
Lesotho 
Cambodia 
Niger 
NGOs 
2nd 
tranche 
UNWRA 
Total 
120 000 
61 236 
52 000 
22 000 
60 000 
20 000 
15 000 
50 000 
1 162 
401 398 
5 000 
800 
1 122 
6 922 
1 900 
1 000 
2 000 
1 684 
6 584 
8000 
2 600 
5000 
2 500 
6 250 
1 080 
25 430 
500 
500 
3 000 
15 000 
583 
18 583 
4.0 
1.5 
2.0 
1.5 
5.0 
3.36 
17.36 
hi 
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Poultry farming in West Africa 
CDI supporting integration 
of "South-South" trade 
Poultry farming represents a strategic source of animal protein for the people of West Africa. 
This sector, which has developed substantially over recent years, depends upstream on a 
regular supply of high-quality feedingstuffs at competitive prices. The CDI organised an 
initial "ACP-EU Industrial Partnership Meeting" in this field in Saly-Portudal (Senegal) 
in 1993. Since then, several projects involving the poultry farming sector have been assisted 
and monitored by the Centre. Another meeting was aho arranged there by the CDI on 
August 1st and 2nd 1995. Bringing together several players from the regions "poultry feed" 
branch, the meeting studied ways and means of solving the major procurement problems 
faced by local feed suppliers. 
n the new circumstances that 
have been prevailing for almost 
two years now following devaluation of 
the CFA franc (which occurred just af-
ter the first Saly-Portudal meeting), 
West African poultry farming has been 
going through a turbulent time, espe-
cially as a result of the substantial fall 
in purchasing power, spiralling inflation 
and growing price instability. On the 
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other hand, the change in 
monetary parity has made 
traditional imports of eggs 
for hatching much dearer, 
which has encouraged the 
domestic rearing of breed-
ing hens. Downstream, the 
industrial slaughterhouse of 
Senegal is being consolidat-
ed to meet growing demand 
on the market. But the take-
off of this growth sector has 
now run up against a critical 
problem: the procurement SEDIMA 
difficulties of feed suppliers 
throughout the West Sahel area. It was 
this diagnosis that persuaded the CDI 
to organise its seminar on this subject 
in Saly-Portudal at the beginning of Au-
gust I 995, attended by representatives 
from Burkina-Faso, the Côte d'Ivoire, 
Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and France. 
For two days, professionals concerned 
with the problems of this sector - feed 
suppliers, farmers, middlemen, trans-
battery bens (Senegal) 
port operators, etc. - examined the 
current problems affecting the market 
and tried to find ways and means of 
remedying this situation on a regional 
level. 
The main maize producing and con-
suming country is Senegal, which ac-
counts for 80% of the industrial poul-
try farms in the West Sahel region. The 
major problem facing feed suppliers 
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Presentation by a participant during the working sessions at the Saly-Portudal seminar 
concerns the acquisition of maize and fish 
meal, which they cannot find in suitable 
quantities and qualities and at competitive 
prices compared to maize imported from 
outside the Economic Community of 
West African States. 
A field study carried out at the request of 
the CDI prior to the seminar, by Mr El 
Hadji Diao, the Centre's sectoral corre-
spondent in Senegal, underlined the main 
obstacles that exist at present to making 
full use of the region's maize supply: weak-
ness of agricultural production and mar-
keting structures, price distortions, lack 
of professional cooperation among the 
players in the sector, expensive and diffi-
cult transportation, high taxation and 
heavy customs duties. 
Following this analysis, broadly shared by 
the professionals present in Saly-Portudal, 
the debates allowed some concrete stra-
tegic options to be determined. In effect, 
it would seem that the maize shortage, 
particularly critical in Senegal, could be 
eased by supplies available in Mali and 
Burkina-Faso. This presupposes the 
grouping of orders at the beginning of the 
marketing year, organisation of transport 
by rail and road, and an effort to reduce 
the customs and fiscal obstacles erected 
by the authorities. Similarly, Mauritania 
could prove to be a useful source of fish 
meal, provided that appropriate trading 
channels are established. 
The participants also drew up a list of 
short-term objectives: the need to en-
courage the creation of maize storage 
units, which are essential for the regular 
procurement of supplies; the establish-
ment of seasonal credit facilities in close 
cooperation between storage operators, 
buyers and capital providers; the collec-
tion and distribution of statistical informa-
tion (quantities, prices, origins, etc). To 
this effect, a permanent database, con-
stantly updated by the professionals them-
selves, could be developed with the help 
of the CDI. 
In the medium term, the participants 
would like some major incentives (sup-
port measures, dissemination of informa-
tion, seasonal loans, organisation of col-
lection) for the regional development of 
maize production. They favour the crea-
tion of a pilot production and storage 
plant on an industrial scale, with the finan-
cial participation of feed suppliers and 
other players in the sector. The Centre 
could also contribute towards getting this 
sort of initiative off the ground. 
Contact at the CDI: 
Mr Chérif Toure, 
Sectoral Expert - TD. 
Tel: (32-2) 679 19 05. Fax: 675 26 03 
CDI projects in the 
poultry fanning sector 
in West Africa 
Since the first Industrial Partnership 
Meeting in Saly-Portudal at the end of 
1993, the CDI has been involved in eight 
project assistance operations in the poul-
try feed sector for the West African re-
gion. Seven projects are currently in the 
pre-assistance stage. 
Country  Projects 
in progrès 
Projects in pré-
assistance stage 
Furthermore, the Centre has also been 
increasing its interventions in favour of 
projects directly linked with poultry 
farming. In particular, we could mention: 
assistance in the creation of hatcheries in 
Senegal and the Côte d'Ivoire; aid for de-
velopment of the commercial strategy of 
the first poultry abattoir designed to sup-
ply the regional market constructed in Se-
negal; creation of meat cutting and mar-
keting centres in Burkina-Faso and the 
Côte d'Ivoire; the imminent opening of a 
private pilot centre for raw materials 
analysis. 
CDI guide to industrial 
poultry farming 
In the "Technologies" series in the col-
lection of CDI guides, this 5 I-page pub-
lication presents information and advice 
collected from both African and Europe-
an professionals. More than a convention-
al poultry farming manual, this guide aims 
to help the professional poultry farmer 
or project leader in this field to avoid a 
number of mistakes by providing a series 
of analytical and decision-making tools: 
diagrams, advice, technological profile of 
the sector, recommendations for the de-
velopment of projects such as the crea-
tion of hatcheries, abattoirs, feedingstuff 
production units, etc. 
Contact: 
Mr Patrick Keene, Officer responsible for CDI 
technical publications. 
Tel.: (32-2) 679 19 02. Fax: 675 26 03 
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Next ACP/EU 
Industrial Meetings 
WOOD INDUSTRIES N 
THE CARIBBEAN 
Paramaribo, Surinam 
November 6th-1 Oth 1995 
For three years now, in the four main 
countries of the Caribbean which have 
forestry resources (Belize, Guyana, Suri-
nam and Trinidad & Tobago), the CDI has 
been pursuing a policy of giving sectoral 
priority to the wood industries. Thanks 
to this support, several companies in the 
region have been able to establish export 
contacts with European partners. The 
knowledge acquired in the field has al-
lowed this meeting in Paramaribo to be 
organised in order to consolidate and de-
velop the progress achieved in this sec-
tor. Face-to-face meetings will be ar-
ranged between: 
• entrepreneurs selected on the spot -
capable of meeting quality requirements 
on their own regional markets and in Eu-
rope; 
• firms from Europe interested in this type 
of product and possessing high-level com-
mercial and technological know-how. 
These contacts will be aimed in particu-
lar at promoting two kinds of outlets: ar-
ticles with a high value added for joiners 
(windows, doors, floors, etc.) and furni-
ture manufacturers, together with equip-
ment for the very important hotel indus-
try that is rapidly developing in the region 
(a market dominated until now by suppli-
ers in the USA and Asia). 
Contact at the CDI: 
Mrjordi Tio Rottland, 
Sectoral Officer- TD. 
Tel.: (32-2) 679 19 24. Fax: 675 26 03 
FOOTWEAR MANUFACTURE 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
Botswana 
October I5th-20st 1995 
The leather and hide sector represents a 
very important resource in the African 
countries of the ACP Group, especially in 
Southern Africa (Botswana, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe). So far, 
this potential has been regarded by the in-
dustrialised countries as a reservoir of 
raw materials or semi-finished products. 
Today, however, with the new policies 
adopted by their governments for re-
structuring and promoting the private 
sector, a growing number of local compa-
nies in Southern Africa are embarking 
upon the manufacture of leather articles 
such as footwear and clothing (particular-
ly in the field of exotic leathers, which are 
much sought after on the international 
market). Consequently, there are now 
real possibilities of obtaining supplies in 
this subregion, of either complete foot-
wear or uppers, or establishing partner-
ship links (commercial, technical, financial, 
etc.) with local companies with a view to 
meeting the growing demand on domes-
tic markets. It is in the light of these de-
velopments that this meeting has been or-
ganised by the CDI, to bring together EU 
operators in the footwear industry and 
their counterparts in the five above-
mentioned countries of Southern Africa. 
Contact at the CDI: 
Mrs Acquali Dodet Malenge, 
Geographical Officer for Southern Afinca - TD. 
Tel.: (32-2) 679 19 07. Fax: 675 2603 
MAT-CONSTRUCT '95: EU/CENTRAL AFRICA FORUM 
BUILDING MATER ALS AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
AND PUBLIC WORKS SECTOR 
Libreville - Gabon - October 24th-27th 1995 
The countries of Central Africa have sub-
stantial needs as regards the development 
of infrastructures (roads, bridges, ports, 
urban amenities, etc.), collective facilities 
(schools, hospitals, administrative build-
ings, etc.) and housing. In this last-
mentioned field, population growth and 
rapid urbanisation are generating a very 
high level of demand for building work. 
The construction and public works mar-
ket is therefore an important outlet for 
a wide range of building and finishing ma-
terials. 
On the basis of this observation, the 
European Commission decided >->->-
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to focus its biennial EU/Central Afri-
ca Industrial Forum on this particular 
sector. This business get-together for 
industrialists from I I African coun-
tries (Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Con-
go, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwan-
da, Sao Tomé & Principe and Zaire) 
and the 15 countries of the Europe-
an Union will offer the participating 
companies a unique opportunity to 
obtain information and establish com-
mercial, industrial and financial con-
tacts in the field of building materials 
and in the construction and public 
works sector, through the organisa-
tion of bilateral meetings between 
company heads. 
The CDI has cooperated extensively 
with the European Commission in 
preparing and organising this Forum: 
identification of potential partici-
pants; preparatory study on the situ-
ation in the industry - which will serve 
as a basis for the debates; financial 
contribution towards the travel ex-
penses of numerous African and Eu-
ropean participants. In Libreville itself, 
the Centre will be holding an exhibi-
tion on the technologies for manufac-
turing compressed earth blocks and 
cement tiles and organising an infor-
mation seminar on the know-how 
connected with these materials('). 
The CDI will also be offering its assis-
tance to any participating companies 
which may request it and will be fol-
lowing up the Forum in conjunction 
with the European Commission. 
(1) The CD/ ¡MS published a guide on com-
pressed earth blocks, available on request. 
Contacts at the CDI: 
• Mr S. Boubekeur, 
Sectoral Officer - TD. 
Tel.: (32-2) 679 19 28. Fax: 675 26 03 
»MrA. Adade, 
Geographical Coordinator for Central 
Africa - PD. 
Tel.: (32-2) 679 18 12. Fax: 675 26 03 
Spotlight on design and 
creation 
The first Trend Forum was organ-
ised in Mauritius from August 
22nd to 24th last for the countrys 
extremely important garment in-
dustry - the biggest employer on the 
hhnd, providing some 100,000 
jobs. This event, supported by the 
CDI, reflected the determination 
of local industrialists to meet the 
new GATT era with the focus on 
design and creation. 
or the last two decades, the strat-
egy followed by the Mauritian gov-
ernment to promote the clothing indus-
try has been a resounding success. Thanks 
to the rules of preference set out under 
the previous GATT arrangements and to 
the comparative advantage of low produc-
tion costs in a free zone, many companies 
have recorded increases of around 100% 
in personnel, productivity and output. 
But the new rules of the World Trade Or-
ganisation have thrown the textile and 
clothing markets wide open. They will 
radically change the conditions of compe-
tition on which Mauritius has been able to 
construct the development of this sector. 
Over the next ten years, the island is go-
ing to be confronted with a major chal-
lenge which the EPZDA (Export Process-
ing Zones Development Authority) 
intends to take up in every way, recognis-
ing the need for a substantial improve-
ment in product quality. Today, faced with 
keener international competition, perfor-
mances in terms of design and creativity 
are an essential precondition for winning 
market shares. 
Over the last three years, there have been 
various EPZDA initiatives, jointly support-
ed by the Mauritian government, the Eu-
Siveat Sun clothing workshops in Mauritius 
ropean Commission and the CDI, with a 
view to stepping up the value added of 
Mauritian products. In this context, the 
training programmes to improve produc-
tivity and quality entrusted to FIELDEN 
HOUSE by the CDI and EPZDA in 1993 
and 1994 were aimed at improving the 
export performances of 20 to 25 com-
panies. 
Organised at the end of August, this very 
first 1995 Trend Forum constituted a new 
event open to local and regional compa-
nies and to experts, specialised institu-
tions and buyers in the European textile 
industry. The aim of the meeting, which 
comprised workshops, fashion parades 
and individual business contacts, was to 
identify new trends and to explore the 
conditions for market access, particular-
ly in Europe. Trend Forum '95 also served 
as a testing ground for Mauritian indus-
trialists, allowing them to prepare for 
their active participation in the MITEX 
fair next October in Milan. 
Contact at the CDI: 
Mrs Mary-Jane CAUDRON, 
Geographical Officer for East Africa. 
Tel.: (32-2) 679 18 05. Fax: 675 26 03 
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Strengthening of 
France/CDI cooperation 
During the first seven months of 1995, a third of the CDIs European cofinancing was carried out 
with the Caisse française de Développement. 
he CDI's European Network aims 
to enable the Centre to mobilise 
the technical and financial resources avail-
able in the EU for industrial projects in 
the ACP countries and to find European 
companies to become involved as part-
ners. To this end, the CDI has signed 
agreements with around thirty European 
institutions - some of them coupled with 
a financial package. This close coopera-
tion allows the Centre to tie in with Eu-
ropean industrial circles and to organise 
joint interventions with these partners in 
favour of ACP projects. 
Seven agreements have been signed with 
the following French institutions: 
Ministère de la Coopération et du 
Développement · Caisse française de 
Développement (CFD) · Assemblée des 
Chambres françaises de Commerce et 
d'Industrie (ACFCI) · Association de la 
Région Provence-Alpes-Côte-d'Azur 
(PACA) pour le Développement et la 
Coopération Industrielle (ADECI) · 
INTERCO-Aquitaine · Institut régional 
de Développement de Champagne-
Ardennes (IRCOD) · Entreprise Rhône-
Alpes International (ERAI). 
The CDI also collaborates with other na-
tional and regional bodies in France, with-
out such cooperation being formalised by 
a written agreement. 
Since 1986, the agreement signed with the 
CFD has been the only one in France to 
be coupled with a financial package 
through which the CDI and the CFD joint-
ly finance different interventions. The two 
bodies have therefore developed a long 
working experience together in providing 
At the CDI headquarters, a working meeting between a team from the Centre and representatives of all the 
member organisations of the French institutional network (CFD and regional industrial cooperation agencies) 
companies with their assistance. Re-
newed in October 1994, this agreement 
has been strengthened by a more system-
atic approach to seeking out partnership 
opportunities in the ACP countries with 
the help of the French regions and by sim-
plified processing of joint projects. This 
has made the CFD the Centre's special 
associate on French territory. 
■ In mid-August 1995, the CFD approved 
the sum of 459,000 ECU for six interven-
tions to be carried out with the CDI (see 
inset opposite), i.e. a third of the cofi-
nancing arrangements reached by the 
Centre throughout its European net-
work. Four other requests representing 
CFD cofinancing of 208,000 ECU are also 
being examined. By way of a comparison, 
during the whole of 1994 the CFD ap-
proved cofinancing operations with the 
Centre totalling 486,000 ECU. 
■ Twelve CDI interventions for the 
present year involve French companies: 
seven of them have established partner-
ships with ACP firms and the other five 
are playing a part as suppliers of services. 
GFD/CDI cofinancing arrangements 
over the first seven months of 1995 
Country 
Guinea 
Mauritania 
Congo 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Gabon 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Nature of project 
Fishing 
Manufacture of polystyrene crates 
Milk processing 
Milk 
Technical assistance and training 
"Trade-guild" support programme in six countries 
(see inset on the following page) 
->->-
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100 industrial "trade-guild 
support projects 
n July this year, the French asso-
ciation "Entreprise et 
Développement", a network of decen-
tralised initiatives for "North-South" 
industrial partnerships, launched the 
programme "100 projets pour 
l'Afrique et la Méditerranée". This 
mobilising exercise is aimed at promot-
ing the creation of Franco-African "in-
dustrial couples" based on cooperation 
between companies working within the 
same "trade". The partnerships may be 
of different types: commercial, techno-
logical, financial, etc. Thanks to person-
alised individual support going beyond 
a strict customer-supplier relationship, 
they should enable SMEs in the South 
to attain greater control over their pro-
duction tool, their operating methods 
and their market access. They are also 
aimed at involving French companies in 
an alliance strategy with their partners 
which could possibly lead to co-
investment operations favouring their 
development. The sub-Saharan African 
countries to which priority is being giv-
en in this initiative are Benin, Burkina-
Faso, the Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Se-
negal and Togo. 
Led by "Entreprise et Développe-
ment", this industrial support pro-
gramme, the first stage of which is 
planned for two years hence, has the 
financial backing of a steering commit-
tee bringing together the French Min-
istries of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, 
Industrial Affairs, Foreign Trade, Agri-
culture and Fisheries, as well as the 
CFD and the CDI, which are also pro-
viding technical support. To back up the 
incipient "industrial couples", the pro-
gramme is funding evaluation and con-
sultancy missions by the entrepreneurs 
themselves or by executives of the 
partner companies and providing the 
necessary follow-up to give tangible 
shape to "diagnosis-proposals", espe-
cially in the form of feasibility studies 
and the search for financing. 
Contacts: 
• CFD: Mr Michel Oudin - Paris. 
Tel: (33-1) 40063131. Fax: 40063826 
» Réseau Entreprise et Développement 
MrJean-CUude Sitbon - Marseilles 
Tel.: (33) 9114 4228 - Fax: 9191 8537 
• CDI: Mr Paolo Baldan, 
Officer responsible for the European 
Network - TD. 
Tel.: (32-2) 679 1932. Fax: 6752603 
SITACUIR (footwear manufacturers) -
Cameroon: a project that has benefited from 
an intensive training programme jointly 
provided by the CDI and the CFD 
JfK 
Euramide : 
African 
managers 
return home 
The CDI is supporting an original 
training experiment in France 
launched by the Institut français de 
Logistique, d'Audit et de Formation 
(ILAF). This organisation has devel-
oped a retraining programme for un-
employed African executives living in 
France. Carefully selected for their 
skills, the participants in this course 
receive theoretical and practical 
training in company creation and 
management and prepare a pre-
feasibility study on a project of their 
choice, with a two-month spell at a 
French company in the sector con-
cerned. In particular, the CDI makes 
a financial contribution towards an 
"opportunity identification" trip to 
Africa for the originators of the best 
projects. To mount the project, the 
would-be managers can call upon the 
services of the local CDI antennae. 
If they prove to be sufficiently inter-
esting, the projects could also receive 
joint financial support from the CDI 
and the CFD, which also has local 
agencies. 
■ 
Contacts: 
• CDI: Dr Hamed Sow, 
Geographical Officer for West Africa. 
Tel: (32-2) 679 18 24. Fax: 675 26 03 
' ILAF: Mr Pierre Schal. 
Tel: (33) 26472071. Fax: 2649 0326 
■ . 
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Dredgers: 
Successful transfer 
of technology 
he article published in Partner-
ship No. 10 in November 1993 
concerning our project to transfer 
dredger construction technology to 
the ACP countries was a great suc-
cess. This project, initially limited to 
Nigeria, consisted in partly construct-
ing light dredgers on the spot- in part-
nership with a local entrepreneur -
specially designed for the conditions 
encountered in ACP countries. The 
operation received technical and 
marketing assistance from the CDI. 
Following this article, over 30 com-
panies from all four corners of the 
world, interested in this technology 
developed by Daniel Doyen TOYO 
(Belgium), got in touch with us. The 
excellent contacts established have 
led to a number of concrete results: 
■ NIGERIA: production and sales of 
dredgers are continuing at a sustained 
level; 
■ BENIN: SIBEAU has already pro-
duced four dredgers (the company 
received a loan from UN IDO for this); 
■ CAMEROON: negotiations are in 
course with SOCODES, a company 
that is prepared to manufacture the 
equipment; 
■ SENEGAL: a project for the con-
struction of a demonstration dredg-
er is well under way, again with the 
support of the CDI. It should be 
pointed out that West Africa is faced 
with a serious problem of beach ero-
sion and sand extraction is no longer 
allowed. One solution, therefore, is 
to extract river sand using simple, 
light, reliable and transportable 
equipment, which is the case with the 
dredgers in question; 
■ ANGOLA, ZAMBIA and ZAIRE: 
cooperation agreements are about to 
be signed for the local manufacture of 
dredgers. Here it is a question of ex-
tracting diamonds from deep rivers. 
But there have been reactions to Part-
nership from well beyond the ACP 
countries: contracts have also been 
signed - following this publication -
with companies in the MIDDLE EAST 
and the FAR EAST for excavation 
work for pipelines. The biggest suc-
cesses so far, however, have been in 
EGYPT and MOROCCO, for large 
dredging units, and in ALGERIA with 
a project for the local construction of 
39 dredgers. The objectives in these 
three countries have been, respec-
tively, to dig the foundations for a 
bridge over the Nile, dredging for the 
construction of a marina and the 
cleaning-out of dams. 
The lesson that we have learnt from 
this experience is that the concept of 
equipment adapted to suit local con-
ditions and partial manufacture on the 
spot can guarantee success: the prob-
lems connected with payments in 
hard currency aregreatly reduced and 
local maintenance of equipment in 
proper conditions is ensured. 
(I) This text was transmitted to us by Mr Ed-
ouard de Grand Ry. Sales Manager of DAN-
IEL DOYEN TOYO (Belgium}. 
ACP NETWORK 
■ Mozambique: CDI participation in 
the first conference on development of 
the private sector in Mozambique. 
This meeting was organised at the begin-
ning of July 1995 in Maputo by the Mo-
zambique government, with the support 
of the World Bank, the European Com-
mission and the Italian government. Mr 
Matos Rosa, Deputy Director of the CDI, 
was invited to describe the role of the CDI 
and the assistance possibilities offered by 
the Centre. A special programme is being 
prepared at the moment. The conference 
brought together representatives of the 
governmental authorities, the private sec-
tor and the banking sector, to study the 
handicaps holding back thegrowth and de-
velopment of the private sector in Mo-
zambique and to reach a consensus on a 
series of concrete actions to be brought 
into effect. During this mission, Mr Matos 
Rosa also visited two Mozambique com-
panies receiving assistance from the CDI, 
namely: 
• RIPLEX, an SME with a staff of 15, man-
ufacturing plastic articles (household 
goods, bottles, bags, etc.), whose prod-
ucts have been meeting with growing 
success on the market. RIPLEX has re-
ceived training and production start-up 
assistance. 
• "Lusalite du Mozambique", whose two 
plants in Maputo and Dondo manufacture 
sheets and accessories of asbestos cement. 
This company has been helped in the com-
missioning of new equipment. 
EU NETWORK 
■ New Greek expert on secondment 
to the CDI. On May 1st 1995, the Greek 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a Greek 
expert, Miss Dimitra Douma, available to 
the Technical Services Division (TD) of the 
European Network. Miss Dimitra Douma 
had been working in Athens since 1988 at 
the Development Division of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, where she was in charge 
of dossiers connected with the Lomé Con-
vention. »■»-»-
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■ Agreement between 
the CDI and the Comité 
belge du Forum franco-
phone des Affaires (FFA). 
The FFA, whose task is to pro-
mote partnerships between 
firms in the French-speaking 
regions of Belgium and com-
panies in the developing coun-
tries, has signed a cooperation 
agreement with the CDI. The 
FFA will place its own network 
of contacts and correspon-
dents in French-speaking Bel-
gium at the disposal of the 
Centre for the dissemination 
ofinformation on its activities 
and for the search for partners 
and appropriate technologies. 
The decentralised network of 
the CDI will be used to pro-
mote proposals for partner-
ships and technological trans-
fers from the FFA. The two 
bodies will endeavour to set 
up the possible cofinancing of 
projects via the funds that can 
be mobilised through the 
Agence générale de la 
Coopération au Développe-
ment (AGCD), the Belgian fi-
nance institution with which 
the Centre also has an agree-
ment. 
Contacts: 
• FFA: Mrs Lucile Lambert -
Ministiy of the Walloon Region. 
Tel: (32-2)211 5639. 
Fax: 211 55 37 
• CDI: Mr Paolo Baldan, Offi-
cer responsible for the Europe-
an Network, 
Tel: (32-2)679 1932. 
Fax: 675 26 03 
CALENDAR 
■ October 15-20 1995 
Botswana 
Industrial Partnership Meeting 
on Footwear Manufacture in 
Southern Africa 
(see pages 3) 
■ October 24-27 1995 
Libreville - Gabon 
MAT-CONSTRUCT '95 -
Building Materials and the 
Construction and Public Works 
Sector (see pages 3) 
■ November 6-10 1995 
Paramaribo - Surinam 
Industrial Partnership Meeting 
on the Wood Industries in the 
Caribbean 
(see pages 3-4) 
■ November 21-24 1995 
Dakar - Senegal 
AGRO-IND '95 - EUIACP 
Industrial Forum on Agro-
industries 
The CDI annual report has 
just been published. A pre-
cious source of informa-
tion on the whole range of 
actions carried out by the 
Centre. In particular, the 
report contains a detailed 
description of the 20 pro-
jects supported by the 
Centrein 1994. 
Contact: 
Mr K. Mbayi, Officer for 
External Rektions and 
Communications, 
Tel: (32-2)67919 61. 
Fax: 675 26 03 
CDI Director on working mission 
to Mauritania,Guinea Conakry 
and Mah 
■ , ·.. 
Partnership is a publication 
of the Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI), 
created under the ACP-EEC Lomé Convention. 
■ Responsible Editor: 
Mr. Surendra Sharma, Director of the CDI, 
Avenue Herrmann Debroux 52, B-1160 Brussels, Belgium. 
• Coordination: 
Mr. K. Mbay, CDI Communication and External Relations Officer 
Tel. : (32-2) 679 19 61 · Fax : (32-2) 675 26 03 
' Editing and production: European Service Network - Brussels 
The Director, Mr Surendra Shai-ma, discussing aspects of a lime 
crushing/ceramic tile manufacturing enterprise assisted by CDI 
in Mali. 
n early July, the Director, Mr Surendra Sharma, made 
an intensive week-long working visit to Mauritania, 
Guinea Conakry and Mali as well as a quick stop-over visit to 
Côte d'Ivoire, visiting several CDI-assisted projects, to assess 
the impact of assistance provided by the Centre. 
Mr Sharma held discussions with industrial project promot-
ers for possible future assistance, as well as with executive 
representatives of industry and manufacturers associations, 
for priority industry sector needs for CDI to focus upon. The 
Director also held discussions with Ministers of Industry and 
Planning, senior officials in these Ministries and National Au-
thorising officers, both to obtain an indication of the priority 
needs for CDI interventions, as well as to sensitise at govern-
ment level the importance of allocating some tangible sup-
port to private sector development via the National Indica-
tive Programme Funds, should ACP countries wish to 
continue receiving CDI's assistance to industry when the Sec-
ond Financial Protocol becomes effective from 1996 onwards. 
A further aspect of Mr Sharma's visit was to engage in frank 
discussions with executives of CDI's antenna institutions in 
the countries visited as well as with correspondents of CDI. 
The Director also agreed, in principle, for CDI to sponsor di-
rect assistance to small and medium scale enterprises through 
the use of local experts and consultants to be channelled via 
OP1P in Guinea Conakry and CAPES in Mali, both well re-
spected CDI antenna institutions in their respective coun-
tries. 
The Director also held meetings with EU Delegations in each 
of the countries visited both to solicit support for CDI ac-
tions and activities as well as to offer CDI's support to EU 
private sector development programmes conducted by the 
EU Delegation under the Lomé Convention. 
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Summary 
No. 88 — September 1995 
(position as at 12 August 1995)  PING COÜlC^- 3&o 
EC-financed development schemes 
The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EC 
development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows: 
Geographical breakdown 
The summary is divided into three groups of 
countries, corresponding to the main aspects of 
Community development policy: 
— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific), which signed the multilateral 
conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), 
Lomé II (31 October 1979), Lomé III (8 De-
cember 1984) and Lomé IV (15 December 
1989), plus the OCT (overseas countries and 
territories) of certain member states of the EC, 
which get the same type of aid as the ACP 
countries; 
— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and 
Mashraq), which signed cooperation agree-
ments with the EC since 1976 and 1977; 
— the ALA developing countries of Asia and 
Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of 
annual aid programmes. 
The information within each of these groups is 
given by recipient country (in alphabetical 
order). 
Note 
As the information provided is subject to 
modification in line with the development 
aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, 
or with the conditions laid down by the 
authorities empowered to take financial 
decisions, the EC is in no way bound by this 
summary, which is for information only. 
Information given 
The following details will usually be given for 
each development scheme: 
— the title of the project; 
— the administrative body responsible for it; 
— the estimated sum involved (priorto financing 
decision) or the amount actually provided (post 
financing decision) ; 
— a brief description of projects envisaged 
(construction work, supplies of equipment, 
technical assistance, etc.); 
— any methods of implementation (international 
invitations to tender, for example) ; 
— the stage the project has reached (identifi-
cation, appraisal, submission for financing, 
financing decision, ready for implementation). 
Main abbreviations 
Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority 
Int. tender: International invitation to 
tender 
Ace. tender: Invitation to tender (ac-
celerated procedure) 
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to 
tender 
TA: Technical assistance 
EDF: European Development Fund 
mECU: Million European currency units 
Correspondence about this operational summary can 
be sent directly to: : 
Mr. Franco Cupini 
Directorate-General for Development 
Commission of the European Union 
G 12 4-14 
200, rue de la Loi 
B-1049 Brussels 
Please cover only one subject at a time. 
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Al Planning and public administration 
A1A Administrative buildings 
A1 Β Economie planning and policy 
A1C Assistance to the normal operations of 
government not falling under a different 
category 
A1 D Police and fire protection 
A1 E Collection and publication of statistics of all 
kinds, information and documentation 
A1 F Economic surveys, pre-investment studies 
A1G Cartography, mapping, aerial photography 
A1 H Demography and manpower studies 
A2 Development of public utilities 
A2A Power production and distribution 
A2AÌ Electricity 
A2B Water supply 
A2C Communications 
A2D Transport and navigation 
A2E Meteorology 
A2F Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-
power) 
A3 Agriculture, fishing and forestry 
A3A Agricultural production 
A3B Service to agriculture 
A3 C Forestry 
A3D Fishing and hunting 
A3 E Conservation and extension 
A3F Agricultural storage 
A3G Agricultural construction 
A3H Home economics and nutrition 
A3I Land and soil surveys 
A4 Industry, mining and construction 
A4A Extractive industries 
A4AÌ Petroleum and natural gas 
A4B Manufacturing 
A4C Engineering and construction 
A4D Cottage industry and handicraft 
A4E Productivity, including management, auto-
mation, accountancy, business, finance and 
investment 
A4F Non-agricultural storage and warehousing 
A4G Research in industrial technology 
A5 Trade, banking, tourism and other 
services 
A5A Agricultural development banks 
A5B Industrial development banks 
A5C Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities 
A5D Export promotion 
A5E Trade, commerce and distribution 
A5F Co-operatives (except agriculture and hous-
ing) 
A5G Publishing, journalism, cinema, photog-
raphy 
A5H Other insurance and banking 
A5I Archaeological conservation, game reserves 
A6 Education 
A6A Primary and secondary education 
A6B University and higher technical institutes 
A6BÌ Medical 
A6C Teacher training 
A6Ci Agricultural training 
A6D Vocational and technical training 
A6E Educational administration 
A6F Pure or general research 
A6G Scientific documentation 
A6H Research in the field of education or training 
A6I Subsidiary services 
A6J Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc. 
A7 Health 
A7A Hospitals and clinics 
A7B Maternal and child care 
A7C Family planning and population-related 
research 
A7D Other medical and dental services 
A7E Public health administration 
A7F Medical insurance programmes 
A8 Social infrastructure and social wel-
fare 
A8A Housing, urban and rural 
A8B Community development and facilities 
A8C Environmental sanitation 
A8D Labour 
A8E Social welfare, social security and other 
social schemes 
A8F Environmental protection 
A8G Flood control 
A8H Land settlement 
A8I Cultural activities 
A9 Multisector 
A9A River development 
A9B Regional development projects 
A10 Unspecified 
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY ACP STATES 
New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left 
Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics 
ANGOLA 
Health project 'Post-emergency'. 15 
mECU. TA. to the Ministry of Health, supply 
of medicines, health projects in Luanda, 
fight against AIDS. Works, supplies, T.A. 
and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ANG 7007 A7 
Artisanal fisheries in Namibe. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry for Fisheries. Estimate 
10.400 mECU. Works, supply of equipment 
and boats, T.A., training, line of credit. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ANG 6032(7) A3d 
Rehabilitation of the Tchivinguiro 
Institute. Estimated total cost 9 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ANG 7014 A6b 
Reconstruction support prog-
ramme. Estimated total cost 58 mECU. 
Relaunch of economic and social activities. 
Improvement of basic social services and 
living conditions, poverty alleviation, in-
crease of production and of basic communi-
cation possibilities, amelioration of basic 
infrastructures, participation in mine-clear-
ing operations, support for demobilisation. 
Project on appraisal. 7 th EDF. 
EDF ANG 6036 A7.A8 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
Livestock development. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.130 
mECU. Supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF AB 5003 (7001) A3a 
Upgrading and expansion of Antigua 
Hotel Training Centre. Construction of 
and equipment for part new and part re-
novated and upgraded facilities. Estimated 
cost 2.200 mECU. Works, supplies, design 
and supervision, T.A. and training. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF AB 7001 A6d 
BENIN 
Fish breeding. Applied research and 
popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: 
MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF BEN 6009 A3d 
Rehabilitation of the Cotonou-Hi-
lacondji Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics et des Transports. Estimated 
cost 1 7 mECU. Rehabilitation works over 93 
km. Works by int. tender. Supervision, 
geotechnical control, follow-up, evaluation. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BEN 6017 A2d 
Rural structures programme in 
Mono Province. Resp. Auth. : Ministère du 
Plan et de la Restructuration Economique. 
6.500 mECU. Work construction, rehabili-
tation of water systems, roads, schools, 
markets, warehouses, Works by ace. tender, 
supplies by local manufacturers. T.A., evalu-
ation. Participation NGO AFVP (F). Date 
financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF BEN/6003/001 A3a 
BURKINA FASO 
Tougan — Ouahigouya — Mali 
border road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics. Modern earth-road. Super-
vision: short-list done. Estimated cost 
13.5m ECU. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing 1st half 95. 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7004 A2d 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. 95-96. Hard currency allowance 
to import ACP and EC goods, with negative 
list. 25 mECU. T.A. for starting and follow-
up. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7200/002 A1c 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural — Cereals. 6.100 mECU. 
Support for institutional reform, works, 
supply of equipment, T.A., lines of credit. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7009 A3a 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural — Environment. Estimated 
cost 1.950 mECU. Soil map and inventory, 
soil management and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7010 A3a 
Periodical maintenance programme. 
Ouagadougou-Ghana, Bobo-Côte d'Ivoire, 
and Bobo-Mali. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics. Estimated total cost 30 
mECU. Works, supervision, T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 6017 A2d 
Support project for the reform of the 
pharmaceutical sector. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de la Santé - Direction des 
Services Pharmaceutiques (DSPh) and 
CAM EG. 1.6 mECU. Line of credit, works, 
equipment and T.A. Date financing June 95. 
8th EDF. 
EDF BK 7017 A7c 
Geological cartography. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de l'Energie et des Mines. Es-
timated total cost 15 mECU. Aerial geophy-
sical survey for the middle west, creation of a 
national geophysical data bank, geological 
mapping 1/200.000. Works, equipment, 
T.A. Tender dossiers preparation : short-lists 
to be done. Project on appraisal. 7 th EDF 
EDF BK SYS 9999 A Ig, A4 
BURUNDI 
Ruvubu Game Development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement, du 
Tourisme et de l'Environnement. 4 mECU. 
Supervision and management. Works, sup-
plies, T.Α., training and awareness-raising. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 6029 A5i 
Support project for micro-enter-
prises. 10 m ECU. Support to prepare 
technical dossiers, management follow-up. 
T.A., training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 7004 A4, A5 
Health rehabilitation in the pro-
vinces of Bubanza, Cibitoke, Rutana, 
Ruyigi and Cankuzo. 5.500 mECU. 
Works, equipment, T.A. and evaluation. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 7003 A7 
CAMEROON 
Integrated rural development pro-
gramme in the North-East and North-
west Benoué regions. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istère du Plan et de l'Aménagement du 
Territoire. Estimated cost 13.350 mECU. 
Works, equipment, T.A., training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6002/7001 A3a 
General Import Programme. Hard 
currency allowance to import ACP and EC 
goods with negative list. 20.200 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 7200/001 A1c 
Lagdo fishing project. Resp. Auth.: 
MINEPIA. Estimated cost 3.500 mECU. 
Preservation and improvement of the social-
economic situation around Lake Lagdo. 
Project on appraisal. 7 th EDF. 
EDF CM 6002/002 A3a 
Protection and sanitation for 
Kousseri town. Kousseri road net-
work. Resp. Auth.: MINTP. Estimated cost 
4 mECU. Dyke rehabilitation works along 
the Logoni river, road works and rain water 
drainage. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6022 A8g, A9a 
Access road to the Tikar Plain. Resp. 
Auth.: MINTP. Estimated cost 14.232 
mECU. Road works over the Kakar-Sabon-
gari-Atta-Sonkolong road. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6037 A2d 
Tikar Plain development. Resp. Auth. : 
MINAT. Estimated total cost 8 mECU. 
Social-economic improvement. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6004 A3a 
CAPE VERDE 
Rural electrification - Praia. Resp. 
Auth.: Municipalité de Praia. Estimated cost 
1.457 mECU. Works and supply of equip-
ment for the electrification of 3 centres in 
'rural Praia'. (Diesel power station and LT/ 
MT distribution network). Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CV 7005 A2ai 
Solar Regional Programme. 3rd part. 
Resp. Auth.: Cellule nationale de réalisation 
du P.R.S. Estimated cost 0.507 mECU. 
Construction, rehabilitation, equipment, 
support mission, awareness-raising. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CV 7006 A2b, A3e 
Road infrastructure improvement in 
the Santiago, São Nicolau and Maio 
islands. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Infra-
structures et des Transports - Direction 
Générale des Infrastructures. 3.090 mECU. 
Works by ace. tender. Work supervision 
short-list done. Date financing June 95. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF CV 7003 A2d 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
Support for Structural Adjustment. 
General Import Programme. Hard cur-
rency allowance to import ACP and EC 
goods with negative list. 10 mECU. T.A. 
foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
CA 7200 A1 c 
Support for agricultural production 
and for rural centres self-promotion. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Agriculture et de 
l'Elevage. 8.500 mECU. Works by direct 
labour. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. evalu-
ation, audit, training and follow-up. Project 
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EDF CA 6005/001  A3a 
Support for Primary Health Care in 
the Basse-Kotto region. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de la Santé, Publique et de la 
Population. 1.800 mECU. Buildings, wa-
rehouses, Health centres, medical equip-
ment, vehicles, medicines, T.A. evaluation, 
training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CA 7004 A7, A8 
Support for the transport sectoral 
programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Transports et desTravaux Publics. Estimated 
cost 50 mECU. Road rehabilitation. Works, 
supervision, supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CA 6008 A2d 
COMOROS 
Sea-access to Moheli island. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement— Direc-
tion Générale des Travaux Publics. 3.250 
mECU. Works, by int. tender. T.A. for further 
investigations, tender dossier and works 
supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 6006/7003 A2d 
Development of cultivation for 
export. Vanilla and Ylang Ylang. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère du Dev. Rural. 1.900 
mECU. Vanilla and improvement of quality 
(laboratory, management, marketing). 
Supply of non-wood ovens. Crop diversifi-
cation. Equipment, T.A. and training. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7004 A3a 
Support for the establishment of the 
'Centre National de l'Artisanat Ca-
morien'. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Eco-
nomie, du Plan, de l'Industrie et de l'Arti-
sanat. 0.300 mECU. Works, equipment and 
T.A. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM (REG) 6502/001 A4d 
CHAD 
Re-launch of the fishing sector. Es-
timated cost 2.500 mECU. Sectoral study: 
short list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CD 7011 A3a 
River Chari embankment protection. 
Estimated total cost 5 mECU. To improve 
living conditions in N'Djamena. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CD 5027 A8f,g 
Support for the electoral process. 
Resp. Auth. : UNDP(PNUD). Estimated total 
cost 0.500 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6 th 
EDF 
EDF CD 7015 Ale 
CONGO 
Support for the Health Development 
National Programme. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istère de la Santé. 10 mECU. Construction 
and rehabilitation works, T.Α., training, 
supply of equipment and medicines. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF COB 7005 A7 
Support for population and housing 
general census. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de 
l'Economie et du Plan-Centre National de la 
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques. EDF 
part 0.500 mECU. Supply of equipment and 
* T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF COB 7008 Alg,h 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Support programme for the 'pineap-
ple market'. Estimated cost 7.780 mECU. 
EDF 6.100 mECU, O.C.A.B. (Organisation 
Centrale des Producteurs - Exportateurs 
d'Ananas et des Bananes), 1.680 mECU. 
Works, supplies, T.A., training, studies, line 
of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6016 A3a 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. Phase III. 28.800 
mECU. Hard currency allowance to import 
ACP and EC goods, with negative list. T.A. 
foreseen. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF 7200/002 A1c 
Irrigated rice-growing areas in the 
Central and Northern Central regions. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF 
15.700 mECU. Infrastructure, organization, 
training. Works, supply of vehicles, equip-
ment, T.A., studies, training. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 5021/001 A3a 
Support for the establishment of a 
service company. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Industrie et du Commerce. Estimated 
total cost 5 mECU. Support structure for 
SME's. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 7012 A5d,e 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. Phase IV. Estimated 
cost 20.500 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 7200/003 A1 c 
Emergency rescue centre in ABOBO. 
Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Medical and 
fire rescue centre for the North-Eastern zone 
of Grand Abidjan. Building, vehicles and 
equipment. Identification study for the 
centre: short-list to be done. Project on 
appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6019 A1d,A7d 
DJIBOUTI 
Fight against desertification and 
development of livestock husbandry in 
Western-Djibouti. Resp. Auth. : Ministère 
de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural. 
1.665 mECU. Supply of equipment, studies, 
T.A. Project suspended. 7th EDF. 
EDF DI 6008 A3a 
Health training programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique et des 
Affaires Sociales. 0.750 mECU. T.A., schol-
arships, seminars, training. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DI 7101/002 A7e 
DOMINICA 
Eco-Tourism Site Development. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Tourism (MTIT). Estimated total cost 0.558 
mECU. EDF 0.500 mECU, local 0.058 
mECU. Works, equipment and training. 
Project on appraisal. 7 th EDF. 
EDF DOM 60021001 A5c 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Geological and mining development 
programme. 23 mECU. Studies, program-
mes management, works, T.A. and evalu-
ation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO SYS 9999 A4a,e 
Los Toros Hydroelectric project. 
Construction of a hydroelectric power 
station. Civil works, supply of electrome-
chanical and hydromechanical equipment. 
Capacity 9.2 Mw. Annual output 57.27 
Gwh. Estimated cost 25.4 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7005 A2ai 
Support programme for the private 
sector. Estimated total cost 7 mECU. EDF 
4.2 mECU, local 0.950 mECU, local private 
sector and SME'S 1.4 mECU, C.D.I. 0.450 
mECU. EDF part: line of credit and T.A. Date 
financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
Essential goods import programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Presidency of the Republic. 
Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency 
allowance to import essential goods. Project 
on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF EG 0000 A1c 
Conservation and rational utilisation 
of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming, 
Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General 
for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classifi-
cation and Use Master Plan — National 
System of Conservation Units — Forest 
Training and Research Centre. T.A. and 
supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF EG 6001 A3c, e, i 
Rural development programme in 
the South-East. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de 
l'Agriculture. 4.500 mECU. Works, supplies 
and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF EG 6005 (7001) A3a 
ERITREA 
Rehabilitation Programme. 3.7 
mECU. NGO projects for health, veterinary 
services, water supply and demobilization of 
soldiers. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ERY 7255 A7.A8 
ETHIOPIA 
Strengthening of water supply and 
sanitation in Addis Ababa. Resp. Auth.: 
Addis Ababa Water Supply and Sewerage 
Authority. Estimated cost 1.990 mECU. 
Supply of metering and control equipment. 
T.A. and consultancies. Project on appraisal. 
7th EDF. 
EDF ET 5006/7 A2b,A8c 
Rehabilitation of the Addis-Ababa -
Modjo - Awasa Road. Resp. Auth.: 
Ethiopian Road Authority. Estimated cost 40 
mECU. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7005 A2d 
Social Rehabilitation Programme. 
EDF 6.868 mECU. Rehabilitation of health 
(including water and sanitation) services 
and of agri-pastoral activities. Works, sup-
plies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7012 A3-A7-A8 
Reintegration of displaced Ethiopian 
nationals from Eritrea. Estimated cost 2 
mECU. Works, training, line of credit, T.A. 
and supply of equipment. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7255/001 A8b,e 
SM E development programme. Es-
timated total cost 25 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7003 A5 
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Mining development programme 
and diversification. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère des Mines, de l'Energie et des Re-
ssources Hydrauliques. Estimated cost 14 
mECU. Works by direct labour and int. 
tenders. Equipment by int. tender, T.A., 
follow-up and evaluation. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF/SYS/GA9999 A4a 
Rural water supply and micro-pro-
jects in 3 provinces. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère de l'Eau et de l'Energie. 8.600 mECU. 
300 new wells and rehabilitation of 210 
existing water points. Drinking water for 
Haut-Ogooué, Ngounié and Woleu-Ntem 
provinces. Works, supply of equipment, T.A., 
training,follow-up. Projectin execution.7th 
EDF. 
EDF GA 6015 A2b 
GAMBIA 
General Import Programme. Support 
for Structural Adjustment. Hard cur-
rency allowance to import ACP and EC 
goods, with negative list. 1.400 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GM 7200/002 A1c 
GHANA 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. 5 mECU. Supply of equipment. 
T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF G H 7003 A6 
Western Region Agricultural De-
velopment Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture. 15 mECU. T.A., 
buildings and training, supply of equipment. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDFGH A3a 
Lomé IV - Microprojects prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Finance & 
Economic Planning. 7 mECU. T.A., transport 
+ equipment, materials and supplies. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF G H A3a 
Protected Area Development in 
South Western Ghana. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Land and Forestry. 5 mECU. Τ.Α., 
* buildings, equipment and supplies. Project 
in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF GH 7005 A3a 
Woodworking Sector Development. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Econ-
omic Planning. 4.5 mECU. Equipment, T.A., 
overseas training. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDFGH A3c 
Transport Infrastructure Prog-
ramme. Phase II. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of 
Roads & Highways. 70 mECU. Works, 
supplies, supervision, training. Project on 
appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDFGH A2d 
General Import Programme III. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Economic 
Planning. 32.2 mECU. T.A. for monitoring. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDFGH A1c 
University Link. University of Ghana 
-Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Resp. Auth. : 
Ministry of Education. 1.2 mECU. Τ.Α., 
equipment, scholarships, evaluation. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GH 7101/001 A6b 
Microprojects programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Labour, Social Service, 
Community Development. 0.220 mECU. 
Water supply, road improvements, repairs 
and extension of schools, medical and 
community centre and sports grounds. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GRD 7102 
Rehabilitation of the Bellevue-Gren-
ville Section of the Eastern Main Road 
- Grenville - Mama Cannes portion. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 2 mECU. 
Works by direct labour, small T.A. and supply 
of equipment for repairs. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GRD 7002/001 A2d 
GUINEA 
Development of secondary towns. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement 
du Territoire. Estimated cost 7 mECU. Build-
ings, market, railway stations, roads, T.A. 
and training, management, work super-
vision, supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUI 7008 A8a,b 
General Import Programme. Support 
for Structural Adjustment. 19 mECU. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUI 7200 A1 c 
GUINEA BISSAU 
João Landim bridge construction. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
Estimated cost 23 mECU. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 7013 A2d 
Livestock development. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère du Dév. Rural. Estimated cost 
1.200 mECU. Zootechnical actions, privatis-
ation, veterinary profession. Supply of 
equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF GUB 5007/003 A3a 
Support to create environmental 
legislation. Resp. Auth.: National Council 
for Environment. (CNA) 0.500 mECU. T.A., 
seminars, training. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF GUB 7011 A8f 
Conservation and rational use of 
fragile eco-systems. Resp. Auth.: Secré-
tariat d'Etat au Tourisme, Environnement et 
Artisanat. 1.350 mECU. Buba region and 
Cufada region. Works, supply of equipment 
* and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 7011/001 A8f 
GUYANA 
Pouderoyen water supply system. 
Resp. Auth.: Guyana Water Authority 
(GUYWA). 6 mECU. Raw water supply, 
treatment process, storage reservoirs, site 
work, transmission main, distribution main, 
T.A., supervision, evaluation. Date June 95. 
7th EDF. 
EDF GUA 7003 A2b 
HAITI 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. Resp. Auth. : Ministère 
des Finances. 23 mECU. General Import 
Programme with negative list. Different T.A. 
with individual experts. Date June 95. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF HA 7200 A1c 
Credit scheme for micro and small 
enterprises. Resp. Auth.: Planning In-
stitute of Jamaica. Implementation by Apex 
Institution and Coordination and Monitor-
ing Unit. 7 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and 
evaluation. Project on appraisal. 5th, 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF J M 5020 A4.A5 
Institutional strengthening prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth. : National Water Com-
mission (NWC). Estimated cost 3 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF J M 7005 A8a,b,c 
Agricultural sector support prog-
ramme (ASSAP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Agriculture - Rural and agriculture dev. 
Auth. (RADA). 5 mECU. More sustainable 
farming systems, soil conservation, reaffor-
estation and community education. Works, 
supply of vehicles, equipment, T.A. studies. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF J M 7004 A3a 
KENYA 
Strengthening of STD and HIV/AIDS 
Programme in Nairobi and Mombasa. 
Special Treatment Clinic (STC) in Nairobi 
and the Ganjoni clinic at Mombasa. 1.577 
mECU. Works, supply of equipment by int. 
tender, T.A. training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF K E 08000 A7b,c 
Farming in tsetse infested areas. 
Estimated total cost 14.600 mECU. Refine 
the techniques to trap the tsetse fly and 
develop better technologies to prevent 
infections. Monitor the environmental 
impact of the techniques. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF KE 7011 A3a 
Emergency Repair of Nairobi-Mom-
basa Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public 
Works and Horning (MoPW&H). 1.966 
mECU. Works, by ace. tender. Supervision. 
•k Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF KE 7010/001 A2d 
Family Health Programme. Estimated 
total cost 28.710 mECU. Reproduction 
health status of Kenyans family planning 
services broadened. EDF 14.810 mECU, 
ODA (UK) 13.900mECU. Project on ap-
praisal. 6th and 7th EDF 
EDF KE 7015 A7b 
KIRIBATI 
Airport development programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport. 1.200 
mECU. Upgrading of airport operations and 
security in Tarawa, Kiritimati and Kanton 
atolls. Small scale building works and minor 
supplies with associated training and short-
term expertise. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF Kl 7005 A2d 
LIBERIA 
Rehabilitation Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: EC aid coordination office in Mon-
rovia. 25 mECU. Essential repairs to water 
and power supply systems, restoration of 
basic health and school facilities, distri-
bution of seeds and tools, improved access 
to isolated regions, assisting the re-integ-
ration of ex-combatants and returning re-
fugees. Implementation by local NGOs and 
European NGOs. Project in execution. 6th 
lho Courier no. 163 — leplember· October 1995 and 7th EDF. 
EDF LBR 7001 
MADAGASCAR 
A1c 
equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MAI 6009/001 A7b,c 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6116/001  A2a,ai,b 
Kamolandy bridge reconstruction. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
1.540 mECU. Submersible-type bridge. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAG 6027 A2d 
Road infrastructure rehabilitation. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
Estimate 72.500 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works, supervision. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 95. 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDF MAG 7004 A2d 
Support programme to rehabilitate 
social and economic infrastructures. 
Interventions after cyclones. EDF part 
17.500 mECU. Railways and road rehabili-
tation, small hydraulic works. Social infra-
structure rehabilitation. Technical expertise 
study to be done for roads. Works, supplies, 
supervision and control, evaluation. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAG 7009 A2, A8 
Bemaraha Project. 2nd phase. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministère d'Etat au Dév. Rural. 0.700 
mECU. Training and awareness-raising for 
the protection of cultural and environmental 
wealth of the 'Tsingy de Bemaraha' region. 
Classified world property site by Unesco. 
Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd 
half 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAG 7020 A3a 
First decentralized cooperation pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.; National Author-
ising officer and Head of EU Delegation and 
authorized NGOs 1.900 mECU. Works, 
purchase of equipment by direct agreement, 
restr. tender or int. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAG 7022/000 A7.A8 
MALAWI 
Poverty alleviation programme-
Pilot project Agroforestry. Resp. Auth. : 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock De-
velopment MOALD. 1 mECU. Sustainable 
land utilisation on catchment area level 
achieved and water supply and sanitation at 
household and village level improved. 
Equipment and T.A. T.A. : short-list done. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MAI 5001/001 A3a 
Poverty Alleviation Programme-Ag-
roforestry component. Resp. Auth.: 
MOALD. Estimated total cost 47 mECU. 
EDF 22 mECU, local 2 mECU, counterpart 
funds from food aid 94 23 mECU. Water 
supply, sanitation, supply of fertilizers, T.A. 
and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAI 5001/002 A3a 
Structural Adjustment Programme 
1995. Estimated cost 26.100 mECU. Gen-
eral Import programme. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing June 95. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MAI 7200 A1 c 
Information, education and com-
munication population programme. 
Resp. Auth. : NAO-Ministry for Women and 
Children's Affairs, Community and Social 
Services - Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. 
Increase awareness and promote behaviour 
change as regards reproductive health, 
including disease prevention. Supply of 
MALI 
Support to develop rural credit. Resp. 
Auth. : Banque Nationale de Développement 
Agricole. BNDA. EDF part 1.910 mECU. T.A. 
and line of credit, training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001/002 A5a 
Better use of surface waters in the 
5th region. Consolidation. Resp. Auth.: 
Gouvernorat de Mopti. EDF 4.300 mECU. 
Works, irrigation, supply of pumps, inputs, 
T.A., follow-up and evaluation, training, 
research. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF M LI 6005/002 A3a 
Support for the programme for the 
rehabilitation and maintenance of 
priority roads. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
l'Equipement et de Transport. Estimated cost 
43.4 mECU. Rehabilitation and strengthen-
ing of 380 kms of bitumenised roads 
(Ségou-Koutia la-Burkina Border-Ouan-
Sévaré) and strengthening of 1 80 kms of the 
Diéma- Didiéni road. Supervision. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7004 A2d 
Support for the decentralisation 
programme. Estimated cost 0.600 mECU. 
T.A., studies, communication campaigns, 
equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7009 A1 b 
Support for 'Crédit Initiative - S.A.'. 
Resp. Auth.: Crédit Initiative S.A. under 
control of Ministère des Finances. Estimated 
cost 3 mECU. Credit to S M E's, management, 
project studies. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001/006 A4d,c-A5 
Support for the Ministry of External 
Affairs. Resp. Auth.: Ordonnateur 
National. 0.300 mECU. Support for the 
ACP/EC cooperation unit and for the deleg-
ation for African integration. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6007/001 Ale 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme 95-96. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère des Finances et du Commerce. 25 
mECU. General Import Programme with 
negative list. T.A. foreseen. Date financing 
June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7200 A1c 
Support for HIV/AIDS programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé - Centre 
National de Transfusion Sanguine (CNTS). 
1.41 0 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, 
TA., training ΤΑ. : CRTS Anger ( F). Medical 
equipment, equipment procured by CRTS 
Anger (F). Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7015 A7b,c 
MAURITANIA 
Second Road Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 7.350 
mECU. Supply of equipment and materials 
by int. tender. Studies, auditing, T.A. and 
training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6004-7004 A2d 
National measures to support the 
Solar Regional Programme. Estimated 
cost 2.520 mECU. Infrastructural works 
(tanks, wells, pipes) and awareness-raising, 
training and follow-up for the recipient 
communities, works and T.A. Project on 
Aleg lake region economic develop-
ment. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural 
et de l'Environnement. 3 mECU. Irrigation in 
2.000 ha. Works, studies, evaluation, T.A. 
7th EDF.Date financing June 95. 
EDF MAU 7014 A3 
Support for farmers in Gorgol and 
Trarza regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du 
Développement Rural et de l'Environne-
ment. 1 mECU. Equipment, T.A. evaluation, 
follow-up. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 7015 A3a 
S.N.I.IVI. rehabilitation and rational-
isation. Resp. Auth.: SNIM - Soc. Nat. 
Industr. et Minière. 58 mECU. Nouadhibou 
port dredging, supply of specialized equip-
ment for mining. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU-SYSMIN 9999 A4a 
Institutional support for the rural 
and economic development of the 
Tagant region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du 
Dév. Rural et de l'Environnement. 0.700 
mECU. Works, supply of equipment, T.A. 
* Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 7007 A3a 
MAURITIUS 
National solid waste management 
project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environ-
ment and Quality of Life. Estimate 8.650 
mECU. EDF 7 mECU. Construction of a fully 
enginered landfill to cater for about 600 t of 
solid waste per day. Works and supplies by 
int. tender. T.A. for supervision and evalu-
ation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAS 6017 A8b,c,f 
AIDS programme, Resp. Auth.: Min-
istry of Health. 0.423 mECU. Prevention of 
sexual transmission, maintenance of safe 
blood supply, rationalisation of patient 
management. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAS 7004 A7b,c 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Socio-economic reintegration of 
young people. Estimated cost 1.950 
mECU. Supplies, T.A. and pilot actions. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF MOZ 7017 A8b 
Supply of voting material. Estimated 
cost 13 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MOZ 7004/001 A1c 
Rehabilitation of the rural health 
system. Estimated cost 42 mECU. Rehabili-
tation and renovation of 7 rural hospitals and 
2 health centres. Supply of essential medi-
cines and equipment, T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MOZ 7018 A7a,e 
NAMIBIA 
Namibia Integrated Health Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Health and 
Social Services. 13.500 mECU. Infrastruc-
tures, equipment, training and T.A. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd 
half 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7007 A7 
Expansion of NBC transmitter net-
work and production facilities for 
educational broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: 
Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. Es-
timated total cost 5.7 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, 
VI  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY local 0.700 mECU. Works, supply of equip-
ment, technical training and technical con-
sultancies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7005 A6i 
Rural Development Support Pro-
gramme for the Northern Communal 
Areas. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Agriculture, 
Water and Rural Development. 7.7 mECU. 
Strengthening of the agricultural extension 
service, training of extension officiers and 
establishment of a rural credit system. 
Supply of office equipment, vehicles, agric-
ultural inputs, T.A., training, evaluation. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7011 A3a 
Rural towns sewerage schemes. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local Government 
and Housing. Estimated cost 2.500 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7015 A8c 
Namibia Tourism Development Pro-
gramme. (Foundation Phase). Resp. 
Auth. : Ministry of Environment and Tourism. 
1.882 mECU. Establishment of a Tourism 
Board and commercialisation of the Govern-
ment resorts (Namibian Wildlife Resorts). 
Staff training. T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF NAM 7010 A5c 
NIGER 
Road infrastructures and telecom-
munications. 40 mECU. Rehabilitation of 
Tillabery-Ayorou (Tender launched), Farie-
Tera and Say-Tapoa roads. For telecom-
munications: earth station in Arlit and 
administrative centre in Niamey. Works and 
supervision. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF NIR 7005 A2d, c 
Integrated development programme 
in the sheep-farming zone. (Azaouak, 
Tadressand Nord-Dakoro). Resp. Auth.: 
Ministères de l'Hydraulique et de l'Environ-
nement, de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage, de la 
Santé Publique et de l'Education Nationale. 
18 mECU. Rehabilitation works, wells, 
drilling, supply of equipment, T.A, training, 
evaluation and follow-up. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF 
EDF NIR 7012 A3a 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance to 
import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 
20 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF NIR 7200 A1c 
Decentralized cooperation prog-
ramme. Rural development and creation of 
private companies. 1.5 mECU. Works, sup-
* plies and T.A. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF NIR 7013 A3,A5 
Fishery development in the southern 
Zinder zone. Resp. Auth.: NGO under 
control of Ministère de l'Hydraulique et de 
l'Environnement. Estimated total cost 0.500 
mECU. Professional sector organisation, 
strengthening of fish marketing. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NIR 7014 A3a 
Environmental protection prog-
ramme in the lower Tarka Valley. Es-
timated total cost 10 mECU. To stop ecol-
ogical and economical destruction of the 
zone. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NIR 6002/002 A3a 
NIGERIA 
Human resources development. Insti-
tutional support for community develop-
ment and vocational training. Estimate 17 
mECU. Supplies, T.A. training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7006 A6b,c,d 
Basic health care programme. Es-
timated total cost 2 mECU. Improve provi-
sion of primary health care. Preparation of 
Health Master Plans. Project on appraisal. 
7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7010 A7b 
Drugs demand reduction prog-
ramme. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. 
Improved health of young people. Reduc-
tion in drug usage. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UNI 7013 A7e 
AIDS programme- Phase II. Estimated 
total cost 2 mECU. Improved health care 
provision, to reduce incidence of AIDS. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7014 A7b,c 
Regional Road Programme, Borno 
and Yobe States. Estimated total cost 20 
mECU. Construction/rehabilitation of re-
gional road linking Nigeria and Niger. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7002 A2d 
Middle Belt rural water supply. Es-
timated total cost 15 mECU. Improve health 
and diet. Improve drinking water supply to 
rural communities. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UNI 7012 A2b 
Yobe State Rural Development Pro-
gramme (NEAZDP II). Estimated total 
cost 16.5 mECU. Poverty alleviation. In-
creased rural supply of drinking water. 
Improved provision of health and education 
services. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 6002/001 A3a 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: National Dept. of 
Education (NDOE) and Commission for 
Higher Education (CHE). 15 mECU. Works: 
building renovation, university construction, 
rehabilitation works, works supervision, 
scholarships, training. Works for the un-
iversity by int. tender. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF PNG 6008/7001 A6a,b 
Environmental Monitoring of 
Mining. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of the Environ-
ment and Conservation. EDF 1.6 mECU. 
T.A. for 30 man/months and technical 
consultancies. Training. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF 
EDF PNG 7001 A4a 
E.U. Programme Management Unit 
in support of the National Authorising 
Officer (NAO). Estimated cost 1.200 
mECU. T.A., training and auditing. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF PNG 6001 A1c 
ENB High School Emergency Up-
grading Programme. 2 mECU. Enlarge-
ment of existing schools. Works by ace. 
stender. Supply of equipment, T.A. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF PNG 7004 A6a 
SENEGAL 
St-Louis regional development pro-
gramme. 22.5 mECU. Job creation, lines of 
credit, T.A. to the S.M.E's, training, studies. 
Health centres, clinics, medical equipment 
and consumables, training, information. T.A. 
to the Direction Regionalein St-Louis and to 
the Sen/ice des Grandes Endémies in Podor. 
Drainage network, sanitation. Environ-
mental protection with wind-breaks. T.A. 
Study of a water-engineering scheme in 
Podor. Works by ace. tender. Supplies by int. 
tender. T.A. by restr. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 6002/7002 A3a 
Support for the economic develop-
ment of the Ziguinchor region. 1.990 
mECU. Line of credit for SM E's and support 
for artisanal fisheries. Supply of equipment, 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF SE 5024/7001 A3a 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme with negative list. 20.100 mECU. 
T.A. foreseen. Date financing June 95. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF SE 7200/002 A1c 
SIERRA LEONE 
Improvement of Freetown - Conakry 
road link. Estimated cost 30 mECU. Re-
construction of about 120 kms of road from 
Masiaka in Sierra Leone to Farmoreah in 
Guinea. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF SL 7004 A2d 
Sierra Leone roads authority (SLRA) 
support programme. Resp. Auth.: SLRA. 
22.500 mECU. To strengthen SLRA's man-
agement capacity, support maintenance 
operations, rehabilitate 160 km of road, 
provide training and equipment to enable 
local private contractors to increase their role 
in road works. Rehabilitation works, equip-
ment, T.A. to SLRA. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF SL 7002 A2d 
SOMALIA 
Rehabilitation programme. 38 mECU. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF 
EDF SO 6029 
SURINAME 
Rice research and breeding station. 
Resp. Auth.: Suriname National Rice In-
stitute (SNRI). 3.215 mECU. Construction 
of research facility, laboratory, research, field 
equipment, office and transport equipment, 
T.A., training, monitoring and evaluation. 
T.A. short-list done. Works by ace. tender, 
supplies by int. tender. Project in ex-
ecution.7th EDF. 
EDF SUR 60002 A3a 
Tourism development programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Suriname Tourism Foundation. 
Estimated total cost 0.849 mECU. Insti-
tutional strengthening, statistics and re-
search, product upgrading and develop-
ment, tourism awareness programme, mar-
keting and promotion, human resource 
development. Supply of equipment and T.A. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF SUR 7003 A5c 
SWAZILAND 
Technical Cooperation programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Government of Swaziland 
(N.A.O.) 1.860 mECU.T.A. 12 person-years 
to selected agencies in the public and 
parastatal sectors. Project on appraisal. 7th 
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EDF SW 7001  A1f 
Science and Mathematics Advice 
and Regional Training (SMART). Resp. 
Auth. : The University of Swaziland - Train-
ing Dept. 0.720 mECU. Supply of equipment 
and materials by int. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF SW 6101/7 A6b 
TANZANIA 
Support for Aids Control in Tan-
zania. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 
4 mECU. To strengthen health and other 
support services. Supply of equipment and 
T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 08000/000 (7001 ) A7c 
Mwanza-Nyanguge Road Rehabili-
tation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport 
and Communications. Estimated cost 35 
mECU. Rehabilitation of 62 km of trunk 
roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and Mwanza 
airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza se-
werage system (main works). Design study 
ongoing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6021 A2d 
Mwanza Water Supply. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and 
Minerals. Estimated cost 11.100 mECU. 
Works, pumping equipment, studies and 
supervision. Short-list done. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 5005(7) A2b 
Iringa Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. 
Estimated cost 9.100 mECU. Pumping, 
treatment, storage and distribution. Works, 
equipment, design and supervision. Short-
list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7009 A2 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Phase III. Resp. Auth.: Bank of 
Tanzania. 30 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7200/002 A1c 
Assistance for the 1994-95 electoral 
process. Estimated cost 1.700 mECU. 
Supply of voting material and equipment. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7017 A1c 
Ruvuma-Mbeya Environmental Pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Regional Develop-
ment Authorities. Estimate 10 mECU. Im-
provement of forest conservation and use. 
Supplies, T.A., studies, training, manage-
ment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7018 A3c 
Support for coffee research. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated 
total cost 1.98 mECU. T.A. and supply of 
equipment for the research centres, training. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6001/002 A3a 
Road rehabilitation and mainten-
ance (Ruvuma and Iringa Regions). 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transports and 
Communications. Estimated total cost 15 
mECU. EDF 1 2 mECU, local 3 mECU. Road 
rehabilitation, support to regional and dis-
trict engineers'offices, training of local 
contractors. T.A. and supplies. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7011 A2d 
TOGO 
Educational project AIDS/STD. 
Phase II. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la Santé. 
0.625 mECU. Training, pedagogical equip-
ment, supplies audit, T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF TO 7003 A7b,c 
TONGA 
Vava'u Airport Development Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation 
2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment 
and training. Works by direct labour, sup-
plies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 
5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d 
Upgrading Neiafu Harbour. Improved 
harbour access, wharf functions and moor-
ing facilities. Estimated total cost 1.5 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TG 6002 A2d 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Training project for young farmers 
(AYTRAP). Assistance for the young far-
mers to create rural enterprises. Estimated 
cost 7.300 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 2.300 
mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and monitoring. 
Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF TR 7002 A3a 
TUVALU 
Outer Island Primary School Re-
habilitation. Estimated total cost 0.300 
mECU. To improve the physical state of the 
primary school facilities on the outer islands, 
Nukufetau and Vaitupu. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TV 7004 A6a 
UGANDA 
Smallholder Tea Development Pro-
gramme. (STDP). Resp. Auth.: Uganda 
Tea Growers Corporation (UTGC). 20 
mECU. Increase in the production and 
quality, management improvements, infra-
structure development, institutional and 
financial sustainability, environment conser-
vation and regional development. Works, 
supply of equipment, T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UG 6002/7002 A3a 
Support to the Uganda Investment 
Authority. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Finance. 1.950 mECU. Supply of equipment 
and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UG 7005 A5e 
Road maintenance programme in the 
South West. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Works. 22 mECU. Works, supplies and 
supervision. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF UG 7004 A2d 
Animal water supply in Karamoja. To 
establish water retaining structures in selec-
ted strategic areas. 1.950 mECU. Works, 
equipment, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UG 7008 A2b 
Support for Parliamentary and Pre-
sidential Elections. Resp. Auth. : UNDP. 
Estimated total cost 1.950mECU. Projecton 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UG 7009 A1c 
ZAIRE 
Temporary assistance programme 
for health care (P.A.T.S.). Rehabili-
tation programme. Estimated cost 18.500 
mECU. To ensure that the health-care 
services that are still operating survive. 
Implementation by NGOs and local organi-
zations. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZR 6029 A7a,b 
ZAMBIA 
Reorganisation and restructuring of 
the Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife Services. Resp. Auth.: Depart-
ment of National Parks and Wildlife services. 
Estimated cost 5 mECU. Works, supplies and 
T.A. Project in execution.7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7002 A3c,d 
Rehabilitation of main runway at 
Lusaka International Airport. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Transport. Estimated cost 
5 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG-ROR 7319-ZA A2d 
Feeder roads rehabilitation prog-
ramme. 5 mECU. To rehabilitate rural feeder 
roads in the central and copperbelt pro-
vinces. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 6027 A2d 
Editing and printing of geological 
maps. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Mines. 
0.950 mECU. To produce 20 geological 
maps and 10 structural maps. To assist with 
training the Zambian geological survey 
department. T.A.: a full-time cartographer 
for 2 years and a geological map editor for 1 
year. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 5029 A1g 
Support for the development of the 
crafts sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Community Development and social ser-
vices. Estimated total cost 0.500 mECU. 
Training for technical skills and management 
prevision of grants and loans for tools, 
materials, transport. Supplies and T.A. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7004 A4d 
Management training for the minis-
tries of health and education. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministries of Health and Education. 
Estimated total cost 1.200 mECU. EDF 1 
mECU, local 0,200 mECU. T.A. multi-
sectoral: management/administration, plan-
ning, accounting-training. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7003/001 A6/A7 
Forestry management for sus-
tainable woodfuel production in 
Zambia (along the railway line). Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Environment. Estimated 
total cost 2 mECU. Training, supply of 
equipment, studies and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7009 A3c 
ZIMBABWE 
OMAY Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe 
land use and health programme. Resp. 
Auth.: A.D.A. 4.6 mECU. Raising the stan-
dardoi living of rural populations. Conserva-
tion and improved utilisation of the wildlife 
resources, support to agriculture and im-
provement of social infrastructure. Road 
network, water, sanitation, building of a 
district hospital, equipment and supplies. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZI M 6004/7002 A3a 
Support for the Faculty of Vete-
rinary Science of the University of 
Zimbabwe. Resp. Auth.: Faculty of Vete-
rinary Science. 9.1 mECU. Supply of vehic-
les and equipment. T.A., University link, 
fellowships, scholarships. For Zimbabwe 
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EDF ZIM 5004/7001 A6b 
Wildlife Veterinary Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife Management. EDF 1.500 mECU. 
Increase of wildlife population, particularly 
of endangered species: black and white 
rhino — tourism development, works, sup-
plies, T.A., training and evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF ZIM 6018 A5c, A8f 
Gokwe north and south rural water 
supply and sanitation project. 6.100 
mECU. Rehabilitation of existing water-
points, new domestic water-points, latrines, 
maintenance, health education, T.A., train-
ing, evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF ZIM 7001 A2b 
Overseas Countries 
and Territories (OCT) 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 
Support for the Public Library in 
Curaçao. Resp. Auth.: Public Library Cu-
raçao. 0.650 mECU. Works, supply of equip-
ment, training. Date financing June 95. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF NEA 7003 A6g 
ARUBA 
T.A. for managerial training. EDF 
1.900 mECU. A training unit will train private 
and public executives and will advise com-
panies on demand. Supplies T.A. and evalu-
ation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ARU 6006 A6b 
NETHERLANDS 
ARUBA 
ANTILLES 
Tourism development programme. 
Estimated total cost 6-6.5 mECU. EDF 4-5 
mECU, local 0.100 mECU, local private 
sector 1.400 mECU. Training, T.A., market-
ing in Europe. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7835 A5c 
NEW CALEDONIA 
Construction of a vocational train-
ing centre for apprentices. Estimated 
total cost 2.95 mECU. EDF part 0.830 
mECU. Works by ace. tender. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF NC 7002 A6d 
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS 
Water and sewerage in Providen-
ciales. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 
3.700 mECU. Water supply works and pipes. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TC 7001 A8b,c 
ST. HELENA 
Wharf improvement project. Resp. 
Auth.: Public Works + Service. Department. 
Estimated total cost 1.743 mECU. To in-
crease the safety and efficiency of James-
town Port by upgrading wharf facilities for 
passenger and cargo handling. Works, sup-
plies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF S H 7001 A2d 
WALLIS AND FUTUNA 
Holo-Fakatoi Road in Wallis (RT2). 
EDF 0.600 mECU. Bitumen road. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF WF 7001 A2d 
Construction of territorial road n° 1 
in Futuna. 0.840 mECU. Works and re-
habilitation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF WF 7003 A2d 
Regional Projects 
BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER 
Regional project for the manage-
ment of the 'W' national park and 
adjoining game reserves. Estimated total 
cost 20 mECU. To establish three manage-
ment units, 10 bridges and 20 observation 
posts with their equipment. Building and 
rehabilitation of administrative, technical 
and social buildings, tracks and bridges. 
T.A., training and studies. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f 
EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Statistical training centre for 
Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth. : 
Secretariat of the centre. 5 mECU, Widening 
of capacity. Construction of class-rooms, 
offices and housing. Project on appraisal. 
5th EDF. 
EDF REG 5311 (7) A6b 
PALOP COUNTRIES - ANGOLA -
MOZAMBIQUE-GUINEA BISSAU 
- SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE - CAPE 
VERDE 
Bibliographic Fund. Resp. Auth. : Bibli-
ographic Fund-Maputo. 2.5Ó0 mECU. De-
velopment of human resources. Editing, 
circulation, reading promotion. T.A. and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7901/008 A6g,i 
CAMEROON - CENTRAL 
RICAN REPUBLIC 
AF-
Bertua-Garoua Boulai Road. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics (Ca-
meroon). Rehabilitation and improvement of 
transport infrastructures between Douala 
and Bangui. Estimated total cost 50 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF REG -CM -CA- 7002/001 A2d 
MALI-GUINEA 
Flood forecast and control, hydro-
logical simulation for the Niger upper 
basin. Estimated total cost 6 mECU EDF 
5.175 mECU, France (foreseen) 0.375 
mECU, Denmark (foreseen) 0.150 mECU, 
Mali-Guinea (foreseen) 0.300mECU. Flood 
forecast system, hydrologicai model of local 
simulation with parametric régionalisation. 
Warming system via telecommunication and 
satellite teletransmission. Statistical studies. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6181 A8f,A8g 
CENTRAL AFRICA 
CIESPAC - Public Health Education 
Centre in Central Africa. 1.980 mECU. 
Student accomodation, equipment, scholar-
ships, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7205 A6b 
ECOFACII - Forest ecosystems. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère du Plan. République du 
Congo. Estimated total cost 12.500 mECU. 
To develop national and regional capacities 
for good management of forest resources. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6203/001 A3c 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF I.O.C. -
INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION 
COMORES - MADAGASCAR -
MAURITIUS - SEYCHELLES 
Technical cooperation framework 
programme. 1.800 mECU. T.A., auditing 
and evaluation, equipment, training. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7501 A1 b 
Integrated Regional Programme for 
Trade Development. (PRIDE). Resp. 
Auth.: I.O.C. Secrétariat. EDF 9.3 mECU. 
Equipment. T.A., training, management. 
Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7503 A5 
BURUNDI — RWANDA — TAN-
ZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — 
KENYA 
Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabi-
litation of the road Kigali-Butare-
Burundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 8 
mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CBI 
Support for the Technical Working 
Groups and Policy Implementation 
Committees under the Initiative to 
facilitate Cross-Border Trade, Invest-
ment and Payments in Eastern and 
Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean 
(CBI). To improve regional economic co-
herence in the areas of trade, investment and 
macro-economic policies. 2 mECU. T.A. 
Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 70012/001 A5c 
Standardization and quality assur-
ance. Resp. Auth.: COMESA Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa). 
Estimated total cost 2.543 mECU. To de-
velop harmonized standardization and 
quality control practices. T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7321 A5e 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF 
ECOWAS 
Guarantee Fund for Private Invest-
ments - Financing in Western Africa. 
FGIPAO - Lomé. Creation of a Guarantee 
Fund to cover partially credit risks given by 
banks to the private sector. Total estimated 
cost 22.5 mECU. EDF 3.8 mECU - Others: 
France, Germany, E.I.B., Commercial Banks 
(E.U.). Development Agencies. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7115 A5 
Consumer price index in the U EMOA 
countries. Resp. Auth.: EUROSTAT & 
EUROCOST 1.620 mECU. T.A., training, 
supply of equipment. Date financing June 
95. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG/ROC/71 06/001 A1c 
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Regional environmental training and 
information programme. Resp. Auth.: 
Institut du Sahel in Bamako. 1 6 mECU. T.A. 
training, supply of equipment. Date finan-
cing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6147/001 A6/A8 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF P.T.A. 
Regional integration in East and 
Southern Africa. Assistance to PTA 
Secretariat. (Preferential Trade Area). 
Short and long-term. T.A., studies, training. 
Estimated cost 1.500 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 731 6 A1 b 
PACIFIC ACP STATES 
Pacific regional agricultural pro-
gramme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Forum 
Secretariat. Fiji. 9.265 mECU. Improvement 
and dissemination of selected crops, agricul-
tural information and techniques to farmers. 
T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6704/001 A3a 
Cyclone Warning System Upgrade. 
Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. Project 
coordinator at the Tropical Cyclone Warning 
Centrein Nadi-Fiji: 1.950 mECU. Supply of 
specialized equipment, T.A., training evalu-
♦ ation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7709 A8g 
SADC 
SADC Regional Customs Training 
Programme. Long-term. T.A. to the Bot-
swana, Lesotho, Namibian and Swaziland 
customs services. Training and equipment. 
1.9 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 541 2/7 A1b 
SADC Language Training Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Institute of Lan-
guages in Maputo as Regional Project 
Coordinator (RPC). 2 mECU. English lan-
guage training and Portuguese language 
training. Monitoring-evaluation. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6415/6430/6433/7 A6 
Regional training programme for 
food security. Resp. Auth. : Food Security 
Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU) 
in Harare. 5 mECU. Training and T.A. Supply 
of equipment by int. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6420/7 A6ci 
S.I.M.S.E.C. - SADC Initiative for 
Mathematics and~Science Education 
Cooperation. To establish a professional 
unit, called SIMSEC Unit for information 
exchange, teacher training curriculum de-
velopment, staff development, research 
cooperation and support for teachers' or-
ganisations. Project on appraisal. 5 mECU. 
7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6428 A6b 
Wildlife Management Training Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: SADC Sector for Inland 
Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife. 8 mECU. 
Staff training, equipment and teaching 
materials, long-term T.A. evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 6408/002 A3e, A6b, A8f 
SADC — MOZAMBIQUE 
Beira port dredging contract. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. 
15 mECU. Dredging for two years of the 
access channel to the port of Beira. Works: 2 
years, 4 million m
3/year. Supervision and 
training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7401 A2d 
BENIN — COTE D'IVOIRE — 
GHANA — GUINEA — GUINEA 
BISSAU—TOGO 
Regional programme to increase 
awareness in western coastal African 
countries of natural resources protec-
tion. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Environne-
ment-Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. 
Priorities: fight against bush fires and 
deforestation and for soil protection. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF 
EDF REG 6113 A3e 
KENYA - UGANDA - TANZANIA 
Lake Victoria Fisheries Research 
Project (Phase II). Project headquarters in 
Jinja-Uganda at FIRI-Fisheries Research 
Institute. EDF part 8.400 mECU. T.A., 
supplies, training, monitoring and evalu-
ation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 5316/001 A3d 
CARIBBEAN REGION 
Regional Tourism Sector Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 12.8 
mECU. Marketing, Promotion, Education, 
Training, research and statistics, product 
development and protection of cultural 
heritage. Works, equipment and T.A. Date 
financing June 95. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7601/001 A5c 
Regional Trade Sector Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 14 mECU. 
Access of Caribbean firms to identified 
markets, strengthen the competitiveness of 
export oriented firms, improve the avail-
ability of trade information and support 
institutional development. Supply of equip-
ment and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date 
financing June 95.7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7601/002 A5d,e 
Caribbean Examinations Council 
(CXC) - Development Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Registrar of CXC in Barbados. 
2.500 mECU. T.A., external consultancies, 
equipment. Project in execution.7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7603 A6a 
University level programme. Resp. 
Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 21 mECU. To train a 
critical mass of Caribbean ACP nationals at 
masters degree level in development econ-
omics, business administration, public 
administration, agricultural diversification, 
natural resources, management and archi-
tecture, works, educational equipment, T.A., 
scholarships. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7604 A6b 
Caribbean Postal Union. Resp. Auth.: 
S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 mECU. T.A. and other 
action necessary for the creation of the 
Caribbean Postal Union. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7605 A2c 
Caribbean Telecommunication 
Union. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 
mECU. T.A. for the accomplishment of the 
C.T.U. and the harmonisation of legislation 
on Telecommunication within the Cariforum 
member states. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF REG 7605/001  A2c 
Regional Airports Project. Resp. 
Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 2 mECU. Upgrading 
of equipment and improvement of training of 
staff. Improved safety and air navigation 
standards in two airports in Suriname and 
one in Guyana. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF REG 7605/002 A2d 
Caribbean Regional agriculture and 
fisheries development programme. 
Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 22.2 mECU. 
Creation of an agricultural credit revolving 
fund, research and training activities to 
support commercial opportunities, establ-
ishment of an information network and 
subprogrammes in the fisheries, livestock 
and rice subsectors. Supply of equipment, 
T.A. and programme management short 
studies. Credit Fund. Project in exec-
ution.7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7606 A3a 
Education policy and dialogue. Resp. 
Auth. : Cariforum S.G.. 0.450 mECU. T.A. for 
regional common policies in three education 
areas: basic education, technical and vo-
cational training, language teaching. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7607 A6a,d 
Cultural Centres. Resp. Auth.: S.G. 
Cariforum. 1.500 mECU. Promote cultural 
identity and foster mutual knowledge of the 
rich cultural panorama. Restoration of build-
ings, supply of equipment, T.A. in artistic 
fields and management. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7610 A8i 
Tertiary level programme. Estimated 
total cost 5 mECU. Upgrading tertiary level 
education and teacher training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6628/001 A6b 
Cariforum Regional Environment 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 
Estimated total cost 11 mECU. Environ-
mental management action, programme for 
protected areas and community develop-
ment, management and expansion of marine 
and coastal park and protected areas. Ter-
restrial parks. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7613 A8f 
MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES 
ALGERIA 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. Sectoral Import Programme 
for building materials to finish 100,000 
social housing units. 70 mECU. hard 
currency allowance to cover CIF imports. 
Management by Crédit Populaire d'Algérie 
(C.P.Α.). Special accounts in the Central 
Bank. Banque d'Algérie (B.A.). Purchase by 
a positive list (electrical equipment — spare 
parts). 1st int. tender launched. Project in 
execution. 
SEM AL 688-92 A1c 
Support for the Algerian rural 
sector. 30 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM AL A3a 
EGYPT 
Private Sector Development Pro-
gramme. PSDP. 25 mECU. Improvement 
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY of performance of private companies in 
domestic, regional and international mar-
kets. Business support programme. Inform-
ation, T.A., monitoring, evaluation and audit. 
Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 898/94 A5 
Veterinary Services Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and 
Land Reclamation (MDALR). 20 mECU. 
Line of credit training, T.A., equipment. 
Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 932/94 A3a 
Upper Gulf of Aqaba Oil Spill Con-
tingency Project. Resp. Auth.: Egyptian 
Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA), Min-
istry of Environment for Israel and Aqaba 
Ports Authority for Jordan with a rep-
resentative from the EC. EC 2.900 mECU, 
Egypt 0.200 mECU. Procurement of the 
equipment, development of local infrastruc-
ture, training and T.A. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 1171/94 A8f 
Gulf of Aqaba Protectorates De-
velopment Programme (GAPDP). 
Resp. Auth. : Egyptian Environmental Affairs 
Agency (EEAA). Estimated total cost 12 
mECU. EC contribution 10 mECU, local 2 
mECU. T.A. to the EEAA Division for natural 
sites protection. Supply of equipment, T.A. 
for a specific training programme : natural 
sites protection. Works, supplies, T.A. Pro-
ject on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
July 95. 
SEM EGT 537/95 A8f 
JORDAN 
Support for Structural Adjustment. 
Phase III. Hard currency allowance with 
negative list. 20 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing May 95. 
SEM JO 279/95 A1c 
MALTA 
Strengthening educational and 
economic relations with the Com-
munity. 1.7 mECU. Scholarships and 
traineeships, establishment of a Euro-In-
formation Centre, integrated marketing pro-
grammes and tourism promotion. Different 
T.A. and purchase of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
SEM MAT 91/431 A5c, d 
equipment, training monitoring and evalu-
ation. Major equipment by int. tender. 
Project in execution. 
SEM SYR 899/94 A1 
Demographic sector programme in 
Syria. 2 mECU. Provision of quality Mother 
and Child Health/Family Planning services, 
population and housing census, strengthen-
ing civil registration system. Project in 
execution. 
SEM SYR 890/94 A7c 
Private Sector Development. Resp. 
Auth.: Syrian-European Business Centre. 7 
mECU. To improve the performance of 
indigenous business in local, regional and 
international markets. Establishment of the 
SEBC. T.A., monitoring, evaluation and 
audit. Project in execution. 
SEM SYR 1189/94 A5d,e 
TUNISIA 
Support for Structural Adjustment 
Programme. Hard currency allowance 
with negative list. Management Central 
Bank of Tunisia. 20 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 
95. 
SEM TUN 518/95 A1c 
Private Sector Development Pro-
gramme. 20 mECU. Creation of Euro-
Tunisie Entreprise. External consultant will 
be appinted as Euro-Tunisie Entreprise 
director. Aid programme for firms, insti-
tutional development, investment/trade pro-
motion, consultancy, training, joint ven-
tures. Followps, evaluation and financial 
control. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing July 95. 
SEM TUN 526/95 A1 /A5 
TURKEY 
Programme to broaden relations be-
tween EC and Turkey. EC contribution 
3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equip-
ment for the Universities of Ankara and 
Marmara. Training centre and language 
laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a 
Euro-Turkish 'Business Council'. Project in 
execution. 
SEM TU A6b 
of equipment for infrastructure maintenance 
and solid waste management. Municipa-
lities: Rafah, Khan Younis, Gaza, Hebron, 
Ramallah, Nablus and Jenin. T.A. will 
include full-time secondment in 95/96 and 
half time in 97 of municipal engineers with a 
project manager and short-term specialist 
input. Works by ace. tender. T.A. : short lists 
to be done. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing May 95. 
SEM OT 95/96 - 300/95 A1c 
Gaza Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Health. EC contribution 7.500 mECU. To 
meet the final completion date of January 
96, further financing is urgently required. 
This financing will cover the execution of the 
utility connections, the remaining construc-
tion works, the provision of the main medical 
equipment and T.A. for the initial operation. 
Operation initially by UNRWA. Expatriate 
T.A.: short list to be done. Medical equip-
ment by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing May 95. 
SEM OT 302/95 A7a 
Private Sector Development. Resp. 
Auth.: Palestinian Business Services Centre 
(PBSC) in Ramallah. EC contribution 6 
mECU (1995 Budget 3 mECU - 1996 
Budget 3 mECU). Programme of consulting 
information and training services. Consult-
ing services by EC consultants. T.A. : short 
lists to be done. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing May 95. 
SEM OT 95/96-342/95 A4.A5 
EGYPT - PALESTINE - JORDAN -
ISRAEL 
Middle East Peace Projects. 33 mECU 
(Budget 95: 13 mECU, Budget 96: 20 
mECU). Planning and consulting support 
measures for major regional investments: 
water infrastructure projects on the Jordan 
and Yarmouk, development of Gulf of Aqaba 
area, transport infrastructure and the inter-
connection of electricity grids, integrated 
economic development of Gaza, Sinai and 
parts of Israel. Regional veterinary cooper-
ation and the establishment of an integrated 
water data system. Feasibility studies, de-
tailed plans, engineering designs. T.A. by 
restricted tender or direct agreement. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
May 95. 
SEM REG 95-96/298-95 A9a,b 
MOROCCO 
Support for Mother and Child Care. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la Santé Publique. 
9 mECU. Works by int. tender, studies, Τ.Α., 
evaluation. Supply of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
SEM MOR 930/94 A7b 
Private sector development prog-
ramme. 30 mECU. Provision of consul-
tancy and training services to private enter-
prises delivered through a business centre in 
Casablanca 'Euro-Maroc Enterprise' staffed 
by expatriate and local consultants. A small 
office will also be established in Tangiers. 
Credit line for small enterprise creation in 
north Morocco. T.A. and training. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 
95. 7th EDF. 
SEM MOR 299/95 A4/A5 
SYRIA 
Banking Sector Support Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Syrian Central Bank 
(SCB) and the Commercial Bank of Syria 
(CB). 4.5 mECU. Supply of T.A., computer 
WEST BANK AND GAZA 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
Gaza City solid waste disposal -
completion. Resp. Auth.: Municipality of 
Gaza City. EC contribution 5 mECU. Provi-
sion of technical services and supply of 
rolling stock and equipment. T.A. and 
training. Project in execution. 
SEM OT/95/02 A8b,c,f 
Programme of institutional ca-
pacity-building forthe Palestinian Au-
thority. Resp. Auth.: Palestinian Authority 
with the European Commission Represen-
tative to the Occupied Territories and the 
European Commission T.A. Office. E.C 
contribution 2.500 mECU. Provision of 
assistance to seven Ministries. T.A., supply 
of equipment training. Project in execution. 
SEM OT/95/03 A1c 
Municipal Support Programme, 
Gaza and West Bank. EC Contribution 25 
mECU (Budget 95: 10 mECU - Budget 96 : 
1 5 mECU) Municipal infrastructure rehabili-
tation and expansion within the road, water 
supply, building and sewage sectors. Supply 
MED-CAMPUS 
Multiannual support programme for 
development cooperation actions be-
tween European universities and 
higher education institutes those from 
Mediterranean non-Community coun-
tries. EC contribution for 96-98 35 mECU. 
Training courses for managers, university 
teaching staff and post-graduates in MNC. 
Practical training in EC and MNC. Applied 
research. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing July 95. 
SEM REG 521195 A6b,c 
A.L.A. 
developing 
countries 
ASIA and LATIN 
AMERICA 
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Integrated development Ramon 
Lista. EC contribution 5.500 mECU. T.A-
Support for indigenous populations. Project 
on appraisal Date foreseen for financing 2nd 
half 95. 
ALA ARG B7-3010/94/152 A3a 
BANGLADESH 
New Options for Pest Management 
(NOPEST). Resp. Auth.: CARE Ban-
gladesh 6 mECU. To motivate and assist 
32,000 farmers in rice growing areas of 
Mymensingh and Cornilla districts. Training, 
equipment, T.A. by CARE, monitoring and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA BD 9431 A3a 
PROMOTE* Female Teachers in Sec-
ondary Schools. ("Programme to Mo-
tivate, Train and Employ). 36 mECU. 
Date financing June 95. 
ALA BD 95/7 A6a 
BOLIVIA 
Ministry of Development and En-
vironment. T.A. tosupportthe execution of 
programmes. 1 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
ALA BOL B7-3010/94/42 A3a 
Rural development in the Mitzque 
and Tiraque valleys. 16.410 mECU. Dif-
ferent, T.A. for bridges, canals, improvement 
of cultivated soils. Date financing May 95. 
ALA BOL B7-3010/94/49 A3a 
Support for export promotion. 0.980 
mECU. T.A. and training for 30 Bolivians 
trade representatives. Establishment of 2 
trade promotion offices in Europe. Inform-
ation data system. Project in execution. 
ALA BOL B7-3010/94/52 A5d 
Support for artisanal fisheries and 
acquaculture. T.A. to improve know-how. 
4 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing 2nd quarter 95. 
ALA BOL B7-3010-94/53 A3a 
Job promotion. 3 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 
ALA BOL B7-3010/95/25 A5 
Seeds integrated development pro-
ject. 5 mECU. Increase of the national 
productivity by improvement of seed quality. 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA BOL B7-3010/95/070 A3a 
BRAZIL 
Cooperation for quality improve-
ments in the industrial sector. EC 
contribution 0.400 mECU. T.A. Short-list to 
be done. Project on appraisal. 
ALA BRA B7-3011 -94/65 A4g 
Action group for telecommuni-
cations. Studies, seminars. Short-lists to be 
done. 0.570 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing September 95. 
ALA BRA/B7-3010/95/125 A2c 
Support for underprivileged popu-
lations in Rio and Sao Paulo regions. 10 
mECU. Housing, health, education, training, 
support for micro-enterprises. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing Nov-
ember-December 95. 
ALA BRA/B7-3010/95/115 A8c 
CAMBODIA 
Support for the agricultural sector 
and primary education. EC contribution 
49.800 mECU. Supply of equipment, dif-
ferent T.A. studies. Project on appraisal. 
ALA CAM 94/14 A3a 
CHILE 
Study to create a technological 
centre in Santiago. 0.500 mECU. Short-
list to be done. Project on appraisal. 
ALA CHI B7-3011 -94/1 72 A6b 
COLOMBIA 
Basic social services in Ciudad Bo-
livar. 8 mECU T.A. to the local services. 
Training. Project in execution. 
ALA COL B7-3010/94/101 A8b 
Support for the creation of basic 
technological enterprises. 0.900 mECU. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 
ALA COL B7-3011 /94/41 A5c 
ECUADOR 
Rehabilitation of the Paute zone. 12 
mECU. T.A., training, supply of équipement. 
Project in execution. 
ALA ECU B7-3010/94/44 A3a 
Environmental impact of oil exploi-
tation in the Amazone region. 7.313 
mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA ECU B7-3010/94/130 A8f 
Ministry of External Relations mod-
ernization. 0.400 mECU. T.A. and supply 
of equipment. Project on appraisal. 
ALA ECU B7-3011/94/161 A1c 
Improvement of crop production and 
use of phytogenetics products. 0.995 
mECU. Training research promotion, T.A. 
Project in execution. 
ALA ECU B7-3010/94/103 A3a 
EL SALVADOR 
Health and basic health programme 
in the western region. EC participation 
10 mECU. Drinking water, sanitation, health 
centres, infrastructures, training, T.A. Projet 
in execution. 
ALA ELS B7-3010/93/91 A7c 
Training in the géothermie energy 
sector. 0.600 mECU. T.A. and training. 
Project in execution. 
ELS B7-3011/94/36 A2a 
Support for the Informal Sector. 
Phase II. EC contribution 7 mECU. Project 
in execution. 
ALA ELS B7-3010/94/83 A5e 
Support for agricultural reform. 
0.975 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
ALA ELS B7-3010/95/06 A3a 
Institutional support forthe national 
academy of public security. 0.950 
mECU. T.A. and training. Project in exe-
cution. Short-list to be done. 
ALA ELS B7-5076/94/194 A1c 
Support for the productive process 
in the San Vicente department. 13 
mECU. T.A., line of credit, integration of ex-
servicemen. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing September-October 95. 
ALA SLV/B7-3010/95/88 A9b 
GUATEMALA 
Programme to help street children in 
Guatemala City. EC contribution 2.5 
mECU. T.A. and training. Short-list to be 
done. Project in execution. 
ALA G UA B7-301 0/94/109  A8e 
Support for the informal sector. 
7.500 mECU. T.A. training, line of credit. 
Project in execution. 
ALA G UA B7-3010/94/47 A5 
Rural development programme in 
the Totonicapan Department. EC con-
tribution 7.500 mECU. Works, supplies, line 
of credit, T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA GUA B7-301 0/94/81 A3a 
Rural Development in Baja Verapaz. 
EC contribution 8 mECU. Works, supplies, 
line of credit, T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA G U A B7-301 0/94/89 A3a 
Rural Development in Alta Verapaz. 
EC contribution 7 mECU. Works, supplies, 
line of credit, T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/90 A3a 
Export strengthening towards Euro-
pean Union. 0.500 mECU. T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 
ALA G UA B7-3011 /94/01 A5d,e 
Episcopal Conference and Broad-
casting Institute. 0,890 mECU. Training 
and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/95 A5g,A6 
Self-sustained development prog-
ramme in the Atitlan Lake valley. Phase 
II. 8.800 mECU. T.A., support to small-
farmers, handicraft and environment. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
October 95. 
ALA GTM/B7-3010/95/85 A3a 
HONDURAS 
Programme to help street children. 
EC contribution 0.600 mECU. T.A. and 
training. Project on appraisal. 
ALA HON B7-3010/94/118 A8e 
Programme to support SME's and 
farmers in the Olancho area (PRO-
LANCHO). Resp. Auth.: National Planning 
Ministry (SECPLAN). EC contribution 
9.860 mECU. Supply of equipment by int. 
tender, T.A., monitoring. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA HON B7-3010/94/124 A3a 
National Centre for Market and 
Trade Promotion. 0.900 mECU. T.A., 
studies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing 2nd half 95. 
ALA HND/B7-3011/95/077 A5e 
Support for vocational training. 5 
mECU. T.A. to improve technical training. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st quarter 96. 
ALA HND/B7-3010/95/79 A6d 
T.A. to promote specific projects for 
electricity production. 0.700 mECU. T.A. 
for management. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing end 95. 
ALA HND/B7-3010/95/80 
T.A. to develop the institutional 
programme for a legal framework and 
energy saving. 0.500 mECU. To develop a 
specific programme for efficiency and 
energy saving. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing 2nd half 95. 
ALA HND/B7-3010/95/81 A2ai 
Support for production in the Copàn 
and Sta Bàrbara zones. 7 mECU. T.A. for 
production, line of credit, local management 
and organization. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing 1st quarter 96. 
ALA HND/B7-3010/95/116 A3a 
XII  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY INDIA 
Transfer of Technologies for Sus-
tainable Development (BAIF). Resp. 
Auth.: NABARD — National Bank for 
Agricultural and rural Development. Project 
management BAIF (Indian NGO) EC contri-
bution 19.5 mECU. Wasteland development, 
Wadi programme, sericulture, cattle de-
velopment, T.A., training, monitoring and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA IN 94/32 A3a 
Saline Land Reclamation in Mahar-
ashtra. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Irrigation 
Department's Khar Lands Development 
Circle (KLDC) EC contribution 15.5 mECU. 
Works, equipment, T.A. monitoring and 
evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA IN 94/27 A3a 
INDONESIA 
EC-Indonesian Forest Sector Sup-
port Programme. Resp. Auth. : Directorate 
General for Forest Inventory and Land Use 
Planning - Ministry of Forestry. EC contri-
bution 25.882 mECU. Forest Inventory and 
monitoring. T.A. for detailed forest survey 
and mapping, training. Integrated Radio 
Communication Systems: T.A. for instal-
lation and training. Short-lists done. Project 
in execution. 
ALA IND 9242 A3c 
EC-Indonesian Forest Programme: 
Forest Fire Prevention and control in 
South Sumatra. Resp. Auth.: Directorate 
General for Forest Inventory and Land Use 
Planning Ministry of Forestry. EC contri-
bution 4.050 mECU. T.A. for establishment 
of fire prevention analysis and procedures, 3 
pilot projects for fire management units and 
equipment. Short-list done. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA IND 9212 A3c 
Gunung Leuser development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Indonesian Plan-
ning Ministry-BAPPENAS. EC contribution 
32.5 mECU. Works, infrastructures, supply 
of equipment, T.A. training, monitoring 
evaluation. Project in execution. 
ALA IND 94/26 A3a 
LAOS 
Micro-projects in Luang Prabang. 
Phase 2. 12.800 mECU. Date financing 
June 95. 
ALA LAO 95/8 A3a 
MEXICO 
Improving living conditions for 
children and young people. 0.800 
mECU. T.A. and training. Project on ap-
praisal. 
ALA MEX B7-301 0/95/23 A8c 
NICARAGUA 
TROPISEC — Development of small 
rural production in the dry tropical 
zone. EC contribution 7 mECU works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA NIC B7-3010/93/144 A3a 
Urban water supply and sewerage. 
Resp. Auth.: Instituto Nicaragueuse de 
Acueductos y Alcantarillados (INAA). EC 
contribution 11 mECU. Three drinking water 
supply projects in Chichigalpa, Masatepe — 
two towns in the Pacific region and 
Camoapa. Two sewerage networks plus 
provisional basic drainage in the towns of El 
Viejo and Jinotepe. Works, equipment, T.A. 
monitoring and evaluation. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA NIC B7-301 0/94/1 23 A2b 
Roads and bridges rehabilitation. 2.6 
mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA NIC B7-301 0/94/1 23 A2d 
Roads rehabilitation. 4 mECU. Project 
in execution. 
ALA NIC B7-5076/94/144 A2d 
Support for underprivileged child-
ren. 0.857 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
ALA NIC B7-3010/94/167 A8c 
Housing construction in Managua. 9 
mECU. Works, supervision, equipment and 
T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing November 95. 
ALA NIC/B7-3010/95/90 A8a 
Support for vocational training. 
5.200 mECU. To improve technician and 
teacher training. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing November 95. 
ALA NIC/B7-3010/95/109 A6c 
PAKISTAN 
Post-flood rehabilitation and pro-
tection project. 20.5 mECU. T.A., road 
works, dam construction. Works by ace. 
tender. Project on appraisal. 
ALA PK 94/04 A8g 
Palas conservation and development 
project. 4.800 mECU. Date financing June 
95. 
ALA PK 95/05 A3a 
PANAMA 
Support for rural SM E's in the cen-
tral region. 5 mECU. Supply of T.A. and 
line of credit. Project in execution. 
ALA PAN B7-3010/94/137 A3a 
PARAGUAY 
Durable development of the Para-
guayan Chaco (protection of the in-
digenous zones and ecosystem). EC 
contribution 14.800 mECU. T.A. and train-
ing. Project in execution. 
ALA PAR 93/40 A3a 
PERU 
Support for export promotion. EC 
contribution 3.774 mECU. T.A. Short-list 
done. Project in execution. 
ALA PER B7-3010/93/175 A5d 
Coica valley development prog-
ramme. EC contribution 5 mECU. T.A. and 
supply of equipment. Short-list to be done. 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA PER B7-3010/94/33 A3a 
Women in rural situations. EC contri-
bution 5 mECU. Piura and Ayacucho re-
gions. Improvement of the women's con-
ditions. Social services. Project in execution. 
ALA PER B7-3010/94/106 A3a 
Vocational training programme. 9 
mECU. T.A. training technical qualifications 
for non qualified young people. Project in 
execution. 
ALA PER B7-3010/94/55 A6d 
Street children. 7 mECU. Project in 
execution. 
ALA PER B7-3010/94/127 A8c 
Framework programme for vo-
cational, technological and pedago-
gicaltraining. 7 mECU.To improve secon-
dary education quality and support teacher 
training. Project on appraisal. 
ALA PER/B7-3011/95/004 A6c 
Sustainable development of the 
Manu National Park and Biosphere 
Reserve. 6.600 mECU. Project on ap-
praisal. 
ALA PER/B7-5041/95/128 A8f 
PHILIPPINES 
Rural integrated development pro-
gramme in the Aurore zone. EC contri-
bution 13 mECU. Works, supply of equip-
ment and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 9326 A3a 
Tropical forest protection in Pa-
lawan. EC contribution 17 mECU. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 9337 A3a 
Partnership for Women's Health and 
Safe Motherhood (P-WHSM). 17 
mECU. Date financing June 95. 
ALA PHI 95/4 A7b,c 
URUGUAY 
Integrated development programme 
for rural communities. 5.150 mECU. T.A. 
and housing construction for poor families. 
Project in execution. 
ALA URU B7-3010/94/39 A3a 
Cooperation Programme for Arom-
atic Plants and Essential Oils. 1 mECU. 
T.A. for production development, indus-
trialisation and commercialization. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
October 95. 
ALA URY/B7-3011/95/72 A3a 
VENEZUELA 
Support for the establishment of the 
National Centre for Energy and En-
vironment. EC contribution 1 mECU.T.A., 
local services, training, seminars. Short-list 
to be done. Project on appraisal. 
ALA VEN B7-3011 /94/15 A2a,A8f 
Social Structural Adjustment in 
Venezuela. Resp. Auth.: The Foundation 
set up to oversee the Experimental Vo-
cational Training Centre. Estimated total 
cost 12.2 mECU. EC contribution 5.3 mECU, 
Provincial Government of Guipúzcoa 
(Spain) 0.959 mECU, local 5.941 mECU. EC 
contribution. Equipment and furniture by int. 
tender. T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA VEN B7-3011 /94/112 A6d 
PETARE PROJECT - Fight against 
drugs. 0.998 mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA VEN B7-5080/94/113 A8c 
B.I.C. Barquisimeto. 0.500 mECU. T.A. 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA VEN B7-3011 /94/99 A5d 
Support for the Health Sector. 9 
mECU. Improvement of the health systems, 
T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing Nov-
Bmbsr 95 
ALA VEN/B7-3010/95/56 A7e 
Articulation and development of 
social economy. 8 mECU. T.A. training. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing November 95. 
ALA VEN/B7-301O/95/57 A5f 
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T.A. programme for transition to 
market economy. EC contribution 16 
mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA VIE 9336 A1 b 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
Cooperation programme with Euro-
pean Union towns, regions and local 
collectivities. 4 mECU. T.A., training. 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA AML B7-3010/94/1 68 A5 
10 mECU. Pro- Fight against cancer. 
ject on appraisal. 
ALR B7-3010/95/03  A7 
B.I.D. Special fund for small produc-
tion projects. 15 mECU. T.A. in the 
framework of B.I.D. activities. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing Sep-
tember 95. 
ALA AML/B7-3010/95/113 A5b 
ALURE: Optimum use of energy re-
sources. 7 mECU. Support Unit-financing 
of action to modernize institutions and 
specialized companies. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing September 95. 
ALA ALR/B7-3011/95/42 A2a,i 
AL-INVEST - Consolidation phase. 
41 mECU. Liberalization of the economic 
structures and market integration. (Com-
mercial exchanges promotion, technology 
transfer, direct investments, joint-ventures). 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing October 95. 
ALA AML/B7-3011/95/138 A5e 
Special Funds for European T.A. in 
Latin American countries. 4 mECU. T.A. 
in the framework of B.I.D. activities. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
September 95. 
ALA AML/B7-3010/95/114 A5b 
ANDEAN PACT 
Programme to eradicate foot and 
mouth disease. EC contribution 1.800 
mECU. Project on appraisal. 
ALA PAN B7-3010/94/63 A3a 
T.A. programme for customs. 5 
mECU. T.A. and training. Project on ap-
praisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st 
quarter 1995. 
ALA-AND B7-3011/94/163 A1 b 
Support for the Tribunal A. de Car-
tagena. 0.617 mECU T.A. Project in exe-
cution. 
ALA REG AAN B7-3011/94/51 A8b 
CENTRAL AMERICAN 
TRIES 
COUN-
EUROTRACE. 0.500 mECU. Compute-
rized system and data bank for external trade 
and commerce. Project in execution. 
ALA REG AMC B7-3011/94/151 A5c 
Sustainable development prog-
ramme in rural border zone. 11.160 
mECU. Regional programme to exchange 
experiences in sustainable development, 
project promotion. T.A. monitoring supply of 
equipment. Project on appraisal. 
ALA REG AMC B7-5041/1/94/17 A3a 
Development aid to the indigenous 
populations in Central America. EC 
contribution 7.500 mECU. T.A. and supply 
of equipment. Project in execution. 
ALA REG ACR/B7-3010/93/172 A3a 
SOUTHERN AMERICAN COUN-
TRIES 
Pilcomayo River. 0.850 mECU. Study. 
Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. 
ALA REG AMS B7-3010/94/147 A2d 
DELEGATIONS OF THE COMMISSION 
In ACP countries 
Angola 
Rua Rainha Jinga, 6 
Luanda CP. 2669 
Tel. 393038 — 391277 — 391339 
Telex 3397 DELCEE AN 
Fax (244 2) 392531 
Barbados 
James Fort Building 
Hlncks Street, Bridgetown. 
Tel. 427-4362/429-7103 
Telex 2327 DELEGFED WB 
BRIDGETOWN 
Fax (1 -809) 4278687 
Benin 
Avenue Roume, Bâtiment administratif 
B. P. 910. Cotonou 
Tel. 31 26 84/31 2617 
Telex 5257 DELEGFED — COTONOU 
Fax (229) 315 328 
Botswana 
P.O. Box 1253 - 68 North Ring Road 
Gaborone, Botswana 
Tel. (267) 314 455/6/7 
Telex BD 2403 DECcC 
Fax (267) 313 626 
Burkina Faso 
B.P. 352 
Ouagadougou 
Tel. 307 385/307 386 - 308 650 
Telex 5242 DELCOMEU — BF 
Fax (226) 30 89 66 
Burundi 
Avenue du 13 Octobre 
B.P. 103, Bujumbura 
Tel. 3426/3892 
Telex FED BDI 5031 — BUJUMBURA 
Fax (257-22) 4612 
Cameroon 
QUARTIER BASTOS 
B.P. 847, Yaoundé 
Tel. (237)20 13 87-20 33 67 
Fax (237) 202149 
Cape-Verde 
Achada de Santo Antonio 
C.P. 122-Praia 
Tel. (238)61 55 71/72/73 
Telex 6071 DELCECV 
Fax (238) 61 55 70 
Central African Republic 
Rue de Flandre 
B.P. 1298 Bangui 
Tel. 61 30 53/61 01 13 
Telex 5231 RC DELCOMEU — BANGUI 
Fax (236) 61 6535 
Chad 
Concession Caisse Coton. Route da Farcha 
B.P. 552. N'Djamena 
Tel. 51 59 77/51 22 76 
Telex 5245 KD 
Fax (235) 51 21 05 
Comoros 
Boulevard de la Corniche. 
B.P. 559 — Moroni 
Tel. (269) 73 23 06 — 73 31 91 
Telex 212 DELCEC KO 
Fax (269) 73 24 94 
Congo 
Av. Lyautey 
near Hotel Méridien 
B.P. 2149, Brazzaville 
Tel. 83 38 78/83 37 00 
Telex DELEGFED 5257 
Fax (242) 83 60 74 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Immeuble 'AZUR' Bd, Crozet, 18 
B.P. 1821, Abidjan 01 
Tel. 21 24 28 — 21 09 28 
Telex 23729 DELCEE — ABIDJAN 
Fax (225) 214089 
Djibouti 
Plateau du Serpent, Boulevard du Maréchal Joffre 
8.P. 2477 Djibouti 
Tel. 35 26 15 
Telex 5894 DELCOM DJ 
Fax (253) 350 036 
Dominican Republic 
Calle Rafael Augusto 
Sanchez 21 
Ensanche Naco 
Santo Domingo 
Tel. (809) 540 58 37-540 60 74 
Fax (809) 567 58 51 
Telex 4757 EUROCOM SD DR 
Equatorial Guinea 
Apartado 779 — Malabo 
Tel. 2944 
Telex DELFED 5402 EG 
Ethiopia 
Off Bole Road 
P.O. Box 5570, Addis Ababa 
ET 
LIBREVILLE 
Tel.251-1-61 2511 
Telex 217 38 DELEGEUR -
Fax (251-1) 61 28 77 
Gabon 
Quartier Batterie IV 
Lotissement des Cocotiers 
B.P. 321, Libreville 
Tel. 73 22 50 
Telex DELEGFED 5511 GO 
Fax (241 ) 736554 
Gambia 
10 Cameron Street 
P.O. Box 512, Banjul 
Tel. 227777 — 228769 — 226860 
Telex 2233 DELC0M GV — BANJUL 
Fax (220) 226219 
Ghana 
The Round House — Cantonments Road, 
K.I. A.-Accra 
P.O. Box 9505 
Tel. (233-21) 774 201/2-774 236-774 094 
Telex 2069 DELCOM — GH 
Fax (233-21) 774154 
Guinea Bissau 
Bairro da Penha, C.P. 359, 
Bissau 1113 
Tel. (245)2510 71/25 10 27/ 
251469/251471-72 
Telex 264 DELCOM Bl 
Fax (245) 25 10 44 
Guinea 
Commission 
Central Mail Department 
(Diplomatic Bag Section — B 1/123) 
Rue de la Loi 200, 1049 Bruxelles 
Telex via Embassy Fed. Rep. of Germany 22479 
Tel. (224) 41 49 42 
Fax (224) 41874 
Guyana 
72 High Street, Kingston 
P.O. Box 10847, Georgetown 
Tel. 64 004-65 424-63 963 
Telex 2258 DELEG GY — GEORGETOWN 
Fax (592-2) 62615 
Haiti 
Delmas 60 - Impasse brave n. 1 
(par Rue Mercier-Laham 
B.P. 15.588 Petion-Ville 
Port-au-Prince - Haiti - W.I. 
Tel.: (509) 57-5485, 57-3491, 57-3575, 57-1644 
Fax (509) 57-4244 
Jamaica 
8 Olivier Road, Kingston 8 
XIV OPERATIONAL SUMMARY P.O. Box 463 Constant Spring, Kingston 8 
Tel. (1-809) 9246333-7 
Telex 2391 DELEGEC JA 
Fax (1-809) 9246339 
Kenya 
"Union Insurance House" 2nd and 3rd floors 
Ragatl Road 
P.O. Box 45119, Nairobi 
Tel. (254-2) 713020/21-712860-712905/06 
Telex 22483 DELEUR — KE 
Fax (254-2) 716481 
Lesotho 
P.O. Box MS 518 
Maseru, 100, Lesotho 
Tel. 313 726 
Fax 266 — 310193 
Liberia 
34 Payne Avenue, Sinkor 
P.O. Box 10 3049, Monrovia 
Tel. 26 22 78 
Telex 44358 DELEGFED LI — MONROVIA 
Fax (231 ) 262266 
Madagascar 
Immeuble Ny Havana — 67 hectares 
B.P. 746, Antananarivo 
Tel. 242 16 
Telex 22327 DELFED MG — ANTANANARIVO 
Fax (261-2) 32169 
Malawi 
Europa House 
P.O. Box 30102, Capital City 
Lilongwe 3 
Tel. 78 31 99-78 31 24-78 27 43 
Telex 44260 DELEGEUR Ml — LILONGWE 
Fax (265) 78 35 34 
Mali 
Rue Guègau — Badalabougou 
B.P. 115 Bamako 
Tel. 22 23 56/22 20 65 
Telex 2526 DELEGFED — BAMAKO 
Fax(223) 223670 
Mauritania 
Hot V, Lot 24 
B.P. 213, Nouakchott 
Tel. 527 24/527 32 
Telex 5549 DELEG MTN — NOUAKCHOTT 
Fax (222-2) 53524 
Mauritius 
61 /63 route Florea Vacoas 
P.O. Box 10 Vacoas 
Tel. 686 50 61 /686 50 62/686 50 63 
Telex 4282 DELCEC IW VACOAS 
Fax (230-686) 6318. 
Mozambique 
C.P. 1306 — MAPUTO 
1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe — MAPUTO 
Tel. 1 -49 02 66 — 1 -49 17 16 — 1 -49 02 71 
1 -49 07 20 
Telex 6-146 CCE MO 
Fax (258-1) 491866 
Namibia 
Sanlam Building 
4th floor 
Independence Avenue, 154 
Windhoek 
Tel.: 264-61-220099 
Fax 264-61 23 51 35 
Telex 41 9 COMEU WK 
Niger 
B.P. 10388, Niamey 
Tel. 73 23 60/73 27 73/73 48 32 
Telex 5267 NI DELEGFED — NIAMEY 
Fax (227) 732322 
Nigeria 
4, Idowu Taylor St, Victoria Island 
PM Bag 12767. Lagos 
Tel. 61 78 52/61 08 57 
Telex 21 868 DELCOM NG LAGOS — NIGERIA 
Fax (234-1) 617248 
Abuja 
Tel 09/5233144/46 
Telex 0905/91484 
Fax 09-5233147 
Pacific (Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu) 
Dominion House, 3rd Floor 
Private Mail Bag, G PO. Suva, Fiji 
Tel. 31 36 33 
Telex 2311 DELECOM FJ — SUVA 
Fax (679) 300 370 
Papua New Guinea 
The Lodge, 3rd floor, Bampton Street 
P.O. Box 76 
Port Moresby 
Tel. (675) 21 35 44-21 35 04-21 37 1 8 
Telex NE 22307 DELEUR — PORT MORESBY 
Fax (675) 217 850 
Rwanda 
Avenue Député Kamuzinzi, 14 
B.P. 515, Kigali 
Tel. 755 86/755 89/725 36 
Telex 2251 5 DECCE RWMCI 
Fax 250 — 74313 
Senegal 
12, Avenue Albert Sarraut, Dakar 
Tel. 23 13 34 - 23 47 77 -
23 79 75 
Telex 21665 DELEGSE SG 
Fax (221) 217885 
Sierra Leone 
Wesley House 
4 George Street 
P.O. Box 1399. Freetown 
Tel. (232.22) 223 975-223 025 
Telex 3203 DELFED SL — FREETOWN 
Fax (232-22) 225212 
Solomon Islands 
2nd floor City Centre Building 
Solomon Islands 
P.O. Box 844 — Honiara 
Tel. 22 765 
Telex 66370— DELEGSI 
Fax (677) 23318 
Somalia 
EC Somalia Unit 
Union Insurance House - 1st floor 
Ragati Road 
P.O. Box 30475 Nairobi 
Tel.: (254-2)712830-713250/251 
Fax (254-2)710997 
Sudan 
3rd Floor — The Arab Authority for Agricultural 
Investment and Development Building 
Army Road, Khartoum 
P.O. Box 2363 
Tel. 75054-75148-75393 
Telex 23096 DELSU SD 
Suriname 
Dr S. Redmondstraat 239 
PO. Box 484, Paramaribo 
Tel. 4993 22 - 499349 - 492185 
Telex 192 DELEGFED SN 
Fax (597)493076 
Swaziland 
Dhlan'ubeka Building, 3rd floor 
Cr. Walker and Tin Streets 
P.O. Box A.36 
Mbabane, Swaziland 
Tel. 42908/42018 
Telex 2133 WD 
DELEGFED MBABANE 
Fax (268) 46729 
Tanzania 
Extelcoms House, 9th Floor 
Samora Avenue 
P.O. Box 9514. Dar es Salaam 
Tel. 46459/60/61/62 
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR — 
DAR ES SALAAM 
Fax (255-51) 46724 
Togo 
Avenue Nicolas Grunitzky 
B.P. 1657, Lomé 
Tel. 21 36 62/21 08 32 
Telex 5267 DELFED-TG 
Fax (228) 211300 
Trinidad and Tobago 
The Mutual Centre 
16, Queen's Park West 
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain 
Trinidad W.I 
Tel. 62-2 6628/62-2 0591 
Telex 22421 DELFED WG 
Fax (809) 622-6355 
Uganda 
Uganda Commercial Bank Building, 
Plot 12 
Kampala Road, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 5244, Kampala 
Tel. 233 303/ 233.304 
Telex 61139 DELEUR — UG — KAMPALA 
Fax (256-41) 233708 
Zaire 
71. Av des Trois Ζ 
BP 2000, Kinshasa 
By satellite: tel. 00871 1546221 
Telex 00 581 154.62.21 
Fax 00871 1546221 
Zambia 
P.O.Box 34871 
Plot 4899 
Los Angeles Boulevard 
Lusaka 
Tel. 25 09 06-25 07 11 - 25 11 40 
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA — LUSAKA 
Fax (260-1) 250906 
Zimbabwe 
P.O. Box 4252 
Construction House (6th floor) 
110, Leopold Takawlra Street 
Harare 
Tel. (263-4) 70 71 20/139 - 75 28 35-
72 21 37 - 70 71 43 
Telex 24811 Deleur ZW 
Fax (263-4) 725360 
In the OCT 
Netherlands Antilles 
Scharlooweg 37 
P.O. Box 822, Willemstad 
Curaçao 
Tel. (599.9) 618488 
Fax (599.9) 618423 
Aruba 
LG. Smith Blvd. 50, (P.O. Box 409) 
Oranjestad 
Tel.297-8-34131 
Fax 297-9-34575 
In the Mediterranean 
Countries 
Algeria 
36, Rue Arezki Abri 
Hydra-16035 Alger 
Tel. 59 08 22 — 59 09 25 — 59 09 42 
Telex 66067 EURAL DZ — ALGERIE 
Fax (213-2) 593947 
Cyprus 
Irish Tower Court, 8th Floor 
242 Agapinor Street, Corner of Makarios Avenue.PO Box 
3480 
Nicosia 137, Cyprus 
Tel. (357-2)36 92 02 
Telex (605) 4960 ECDELCY 
Fax (357-2)36 89 26 
Egypt 
6. Ibn Zankl St.-Zamalek 
Tel. (20-2) 340 83 88 — 341 93 93 — 340 1184 — 
340 74 09 
Telex 94258 EUROP UN ZAMALEK 
Fax 3400385 
Israel 
The Tower, 3 Daniel Frisch St., 
TEL AVIV 64731 
Tel. (972-3) 696.41.66 
Telex 3421 08 DELEG — IL 
Fax (972-3) 695 1983 
Jordan 
Al Jahez St. 15, Shmeisani. Amman 
P.O. Box 926 794 
Tel. 66 81 91 /66 81 92 Amman 
Telex 22 260 DELEUR JO AMMAN 
JORDAN 
Fax (962-6) 686 746 
Lebanon 
Immeuble Duraffourd, Avenue de Paris, Beirut 
B.P. 11 -4008, Beirut 
Tel. 3630 30/31 /32 
Telex DELEUR 23307 
Malta 
Villa 'The Vines', 51 
Ta'Xblex Sea Front, Ta'Xblex-Malta 
Tel. : (356) 34 48 91 -93-95, 345111 
Telex: (356)910 EC MLA 
Fax (356)34 48 97 
Morocco 
2 bis rue de Meknés-Rabat 
B.P. 1302. Rabat 
Tel. 7612 17/7612 46/7612 48 
Telex 32620-(M) 
Fax (212-7) 761156 
Syria 
Rue Chakib Arslan 
P.O. Box 11269, Damascus 
Tel. (963-11) 3327640/641 
Telex 412919 DELCOM SY 
Fax (963 11 ) 3320683 
Tunisia 
Avenue Jugurtha 21 
B.P. 143, Cité el Mahrajene, 1082 Tunis 
Tel. 78 86 00 
Telex 14399 — TUNIS 
Fax (216-1) 788201 
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Argentina 
Plaza Hotel, Florida 1005, Buenos Aires 
Tel.: (54-1) 312 60 01/09 
Telex : 22488 PLAZA AR 
Telefax: (54-1) 313 2912 
Bangladesh 
Plot 7, Road 84 
Gulshan — Dhaka 
Tel.88 47 30-31-32 
Telex 642501. CECO BJ 
Fax (88.02) 88 31 18 
Brazil 
Q.I. 7 — Bloc A — Lago Sul — Brasilia (D.F.) Brasil 
Tel.:(55.61) 248.31.22 
Telex.: (038) 61.25.17/61.36.48 DCCE BRE 
Fax.: (55-61) 248.07.00 
Chile 
Avenida Américo Vespucio SUR 1835, Casila 10093, 
Santiago (9) Chile 
Tel.: (56) 22.28.24.84 
Telex: (034) 34.03.44 COMEUR CK 
Fax (56) 22.28.25.71 
China 
15 Dong Zhi Men Wai Dajie 
Sanlltun, 100600 Beijng 
Tel.: (86-1)532 44 43 
Telex: (085) 222 690 ECDEL CN 
Fax (86-1)532 43 42 
Colombia and Ecuador 
Calle 97 π- 22-44 
94046 — 14 Bogota 8 
Tel. (57-1 ) 236 90 40/256 48 28/256 84 77 
Fax (57-1) 610 00 59 
Costa Rica (HQ of the Delegation for Central America) 
Centro Calón — Apartado 836 
1007 San José 
Tel. 332755 
Telex 3482 CCE AC 
Fax (506) 210893 
India (HQ of the Delegation in South Asia) 
65 Golf Links 
New Delhi 110003 
Tel. 462 92 37/38 
Telex 61315 EUR-IN 
Fax 462 92 06 
Indonesia (HQ of the Delegation for Brunei, Singapore 
and the ASEAN Secretariat) 
Wisma Dharmala Sakti Building, 16th floor 
J.L Jendral Sudirman 32 
P.O. Box 55 J KPDS Jakarta 10 220 
Tel. 570 60 76/68 
Telex 62 043 COMEUR IA 
Fax (62-21) 570 6075 
Korea 
ICON Building 
33-12 Changchoong-dong 1-ga 
Choong-Ku 
Seoul 100-691 - Korea 
Mexico 
Paseo de la Reforma 1675, 
Lomas de Chapultepec C.P. 
11000 Mexico D.F. 
Tel. (52-5) 540.33.45 to 47 — 202.86.22 
Telex: (022) 176.35.28 DCCEME 
Fax (52-5) 540.65.64 
Pakistan 
No 9 Street n. 88 
G-6/3, Islamabad 
P.O. Box 1608 
Tel. (92-051 ) 21 1 8 28 
Fax (92-051) 82 26 04 
Peru 
B.P. 180 792, LIMA 18 
Manuel Gonzales Olaechea 247 
San Isidro, Lima 27 
Tel. (5114) 41 58 27/32-403097 
Telex 21085 PE-COMEU 
Telefax (51-14) 41 80 17 
Philippines 
Salustlana D. Ty Tower, 
7th Floor 1 04, 
Paseo de Roxas corner 
Perea Street - Legaspi Village - Makati 
Metro Manila 
Tel. (63-2) 8126421-30 
Telex 22534 COMEUR PH 
Fax (63-2) 812 66 86 - 812 66 87 
Thailand (HQ of the Delegation in Indochina, Thailand, 
Malaysia) 
Kian Gwan House 11 — 19th floor 
140/1 Wireless Road 
Bangkok 10 330 
Tel. 255 91 00 
Telex 82764 COMEUBKTH 
Fax (66 2) 2559114 
Uruguay 
Boulevard Artigas 1257 
CP 11200 Montevideo 
Tel.: (598) 2.40 75 80 
Telex: 23925 CCEUR UY 
Fax (598) 2-41 20 08 
Venezuela 
Calle Orinoco - Las Mercedes 
Apartado 768076, Las Americas 1061 A 
Caracas 
Tel. 91 51 33 
Telex 27298 COMEU 
Fax (582) 993 55 73 
OFFICES OF THE COMMISSION 
In ACP countries 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Alpha Building 2nd floor 
Redcliffe Street 
St. John's, Antigua W.I., 
P.O. Box 1392 
Tel. and fax (1-809) 4622970 
Bahamas 
Frederick House, 2nd floor, Frederick St. 
P.O. Box N-3246, Nassau 
Tel. (32)55850 
Telex DELEGEC NS 310 
Belize 
1 Eyre Street 
P.O. Box 907 
Belize City, Belize 
Tel. (501-2) 72785 and fax 
Telex 106 CEC BZ 
Grenada 
Archibald Avenue 
P.O. Box 5, St George's, Grenada, West Indies 
Tel. (1809) 440 4958 — 440 3561 
Telex 3431 CWBUR G A 
(Attn. EEC Delegation) 
Fax (1809) 4404151 
São Tomé & Principe 
B.P. 132 — Sao Tomé 
Tel. (239 12) 21780-21375 
Telex 224 Delegfed ST 
Fax (239-12) 22683 
Seychelles 
P.O. Box 530 — Victoria, Mahé 
Tel. (248) 32 39 40 
Fax(248) 323890 
Tonga 
Malle Taha 
Taufa'ahau Road, private mailbag n°5-CPO 
Nuku Alofa 
Tel. 23820 
Telex 66207 (DELCEC TS) 
Fax 23869 
Vanuatu 
Orient Investment Building, Ground Floor, 
Kumul Highway 
P.O. Box 422, Port-Vila 
Tel. (678) 22501 
Fax (678) 23282 
Western Samoa 
PO Box 3023, 
Loane Viliamu Building, 4th floor, Apia 
Fax (685)24622 
In the OCT 
New Caledonia 
21 Rue Anatole France 
B.P. 1100 Noumea 
Tel. (687) 27 70 02 
Fax (687) 28 87 07 
Commission of the 
European Union 
Representation Office 
in Turkey 
15, Kuleli Sokak 
Gazi Osman Paca, Ankara 
Tel. 137 68 40-1-2-3 
Telex 44320 ATB E TR 
Fax (90-312) 437 79 40 
Commission of the 
European Union 
Delegation in the 
South African Republic 
2, Greenpark Estates 
27, George Storrer Drive Groenkloof, Pretoria 
0181 South Africa 
Tel.: (0027-12)46 4319 
Fax (0027-12) 46 99 23 
XVI OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Géopolitique des Petites Antilles 
— Influences européenne et 
nord-américaine 
(The Geopolitics of the Lesser 
Antilles — European and North 
American influences) 
By François Taglioni. Editions Kar-
thala. Collection Hommes et 
Sociétés, 22-24, boulevard Arago 
— F-75013 Paris. 1995. 312 p, 
160 FF. ISBN 2-86537-568-4. 
The author ¡s a Doctor of Geog-
raphy who has taught the 
geopolitics of the Lesser Antilles 
— a geographical area which has 
not been greatly studied — at 
the University of Paris X-Nan-
terre. Although they vary in 
some respects, the geopolitical 
situations of these islands have a 
large number of similarities. 
These include the constraints of 
insularity and the consequences 
of being an economic, political 
and human patchwork with 
structures inherited from the 
past. These factors help to keep 
the territories in question in a 
state of dependence, limiting 
their opportunities for develop-
ment. This work adopts a compa-
rative approach and seeks to de-
termine the room for manœuvre 
which the Lesser Antilles have 
with regard to the geopolitical 
blocs of Europe and North 
America. 
Organisations Economiques Mon-
diales — 2ème édition 
(International Economie Organis-
ations — second edition) 
By Jacques Fontanel. Editions 
Masson. Collection Droit — Scien-
ces économiques. (120, boulevard 
Saint-Germain, F-75280 Paris). 
1995. 186 p. ISBN 2-225-84690-1. 
The author is an expert attached 
to several international organis-
ations and director of a research 
centre at the Pierre Mendès 
France university in Grenoble 
where he teaches. In this work he 
introduces the large number of 
international organisations which 
have proliferated in our century, 
and in particular the little known 
ones of the developing countries. 
These are the bodies that organ-
ise production and international 
exchanges, define the inter-
national system of payments and 
development financing, set up 
consultative, cooperative and in-
tegrative structures and initiate 
permanent discussions which 
reduce the sources of conflict be-
tween states. 
Balance sheet and outlook for 
industrial development in the 
ACP countries — Eighteenth 
annual meeting of the ACP-EU 
economic and social partners. 
Economic and Social Committee 
of the European Community (2, 
rue Ravenstein — B-1000 
Brussels). 1994. 130 p. Catalogue 
no ŒS-95-00S-FR. 
In addition to the action announ-
ced at the inaugural session of 
the 1994 meeting of the ACP-EU 
economic and social partners, this 
publication also contains docu-
ments for discussion purposes 
submitted by the ACP and the 
Economic and Social Committee 
and the final declaration which 
includes the recommendations 
made after the work had been 
completed. 
L'Entrée en vie féconde — Ex-
pression démographique des mu-
tations socio-économiques d'un 
milieu rural sénégalais 
(Reaching child-bearing age — 
the demographic effects of socio-
economic changes in a rural Sen-
egalese environment) 
By Valérie Delaunay. Editions 
Ceped (Centre français sur la 
Population et le Développement). 
Les Etudes du Ceped no 7, 15, 
rue de l'Ecole de Médecine, F-
75270 Paris. 1994. 326 p. 90 FF. 
ISBN 2-87762-068-9. 
The author, a Doctor of Demog-
raphics, conducted her research 
into changes in the matrimonial 
system in response to sex before 
marriage in a rural Senegalese en-
vironment under the auspices of 
the Niakhar population obser-
vatory in Senegal. She takes stock 
of changes in the social and econ-
omic context of this environment 
resulting from the agricultural 
crisis (lower rainfall, lower'inter-
national commodity prices, over-
exploitation of the land) which 
resulted in more widespread 
seasonal migration to the towns. 
This is something which mainly 
affects young people, and young 
women in particular. 
Moving to the Market : The 
World Bank in Transition 
By Richard W. Richardson and 
Jonas H. Haralz. Overseas Devel-
opment Council, 1875 Connec-
ticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 1012, 
Washington DC 20009 USA. 1995. 
96 p. $9.95. ISBN 1-56517-023-7. 
This book looks at the changes 
taking place in the sphere of de-
velopment at a time when the 
private sector is becoming the 
most favoured engine of econ-
omic development. Over the past 
few years, the World Bank has 
been asked by member govern-
ments to reconsider its role in 
private sector development. This 
essay reviews the initiatives taken 
in this area by the IBRD and the 
IFC (International Finance Corpor-
ation) and makes recommend-
ations for the future. 
Countrysides at risk : The poli-
tical geography of sustainable 
agriculture 
By Robert L. Paarlberg. Overseas 
Development Council, 1875 Con-
necticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 
1012, Washington DC 20009, 
USA. 1994. 99 p. $ 9.95. ISBN 1-
56517-021-0. 
This work reviews agricultural 
practices in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, regions which have food 
supply problems which are al-
ready acute and are rapidly be-
coming more so. Almost 700 mil-
lion people do not have sufficient 
food to permit normal growth in 
these three continents. How then 
can sufficient food be produced 
without leading to further de-
terioration of the environment? 
The essay suggests several courses 
of action to be taken by the 
international community by way 
of aid. 
Multnational Development Banks 
— An Assessment of their Finan-
cial Structures, Policies and Prac-
tices 
By Percy S. Mistry. Fondad 
(Forum on Debt and Develop-
ment), Noordeinde 107 A, 2514 
GE The Hague, Netherlands. 
1995. 284 p. HFL 47.50 or $25.00. 
ISBN 90-74208-05-3. 
As its title indicates, this work 
evaluates the financial structures, 
policies and practices of the 
multilateral development banks 
and tries to make them accessible 
to those who are not financial 
specialists. 
World Credit Tables — Creditor-
debtor relations from another 
perspective 
Eurodad, 10 square Ambiorix, B-
1040 Brussels. 1994-95. 237 p. 
US$ 25. ISBN 90-802408-1-8. 
The main aim of this work is to 
review the financial profiles of 
the countries to which the 
Southern states are in debt, and 
the 'creditor-debtor' statistics 
which are never available in the 
official publications of govern-
ments and international financial 
organisations. It also contains an 
analysis of the 'debt strategy' 
and an evaluation of financial 
flows to Southern countries. ■■ 
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